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Abstract 
 
It is common knowledge that owing to their particular vulnerability children worldwide 
falls prey to physical and/or sexual violence in the home and/or community or 
witness criminal acts. Consequently children are called upon to testify in a court of 
law to cruelties or acts of violence. As a result of their developmental shortcomings 
and immaturity, children find the criminal justice system extremely intimidating and 
challenging. The importance of realising a justice system that not only affords an 
accused person the right to a fair trial but also protects and safeguards the rights of 
the child victims of and witnesses to the crime is thus indisputable. The purpose of 
this research was therefore to assist the South African criminal justice system in its 
on-going challenge to find a balance between the right of the accused person to a 
fair trial and the protection and safeguarding of the rights of child victims and child 
witnesses. The protection and safeguarding of the rights of child victims and child 
witnesses in terms of the South African Constitution, applicable domestic law and 
international instruments relating thereto were extensively discussed and 
shortcomings identified. Possible solutions to ensure that child witnesses and child 
victims are adequately protected and supported during the trial stage of the criminal 
process were advanced. Particular emphasis was placed on the role of an 
intermediary in assisting child victims and child witnesses during the court process. 
Comparative research on the protection of child victims and child witnesses in the 
criminal justice systems of New Zealand and Namibia were also conducted. 
Conclusions drawn from comparative studies were used to recommend appropriate 
changes to the current system. It is submitted that the adequate protection and 
safeguarding of the rights of child victims and child witnesses are dependent not 
only on sound legal principles but also on governmental and other involved 
stakeholders’ commitment toward the realisation of these rights. In order to give 
proper effect to the protection and safeguarding of child victims’ and child witnesses’ 
rights, it is proposed that the recommendations made throughout this study should 
be adopted and implemented. In this regard the role of an intermediary is crucial 
and the use of intermediaries should be promoted. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
Introduction 
 
Until recently, the law did not pay much attention to the stress that child 
complainants … suffer when they testify in courts. Child complainants … were 
required to relive the horror of the crime in open court. The circumstances under 
which they gave evidence and the mental stress or suffering they went through while 
giving evidence did not appear to be the concern of the law. And, at times, they were 
subjected to the most brutal and humiliating treatment by being asked to relate the 
sordid details of the traumatic experiences that they had gone through. Regrettably, 
although there were welcome exceptions, the plight of child complainants was 
seldom the concern of those who required them to testify or those before whom they 
testified.1 
 
1 PROBLEM STATEMENT 
 
1.1 Background 
 
One of the fundamental objectives of an effective justice system is not only to afford 
an accused person the right to a fair trial, which includes the right to adduce and 
contest evidence, but also to protect and safeguard the rights of the victims of and 
witnesses to the crime.2 The challenge for any criminal justice system is therefore 
to enable the accused person to exercise the right to contest evidence while 
                                            
1   Director of Public Prosecutions, Transvaal v Minister of Justice and Constitutional 
Development 2009 (2) SACR 130 (CC) at para [1] (hereinafter DPP v Minster of Justice and 
Constitutional Development). 
2  In terms of section 35(3)(i) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 every 
accused person has the right to a fair trial, which includes the right to adduce and contest 
evidence. 
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simultaneously protecting the rights of witnesses. Where the victims and witnesses 
comprise a vulnerable group, namely children,3 it is imperative that their rights be 
zealously protected and that they should not be exposed to the negative effects of 
such a criminal justice system or further victimised by the very system put in place 
to protect them.4 It is however common knowledge that the rights of children have 
not been adequately recognised in the past and that many legal systems have failed 
to fulfil this objective. Prior to the 1980s very few countries in the world recognised 
children’s unique characteristics, such as their innocence, naivety, lack of maturity, 
language and cognitive development, in relation to those of adults. The need for an 
individualised approach when dealing with child victims and child witnesses in the 
criminal justice system was not acknowledged. Instead, the focus was mainly on 
whether children were competent to give evidence and whether they were reliable 
and credible witnesses. Even though children between the ages of seven and 
fourteen were deemed fit to give evidence, they were not afforded special protection 
nor were they specifically accommodated when interfacing with the justice system. 
Instead, they had to face endless delays, multiple interviews, formal procedures, 
evidentiary difficulties and an adult orientated system.5 The emphasis was placed 
                                            
3  Department of Justice and Constitutional Development: The South African Service Charter for 
Victims of Crime (2004) (hereinafter referred to as the Victims’ Charter) defines a “victim” as 
a person who has suffered harm, including physical or mental injury, emotional suffering, 
economic loss or substantial impairment of his or her fundamental rights through acts or 
omissions that are in violation of our criminal law. “Victims” include, where appropriate, the 
immediate family or dependants of the direct victim. A person may be considered a victim 
regardless of whether the perpetrator has been identified, apprehended, prosecuted or 
convicted and regardless of the familial relationship between perpetrator and victim. “Victim” 
includes everyone, without prejudice of any kind on the grounds of race, gender, sex, 
pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, disability, 
religion, conscience, belief, culture, language and birth. For the purposes of this study the 
concept of victim/complainant encompasses the term witness and the terms will be used 
interchangeably. It is however acknowledged that not all witnesses are direct victims of crime, 
but may be defined in terms of the above-mentioned definition as such, owing to the fact that 
they were witnesses to a crime and thus suffered emotional or mental harm. This definition is 
in line with the United Nations Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime 
and Abuse of Power, 1985. It is of significant importance to understand who would be regarded 
as a victim as this informs who has standing to seek protection, support and redress.  
4 Ovens, Lambrechts & Prinsloo “The child witness in the criminal justice system” 2001 Acta 
Criminologica 25. 
5  Burchell Principles of Criminal Law (2005) 364-369; Simon “Pre-recorded videotape evidence 
of child witnesses” 2006 SACJ 56; Reddi “The child witness in the criminal justice system: 
suggestions for reform” 1993 Journal for Juridical Science 12-126; South African Law 
Commission Protection of the Child Witness Project 71 Working Paper 28 (1989); S v 
Mokoena; S v Phaswane 2008 (2) SACR 216 (T) at paras [46]-[58](hereinafter S v Mokoena). 
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on the child’s responsibility as victim and/or witness to assist the criminal judicial 
system, with little attention being afforded to children’s needs.6  
 
This is also true of the child witness in the South African criminal justice system. In 
the case of DPP v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development,7 dealing with 
the rights of child victims and child witnesses, the Constitutional Court 
acknowledged that in the past South African law did not pay much attention to the 
anxiety and stress that child victims and child witnesses suffer when entering the 
criminal justice system, especially while testifying. Children were required to relive 
the horror of the crime in open court, were subjected to brutal and humiliating 
treatment when asked to relate the (often embarrassing and intimate) details of the 
traumatic experience and suffered severe mental stress.8 Children had to suffer the 
additional ordeal of having to present their evidence in the presence of the accused. 
The adversarial nature of the South African court procedure, with its confrontation 
and cross-examination of witnesses, did little to improve the plight of these children.9 
Add to this the fact that the courtroom is an alien environment with an extremely 
intimidating atmosphere, where the key figures (often only men) wear black gowns, 
it can come as no surprise that children were simply terrified into silence.10   
 
In the last twenty years, however, South Africa has transformed itself into a fully 
democratic and egalitarian state. The constitutional system that was established 
with the enactment of first the interim Constitution in 199311 and thereafter the final 
Constitution in 1996,12 has transformed the legal order in South Africa to a large 
extent. The Constitution has also changed the plight of children. The Constitution 
                                            
6  Bala “Double victims: child sexual abuse and the Canadian criminal justice system” 1990 
Queen LJ 3; Van der Merwe “Children as victims and witnesses” in Boezaart (ed) Child Law 
in South Africa (2009) 563. 
7  2009 (2) SACR 130 (CC) at para [1]. 
8  DPP v Minster of Justice and Constitutional Development 2009 (2) SACR 130 (CC) at para 
[1]. 
9    Müller & Tait “Little witnesses: a suggestion for improving the lot of children in court” 1999 
THRHR 241 at 242. 
10  Department of Justice and Constitutional Development Draft Discussion Document on 
Intermediaries (2008).  
11  Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 200 of 1993. 
12 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
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specifically recognises that children13 are a vulnerable group within society, have 
specific and unique needs and deserve special individualised protection. Their rights 
are recognised as a separate group in the Constitution.14 In accordance with these 
interests, section 28(2) of the Constitution requires that in all matters concerning the 
child, a child’s best interests are of paramount importance. Apart from the protection 
afforded to children in section 28 of the Constitution, children are also entitled to all 
the rights incorporated in the Bill of Rights15 such as the right to human dignity, 
equality and freedom.  
 
Any judicial system involving children should accordingly, as a primary objective, 
strive to strike a balance between the protection of the rights of child victims and 
child witnesses, without compromising the constitutional rights of the accused. A 
central question/theme presented in this study is therefore whether the provisions 
of the applicable law,16 the judicial process and the support systems that relate to 
the protection afforded to child victims and child witnesses while testifying in criminal 
proceedings are constitutionally sound and in line with developments in international 
law.17 
 
This is of significant importance as contemporary research studies conducted on 
the victimisation of children in South Africa show that South African children in 
particular experience and witness exceptionally high levels of crime. The incidence 
of child rape and sexual assault upon minors, for example, has reached horrific 
proportions.18 Alarmingly, these studies also indicate a trend towards a decrease in 
                                            
13  In terms of s 28(3) of the Constitution, 1996 a child means a person under the age of 18 years. 
Any reference hereinafter to the Constitution will be to the 1996 Constitution.    
14 See s 28 of the Constitution. 
15 With the exception of those rights that are expressly restricted to adults, eg the right to vote 
and to seek public office (s 19(3) of the Constitution). 
16  For example the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 as amended by the Criminal Law 
Amendment Act 135 of 1991, the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and Related Matters) 
Amendment Act 32 of 2007, and the Children’s Act 38 of 2005. 
17 The role of intermediaries in particular, which is central to the theme of this thesis, is 
emphasised. 
18  Conradie & Tafana “Adjudication of child victims of rape and indecent assault in Gauteng” 
2005 CARSA 3. A study in the World Health Organization Bulletin released in August 2013 
indicated that the rate of child homicide in South Africa is more than double the global average. 
The study “The epidemiology of child homicides in South Africa” was based on 2009 statistics 
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the age of these victims while the use of brute force directed against them is 
escalating.19 Population-based prevalence studies show that the most common 
forms of violence against children reported in South Africa are physical and sexual 
violence in the home and community.20 The reality is that at a time when children 
should be carefree and their days should be filled with play and fun in a secure and 
nurturing environment, in many areas children are even at risk when walking to 
school. These children have to be transported to school in order to protect them 
from criminal elements.21 In this regard black and coloured South African children in 
the townships and young women in particular are predominately the victims of such 
events.22  
 
Although the underlying causes of violence are complex, it is thought to be rooted 
in the colonial past and is part of the legacy of apartheid, which normalised the social 
acceptance of violence. In addition, widespread poverty, inequality and high levels 
of unemployment combined with rapid urbanisation, inadequate housing and poor 
education outcomes all contribute to the social dynamics that encourage violence. 
                                            
from state mortuaries. Between January and December 2009, 1 018 children were murdered, 
a rate of 5.5 in every 100 000 children under eighteen. Child abuse and neglect preceded 
nearly half (44.5%) of all homicides, but was three times more prevalent among girls than 
among boys (Bull Health Organ 2013 “The epidemiology of child homicide in South Africa” 
available at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/2394040 (accessed 12/11/2013).  
19 Centre for Child Law Justice for Child Victims and Witnesses of Crime (2008) 3-5. A paper 
analysing the 2011-2012 crime statistics indicates that 180 537 contact crimes (defined as 
crimes that involved physical contact between victims and perpetrators) were reported against 
women 18 years and older and 50 688 cases were reported against children younger than 18 
years of age. These statistics show that of the 50 688 cases, 793 children were murdered, 
758 were victims of attempted murder, 25 866 were victims of sexual offences, 12 645 were 
victims of common assault and 10 630 children were victims of assault with grievous bodily 
harm. (Crime Statistics Overview RSA 2011/2012 available at 
http://www.crimestats/2012/downloads/crime_statistics_presen-tation.pdf (accessed 
07/10/2014). A review of juvenile fatalities conducted from January 2014 to December 2014 
on 711 deceased children who passed through the Salt River and Phoenix morgues during 
that period indicated that 32% of all unnatural deaths were cases of homicide. Most of these 
cases involved child abuse. More than three-quarters of the children who died from child 
abuse (78%) were under the age of five. See Faber “Revealed: rising number of kids abused 
and murdered” Sunday Times 12/07/2015 at 12.    
20  Department of Social Development, Department of Women, Children and People with 
Disabilities and UNICEF Violence Against Children in South Africa (2012) 1 at 3. 
21   Snyman Criminal Law 4 rev ed (2008) 25. 
22  Simpson “Women and children in violent South African townships” in Motshekga & Delport 
(eds) Women and Children’s Rights in a Violent South Africa (1993) 3-13; Burton et al 
Research Bulletin: Optimus Study on Child Abuse, Violence and Neglect in South Africa 
(2015). 
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Further, apartheid has had a profound effect on family life in that the migrant labour 
system created an environment where large numbers of fathers were largely absent 
from the lives of their children.23 This is compounded by patriarchal notions of 
masculinity that support the use of violence and risk taking, all of which contribute 
to the high levels of violence in South Africa.24 
 
If the offenders are apprehended, these child victims and witnesses have to appear 
in court to face the perpetrator(s) – a daunting experience. It therefore comes as no 
surprise that statistics indicate that children with increasing frequency represent a 
significant portion of the victims and witnesses that have to appear in court to testify 
about these crimes.25 Despite this, existing evidence suggests that the conviction of 
perpetrators in matters of this nature remains problematic.26 
 
This can be attributed inter alia to the complexity of dealing with child witnesses in 
the criminal justice system. Child victims and child witnesses find the criminal justice 
process very difficult because of their developmental shortcomings and lack of 
maturity. They experience extreme apprehension while waiting for the trail and more 
often than not the process of testifying about the alleged criminal events in 
adversarial courts results in significant mental stress and suffering.27 Children are 
                                            
23  Mathews & Benvenuti “Violence against children in South Africa: Developing a prevention 
agenda” in Mathews South African Child Gauge 2014 (2014) 1 at 26.  
24  Sadan & Mathews “Adopting a violence prevention approach: Shifting from policies and plans 
to implementation” in Mathews South African Child Gauge 2014 (2014) 1 at 80. 
25  Recent crime statistics indicate the extent of violence in South Africa. Unfortunately, although 
certain categories such as homicide and sexual assault are routinely reported, the statistics 
were not disaggregated for children in 2012/ 2013 and 2013/2014 as was the case in 
2011/201. South Africa thus lacks national empirical data on the extent and range of the 
problem. A study conducted by the Centre for Justice and Crime Prevention at the University 
of Cape Town’s Department of Psychology and its Gender, Health and Justice Research Unit 
provides some estimates on the prevalence of violence against children. This study was 
conducted by way of interviews with 9730 adolescents between the ages of fifteen and 
seventeen years and revealed that one in five of the adolescents has experienced some form 
of sexual abuse while one in three reported experiencing physical abuse. With regard to other 
forms of violence, 21% reported exposure to family violence, 44.5% had experienced theft, 
26.2% had been robbed, 21.4% had been threatened with violence and 15.9% had been 
attacked with a weapon. See Burton et al Research Bulletin: Optimus Study on Child Abuse, 
Violence and Neglect in South Africa (2015). 
26  Conradie & Tafana 2005 CARSA 3-18; Iyer & Ndlovu “Protecting the child victim in sexual 
offences: is there a need for separate legal presentation?” 2012 Obiter 72 at 73-75. 
27  Centre for Child Law Justice for Child Victims and Witnesses of Crime 3-5. 
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by their very nature ill-equipped to deal with this confrontational and adversarial 
setting and often suffer additional hardship or secondary victimisation28 when 
interfacing with the judicial process. Secondary victimisation or re-victimisation 
occurs not as a direct result of criminal acts, but through the responses of institutions 
and individuals to the victim.29 Secondary victimisation is the result of 
“unsympathetic, disbelieving and inappropriate responses that victims … 
experience at the hands of society in general and at each stage of the criminal 
justice process”.30 The devastating effect of, for instance, being a victim of abuse or 
sexual violation or witnessing such an act is sometimes exacerbated by the 
experience of the court procedure. This has been described by the Constitutional 
Court as follows:31  
 
A child complainant who relates in open court in graphic detail the abusive acts 
perpetrated upon him or her and in the presence of the alleged perpetrator, will in 
most cases experience undue stress or suffering. This experience will be 
exasperated when the child is subjected to intensive and at times protracted and 
aggressive cross-examination by the alleged perpetrator or legal representative. 
Cumulatively, these experiences will often be as traumatic and as damaging to the 
emotional and psychological well-being of the child complainant as the original 
abusive acts was.  
 
                                            
28  Secondary victimisation has been defined by the United Nations in its United Nations 
Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse, 1985 
(GA/RES/40/30) as “the victimisation that occurs not as a direct result of a criminal act, but 
through responses of institutions and individuals to the victim”. The guide also distinguishes 
two forms of secondary victimisation, namely institutional victimisation (through the policies 
and procedures of bodies such as government departments, community structures and the 
media that may fail, for example, to take into account the perspectives of the victim) and 
individual (through attitudes that inform the response and treatment of victims and may include 
disbelief of the victim’s account, blaming the victim and a lack of support services to assist the 
victim at the interpersonal, institutional and social levels.)  
29  Ibid. 
30  Artz & Smythe (ed) Should We Consent? Rape Law Reform in South Africa (2008) 268. 
31  DPP v Minster of Justice and Constitutional Development at para [108]. 
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The court-induced trauma suffered by child victims and witnesses has been 
described as the “second wound”.32 Some authorities believe that secondary 
victimisation by the criminal justice system may prove to be more traumatic to the 
child than the crime itself.33 In one instance, in a case concerning the rape of a 
fifteen-year-old girl, the girl burst into tears when forced to come face-to-face with 
her two alleged rapists in the courtroom. Her trauma was so extreme that she was 
not even able to answer the first question put to her.34 The anxiety experienced by 
children leads to their becoming uncooperative or unmotivated about testifying as 
to what took place or giving effective testimony; for example they may “forget” 
essential information or confuse events and details.35 This affects their credibility 
dramatically and sometimes leads to the misconception that children are not reliable 
witnesses.36 In addition, endless delays, inadequate court preparation, the lack of a 
recognised support person, independent representation or a guarantee of personal 
safety add to the problems experienced.37 The mere existence of these problems is 
indicative of the fact that current levels of protection do not adequately comply with 
section 28(2) of the Constitution, which provides that in all matters concerning the 
child, the child’s best interests are of paramount importance. 
 
Without the necessary protection and support the whole experience of criminal 
proceedings will leave a permanent scar on these children as it impacts negatively 
on their development, behaviour and perception of their environment and their ability 
to function as individuals. It might even give rise to long-term psychological 
difficulties.38 This concern is shared by the judiciary, which has stated as follows: 
                                            
32  Clarke, Davis & Booysen “A silver era for victims of crime: reassessing the role that victim 
impact statements can play in improving victim involvement in criminal justice procedures” 
2003 Acta Criminologica 43. 
33  Shiller & Spies “Development of a training programme for state prosecutors to address 
revictimisation of the sexually abused child during forensic procedures” 2006 CARSA 36. 
34  Funke & Phaliso “Courts ignore provisions for protection of child rape victims” 08/08/2008 Mail 
and Guardian available at http://mg.co.za/article/2008-08-14-forced-to-face-up (accessed 
07/10/2014). 
35  Müller & Tait “A prosecutor is a person who cuts off your head: children’s perceptions of the 
legal process” 1997 SALJ 593. 
36  Müller & Tait 1997 SALJ 593 
37  Centre for Child Law Justice for Child Victims and Witnesses of Crime 7. 
38  Müller & Van der Merwe “Judicial Management in child abuse cases; empowering judicial 
officers to be the ‘boss in court’” 2005 SACJ 41.  
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It is a sad fact that there is much left to be desired in the present state of our criminal 
justice system and that, in many instances, neither the courts nor their supporting 
institutions succeed in giving due recognition to the paramountcy of children’s 
interests.39 
 
In recognising child victims’ and witnesses’ vulnerability and with the aim of 
improving the experience for these children, several developments have taken place 
both nationally and internationally.  
 
Developments at the national level include, apart from the advent of the interim and 
final Constitutions,  a Victim’s Charter,40  a National Programme of Action for 
Children of South Africa,41 amendments to existing national legislation42 and 
constitutional jurisprudence. These developments recognise the seriousness of the 
impact of crime on child victims and aim to promote equal enjoyment of 
constitutional rights and freedoms for both the offender and the victim of or witness 
to crime.  
 
The introduction of the function of an intermediary by the insertion of section 170A(1) 
into the Criminal Procedure Act is one of the more important interventions in respect 
of the protection of child witnesses.43 The South African Law Commission (as it was 
then known) conducted an investigation into the effect of testimony by child 
witnesses in open court in 1989. The Commission came to the conclusion that 
children were severely traumatised by the adversarial criminal procedures followed. 
In an attempt to alleviate the effect of the accusatorial system on child witnesses 
                                            
39  S v Mokoena 2008 (2) SACR 216 (T) at para [51]. 
40  The Department of Justice and Constitutional Development: The Service Charter for Victims 
of Crime (2004) commonly referred to as the Victims’ Charter of 2004. 
41  National Programme of Action for Children of South Africa: Framework 31 May 1996.  
42  Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 as amended by the Criminal Law Amendment Act 135 of 
1991 and the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and Related Matters) Amendment Act 32 of 
2007; Children’s Act 38 of 2005. 
43  Act 51 of 1977 (“the Criminal Procedure Act”) as amended by the Criminal Law Amendment 
Act 135 of 1991 and the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and Related Matters) Amendment 
Act 32 of 2007. 
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and to avoid direct confrontation between a child and an accused, the Commission 
recommended the introduction of the function of an intermediary into the criminal 
justice system.44  
 
An intermediary is a person specifically qualified to facilitate communication 
between the court and a child in a manner that is not only age-appropriate but also 
understandable to a child. The intermediary takes the child’s cognitive and 
developmental abilities into account when conveying the meaning and contents of 
the court’s questions to the child and acts as a “barrier or shield” between the formal 
justice system and the child, thus ensuring that the child’s rights are respected.45  
 
The efficacy of the intermediary system is, however, dependent on factors such as 
the presence of enabling legislation; the clarity and ease with which such legislation 
can be interpreted by judicial officers; the sensitisation of the courts to children’s 
rights and limitations; the acceptance of the importance of the role of an 
intermediary, and finally government’s commitment towards the proper 
implementation of enabling legislation. Despite the fact that the higher courts and 
prosecutors are very supportive of the intermediary system, preliminary indications 
are that huge systemic challenges exist within our criminal justice system, such as 
the discretionary threshold for eligibility,46 the limited role of intermediaries, the thin 
legislative criterion for the appointment of intermediaries, and financial and logistical 
problems that include the very availability of intermediaries.47 Although the 
                                            
44  South African Law Commission Protection of the Child Witness Project 71 Working Paper 28 
(1989). 
45  DPP v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development 2009 (2) SACR 130 (CC) at para 
[96]. 
46  In terms of s 170A of the Criminal Procedure Act the appointment of an intermediary is subject 
to the discretion of a judicial officer presiding over a criminal proceeding. The judicial officer 
has to determine whether the services of an intermediary are required based on an 
assessment of whether the child will suffer undue mental stress or suffering if the child testifies 
at such proceeding. This test or threshold for eligibility has been criticised for being too vague, 
too stringent and excluding many who might benefit, such as a complainant with little stress 
but serious communication difficulties. See S v Mokoena 2008 (2) SACR 216 (T) at para [79]; 
Muller & Tait 1999 THRHR 247-248. Refer also to para 3.1.4 of ch 5 below. 
47   S v Mokoena 2008 (2) SACR 216 (T) at para [87] to [92]; Müller & Tait 1999 THRHR 241, 
Müller & Hollely Introducing the Child Witness (2000) 24 & 46-48. Refer also to para 3.2.2 of 
ch 5 below for a discussion of the availability of intermediaries.   
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intermediary system has seen much improvement over the past fifteen years, in 
some instances it is still perceived as one of ad hoc service delivery of widely 
variable quality which may require serious government investment.48 An 
investigation into these factors will also form part of this study.  
 
Internationally, the United Nations Economic and Social Council adopted the 
Guidelines on Justice in Matters involving Child Victims and Witnesses of Crime in 
2005.49 These Guidelines were developed as a useful framework for member states 
in enhancing the protection of child victims and child witnesses in the criminal justice 
system, reaffirming the view that every effort must be made to prevent the 
victimisation of children. The Guidelines set out certain rights for these children, 
such as the right to be treated with dignity and compassion, to be protected from 
discrimination, to be informed, to be heard, to express views and concerns, to 
receive effective assistance, et cetera.50 The Guidelines also set international 
standards in order to ensure the recognition of the aforementioned rights and 
advocate that the criminal justice process should be typified with conduct performed 
by trained professionals in a child-sensitive manner with sufficient support measures 
in place.51 These Guidelines, together with other international and regional 
instruments that underwrite the importance of the protection of child victims and 
child witnesses of crime, fall within the ambit of this study. 
In addition a comparative legal study will be conducted to determine whether 
lessons can be learned from other jurisdictions to be implemented in the South 
African context with a view to enhancing the plight of South Africa child victims and 
witnesses within the criminal justice system. 
                                            
48  S v Mokoena 2008 (2) SACR 216 (T) at para [90]-[93]; Jonker & Swanzen “Intermediary 
services for child witnesses testifying in South African criminal courts” 2007 SUR- International 
Journal of Human Rights 91-11; Müller & Hollely Introducing the Child Witness 24; Schutte 
“Child witnesses in the criminal justice system in South Africa: an overview of proposals for 
reform” 2005 Paper presented at the 4th World Congress on Family Law and Children’s Rights, 
Cape Town, South Africa (20-23 March 2005); Iyer & Ndlovu 2012 Obiter 72 at 76-84. Refer 
also to ch 5 below for a discussion of the intermediary system. 
49  Resolution 2005/20, 9 (hereinafter the Guidelines). 
50  See paras [10]-[25]. 
51  Recently, the Constitutional Court in DPP v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development 
2009 (2) SACR 130 (CC) at paras [77] to [79] endorsed the use of the Guidelines in interpreting 
sections of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 relating to child witnesses.  
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1.2 Research problem 
 
The Constitution and various other statutes and international instruments stipulate 
that child witnesses and victims of crime should be protected and supported when 
entering and assisting with the judicial process. The purpose of this research is to 
discuss and critically evaluate the applicable law, the judicial process and the 
support systems that relate to the protection afforded to child victims and child 
witnesses in order to determine to what extent these provisions comply with 
constitutional values and the standards required by international instruments.  
 
1.3 Purpose 
 
The purpose of this study is to investigate whether child witnesses and victims of 
crime are afforded adequate support and protection in the South African criminal 
justice system when called upon to testify.  
 
The starting point is therefore to investigate and evaluate the success of historical 
development regarding the introduction of the child witness into the criminal justice 
system. The positive law regarding child witnesses is discussed and shortcomings 
identified. Possible solutions to ensure that child witnesses and child victims are 
adequately protected and supported during the trial stage of the criminal process 
are advanced. Comparative research on the protection of child victims and child 
witnesses in the criminal justice system of New Zealand and Namibia is also 
conducted.52 Conclusions drawn from comparative studies are used to recommend 
appropriate changes to the current system. 
                                            
52  Refer to ch 1 para 2 hereof for an explanation of the relevance of New Zealand and Namibia 
as a comparative legal resource.  
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1.4 Significance 
 
The field of study is extremely suitable for research, as it has been both nationally 
and internationally recognised that children suffer harm as a result of crime and may 
even suffer additional hardship when assisting with the judicial process and 
especially when presenting their evidence in an adversarial judicial system 
characterised by confrontation and cross-examination.53 It is furthermore common 
knowledge that tension exists between the rights of a victim and those of an accused 
and that the position of a victim, and particularly that of a child victim, is very often 
inferior to that of an accused. While the Constitution guarantees an accused 
distinctive protection, no such protection, except the general protection set out in 
section 28, is afforded to child victims and witnesses.54 The objectives of the study 
are therefore achievable. 
 
It is envisaged that the position of the child witness and child victim in the criminal 
justice system will improve once recommendations based on this research have 
been made. These recommendations should address the various difficulties 
surrounding the child witness in the criminal justice system. 
 
 
 
2 RESEARCH METHOD 
 
                                            
53  Department of Justice and Constitutional Development Draft Discussion Document on 
Intermediaries (2008).  
54  See s 35 of the Constitution.  
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The research method that will be applied is an in-depth desktop literature study 
pertaining to the legal aspects surrounding child victims and witnesses in the South 
African criminal justice system.55 Legislation, judicial decisions, textbooks and legal 
journals will be consulted as well as Law Commission reports and reports on 
government initiatives. 
 
The legal positivist method will be applied in that knowledge in the field of child 
victims and witnesses will be gathered through a process of observation and 
abstract systemisation of information.56  
 
The nature of the research problem further necessitates a historical research 
component. Positive and negative components in the South African legal system 
will be looked at and the changes over periods of time and the impact of these 
changes will be emphasised. However, the historical component of this thesis will 
only consist of a brief historical overview. An in-depth legal-historical approach is 
not envisaged as the purpose of the historical overview is to provide a context for 
the focus of the research. 
    
A thorough legal comparison will be undertaken as it is anticipated that this research 
method will be of significant value. It can assist in providing new insights and 
knowledge, which may in turn give rise to suggestions for meaningful legal reform.57 
The legal systems of New Zealand and Namibia as well as the principles and 
methods applicable in these countries will be examined. The comparative research 
presented belongs to the modernist school of the South African tradition of 
jurisprudence, which concentrates on Anglo-American legal systems, in contrast to 
                                            
55 See para 1 above. 
56 See, in general, Venter et al Regsnavorsing (1990) 63-66. 
57 Venter et al Regsnavorsing 215-217. 
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the purist school, which concentrates exclusively on Roman-Dutch and European 
or Continental legal systems.58 
 
The legal systems of South Africa and New Zealand are very similar. Both countries 
are characterised by similar socio-economic circumstances and cultural diversity. 
New Zealand customary law, like that of South Africa, has an important influence on 
New Zealand positive law.59 The Children, Young Persons and Their Families Act 
24 of 1989, which has incorporated the most far-reaching changes to the protection 
of children and young persons, provides a culturally sensitive approach to dealing 
with children, young persons and their families within the judicial process. In addition 
New Zealand faces similar challenges to those faced in South Africa with regard to 
child victims and witnesses within their judicial system. Some of the concerns 
include language barriers, excessive delays and inconsistencies in practice 
between courts.60 
 
The Namibian legal system is, like that of South Africa, characterised by legal 
pluralism. Its system is an amalgamation of constitutional law, Roman-Dutch 
common law, customary law and international law. Its legal sources and legal 
development could therefore provide valuable insights into the South African 
system. As Namibia is also a signatory to several African treaties, a study of 
Namibian law also enables legal comparison on a regional level.61 Both New 
Zealand law and Namibian law therefore provide a relevant basis for comparative 
legal research.  
 
                                            
58   Ibid  81-83. 
59  Robinson “An overview of child protection measures in New Zealand with specific reference 
to the family group conference” 1996 Stell LR 313-314. 
60  Child Rights Information Network “New Zealand: child witnesses in the New Zealand criminal 
courts – a review of practice and implications for policy” http://www.crin.org/ 
resources/infodetail.asp?id=22431 (accessed 10/08/2010). 
61  Geraldo & Skeffers “Researching Namibian law and the Namibian legal system” 
http://www.nyulawglobal.org/globalex/namibia.htm (accessed 05/08/ 2010). 
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In this thesis various research methods are therefore used in order to find 
appropriate solutions that will ensure that children who are witnesses to and victims 
of crime are sufficiently protected and supported when presenting testimony within 
the judicial court process. 
 
3 FRAMEWORK OF THE THESIS 
 
In order to achieve the aim and the envisaged result of this thesis,62 chapter 2 will 
consist of a historical overview of the legal nature and development of the role of 
child victims of and witnesses to crime in Roman, Germanic, Roman-Dutch and 
South African law. The aim of this investigation is to determine how children were 
perceived in their role as victims and/or witnesses in each of these periods/systems. 
Were they regarded as competent witnesses? If so, under what circumstances were 
they required to give testimony and to what extent were they afforded protection in 
the respective systems? This conclusion has important implications for the rest of 
the study. It is especially relevant when the legal nature and the development of the 
role of child victims of and witnesses to crime in the current South African system 
are evaluated. The historical overview has the further purpose of clarifying past 
instances of insufficient protection of such children with a view to suggesting 
improvements to the current system.  
 
Chapter 3 will consist of an overview of the South African criminal procedure system. 
South African criminal procedural law is based on the accusatorial system and the 
effect of this system on child victims and child witnesses will be discussed. The aim 
of this investigation is to evaluate certain specific elements of the accusatorial 
system that play an important role when children present their testimony, such as a 
passive presiding officer, oral evidence, two opposing parties, confrontation and 
cross-examination, as it is precisely these elements that create difficulties for 
                                            
62  See ch 1 paras 1 & 2 above. 
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children. Closely related to these elements are certain rules of evidence which have 
a pronounced influence on the evidence of children, namely the testimonial 
competence of children, cautionary rule and hearsay evidence. These elements of 
the accusatorial system will be evaluated from the perspective of children with a 
view to highlighting possible shortcomings and suggesting ways to improve the 
system. Comparisons with the inquisitorial system will also be made to determine 
whether this system offers alternative routes by which to obtain the best evidence 
from children.   
 
Children’s rights in South Africa have undergone a significant change since the 
enactment of a democratic constitutional legal order, as well as South Africa’s 
ratification and adoption of principal international instruments protecting the rights 
of children. Chapter 4 consists of an overview of the protection of child victims and 
child witnesses in terms of the Constitution of South Africa and international 
instruments. The aim of the chapter is to evaluate the rights of child victims and child 
witnesses encompassed in the Constitution and international instruments in order 
to determine whether the current protection afforded to child victims and child 
witnesses while testifying in criminal proceedings in South Africa is in line with South 
Africa’s constitutional and international obligations. Emphasis will accordingly be 
placed on the constitutional and international obligations relating to the protection of 
child victims and child witnesses while testifying in criminal proceedings. In line with 
the focus of this study, the role of intermediaries in the realisation of these rights has 
also received special attention.  
 
Chapter 5 consists of an in-depth discussion of the intermediary system in South 
Africa. The historical background to the introduction of the persona of an 
intermediary will be discussed briefly, after which an analysis of the intermediary 
system will be conducted. Possible measures to enhance the intermediary system 
will be considered where relevant. 
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Chapters 6 and 7 consist of an analysis of the intermediary systems in Namibia and 
New Zealand respectively. Namibia and New Zealand share certain aspects of 
criminal justice with South Africa, such as an accusatorial criminal justice system 
and high levels of crime. These two countries are also signatories to key 
international instruments, for example the Convention on the Rights of the Child 
(CRC). The chapters are therefore important since they provide a comparative 
perspective on how Namibia and New Zealand meet their national and international 
obligations with regard to the protection of the rights of child victims and child 
witnesses within their respective jurisdictions. Shortcomings and valuable features 
in the respective jurisdictions are considered with a view to enhancing the South 
African position. 
 
Chapter 8 presents a conclusion on South Africa’s position in line with the 
Constitution and international obligations as well as in relation to the position in 
Namibia and New Zealand. Recommendations on the successful operation of the 
intermediary system in South Africa are made. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
The historical background of the South African criminal justice 
system and the role of child witnesses and child victims within 
the system 
 
“I was … being carried on my father’s shoulders and I saw it [the execution by 
burning]”. His judicial colleagues replied, “You were then a child, and the evidence 
of a child is inadmissible”.1  
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Throughout most of legal history very little is known about children’s involvement in 
criminal proceedings. This could possibly be attributed to the fact that until very 
recently children were not regarded as important or as bearers of their own rights. 
Quite the contrary, early evidence indicates that children’s evidence was 
inadmissible as they were deemed to be incompetent witnesses. Early canon law 
prohibited children from giving evidence unless they had reached the age of 
puberty.2 This practice continued throughout most of the Middle Ages,3 with children 
younger than fourteen years of age being excluded from giving evidence at trials. 
The practice has its roots in Christian theology, which held that people were born 
evil and only became civilised through age and instruction by adults. Eventually the 
common law developed, allowing children of seven or more to testify, provided it 
                                            
1  Talmud cited in Perry & Wrightsman The Child Witness (1991) 37. 
2  Collins & Bond “Youth as a bar to testimonial competence” 1953 Arkansas LR 100-107. The 
average age of puberty was set at 12 years for girls and 14 years of age for boys. See Bullough 
“Age of consent: a historical overview” 2005 Journal of Psychology and Human Sexuality 25 
at 29. 
3  AD500-1000. 
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could be demonstrated that they understood the nature of an oath.4 Today a child’s 
right to testify is no longer subject to a specific fixed age, but is determined on a 
case-by-case basis subject to the child’s being able to take an oath or make an 
affirmation or having been admonished to speak the truth.5 
  
In order to form a more extensive picture of the evolution of the child witness’s and 
child victim’s right to protection in the criminal justice system, it is necessary to 
undertake a brief examination of the development of South African criminal law from 
Roman, Roman-Dutch and English law into our present system. This gives us some 
insight into how crime was dealt with in different periods and what role witnesses 
and victims played in these periods. Where historical evidence is available, the role 
of child witnesses and child victims will be discussed. A brief discussion of the 
relevant periods and the criminal system that prevailed at the respective times is 
thus presented. 
 
2 OVERVIEW 
 
South African criminal law evolved out of a combination of different legal systems, 
its oldest source being the classical law of Rome (753 BC-AD 565), followed by the 
laws and customs of the Germanic people inhabiting Western Europe after the fall 
of Rome (c AD 600). The system of criminal law that developed during this period 
(600-1500) was influenced by the Catholic Church’s emphasis on the moral and 
ethical values of the Judeo-Christian religious beliefs and the rediscovery by certain 
scholars of Emperor Justinian’s lost compilations of Roman law. The following 
period (1500-1750) saw the emergence of distinctive systems of criminal law owing 
to the materialisation of distinct political states. Two of the systems that are of 
particular importance in this study are the law of England and what is referred to as 
                                            
4  Perry & Wrightsman The Child Witness 38. 
5 See s 164 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977. This implies that a child still needs to be 
able to differentiate between a truth and a falsehood. See also ch 3 para 2.6.1 below. 
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Roman-Dutch law.6 Roman-Dutch law was exported to South Africa in the 
seventeenth century and was later greatly influenced by English law in the 
nineteenth century. This mixed system came to be recognised as the distinctive 
South African criminal law system.7 
 
2.1 Early origin 
 
Criminal law has its origin in the human instinct to exact vengeance and retaliate 
against those who have inflicted hurt, pain, suffering or injury on one. In primitive 
societies, individuals who suffered harm in turn inflicted harm or injury on the original 
wrongdoer. Private vengeance tended to escalate into a sort of private warfare as 
families, clans and even tribes were drawn into retaliation and counter-retaliation. In 
time societies became more civilised and demanded that feuding should no longer 
be allowed. Private vengeance was replaced with alternative forms of compensation 
for the victims of harm (such as pecuniary compensation) until a stage of publicly 
administered punishment prevailed. In short, the history of criminal law systems 
involves the story of how societies managed to replace systems of private 
vengeance with state punishment.8  
 
2.2 The Roman contribution 
 
According to legend, Rome was founded seven and a half centuries before the birth 
of Christ, but only three centuries later, in approximately 450 BC, did the first written 
code of Roman law appear in the form of the “Twelve Tables”.9 It was a primitive 
                                            
6  Roman-Dutch law evolved in a province of the Netherlands known as Holland – hence the 
name “Romeins-Hollandse reg”. 
7  Burchell “The evolution of South African Criminal Law” in Burchell & Milton Principles of 
Criminal Law (2005) 20.  
8  Burchell & Milton Principles of Criminal Law (1991) 5.  
9  Ibid.  
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codification of the common law for a primitive society. It marked a division between 
law and religion and most offences (including some which are today regarded as 
public wrongs) were treated as private wrongs or delicts. Wrongs such as theft or 
assault led only to private actions to which civil remedies applied.10 Although the 
Twelve Tables was essentially a system of self-redress, it remarkably featured 
devices for regulating or deflecting simple revenge. Where victims of harm were 
allowed to take personal revenge against a wrongdoer, the degree of retaliation was 
determined by the principle of talio, requiring that the vengeance should be 
proportionate to the harm suffered. In addition the Twelve Tables provided that 
vengeance could be avoided by making a payment to the victim, the amount of 
which was specified in the Twelve Tables. In essence Roman “criminal law” at this 
time was really a law of penal actions.11 
 
Initially “criminal proceedings” were held in public before a magistrate who 
conducted the whole investigation of the case. It was only during the period of the 
late Republic (about 149 BC) that criminal courts were established to suppress 
corruption, extortion and other abuses by provincial magistrates. These courts were 
termed questiones perpetuae and were composed of a magistrate and a jury. They 
were created by specific statutes for specific offences, for instance the quaestio de 
sicariis et veneficis to try charges of murder by violence or poisoning.12 The creation 
of these courts introduced a distinction between criminal and civil law. Proceedings 
before the quaestiones perpetuae were accusatorial and witnesses were examined 
and cross-examined in much the same way as today. “Law of evidence” as we 
understand it today did not exist, however. Decisions were taken by the majority of 
the jury and no appeals were allowed.13  
 
                                            
10  Dugard South African Criminal Law and Procedure Vol IV. Introduction to Criminal Law and 
Procedure (1977) 2. 
11  Burchell & Milton Principles of Criminal Law (1991) 7. 
12  Fragments from these penal statutes were collected in the reign of the Emperor Justinian into 
books 47 and 48 of the Digesta. Refer also to para 2.3 of ch 2 for more on the Digesta.  
13  Esmein A History of Continental Criminal Procedure, with Special reference to France (1913) 
27.  
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Under the centralised government of the Republic, Rome developed to the fullest 
extent and covered almost all the then known world.14 With the expansion of the 
Roman Empire and the succession of despotic emperors extraordinary powers of 
criminal jurisdiction came to be exercised by the emperors and those officials and 
magistrates appointed as the emperors’ delegates. The accusatorial system largely 
disappeared and was replaced by an “inquisitorial system”, with the presiding 
judicial officer again determining the guilt of the accused. This investigation was 
usually directed at obtaining a confession from the accused and torture was 
generally used.15 
 
2.3 The Germanic contribution (AD 600-1500) 
 
2.3.1 The Dark Ages (AD 400-800) 
 
At the end of the fourth century the Germans and later the Huns began to invade 
Rome and this saw the end of the “Roman peace”.16 As a result the Roman Empire 
split into a western and an eastern part, with Rome the capital of the Western Roman 
Empire and Byzantine (the present-day Istanbul in Turkey) the capital of the Eastern 
Roman Empire. During this time the centre of the Empire moved to Byzantine, where 
Roman law survived more successfully than it did in its western counterpart. This 
was mainly due to the influence of the rule of the last Roman emperor, Emperor 
Justinian, who ordered a codification of Roman law known as the Corpus Iuris 
Civilis, which consisted of the Institutiones, Digesta, Codex and Novellae.17  
 
                                            
14  Hosten et al Introduction to South African Law and Legal Theory (1995) 279. 
15  Esmein A History of Continental Criminal Procedure 28. 
16  Hosten et al Introduction to South African Law and Legal Theory 280. 
17  Kleyn & Viljoen Beginner's Guide for Law Students 4 ed (2010) 23-24. 
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The Western Roman Empire entered the so-called “Dark Middle Ages” in which 
Western Europe was perpetually subjected to hostile attacks. As a result Western 
Europe became fragmented into small societies and was eventually overrun by 
Germanic tribes. The law that applied at the time was that of the people known as 
Germans.18 Like Roman law, Germanic law made no distinction between private 
and public law. Germanic law was very primitive and unsophisticated and the judicial 
power vested in and was exercised by the people. An accusatorial system prevailed 
in its most rudimentary form and a mere accusation by a free man was sufficient 
grounds for suspicion against an accused. In essence criminal law presented 
nothing more than a regulated system of private vengeance, where the offender was 
pursued with arms by the victim or his or her family. This was known as “the feud”19 
and the ancient maxim “mort mot ma mit morthe kela” (murder must be cooled with 
murder) prevailed. Disputes were settled by means of a dual or by retaliation.20 Only 
persons capable of exercising legal rights could defend themselves. Women and 
children were regarded as pars domus and were represented by the domus of the 
family. If a woman was raped the penalty was not claimed by herself but by her 
father or tutor.21 The reason for this was that neither women nor children could be 
challenged to single combat.22 Legal proof was strongly influenced by reliance on 
the supernatural and a belief in divine intervention rather than human proof. Gods 
could indicate the truth by signs and could protect the innocent. The outcome of 
such proofs was the “doom” or judgment of the court. For example, one practice that 
existed was “the ordeal by fire” in which an accused placed his or her hands in a 
fire; if he or she was burnt the accused was guilty.23 This primitive accusatorial 
system proved to be inadequate as it allowed many individuals to suffer and many 
                                            
18  Burchell & Milton Principles of Criminal Law (1991) 8. The Germans were a group of Teutonic 
and Scandinavian tribes with a common ethnic and linguistic origin who began to migrate to 
Western Europe during the fifth century. The Scandinavian tribes were known as Vikings. The 
Teutonic tribes included the Franks, Burgundians, Angles and Saxons. They mainly occupied 
Western Europe, the area known today as Germany, Holland and France, while the Goths, 
Vandals and Lombards settled in the east, in the area today known as Spain and Italy. The 
Anglo Saxons, Salic Franks and the Lombards allowed boys aged ten to give evidence in 
criminal proceedings but the Visigoths only regarded a boy of 20 years or older as possessing 
legal capacity. See Wessels The History of the Roman-Dutch Law (1908) 419.  
19  Burchell in Burchell & Milton Principles of Criminal Law (2005) 8.  
20  Wessels The History of the Roman-Dutch Law 703. 
21  Wessels The History of the Roman-Dutch Law 425. 
22  Wessels The History of the Roman-Dutch Law 178. 
23  Dugard South African Criminal Law and Procedure 3. 
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crimes to go unpunished. It is not surprising that it gave way to the inquisitorial 
system of canon law.24   
 
2.3.2 The Middle Ages (AD 500-1000) 
 
Under the Frankish Empire25 the Middle Ages represents a serious effort by the 
kings and governments of the time to suppress private vengeance and to replace it 
with peace. One such method was the introduction of “the peace” in terms of which 
a resort to violence was prohibited at a certain time or place.26 
 
During the late eleventh and early twelfth centuries, the law of Western Europe 
suddenly shed its tribal and informal character and was replaced by a well-defined 
legal system with professional courts and formal legislation. Trials still had the 
character of a popular assembly and were carried out exclusively by word of mouth. 
Criminal law itself was much influenced by the teachings of the Roman Catholic 
Church and the Corpus Iuris Canonici, in terms of which sin equated to personal 
wrongdoing and punishments were personal to the criminal. Punishment no longer 
resulted in retribution against the entire family, as was the case under Germanic 
law. The law was applied with great severity with punishments such as the severing 
of hands, branding, execution by breaking on the wheel and immolation at the stake 
being administered. The law became an instrument of tyranny and oppression in the 
hands of corrupt and capricious officials and was in dire need of reform and change. 
The means of change and reform were established by the rediscovery of Roman 
law.27    
                                            
24  Dugard South African Criminal Law and Procedure 4. 
25  The Franks were a group of German tribes who settled in what is now known as France. 
Between the fourth and sixth centuries the Frankish kings became very powerful and united 
the Frankish kingdoms into an “empire” which included modern Germany, Austria, parts of 
France and Northern Italy. Burchell & Milton Principles of Criminal Law (1991) 10.  
26  Burchell & Milton Principles of Criminal Law (1991) 10. 
27  Burchell & Milton Principles of Criminal Law (1991) 11. 
The historical background of the South African criminal justice system and the role of child 
witnesses and child victims within the system 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
26 
 
2.3.3 The reception of Roman law (AD 1500-1800)  
 
The tenth century saw the rediscovery of copies of Justinian’s Corpus Juris Civilis 
in monasteries in Italy and these texts became the subject of study at the law school 
of Bologna in northern Italy. This renewed interest in the Corpus Juris Civilis was 
attributable in part to the increase in prosperity in Italy as a result of a vigorous trade 
revival at the time, as well as to a general economic revival in Europe. The Corpus 
Juris Civilis was made up of thousands of texts and was so exhaustive that it was 
even said that the original medieval sources of Roman law were “almost buried in a 
sea of ink”.28 The scholars at the law school of Bologna known as glossators set out 
to explain the vast amount of text or to resolve textual anomalies.29 In order to 
accomplish this task they used Roman law as embodied in the Corpus Juris Civilis 
as the basis on which to develop their doctrines.30  
 
The successors to the glossators, the commentators or post-glossators, in contrast 
to the glossators, set out to develop a modern-day legal system that was accessible 
to everyone. Had it not been for this intervention by the glossators, Roman law might 
well have disappeared from the Western world. They were practical lawyers and 
wanted to apply the Corpus Juris Civilis to the needs of everyday legal practice. In 
order to accomplish this task, they endeavoured to harmonise the texts of Roman 
law with those of the statutory, customary and canon law of the time. Borrowing from 
Roman law, they adopted the idea that, before a punishment could be inflicted for a 
crime that had been committed, seven aspects had to be considered, namely: the 
cause, person, place, time, quality, quantity and consequences of the crime. These 
considerations played an important role in the mitigation or aggravation of the 
punishment for the crime or could even lead to the acquittal of the accused. The 
                                            
28  Hosten et al Introduction to South African Law and Legal Theory 288-288. 
29  They did so by writing notes (glosses) between the lines or in the margins of the text, hence 
the name glossators. 
30  Kleyn & Viljoen Beginner’s Guide for Law Students 28. 
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idea of intent (animus) was also introduced. For the first time the concept was 
introduced that a person should not be punished for a crime if he or she did not 
intend to cause harm to the victim.31    
 
The works of the commentators inspired further reform in the field of law and spread 
far and wide over Europe. In Germany the Carolina32 was enacted in 1532 and 
became the general foundation of criminal law until the nineteenth century. The code 
contained 219 articles which set out definitions of crime, penalties and matters of 
criminal procedure.  The new criminal procedure in particular was of great 
significance. It replaced the old accusatorial procedure with what was called the 
“Inquisition prozess” or inquisitorial procedure. It differed from the old accusatorial 
procedure by replacing public and oral testimony with secrecy and writing. It also 
employed a system that relied upon the charge of a public officer rather than upon 
the complaint of a victim. It demanded proof of evidence in the form of an eyewitness 
or a confession from an accused. In the absence of the latter, an accused was 
subjected to torture until he confessed. The accused was brought to open court, 
where the charge was read out. No testimony was given by witnesses and no 
evidence was presented at the trial itself; an orator merely spoke for and against the 
accused. Sentence followed and was executed immediately. This brutal inquisitorial 
procedure with its oppressive system of punishment became the standard 
procedure in most European countries.33  
 
 
2.4 The emergence of modern criminal law  
 
                                            
31  Burchell & Milton Principles of Criminal Law (1991) 12. 
32  In Latin it was known as the Constitutio Criminalis Carolina, but came to be called the Carolina. 
33  Burchell & Milton Principles of Criminal Law (1991) 27. 
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The sixteenth and seventeenth centuries saw the emergence of separate modern 
nation states, such as France, Germany and Spain, in Western Europe. These 
countries began to develop their own separate laws and by the end of the eighteenth 
century a codification of the separate laws had taken place.34 Of particular 
importance in this study are Roman-Dutch law and the law of England as the 
criminal law of the Netherlands and England later played a significant role in the 
development of South African criminal law.   
 
2.4.1 Criminal law of the Netherlands  
 
By the late Middle Ages Holland, like the rest of Western Europe, no longer had a 
distinct legal system but also experienced the reception of Roman law. Roman law 
(as developed by the glossators and commentators) merged with local Germanic 
customary law and came to be known as “Roman-Dutch” law. The reception differed 
from province to province, with the law consequently also differing between 
provinces. However, Roman law served as a unifying factor between the different 
provinces, ensuring that the law in the Netherlands was largely uniform.35  
 
An idea of the system of criminal procedure that existed in the Netherlands during 
the early fifteenth century can be formed from the works of the jurist Wielant, in his 
Practijcke Crimineele, which was later unashamedly plagiarised by Damhouder in 
Praxis Rerum Criminalium. According to Wielant, most prosecutions took the form 
of an inquisition, with the inquiry being held in secret. The accused was, however, 
allowed to adduce evidence and to call witnesses in support of his defence. Despite 
this, torture was still used to extract confessions. Children under the age of fourteen 
and pregnant women were fortunately exempt from these harsh practices.36 
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35  Kleyn & Viljoen Beginner’s Guide for Law Students 30-31. 
36  Dugard South African Criminal Law and Procedure 5. 
The historical background of the South African criminal justice system and the role of child 
witnesses and child victims within the system 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
29 
 
In 1555 the feudal overlord of the Netherlands, Charles, abdicated and finally 
relinquished his European patrimony in the Hall of the Golden Fleece in Brussels. 
Phillip II of Spain acquired the overlordship of the Netherlands – henceforth the 
Spanish Netherlands. Under his reign the law in the Netherlands took on a statutory 
form through the promulgation of an Ordinance on Criminal Procedure in 1570. This 
Ordinance formed the basis of criminal procedure in the Netherlands during the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries despite the Netherlands’ struggle for 
independence. The reason why it was not repealed after the Netherlands obtained 
independence was that it was very similar to the prevailing system of criminal 
procedure. This is clearly illustrated by the fact that the Ordinance allowed only an 
inquisitorial procedure with a public official (known as the fiscal) as prosecutor and 
the judge having absolute discretion to prescribe the modes of punishment. The 
substantive law was characterised by cruelty and punishments such as execution 
by hanging, drowning and burning. Only the province of Holland allowed for 
imprisonment as a punishment. Torture to exact evidence where there was none 
was a standard feature and remained an indispensable part of the process until it 
was abolished in Holland in 1798.37 
 
The seventeenth century was marked by the publication of the works of famous 
Dutch authors. The most famous treatise of the time was that of Antonius Matthaeus 
II (1601-1654), known as the De Criminibus. This treatise included a detailed 
commentary on books 47 and 48 of the Digesta and expounded Romanist criminal 
law free of elements of Italian, canon and Germanic law. Other leading Dutch 
advocates of the day were Pieter Bort (1615-1674), who wrote the Tractaet van 
Crimineele Saecken which was concerned with criminal procedure; Johan Moorman 
(1696-1743), who wrote the Verhandelinge over de Misdaden and DG van der 
Keessel (1738-1816), who was responsible for the Dicta ad Jus Criminale Libri 47 
et 48 Digestorum.38  
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The eighteenth century saw a further change in the Netherlands in that the 
Netherlands was also affected by the fervour of the French revolution and the armies 
of Napoleon Bonaparte. Louis Bonaparte, the brother of Napoleon, became the 
Emperor of the Netherlands in 1806. In 1811 the harsh Roman-Dutch legal system 
of the previous centuries was finally replaced by the French Criminal Code of 1808 
and in 1838 a Wetboek van Strafvordering modelled on French law was enacted.39 
Despite this codification, classical Roman-Dutch law did not become obsolete 
because of the influence of the works of the old authors on classical law.40 
 
2.4.2 English criminal law 
 
Early English law followed the same pattern as Germanic law with an accusatorial 
system in the same primitive form as in the rest of Europe. The guilt of an accused 
was determined by compurgation or ordeal. Compurgation allowed an accused to 
call a number of oath-helpers (compurgators) to swear to the accused’s innocence 
by testifying to his credibility and not to the facts of the case itself. If such 
compurgators were not available the accused had to establish his innocence by 
ordeal or by an appeal to God to work a miracle to show his innocence. Fortunately 
in the Fourth Latin Council in 1215 Pope Innocent II forbade the performing of any 
religious ceremonies in connection with ordeals, which led to the abolition of the trial 
by ordeal.41 This abolition would undoubtedly have resulted in the introduction of 
canon law and the inquisitorial procedure had it not been for the Normans, who 
conquered England in 1066. The Normans introduced an alternative procedure, 
namely “trial by jury”, which preserved the accusatorial system. The jury consisted 
of twelve men from the local community who swore to speak the truth. The “jury” 
had the task of collecting information on the crime and presenting the charges 
against the accused to the court. Initially this jury presented the matter and tried the 
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case. These jurors, chosen from the neighbourhood, acted as both jurors and 
witnesses and decided questions of fact by their own knowledge or by relying on 
hearsay. Later a second jury known as the “petty” jury was introduced. The jury of 
presentment (known as the grand jury) presented the indictment to the second jury, 
who heard the case against the accused and determined his or her guilt or 
innocence.42 This introduced a separation between the role of the jury and that of a 
witness in that a witness henceforth:  
 
swears but to what he has heard or seen … to what has fallen under his senses. 
But a jury-man swears to what he can infer and conclude from the testimony of such 
witness …43 
 
Typically, a trial commenced with an indictment being read to the accused, who then 
pleaded to the charge. This was followed by jury selection; the accused had a right 
to reject members of the jury. The case against the accused was then presented by 
the prosecutor (usually the victim of the crime) and witnesses for the prosecutor 
were called. Thereafter, the accused was allowed to present his or her case. The 
jury were then free to reach a verdict, but only if it reflected their unanimous view. A 
verdict followed the judgment. Death was the punishment for felonies, while 
misdemeanours were punished by corporal punishment, restraint of person or a 
fine.44 
 
Unlike the position in modern English criminal law, an accused was presumed guilty 
and was not entitled to any legal representation or allowed to call any witnesses. No 
rules of evidence prevailed and hearsay was freely allowed. Statements by the 
accused were not made on oath. The accused could be asked incriminating 
questions and was not allowed to remain silent. Despite these shortcomings the 
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43  Buchell’s Case 124 ER 1006 at 1009. 
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English trial was more favourable to an accused than its Continental counterpart 
where the inquisitorial procedure prevailed. An English trial was at least public; the 
accused was allowed to speak in his or her defence; was not tortured and was 
judged by the accused neighbours upon their conscientious assessment of his or 
her guilt or innocence.45 
 
Even though, as stated above, witnesses were called for the prosecutor to testify to 
the jury, this only became common practice in the sixteenth century. This can 
perhaps be attributed to the fact that jurors drew on their own knowledge to reach a 
decision on guilt or innocence. No law existed to compel a witness to testify. This 
approach was only changed by the Acts of 1554 and 1555, which empowered 
coroners and magistrates to compel witnesses for the Crown to testify at the trials 
of persons accused of serious offences. Despite this empowerment by the court, the 
true function of witnesses was not recognised as the court preferred to rely on 
written statements instead of calling a witness. When a witness was compelled to 
testify before the court the question of perjury received scant attention. The accused 
was still not usually permitted to call evidence on his or her own behalf. Even after 
witnesses for the defence were generally allowed in the seventeenth century, 
witnesses still presented their testimony without taking the oath except in cases of 
serious misdemeanour or by special statutory provision.46 
 
 
 
2.4.3 South African criminal law 
 
2.4.3.1 1652-1806 
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In April 1652 Jan van Riebeeck, a Dutch official in the service of the Dutch East 
India Company (VOC), established a refreshment station at the Cape of Good Hope. 
The settlement at the Cape was initially intended to be a halfway house for merchant 
ships of the Dutch East India Company on the route from the Netherlands to Dutch 
East India, but in time it developed into a permanent colony. When the Dutch arrived, 
the Cape was sparsely inhabited by a native population known as the Koi. They 
were pre-literate and their laws were based on oral tradition. The Dutch brought with 
them the law of the Netherlands and maintained law and order in the areas under 
their control in terms of the Octrooi (Charter) of 20 March 1602. This resulted in the 
entrenchment of the Dutch legal system, including the Roman-Dutch system of 
criminal law, at the Cape. This system of criminal law consisted mainly of Roman 
law modified by ancient customs and statutes and it remained in force at the Cape 
until 1806, although in a slightly modified form. The Dutch settlers established a 
criminal court known as the Raad van Justisie (the Raad). The Raad had its seat in 
the Cape; it dealt with both civil and criminal matters and was composed of a 
Commander, seven officials and two burgher councillors.47 It proceeded behind 
closed doors and no reasons for its judgments were made public or recorded. The 
officials and burghers of the Court were not required to have any legal qualifications 
and in fact very seldom had any such qualifications. The public prosecutor before 
the court was the fiscal, who was obliged to investigate all offences and decide 
whether a prosecution should take place or not. The fiscal received a share of all 
fines and confiscations imposed (usually a third), which led to his prosecuting 
offences zealously. No wonder he was the most hated official at the Cape.48 When 
a matter before the Raad was decided, a great deal was left to the discretion of the 
judges, but in reaching their decisions the Raad often referred to the works of jurists 
such as Damhouder, Moorman, Bort and Matthaeus. Even the general works of 
Voet, Groenewegen and Huber were consulted.49 In addition the Court followed 
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Phillip II’s Criminal Procedure Ordinance of 1507, which was inquisitorial in nature. 
Torture was widely used, and punishments were equally savage. The death penalty 
was carried out by way of hanging, strangling, burning or drowning, among others. 
The use of these brutal practices from Roman-Dutch criminal procedure was further 
aggravated by the presence of slaves at the Cape.50 In brief, as no judgments of the 
Raad were either recorded or reported, Roman-Dutch law showed almost no 
development at the hands of the Raad from 1652 to 1795.51 
 
2.4.3.2 1806-1832 
 
In 1775, except for a brief period of Batavian rule from February 1803 to January 
1806, and again in 1806, Great Britain occupied the Cape. The Raad van Justitie 
was now called the Court of Justice. The Court of Justice was empowered under 
the Articles of Capitulation and a Proclamation of 24 July 1795 to administer Roman-
Dutch law in both criminal and civil matters in accordance with the existing laws, 
statutes and ordinances, thus ensuring that Roman-Dutch criminal law remained in 
force. Regardless of this the English disliked the inquisitorial form of procedure 
practiced and initiated a process to replace this system with the English accusatorial 
form of procedure. Further changes to the present system were made in 1796 with 
the abolition of barbaric modes of execution such as breaking on the wheel and the 
prohibition of the use of torture in 1797.  
 
Adherence to Roman-Dutch law in terms of the Capitulation while criminal law was 
modelled on English criminal procedure caused problems, however. In 1808, for 
instance, the Governor discovered that no court of appeal existed and after 
consultation with the British government a High Court of Appeals for criminal cases 
was instituted. In 1813 a proclamation by Sir John Cradock directed that all criminal 
trials were to be conducted in open court. In 1819 the Chief Justice and members 
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of the Court of Justice issued a criminal procedure code, the “Crown Trial”. This 
code departed from the old procedure in some ways. When an offence was 
committed an inspection in loco was held by the court accompanied by the 
prosecutor. Preliminary statements were taken under oath from the witnesses. 
Witnesses had no right of refusal to testify and recalcitrant witnesses were subject 
to both imprisonment and a fine. On the strength of this evidence a trial would then 
commence in the open with the reading of an indictment. The accused’s answers 
were not taken under oath and the accused only received the right to counsel after 
being interrogated. Counsel could then assist with the examination and cross-
examination of witnesses on all points of law that followed. As counsel for the 
accused only obtained access to the accused on the day of the trial, they were 
frequently ill-prepared, which led to a poor defence for the accused.52 
 
Although the Crown Trial added an English flavour to criminal procedure, reports to 
Earl Bathurst and Commissioners Bigge and Colebrook recommended that the 
system of criminal procedure could be still more closely aligned with that of England. 
These recommendations were accepted. In 1825 English replaced Dutch as the 
official language of the courts and in 1827 provision was made in the First Charter 
of Justice for the establishment of a Supreme Court. This Supreme Court was 
modelled on the English accusatorial system and consisted of a Chief Justice and 
three Puisne judges,53 a Circuit Court and a jury. Advocates and judges were to be 
drawn from the English, Irish or Scottish Bars and had to be doctors of law. The First 
Charter of Justice was replaced by a Second Charter in 1832, which confirmed its 
provisions. The Crown Trial of 1819 was replaced by a Criminal Procedure 
Ordinance of 1828, which led to the assimilation of the accusatorial form practised 
in England into the criminal procedure in the courts.54  
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When a precedent for some change was required, jurists turned to English law as 
they saw no advantage in going to Holland where a system of law foreign to both 
the English and the South African Dutch was in force. This, together with the fact 
that judges and advocates were trained in England, detailed reports of English 
decisions were freely available and Roman-Dutch law books were sometimes silent, 
vague or contradictory on a subject, enhanced the practice and strength of English 
law even further.55  
 
A welcome innovation was that an accused was now entitled to remain silent and a 
confession was only admissible if made voluntarily. The following additional 
changes were introduced: prosecution by way of grand jury indictment, the 
replacement of the hated Fiscaal with an Attorney-General and the adoption of the 
English law of evidence through Ordinance 72 of 1830. Since English procedure 
and the English law of evidence were being followed lawyers naturally looked 
towards English law for guidance. The reforms introduced in the Cape between 
1827 and 1832 effectively put an end to the inquisitorial system. Criminal trials now 
followed the English accusatorial procedure, with open confrontation between 
prosecutor and accused and the court acting as arbiter. Notwithstanding this change 
the Roman-Dutch law of criminal procedure somewhat precariously prevailed as the 
South African common law of criminal procedure.56 
 
 
2.4.3.3 1832-1910 
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Cape 
 
Few changes were made to the criminal law system that prevailed at the Cape 
between 1832 and 1910. The only aspects of significance were the introduction of 
the procedure for automatic review in 1856 and the introduction of an evidentiary 
innovation in 1886 which declared that an accused was to be regarded in future as 
a competent but not compellable witness. In addition, in 1869 it was provided that 
the death penalty was no longer to be carried out in public but within the confines of 
the gaol.57  
 
In 1886 a special criminal code for the Transkeian Territories known as the Native 
Territories Penal Code was enacted. Although enacted for the Transkei, the Code’s 
influence ranged beyond the borders of the Transkei as some of its definitions, 
general principles of criminal liability and elements of some of the other particular 
crimes came to be adopted by the South African courts.58  
 
Natal 
 
The Dutch settlers or Boers at the Cape were dissatisfied with British rule and 
furthermore farming in the eastern frontier districts had become increasingly 
dangerous owing to attacks from surrounding indigenous tribes. They therefore set 
out to trek northwards. Approximately twelve thousand Dutch settlers, known as 
“Voortrekkers”, left the Cape between 1835 and 1843. One such group under the 
leadership of Retief initially settled in Natal in 1838 and declared that the 
                                            
57  Dugard South African Criminal Law and Procedure 27. 
58  Burchell & Milton Principles of Criminal Law (1991) 24. 
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Hollandsche Rechtspleging should serve as the basis for the law to be administered. 
59 
 
In 1844 Natal was reincorporated into the Cape as a “District or Colony” of the Cape. 
The system of criminal law of the Colony of Natal was brought into line with the laws 
of the Cape legislature by the introduction of the Charter of Justice of 1832, the 
Criminal Procedure Ordinance of 1828 and the Evidence Ordinance of 1830. 
Procedure was governed by Ordinance No 18 of 1845. Although this resulted in 
Roman-Dutch law as modified by English procedural statutes being applied in Natal, 
the Natal judges, being even more prone than their Cape counterparts to look to 
English law for guidance in deciding questions on Natal common law, effectively 
anglicised criminal law in the administration of justice in Natal.60    
 
Transvaal 
 
Following the English annexation of Natal in 1843, many of the Voortrekkers moved 
on to settle in the Transvaal and Free State. In 1844 the Transvaal settlers founded 
what was known as the Potchefstroom-Winburg Republic and adopted the Thirty-
Three Articles as its constitution.61 The Articles stated that the Hollandsche Wet 
would form the basis of the legal system in this state and marked a move towards 
legal independence.62 This did not, however, result in the introduction of a Dutch 
law of criminal procedure as sources suggest that a system that varied between the 
accusatorial procedure and a moderate type of inquisitorial procedure was 
applied.63 
 
                                            
59  Burchell et al South African Criminal Law and Procedure 40. 
60  Burchell et al South African Criminal Law and Procedure 40. 
61  Dugard South African Criminal Law and Procedure 32. 
62  Hosten et al Introduction to South African Law and Legal Theory 358.  
63  Dugard South African Criminal Law and Procedure 32. 
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In 1852, following the first Anglo-Boer war, the Sand River Convention was signed 
between the Boers and the British Government. It granted the Boers the right to 
govern themselves in accordance with their own laws. In 1858 the newly formed 
South African Republic adopted a Grondwet which enacted the separation of the 
powers of the legislature, executive and judiciary. The judicial powers vested in 
landdrosts, heemraden and jurors and all judgments were to be pronounced in open 
court. In 1859 Addendum 1 was added to the Grondwet; it provided that Van der 
Linden’s Koopmanshandboek should be the statute of the state. If the answer to a 
problem could not be found in Van der Linden, the Wetboek of Simon van Leeuwen 
and Hugo de Groot’s Inleidinge tot de Hollandsche Rechtsgeleerdheid were to be 
consulted as subsidiary sources of law. However, three days later Addendum 3 was 
enacted. It contained a code of criminal procedure which followed both the English-
law trial by jury and the accusatorial system. This procedure was elaborated on by 
Cape Ordinance 5 of 1864, which virtually amounted to the adoption of the criminal 
procedure and evidence system applicable in the Cape. The use of this Ordinance 
also reflected the significant English influence on the classification and 
nomenclature used with regard to specific crimes.64 
 
After a brief interval of British rule from 1877 to 1881 following the British annexation, 
the South African Republic regained its independence with the signing of the 
Pretoria Convention in 1881. Few changes were made to criminal procedure in the 
Transvaal during this time, with the exception of the establishment of a High Court 
of Justice in 1877.65 In 1902 the Transvaal Supreme Court and the Witwatersrand 
High Court were established. The judges of the respective courts frequently relied 
on judgments of the Cape Supreme Court as persuasive authority, resulting in a 
“mixed system” similar to that of the Cape being introduced into the Republic. In 
1903 Ordinance No 1 of 1903, the most comprehensive code of criminal procedure 
in South Africa, was enacted in the Transvaal. It was largely based on the 1828 
Cape Ordinance, as amended, but unlike the Cape Ordinance it regulated the 
course of the trial itself. All Supreme Court criminal cases were to be tried before a 
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judge and jury consisting of nine men. Originally a unanimous verdict was required 
but in 1909 the requirement was replaced with a majority of seven men. Punishment, 
the attendance of witnesses and certain evidentiary rules were also regulated in the 
Ordinance. Such was the importance of the code that it was substantially re-enacted 
after unification as the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act of 1917.66   
 
Orange Free State 
 
The Orange Free State obtained independence in 1854 at the Bloemfontein 
Convention, and enacted its own Grondwet. In terms of the Constitution of the 
Orange Free State Roman-Dutch law became the principal legal system of the 
Republic. However, soon afterwards the Cape rules of criminal procedure and 
evidence were assimilated into the Republic when two ordinances67 based on the 
Cape Criminal Procedure Ordinance of 1828 and the Cape Evidence Ordinance of 
1830 were enacted.68 Although the Evidence Ordinance of the Orange Free State 
directed the courts to follow Roman-Dutch law instead of English law, when the 
Ordinance proved inadequate the courts followed English law in practice.69     
  
After the annexation of the Orange Free State in 1900, the British Government 
maintained Roman-Dutch law as the law of application in terms of the Laws 
Settlement and Interpretation Ordinance of 1902 which determined that “the Roman-
Dutch law shall be the common law of the Colony”. Criminal procedure was 
governed by the Ordinance of 1902, which followed the law of the Cape Colony and 
fell far short of the detailed 1903 Criminal Procedure Ordinance of the Transvaal. 
As regards substantive law, the judges of the High Court of the Orange River 
                                            
66  Act 31 of 1917. Dugard Introduction to Criminal Law and Procedure 32. 
67  Ord  No 4 of 1856 which regulated criminal procedure up to the stage of committal for trial & 
Ord No 6 of 1856 which dealt with the law of evidence.  
68  Burchell et al South African Criminal Law and Procedure 42. 
69  Dugard South African Criminal Law and Procedure 33. 
The historical background of the South African criminal justice system and the role of child 
witnesses and child victims within the system 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
41 
Colony, like those of the Cape, Natal and the Transvaal, applied a mixed system of 
common law.70 
 
2.4.3.4 1910-1977 
 
Following a national convention in 1806, the four colonies, namely the Cape, Natal, 
the Transvaal and the Orange Free State, were unified into one nation on 31 May 
1910. At the time all four colonies followed statutory systems of criminal procedure 
and evidence that were based on the Cape Criminal Procedure Ordinance of 1828 
and the Evidence Ordinance of 1830. The Supreme Court of South Africa was 
created in terms of the Union of South Africa Act of 1909. It consisted of an Appellate 
Division, four provincial divisions, several local divisions and circuit courts and all 
superior criminal court cases were conducted before a judge and jury. With the 
establishment of the Appellate Division the question was raised whether the judges 
would seek to purify Roman-Dutch law of its English influence or continue with the 
growth of South African law as a mixed system. The Appellate Division chose the 
latter course by using Roman-Dutch law, as modified by English law, as the basis 
of its legal system while adapting it to South African social conditions.71  
 
The period between 1910 and 1977 brought various statutory changes to the 
criminal law system of South Africa, of which merely a few will be highlighted.72 In 
1914 a vital change to the jury system was affected by the Riotous Assemblies and 
Criminal Law Amendment Act.73 This Act empowered an Attorney-General to 
establish special criminal courts consisting of two or three judges without a jury for 
                                            
70  Dugard South African Criminal Law and Procedure 33. For an interesting discussion on the 
tension between Roman-Dutch law and English law at the time, refer to Van den Berg 2012 
Fundamina 71 at 81 ff. 
71  Burchell et al South African Criminal Law and Procedure 43. 
72  It must be stressed that the information outlined above is only a brief summary of a vast 
amount of information on the development of criminal law in South Africa. For a more detailed 
discussion, refer to Dugard South African Criminal Law and Procedure 33-56.   
73  Act 17 of 1914. 
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the purpose of hearing serious political offences. In 1917 the pre-Union statutes 
regulating criminal procedure and evidence were consolidated into a single Act, the 
Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act.74 This Act was described by Gardiner and 
Lansdown in their first book, South African Law and Procedure, which appeared in 
1919, as “the most ambitious attempt at consolidation hitherto known in South 
Africa”.75 This Act brought about several changes to the criminal law system of which 
the jury system was undoubtedly the most significant.76 The provisions of the 
Riotous Assemblies and Criminal Law Amendment Act, allowing the Attorney-
General to request a special court, were also extended in terms of the Act to cover 
offences against the law for the prevention of illicit dealings in precious metals and 
the supply of intoxicating liquor to coloured persons. Furthermore, of even greater 
importance, this Act allowed an accused to elect to be tried by a judge without a 
jury.77 In 1954,78 on the recommendation of the Lansdown Commission of 1947, trial 
by jury became the exception and non-jury trial the rule.79   
 
In terms of the 1917 Criminal Procedure Act a court was entitled to subpoena a 
witness for examination or re-examination at any time, and had to do so where in 
terms of the evidence it appeared to be essential to the just decision of a case. Such 
a witness not only had to be in attendance when his name was called but, unless 
excused, had to remain in attendance throughout the trial. Only after judgment had 
been pronounced was the witness entitled to depart.80 The Act furthermore provided 
that every person not expressly excluded by the Act from giving evidence was 
deemed to be a competent and compellable witness. In this regard the Act 
                                            
74  Act 31 of 1917. 
75  Gardner & Lansdown South African Criminal Law and Procedure: Being a Treatise upon the 
Law and Practice of Criminal Matters in the Union of South Africa 2 ed Vol 1 (1924) 34. 
76  These changes included provisions that the powers of arrest, search and seizure had to be 
exercised only under a warrant duly authorised by a judicial officer; that a detained person 
had to be released within 48 hours or brought before a judicial officer for a committal order 
and the right of an accused to legal representation. For a more detailed description of the 
changes, see Dugard South African Criminal Law and Procedure 33 ff. 
77  Dugard South African Criminal Law and Procedure 37. Note that a judge may, however, 
summon two assessors to assist him in the case. The main advantage of this change was that 
it allowed black persons who might have little faith in an all-white jury to avoid such a court. 
78  See s 1 of the Criminal Procedure and Jurors Amendment Act 33 of 1952. 
79  Dugard South African Criminal Law and Procedure 40. Trial by jury was finally abolished in 
1969 by the Abolition of Juries Act 34 of 1969. 
80  S 246 of Act 31 of 1917. 
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distinguished between persons absolutely excluded from giving evidence and those 
excluded from giving testimony in particular proceedings. The former included 
persons afflicted with “idiocy, lunacy or insanity” while the latter included “the 
husband or wife of an accused”. The authority to decide on the compellability or 
competency of a witness to give evidence resided with the court.81   
 
A child of very tender years, who showed immaturity of intellect and was unable to 
give an intelligible account of what he or she had seen or heard, or to appreciate the 
obligation to tell the truth, or to understand the distinction between a truth and a 
falsehood, was regarded as falling into the first class of absolutely incompetent 
witnesses.82 All testimony had to be given under oath, unless the witnesses were 
unable on account of ignorance arising from youth, defective education or any other 
cause to understand the nature of an oath. Testimony could be presented after an 
admonition by the judge or magistrate to speak the truth, the whole truth and nothing 
but the truth, had been administered.83   
 
In the event that a child was thus deemed to be competent to give evidence at a 
trial, such evidence had to be given in the presence of an accused, before an all-
male European jury,84 and the child was obliged to remain in attendance throughout 
the trial unless excused by the court. Notwithstanding the fact that no statutory 
provision dealing with the corroboration of a child’s evidence existed, it was an 
established practice in the Union not to convict upon the single and unconfirmed 
evidence of a child of tender years.85 In R v George,86 Wessels JP held that: 
                                            
81  Ss 260, 261, 262 & 263 of Act 31 of 1917. 
82  R v Sideropoulos 1910 CPD 15; R v De Beer 1933 NPD 30 & R v R 1935 NPD 582.  
83  S 267 of Act 31 of 1917. 
84  S 167 of Act 31 of 1917; s 2 of Act 21 of 1954 and s 114 of Act 56 of 1955. The only concession 
to women was that since 1931 it was possible to call for an all-female jury in terms of the 
Female Jurors Act 20 of 1931. This proved to be impossible to implement, however, because 
there were insufficient names on the jury list. See Hahlo & Kahn South Africa: The 
Development of its Law and Constitution (1960) 261.   
85  Gardner & Lansdown South African Criminal Law and Procedure (1946) 401. 
86  1922 TPD 11. 
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[t]o convict upon the uncorroborated testimony of a child of three years is such a 
dangerous thing that I cannot imagine any magistrate doing it under any 
circumstances.  
 
The learned judge furthermore held that the mere fact that a child had repeated his 
or her story to someone on a previous occasion did not amount to corroboration. 
Similar views were held in R v Sideropoulos,87 R v De Beer88 and R v R89 in respect 
of the testimony of children of ages ranging between four-and-a-half years and eight 
years. It therefore comes as no surprise that children were very apprehensive of the 
“male” criminal justice system and when “persuaded” to testify, as single witnesses, 
were faced with a system that did not convict on their evidence unless corroborative 
evidence was available. To say that they suffered while acting as witnesses under 
the then criminal justice system is putting it mildly.90 
 
Between 1917 and 1955, the consolidated Criminal Procedure Act of 1917 was 
amended by seventeen separate statutes and coupled with the fact that the text was 
in Dutch and English only, with no official Afrikaans translation, a new intervention 
to consolidate the Act was called for. This was effected by the Criminal Procedure 
Act of 1955.91 This Act was also extensively amended by thirty statutes, however. 
Many of these amendments served to tighten up or clarify the Act but other radical 
changes were introduced to cope with matters affecting the security of the State. 
Many changes were also introduced in the field of punishment to address these 
security issues. In 1955 only three offences, namely murder, treason and rape, were 
punishable by death; discretionary capital offences were created for inter alia 
robbery and housebreaking, sabotage, the encouragement by a South African 
                                            
87  1910 CPD 15. 
88  1933 NPD 30.  
89  1935 NPD 582. 
90  Müller & Tait “Little witnesses: a suggestion for improving the lot of children in court” 1999 
THRHR 241. 
91  Act 56 of 1955. 
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resident abroad of acts furthering the achievement of any of the objects of 
communism or of any unlawful organisation, kidnapping and participation in any 
terrorist activities. During this time capital punishment was carried out at an alarming 
rate and it was estimated that South Africa accounted for about 47 per cent of the 
world’s executions at the time.92 It was only in 1995 under the new constitutional 
dispensation that the Constitutional Court in S v Makwanyane93 declared the use of 
capital punishment unconstitutional. 
 
In 1976, a Commission of Inquiry into the Penal System of the Republic of South 
Africa, the Viljoen Commission, recommended the abolition of the punishment of 
imprisonment with solitary confinement, spare diet and hard labour and set the 
scene for the reintroduction of the Criminal Procedure Bill of 1973. The 1973 Bill 
was subsequently amended to give effect to the recommendations of the Viljoen 
Commission passed by Parliament in 1977 and became the Criminal Procedure Act 
of 1977.94  
 
The position of child witnesses improved slightly with the enactment of the Criminal 
Procedure Act of 1977. Section 153(5) thereof provided that “where a witness at 
criminal proceedings before any court is under the age of eighteen years, the court 
may direct that no person, other than such witness or his parent or guardian or a 
person in loco parentis, shall be present at such proceedings”. Child witnesses were 
thus allowed to give evidence “in camera”, but were still obliged to do so in the 
presence of the accused.  
 
It was only after an investigation by the South African Law Commission in 1989 into 
the giving of evidence by child witnesses in open court that the position of child 
                                            
92  Dugard South African Criminal Law and Procedure 47. 
93  1995 (3) SA 391 (CC). 
94  Act 51 of 1977 (hereinafter the Criminal Procedure Act). The Act came into effect on 22 July 
1977.  
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witnesses changed somewhat for the better.95 In acknowledgement of the fact that 
children suffer severe mental stress when giving evidence in the presence of an 
accused, the South African Law Commission recommended the concession that 
children be allowed to testify in a special room via an intermediary. This proposal 
gave rise to the introduction of the function of an intermediary with the enactment of 
section 3 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act96 and later the insertion of section 
170A(1)97 into the Criminal Procedure Act of 1977.98 Section 170A(1) of the Act 
provides as follows:   
 
Whenever criminal proceedings are pending before any court and it appears to such 
court that it would expose any witness under the biological or mental age of 18 years 
to undue mental stress or suffering if he or she testifies at such proceedings, the 
court may, subject to subsection (4), appoint a competent person as an intermediary 
in order to enable such witness to give his or her evidence through that intermediary.  
 
The legislature recognised the context within which child witnesses and 
complainants find themselves when testifying in court, and attempted to alleviate 
some of the problems faced by child victims and witnesses through the said 
amendments.99 
 
2.4.3.5 The pre-1994 apartheid era 
 
                                            
95  South African Law Commission Protection of the Child Witness Project 71 Working Paper 28 
(1989). 
96  Act 135 of 1991. 
97  This section should be read together with sections 161 and 165 of the Criminal Procedure Act. 
98  As amended by the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and Related Matters) Amendment Act 32 
of 2007. 
99  Bekink “Section 170A(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act of 1977: Do intermediaries need to be 
sworn in or not? S v QN 2012 1 SACR 380 (KZP)” 2013 THRHR 285. Refer also to ch 5 below 
for a full discussion of section 170(A) of the Criminal Procedure Act of 1977. 
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The apartheid policy of the National Party, which came to power in 1948, brought a 
barrage of legislation to bear upon South Africans that, firstly, categorised them by 
race and then controlled their freedom according to their race group.100 
 
Apartheid was a system of racial segregation that was enforced through the ruling 
party, the National Party (NP), from 1948 to 1994. Under this policy the rights of the 
black majority inhabitants of South Africa were curtailed in order to maintain white 
Afrikaner minority rule. This policy was not a new invention by the NP but had its 
roots in colonial times under Dutch and British rule. Prior to Union in 1910, the Cape, 
Natal, Orange Free State and the Transvaal each had their own policies on the 
franchise rights of non-whites. In the Cape the franchise qualifications were low and 
non-whites were not excluded. Natal experienced a shortage of skilled workers, 
which led to an influx of Indian immigrants. This in turn gave rise to the problem of 
the Indian vote. Despite a protest led by Mahatma Gandhi, in 1896 the British 
refused to approve the disenfranchisement of Indians, but instead promulgated a 
law excluding all non-whites from voting. The Republic of the Orange Free State 
was free from political and constitutional conflict and franchise rights were extremely 
liberal. After the Jameson Raid in the Transvaal the authorities in the Transvaal 
alerted the Orange Free State to the “dangers” of an influx of immigrants. In contrast 
to the Orange Free State, the Transvaal applied a system of disenfranchisement of 
non-whites. Despite many African communities expecting that the Cape’s non-racial 
franchise would be extended to the other colonies after unification in 1910, the 
contrary position was experienced. The Treaty of Vereeniging made the 
enfranchisement of non-whites subject to the consent of white people, which led to 
their disenfranchisement. Shortly afterwards in reaction to this position the African 
National Congress (ANC) was formed in 1912.101 
 
                                            
100  “Cape Town’s History and Heritage” available at http://www.capetown.at/heritage/ history/ 
apartheid.htm (accessed 06/07/2013). 
101  Bekink Principles of South African Constitutional Law (2012) 91-95. 
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In 1931 the South African Parliament became sovereign with the passing of the 
Statute of Westminster. This did not change the prevailing situation but in fact 
promoted the disenfranchisement of people of colour as an official policy of racial 
segregation (apartheid) was embarked on by the NP following the general election 
in 1948. Legislation was enacted classifying South Africans into four racial groups, 
namely native, white, coloured and Indians. Residential areas were segregated 
according to these racial groups as was education, medical care, parks and other 
public facilities.102 
 
There were numerous calls for the establishment of a non-racial convention, of 
which the Freedom Charter of the ANC was arguably one of the most famous. 
Nevertheless in 1961, when South Africa became a republic, it maintained its policy 
of racial segregation. In 1964 the Rivonia treason trial began in which ten leaders of 
the ANC, including Nelson Mandela, were tried and sentenced for 221 acts of 
sabotage designed to overthrow the apartheid system.103  
 
During this time South African criminal law played a significant role in the 
implementation and upholding of the country’s apartheid policy. This was effected 
by the NP through the employment of the sanctions of imprisonment and fines to 
enforce their discriminatory laws. Under these draconian laws it became a crime if 
non-whites were not in possession of identity documents (passes),104 entered 
certain urban areas105 or used certain public facilities,106 occupied land in certain 
group areas107 or married or had a sexual relationship with white persons.108  
 
                                            
102  Bekink Principles of South African Constitutional Law 95. 
103  Bekink Principles of South African Constitutional Law 101-102. 
104  See the Natives (Abolition of Passes and Co-ordination of Documents) Act 67 of 1952. 
105  See the Natives (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act 25 of 1945.  
106  See the Reservation of Separate Amenities Act 49 of 1953.  
107  See the Group Areas Act 41 of 1950 and the Group Areas Act 36 of 1966.  
108 See the Immorality Act 5 of 1927 and the Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act 55 of 1949. It 
was also a crime for a white person to be involved with a person of colour.  
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These penal provisions resulted in large numbers of blacks being imprisoned or 
fined, which in turn led to civil uprisings, protest actions and unrest, such as the 
Soweto riots of 16 June 1976, which lasted well into the late 1980s. In an attempt to 
control the uprising, opposition leaders were banned and imprisoned and various 
security measures were put in place. New security crimes such as sabotage, 
terrorism and subversion were created and the police and executive authority were 
granted excessive powers such as the right to an arrest without a warrant, detention 
without trial, house arrest and banning. Despite these measures the security laws 
were not successful in suppressing the resistance to apartheid. Civic disorder 
became endemic in black townships.109 Children participated alongside their parents 
and widespread school boycotts took place. In response government declared a 
state of emergency on 21 July 1985, affording them even wider powers. In terms of 
these emergency regulations approximately 20 000 persons, including more than 2 
000 children under the age of sixteen, were arrested without a warrant and detained 
for varying periods of time. In some areas, in the absence of a proper police force, 
vigilante groups emerged whose presence exacerbated violence and disorder within 
the areas. Violence became a socially sanctioned mechanism for achieving change 
and resolving conflict.110 The slogans of the day mobilising violence were “people’s 
war” and “ungovernable”. During this time children in particular suffered violence, 
trauma, abuse and other forms of hardship, such as the loss of a parent or parents. 
It is estimated that between 1991 and 1994 nearly 50 000 children were displaced, 
2 000 physically traumatised and more than 7 000 abandoned as a result of intra-
community violence.111 
 
                                            
109  Burchell in Burchell & Milton Principles of Criminal Law (2005) 36-39. See also Shaw Crime 
and Policing in Post-apartheid South Africa: Transforming under Fire (2002) 1 ff.  
110  South African Publication Association Johannesburg “Most political deaths occurred in the 
run-up to 1994 election: HRC” 27/05/1997 available at http:///www.justice.gov.za/ 
trc/media/1997/ 9705/s970527e.htm (accessed 12/07/2013).  
111  Children in 2001 A Report on the State of the Nation’s Children National Programme of Action 
for Children in South Africa, the Presidency (2001) 146. 
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With the implementation of a new Constitution in 1993,112 the position of non-whites 
improved slightly in that parliamentary franchise was extended to Coloured people 
and Indians. Black people were, however, still excluded.113 
 
2.4.3.6 The 1994 constitutional era 
 
Under both national and international pressure, success against apartheid was 
eventually achieved with the release of Nelson Mandela in 1990; the unbanning of 
the ANC; the adoption of the first democratic constitution, the Interim Constitution in 
1993;114 the removal of racially based crimes from the statute book; the first non-
racial election on 27 April 1994 and thereafter the Constitution of the Republic of 
South Africa, 1996.115    
 
The introduction of a new constitutional framework transformed the entire legal order 
of South Africa and introduced a system in which all laws, including criminal law and 
procedure, have to pass the test for constitutionality. The Constitution with its 
comprehensive Bill of Rights, based on the principles of dignity, equality and human 
rights and freedoms, provides the catalyst for the re-evaluation of the principles of 
both statutory and common law on crime, including any law that may affect 
children.116  
 
In this regard, the Constitution explicitly recognises that children are a vulnerable 
group, have specific and unique needs and must be afforded distinctive protection. 
In addition to the protection offered by the Bill of Rights to which children are entitled 
as ordinary inhabitants of South Africa, their interests have been given independent 
                                            
112  Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 200 of 1993. 
113  Bekink Principles of South African Constitutional Law 96. 
114  Act 200 of 1993. 
115  Bekink Principles of South African Constitutional Law 96-97. 
116  See s 1 of the Constitution.  
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recognition in a “mini-charter created for children only” in section 28 thereof.117 In 
furtherance of these interests section 28(2) of the Constitution requires that in every 
matter concerning a child, a child’s best interests are of paramount importance. It 
therefore follows that the advent of the Constitution also affects the plight of child 
victims and child witnesses in that all laws within the criminal justice system affecting 
children and the way they give evidence will have to pass constitutional scrutiny.118  
 
3 CONCLUSION 
 
The present system of criminal law in South Africa is a truly mixed system that 
combines Roman-Dutch, German, English and unique South African elements. A 
brief overview of the historical development of South African criminal procedural law 
illustrates how this evolution materialised and reveals the role each of these systems 
played in the development of our unique, present-day South African system. It also 
provides clarity as to why our present system is an accusatorial system and not an 
inquisitorial one and explains why, unlike the English system, we have done away 
with the jury system. The effects of the accusatorial system on child witnesses will 
be discussed in greater detail in chapter 3.  
A historical overview of our criminal justice system also illustrates a significant 
evolution in the role of child witnesses within the criminal justice system from a 
system such as the Germanic law where the mere accusation by a free man was 
enough to create a suspicion against an accused (without the involvement of any 
witnesses)119 to the present-day system that acknowledges the significance of child 
witnesses in the criminal justice system.120 
                                            
117  Bekink & Brand “Constitutional protection of children” in Davel (ed) Introduction to Child Law 
in South Africa (2001) 173. 
118  The Constitution and its influence on other important Acts such as the Criminal Procedure Act 
of 1977 and the Children’s Act 38 of 2005 will be discussed in detail later. See also paras 2.1 
& 2.2 of ch 4 below.   
119  Wessels The History of the Roman-Dutch Law 425.   
120  See for example DPP v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development 2009 (2) SACR 
130 (CC) at paras [72]-[74]. 
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Regrettably, history shows that the increase in children’s involvement in the judicial 
system was coupled with some injustices. The competency requirement made it 
impossible for some, especially young children, to give evidence and the hearsay 
rule made it impossible for adults to give testimony on their behalf, regarding what 
the child had said to them. Even if the children were old enough to be deemed 
competent witnesses they were treated with severe scepticism.121 If they were 
allowed to testify, a collection of sub-rules referred to by Spencer as the “adversarial 
package”122 made it extremely difficult for them to do so. This adversarial package 
of traditional rules required of them to tell their tale in open court which was an alien 
environment in which the key figures were often only white men and they were in 
the physical presence of the accused (of whom they were usually afraid). They were 
then subjected to an adversarial cross-examination by someone whose agenda was 
to discredit them by persuading the court that their account was mistaken, 
incomplete or a lie. Throughout all of this they had to remain in attendance unless 
excused by the court.123 
 
In this regard the present system is welcomed in that it recognises children’s 
vulnerabilities and proposes to afford child witnesses and child victims protection. It 
still has some shortcomings and imperfections, however, and faces huge systemic 
challenges.124 These shortcomings and challenges will be discussed in more detail 
later in this thesis. 
                                            
121  R v Manda 1951 (3) SA 158 (A) at 163. 
122  Spencer “Introduction” in Spencer & Lamb (eds) Children and Cross-examination: Time to 
Change the Rules? (2012) 1. 
123  R v Sideropoulos 1910 CPD 15; R v De Beer 1933 NPD 30 & R v R 1935 NPD 582.  
124  See S v Mokoena; S v Phaswane 2008 (2) SACR 216 (T) at paras [87]-[92] & Centre for Child 
Law Justice for Child Victims and Witnesses of Crime 7. See also Department of Justice and 
Correctional Development Report on the Re-establishment of Sexual Offences Courts (2013). 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
The accusatorial system in South Africa and its effect on child 
witnesses and child victims within the system 
 
It has been suggested that the early roots of the present accusatorial (adversarial) 
trial system can be traced to trial by battle:1 physical confrontation gradually 
developed into verbal confrontation.2 
To-day instead of fighting with lethal weapons, we use legal arguments. Where 
combatants formerly met face to face, they now have surrogates–attorneys who fight 
for them. The judge acts as referee, theoretically protecting the contenders against 
foul blows. The jury decides which “side” fought the better fight. But fight it is and 
the object is to win, not necessarily to reveal the truth.3 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Most countries in the world primarily use one of the two criminal justice models of 
procedure: the accusatorial (or adversarial) model or the inquisitorial model. This 
classification is based on the history and evolution of particular systems.4 
Traditionally the English and American countries, or common law world, are seen 
as examples of the former whereas the latter can be found on the European 
continent (e.g. the French or German systems) or in civil law countries. The South 
                                            
1 Re “Oral v written evidence: the myth of the impassive witness” 1983 Australian LJ; Van der 
Merwe “An introduction to the history and theory of the law of evidence” in Schwikkard & Van 
der Merwe Principles of Evidence 3 ed (2009) 1 3 1. 
2 Van der Merwe “Die evolusie van die mondelingse karakter en uitsluitingsreëls van die 
Engelse gemene bewysreg” 1991 Stell LR 281 at 290.  
3 Dressler as quoted by Brouwer “Inquisitorial and adversary procedures – a comparative 
analysis” 1981 Australian LJ 207. 
4 See ch 2 in this regard. 
The accusatorial system in South Africa and its effect on child witnesses and child victims within 
the system 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
55 
African system belongs to the Anglo-American or accusatorial “family”. It should, 
however, be emphasised that no civilised country today follows a purely accusatorial 
or inquisitorial system, but rather a mixed system with a predisposition towards one 
of the two systems.5 Both systems endeavour to discover the truth and to 
accomplish this ideal in a fair manner. The way in which this is effected differs, 
however, one of the main differences being the role the judicial officer plays in the 
proceedings.6 
 
In an accusatorial system a criminal trial consists of two opposing parties placing 
evidence before a judge, who plays a much more neutral or passive role than that 
of his or her inquisitorial counterpart. While the inquisitorial system has been 
depicted as judge-centred the accusatorial system has been described as party-
driven7 or party-centred with each party presenting his or her case to the judge.8 
The judge acts as an umpire and, after having heard the examination and cross-
examination of the parties to the case, adjudicates upon the matter in the light of the 
evidence placed before him or her by the parties. Great emphasis is placed on the 
spoken word and evidence is mainly produced orally.9 
The accusatorial system requires the accuser to present persuasive evidence of the 
accused’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt.10 This is due to the underlying assumption 
of the accusatorial model, namely the accused’s presumption of innocence. The 
best way to discover the truth in terms of this model is by allowing the parties 
themselves to present their evidence in a process which guarantees the use of direct 
                                            
5 Snyman “The accusatorial and inquisitorial approaches to criminal procedure: some points of 
comparison between the South African and continental systems” 1975 CILSA 101 at 102; 
Roodt “A historical perspective on the accusatorial and inquisitorial systems” 2004 Fundamina 
137 at 138. 
6 Snyman 1975 CILSA 103; Steytler “Making South African criminal procedure more 
inquisitorial” 2001 Law, Democracy & Development 1 at 2; Roodt 2004 Fundamina 137. 
7 Department of Justice and Constitutional Development Simplification of the Criminal 
Procedure Project 73 (2001) 8; Steytler 2001 Law, Democracy & Development 2. 
8 Müller & Hollely Introducing the Child Witness (2000) at 4. 
9 Joubert (ed) Criminal Procedure Handbook 11 ed (2014) 298; Goldstein “Reflections on two 
models: inquisitorial themes in American criminal procedure.” 1974 Stanford LR 1009 at 1017. 
It should, however, be noted that affidavits or certificates may be submitted as proof of certain 
facts. See also ss 212-215 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 (hereinafter the Criminal 
Procedure Act).  
10 Burchell South African Criminal Law and Procedure Vol I: General Principles of Criminal Law 
4 ed (2011) 45. 
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confrontation and cross-examination.11 This explains both the emphasis on “orality” 
and the reason why the adversarial trial model can to some extent allow the relative 
inactivity of the adjudicator.12 In sum the foundational assumption of the accusatorial 
system is the belief that partisan advocacy, coupled with equality of arms, is the best 
means of  placing the neutral adjudicator in a position to determine the truth.13 
 
In contrast, the inquisitorial model is regarded as a quasi-scientific or proactive 
search for the truth rather than a dispute. The judge is seen as the master of the 
proceedings and plays a much more active role in collecting and analysing facts.14 
The judge decides whether there are sufficient grounds for instituting a prosecution, 
determines which witnesses to call and elicits the evidence by questioning the 
witnesses. An open system of evidence is followed that places little emphasis on 
oral presentation of evidence or cross-examination. Written evidence plays an 
integral part in the trial and all relevant evidence may be considered by the judge. 
The process becomes an inquest in which the judge attempts to establish the truth 
by integrating the arguments and evidence of the prosecution and defence. It has 
therefore been said that “because of his wide powers, the continental judge 
searches for the material truth, whereas the judge in the accusatorial systems is 
merely bound to search for the formal truth, because he merely relies upon the 
information placed before him by the parties”.15 The fundamental assumption 
underlying the inquisitorial system, in contrast to the accusatorial system, is the 
belief that the State is the powerful guarantor of the public interest and is best 
                                            
11 Department of Justice and Constitutional Development Simplification of the Criminal 
Procedure Project 73 (2001) 9; Van der Merwe in Schwikkard & Van der Merwe Principles of 
Evidence 1 5 2. 
12 Van der Merwe in Schwikkard & Van der Merwe Principles of Evidence 1 5 2; Roodt 2004 
Fundamina 139. 
13 Joubert (ed) Criminal Procedure Handbook 22; Steytler 2001 Law, Democracy & Development 
2; Roodt 2004 Fundamina 139. 
14 Joubert (ed) Criminal Procedure Handbook 22; Snyman 1975 CILSA 103; Du Plessis “An 
inquisitorial system in practice – visit to German criminal courts” 1988 SALJ 305 at 306-307. 
15 Snyman 1975 CILSA 103; Steytler 2001 Law, Democracy & Development 3; Roodt 2004 
Fundamina 140. 
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equipped to establish the truth and at the same time protect the interests of the 
accused through a judge-dominated system.16 
 
For an accusatorial system to be effective there has to be “equality of arms” between 
the parties.17 The child’s inability as an equal adversary is most evident/acute in an 
adversarial truth-finding process and may even lead to the truth simply becoming 
the view of the most powerful party.18  It is precisely the elements of the accusatorial 
system such as oral presentation of evidence, confrontation and cross-examination 
that create particular difficulties for children. The essential elements of the 
accusatorial system from the perspective of child witnesses will thus be investigated 
in order to understand and evaluate the effectiveness of the model with a view to 
making recommendations for an improved system. Comparisons with the 
inquisitorial model will also be made.  
 
2 ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF THE ACCUSATORIAL SYSTEM 
 
2.1 Passive presiding officer 
 
The role of a presiding officer in the accusatorial system is essentially passive or 
neutral.19 The presiding officer ensures that the rules of evidence are satisfied by 
listening to the evidence and arguments presented to him or her by the parties and 
by ruling on the issues of law and fact. Although the role of a presiding officer is 
                                            
16 Goldstein 1974 Stanford LR 1018-1019; Steytler 2001 Law, Democracy & Development 3; 
Roodt 2004 Fundamina 140. 
17 South African Law Commission Simplification of the Criminal Procedure Project 73 (2001) 
para 2.11; Steytler 2001 Law, Democracy & Development 3.  
18 Spencer “Introduction” in Spencer & Lamb Children and Cross-Examination: Time to Change 
the Rules? (2012) 1 at 14. 
19 Joubert (ed) Criminal Procedure Handbook 294. 
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essentially a passive or neutral one, the present-day presiding officer is not totally 
inactive.20 In the matter of Rex v Hepworth Curlewis J remarked as follows: 
 
A criminal trial is not a game where one side is entitled to claim the benefit of any 
omission or mistake made by the other side, and a judge’s position in a criminal trial 
is not merely that of an umpire to see that the rules of the game are observed by 
both sides. A judge is an administrator of justice, he is not merely a figure head, he 
has not only to direct and control the proceedings according to recognised rules of 
procedure but has to see that justice is done.21 
 
South African law provides for judicial involvement in a trial in that the presiding 
officer may decide on the admissibility of evidence and the propriety of the conduct 
of the parties. In addition South African law imposes a legal duty on the presiding 
officer to actively search for the legal truth where it appears essential to the just 
decision of the case.22 In terms of section 186 of the Criminal Procedure Act the 
court may: 
 
at any stage of the criminal proceedings subpoena or cause to be subpoenaed any 
person as a witness at such proceedings, and the court shall so subpoena a witness 
or so cause a witness to be subpoenaed if the evidence of such witness appears to 
the court essential to the just decision of the case.23 
 
The presiding officer may also examine a witness so subpoenaed or recall and re-
examine such a witness in terms of section 167 of the Criminal Procedure Act if it 
                                            
20 Joubert (ed) Criminal Procedure Handbook 295; Steytler 2001 Law, Democracy & 
Development 9; Director of Public Prosecutions, Transvaal v Minister of Justice and 
Constitutional Development 2009 (2) SACR 130 (CC) at para [4] (hereinafter DPP v Minister 
of Justice and Constitutional Development). 
21 1928 AD 265 at 277. Own emphasis added. 
22 See S v Rall 1982 (1) SA 828 (A) at 831B-C; S v Mayiya 1997 (3) BCLR 386 (C) 395C. 
23 Own emphasis added. 
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appears necessary in order to arrive at a just decision in the case. A presiding officer 
is thus not only entitled in terms of South African law to call and put questions to 
witnesses but may be obliged in the interests of justice to act accordingly.24 The 
main purpose of such questioning is to elucidate any points that may still be obscure. 
Questioning of a witness by the presiding officer may, however, not amount to cross-
examination as this would result in an irregularity.25 
 
Conversely in terms of the adversarial system, the presiding officer has a duty to 
conduct any questioning with open-mindedness, impartiality and objectivity and 
should refrain from questioning a witness in a way that, by its frequency, length, 
timing, form, tone, content or otherwise conveys the opposite impression.26 
Furthermore, a presiding officer should not question a witness in a way that may 
intimidate or disconcert the witness or unduly influence the quality of the witness’s 
replies, thereby affecting the witness’s demeanour or impairing the witness’s 
credibility.27 This is of added importance with child witnesses, who require enhanced 
but also exemplary judicial involvement. 
 
An example of a case where the presiding officer should have intervened by 
questioning the witness, but failed to do so, was S v MM.28 In this case the witness 
was a seven-year-old complainant who had allegedly been raped. She testified with 
the aid of an interpreter who was not very competent. In her testimony she used 
words such as rape and penis that were not age-appropriate. No attempt was made 
to discover what she meant by this. The Supreme Court of Appeal was critical of the 
trial court’s failure to explore this and Wallis JA pointed out that children do not 
                                            
24 See S v Rall 1982 (1) SA 828 (A) at 831B-C; S v Mayiya 1997 (3) BCLR 386 (C) 395C. 
25 S v Mathabathe 2003 (2) SACR 28 (T); S v Mseleku 2006 (2) SACR 237 (N); S v Mafu 2008 
(2) SACR 653 (W); S v Saule 2009 (1) SACR 196 (Ck); S v Du Plessis 2012 (2) SACR 247 
(GJS). 
26 S v Rall 1982 (1) SA 828 (A) at 831H-832H; S v Maseko 1990(1) SACR 107 (A); S v Gerbers 
1997 (2) SACR 601 (SCA); S v Mosoinyane 1998 (1) SACR583 (T); S v Mathabathe 2003 (2) 
SACR 28 (T) & S v Maroeli (unreported FB review no 338/12, 17/01/2013). 
27 S v Rall 1982 (1) 828 (A) at 831H-832H; S v Maseko 1990(1) SACR 107 (A); S v Gerbers 
1997 (2) SACR 601 (SCA); S v Mosoinyane 1998 (1) SACR583 (T); S v Mathabathe 2003 (2) 
SACR 28 (T); S v Maroeli (unreported FB review no 338/12, 17/01/2013). 
28 2012 (2) SACR 18 (SCA). 
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usually use language such as “rape” when describing sexual acts or “penis” when 
referring to private parts. The danger thus exists that the interpreter used technical 
expressions instead of the actual words used by the seven-year-old witness.29 
 
The witness had furthermore stated that the appellant had placed his penis “on” and 
not “in” her vagina. This was also not explored.30 Coupled with the fact that the 
doctor’s report lacked clarity on whether there was penetration and that the doctor 
was not called to testify, the appeal had to succeed and the conviction of rape was 
altered to one of indecent assault.31 The Supreme Court of Appeal pointed out that 
it would have greatly assisted the court in considering the appeal if an attempt had 
been made to explore the statements and it had been ascertained whether the 
witness’s statement that the appellant had raped her was compatible with her 
description of the appellant’s penis being placed “on” her private parts.32 
 
This case clearly illustrates that enhanced judicial involvement is called for in the 
light of children’s emotional and developmental shortcomings as well as their 
relative lack of knowledge relating to the judicial system. Aspects such as “in” and 
“on” are difficult concepts for seven-year-olds, especially when used in relation to 
their genital area. This is due to the fact that young children do not conceptualise 
their inner anatomy and consider any contact with their body as taking place “in” 
them.33 For this reason it is vital to ask further questions such as whether the child 
was wearing clothing at the time as this will assist in eliminating the possibility of 
penetration. In this regard the presiding officer can play a very valuable role in 
monitoring whether there is a common understanding between the child and the 
court about the questions asked.34 An awareness of these difficulties, combined with 
an attempt by the presiding officer in S v MM35 to ensure that discrepancies were 
                                            
29 Para [9].  
30 Para [9]. 
31 Para [22]. 
32 Paras [9], [22]. 
33 Müller The Judicial Officer and the Child Witness (2002) 85.  
34 Müller The Judicial Officer and the Child Witness 85-86. 
35 2012 (2) SACR 18 (SCA). 
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clarified, could have resulted in a more convincing conviction of indecent assault or 
even in the conviction of rape being upheld. Add to this the fact that generally 
speaking the accusatorial rules of evidence were not developed to handle the 
problems presented by child witnesses, an enhanced judicial involvement becomes 
a given. However, this also places an increased responsibility on the presiding 
officer to act with due diligence.36 
 
In addition to the aforementioned discretionary provisions and central to the theme 
of this thesis, section 170A of the Criminal Procedure Act affords a presiding officer 
a discretion to appoint an intermediary where there are findings of “undue mental 
suffering or stress”37 on the part of the child witness. In this regard the presiding 
officer should exercise his or her discretion in the best interests of the child 
witness.38 In S v Stefaans39 the court stressed the following: 
 
If the application is opposed, the presiding judicial officer should require that 
appropriate evidence be adduced to enable him to exercise a proper discretion as 
to whether the section may be invoked or not. 
 
Indications are nonetheless that presiding officers are wary of exercising the 
discretion available to them under existing law for fear of compromising judicial 
neutrality or undermining the rights of the accused and because of concern 
regarding the approach to be followed by courts of appeal.40 It has also been 
                                            
36 Müller & Van der Merwe “Judicial management in child abuse cases: empowering judicial 
officers to be the ‘boss in court’” 2005 SACJ 41 at 44. 
37 See ch 5 para 3.1.5 below for a discussion of the application and meaning of the phrase. 
38 DPP v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development 2009 (2) SACR 130 (CC) at para 
[113]. 
39 1999 (1) SACR 182 (CDP) at 188. Own emphasis added. 
40 See Müller The Judicial Officer and the Child Witness 282; Matthias & Zaal “Intermediaries for 
child witnesses: old problems, new solutions and judicial differences in South Africa” 2011 
International Journal of Children’s Rights 251 at 257; Myers “A decade of international legal 
reform regarding child abuse investigation and legislation: steps toward a child witness code” 
1996 Pacific LR 169 at 216; Cossins “Cross-examining the child complainant: rights, 
innovations and unfounded fears in the Australian context” in Spencer & Lamb Children and 
Cross-examination: Time to Change the Rules? (2012) 106; Burrows & Powell “Prosecutors’ 
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suggested that presiding officers shy away from exercising their discretion owing to 
a lack of knowledge of the possible methods of reducing trauma for children.41 I am 
of the opinion that presiding officers who do not exercise their discretion properly 
and take up a position of relative detachment or judicial passivism may in fact 
contribute to the undermining of the rights of the child victim and/or child witness. 
For children to be able to give effective testimony, they should be able to do so in a 
way that takes their emotional and developmental shortcomings into consideration. 
By exercising a proper discretion the presiding officer ensures that the correct 
balance between the conflicting rights of the child and the accused prevails.42 In S 
v Thebus43 Yacoob J pointed out the following general rule: 
 
It is fundamental to a fair trial that it be presided over by a judicial officer who 
respects, protects, promotes and fulfils the rights in the Bill of Rights and who, by 
his or her conduct, demonstrates adherence to the value of the supremacy of the 
Constitution and the rule of law, as required by ss1(c) and 7(2) of the Constitution. 
 
It is therefore imperative that a presiding officer should preside over a trial in a way 
that respects, protects, promotes and fulfils the rights in the Bill of Rights of all 
persons appearing before him, and this is even more vital in the case of children, 
who are highly vulnerable and in need of special protection.  
                                            
perspectives on using recorded child witness interviews about abuse as evidence-in-chief” 
2014 Australian and New Zealand Journal of Criminology 374 at 387; S v Azov 1974 (1) SA 
808 (T); S v Gidi 1984 (4) 537 (C); S v Omar 1982 (2) 357 (NPD); S v Nedzamba (911/2012) 
[2013] ZASCA 69 (27/05/2013) unreported. 
41 See Müller The Judicial Officer and the Child Witness 282; Matthias & Zaal 2011 International 
Journal of Children’s Rights 251 at 257; Myers 1996 Pacific LR 169 at 216; Cossins in Spencer 
& Lamb Children and Cross-examination: Time to Change the Rules? 106.  
42 See Nedzamba v S (911/2012) [2013] SCA (27/05/ 2013) where the trial judge intervened 
where he should not have (at paras [27], [30], [31] and [32]) and failed to intervene where he 
should have (at para [28]). The possibility of an intermediary was not considered either. The 
Supreme Court of Appeal rightly held at para [34] that the “irregularities render the conviction 
and sentence liable to be set aside” and that “[e]qually, for the child complainant there has 
been no closure. In this instance the administration of justice appears to have failed them 
both.” 
43 2003 (2) SACR 319 (CC) at para [109]. 
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Apart from the aforementioned “inquisitorial” powers with which presiding officers 
are endowed in the accusatorial system, a presiding officer could also reduce the 
trauma for a child witness by intervening from the bench during the trial in the 
following ways. The presiding officer should: 
 
 Welcome the child in a tone that is respectful and sensitive to the child’s 
position. By establishing a rapport with a child the effectiveness of the child 
as a witness is greatly enhanced.44 Such rapport can reduce the anxiety 
caused by being in an unfamiliar setting and assures the child that he or she 
is not on trial but need only tell what he or she saw or what happened.45 
 Dispel any myths or misconceptions that may affect a child’s understanding 
of the process. Many children have the belief for instance that if they cannot 
answer a question or if they should make a mistake this will result in their 
going to prison.46 An example of such a case is that of an eight-year-old boy 
who witnessed older boys setting fire to a school. He was handed the 
matches as the older boys fled the scene and found moments later by the 
school authorities. The boy was charged with the offence. Despite being 
drilled by his defence attorney on his story, the boy denied on the stand that 
there had been a fire, believing that if he could convince the judge that a fire 
had never occurred he could go free. The child’s limited understanding of trial 
proceedings made him a useless witness in his own defence.47 
 Briefly explain to a child who the different role players are, for example the 
presiding officer, prosecutor, defence attorney and the intermediary, as well 
as what their involvement in the trial is.48 
                                            
44 Müller The Judicial Officer and the Child Witness 289-296. 
45 Pynoos & Eths “The child as witness to homicide” 1984 Journal of Social Issues 87 at 104; 
Plotnikoff & Woolfson Intermediaries in the Criminal Justice System: Improving 
Communication for Vulnerable Witnesses (2015) 1 at 59; Thoman “Testifying minors: pre-trail 
strategies to reduce anxiety in child witnesses” 2013 Nevada LJ 236 at 254. 
46 Müller & Van der Merwe 2005 SACJ 41 at 43. 
47 Goodman “The child witness: conclusions and future directions for research and legal 
practice” 1984 Journal of Social Issue 157 at 166. 
48 Thoman 2013 Nevada LJ 236 at 250; Müller The Judicial Officer and the Child Witness 289-
296. 
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 Give a simple description of the procedure. At each stage the presiding officer 
should tell the child what will happen next. For example, after examination-
in-chief the presiding officer should explain to the child that “further” questions 
will be put to the child by the defence to ascertain that the court “understands” 
the answers given by the child and not because the court did not believe the 
child in the first instance.  
 Ensure that a child is not bullied or harassed in court and intervene where it 
is clear that a child does not understand a question but is confused or 
traumatised. 
 Allow recesses in the court process during a child’s testimony where the child 
shows signs of fatigue, loss of attention or unmanageable stress. 
 Ensure that the language used is in accordance with the child’s 
developmental abilities. Presiding officers should insist that questions are 
simple, single-topic questions phrased in the active voice and that specialised 
terms are not used. It is incumbent upon the presiding officer to intervene if 
it appears that the child does not understand the questions put to him or her. 
 See to it that cases are dealt with expeditiously in time frames appropriate to 
the victim and the offence.49 
 
In comparison with the accusatorial model, the inquisitorial model is judge-centred 
and proceeds from the premise that a trial is not a contest between two parties but 
an inquiry into the facts to ascertain the truth. In accordance with this model the 
presiding officer plays an active role as he or she calls and interrogates the 
witnesses and also decides on the order in which the evidence is presented. Cross-
examination does not take place but instead the presiding officer tests the reliability 
and accuracy of the witnesses.50 As the proceedings resemble an inquiry children 
                                            
49 Müller The Judicial Officer and the Child Witness 289-296; Plotnikoff & Woolfson 
Intermediaries in the Criminal Justice System: Improving Communication for Vulnerable 
Witnesses 59-73; Thoman 2013 Nevada LJ 236 at 250-258. 
50 Herrmann “Various models of criminal proceedings” 1978 SACC 3 at 5; Du Plessis 1988 SALJ 
307. 
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might find this no more traumatic than an interview via a video recording. 
Furthermore, if this inquiry is conducted by an experienced presiding officer, many 
of the problems associated with the accusatorial system such as confrontation 
between the child and the accused and problems arising from cross-examination 
are eliminated.51 In terms of the German Code of Criminal Procedure,52 for example, 
only the presiding officer has the right to examine a witness under the age of sixteen 
years. If the prosecution or the defence wishes to put additional questions to the 
witness, this may only be done through the presiding officer. This stems from the 
German legislature’s viewpoint that this procedure protects not only the juvenile but 
also the fact-finding process against improper questioning.53 
 
Whereas under the accusatorial system the purpose of the cross-examination of a 
witness is to elicit evidence favourable to the party conducting the cross-
examination and to challenge the truth of the witness’s version of the disputed 
events,54 the notion of an inquisitorial examination is that the questioning is 
conducted by the presiding officer from a neutral standpoint. In the context of child 
witnesses, particularly those that are very young or highly vulnerable, the 
inquisitorial examination is widely thought to be more advantageous than the 
adversarial system.55 
 
The inquisitorial system is not immune from criticism, however. The role of the 
presiding officer is one of the aspects that have come in for criticism. It is argued 
that the presiding officer has to fulfil two roles in one, in that he or she must be both 
the detective searching for the material truth and at the same time the arbiter who 
                                            
51 Zieff “The child victim as witness in sexual abuse cases – a comparative analysis of the law 
of evidence and procedure” 1991 SACJ 21 at 37.  
52 S 241a. 
53 Herrmann 1978 SACC 9. 
54 Du Toit et al Commentary on the Criminal Procedure Act (2010) 22-21; Ambos “International 
criminal procedure: ‘adversarial’, ‘inquisitorial’ or mixed? 2003 International Criminal LR 1 at 
4 
55 Spencer in Spencer & Lamb (ed) Children and Cross-examination: Time to Change the Rules? 
15. 
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must objectively reach a finding on the facts and considerations before him.56 It is 
difficult for the presiding officer to be completely unprejudiced against the accused, 
since he or she is both judge and prosecutor. It is for this reason that the presiding 
officer is often regarded by the accused as being biased or even his or her 
opponent.57 Also, the interviewing of children is a highly specialised task and should 
be conducted by someone with training in developmental psychology, language 
acquisition and communication with children. It has hence been questioned by some 
commentators, of whom Müller is one, whether a presiding officer who has not 
received training in the specific fields will be able to perform these tasks. For this 
reason, the presiding officer may not be best suited to perform the inquisition.58  
 
In order to address the dilemma of how to reconcile the aforementioned problematic 
elements of the two models with regard to child witnesses, in 1989 the South African 
Law Commission (the Commission) proposed the utilisation of an intermediary, 
which suggestion was later implemented,59 as a possible solution to the 
shortcomings in both these systems.60 The Commission contended at the time that 
the structure of the adversarial trial should be maintained and that the presiding 
officer should retain the role of arbiter or passive umpire. An intermediary may be 
appointed, whose actions are controlled by the presiding officer and whose task it 
is to ensure that the rules of procedure and evidence are observed by the 
prosecution and defence. An intermediary then becomes an additional participant in 
the adversarial trial and participates independently from the prosecution and the 
defence. The use of an intermediary adds a new dimension to and is an 
enhancement of the ways in which the legitimacy of the system and the fact-finding 
                                            
56 Snyman 1975 CILSA 108; Van Kloppen “Miscarriages of justice in inquisitorial and 
accusatorial legal systems” 2007 Journal of the Institute of Justice and International Studies 
50. 
57 Snyman 1975 CILSA 108; Roodt 2004 Fundamina 154. 
58 Müller “An inquisitorial approach to the evidence of children” 2001 Crime Research in South 
Africa 1. 
59 Refer to para 2 of ch 5 below for a discussion of the introduction of the use of intermediaries 
into the South African Criminal Procedure Act. 
60 South African Law Commission Protection of the Child Witness Project 71 (1991) para 4.4. 
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process can be promoted and reinforced. The presiding officer is therefore able to 
remain objective while mitigating the court experience for the child.61 
 
2.2 Oral evidence 
 
The accusatorial model affords specific prominence to the oral presentation of 
evidence. In accordance with the accusatorial system, as a general rule evidence 
must be given viva voce (orally), in open court by a sworn witness in the presence 
of the accused.62 The rationale for this practice is historically related to the 
importance attached by common law to the oath, the demeanour of the witness and 
to cross-examination as guarantees of reliability.63 It allows for maximum 
participation in that parties have the opportunity to confront a witness who has 
testified against them and are able to challenge the evidence given by such witness 
in the most direct way possible by cross-examination. The parties and the court are 
also able to observe the demeanour of the witness in order to assess the witness’s 
credibility.64 This practice furthermore stems from the fundamental assumption that 
the oral testimony of a witness at trial represents the best way for an adjudicator to 
deliver judgment on a factual dispute between two opposing parties.65  
 
The exact origin of this assumption is in fact uncertain. Van der Merwe points out, 
however, that an overview of the English law of evidence66 provides us with some 
guidance as to its origin.67 Kötz as quoted by Van der Merwe states the following: 
                                            
61 Van der Merwe “Oral Evidence” in Schwikkard & Van der Merwe Principles of Evidence (2009) 
18 11 1.  
62 Du Toit et al Commentary on the Criminal Procedure Act 22-17. 
63 Joubert (ed) Criminal Procedure Handbook 298. 
64 Joubert (ed) Criminal Procedure Handbook 299. 
65 Van der Merwe in Schwikkard & Van der Merwe Principles of Evidence 18 1. 
66 It should be noted that the English law of evidence serves as the South African common law 
of evidence and is thus relevant to our understanding of the assumption. See Van der Merwe 
in Schwikkard & Van der Merwe Principles of Evidence 1 1. 
67 Van der Merwe 1991 Stell LR 281 at 298. 
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I would submit that the common law’s emphasis on oral evidence, or oral 
argumentation, and on the parties’ right to present their cases through the oral 
examination and cross-examination of witnesses can be explained, at least partly 
by the jury system. If a case is tried by a jury, counsel’s position is not unlike that of 
a playwright. A playwright wishing to convey information to the audience has no 
alternative but to disclose this information through the spoken word of the actors. 
Similarly, counsel cannot present his client’s case to the jury unless he sues 
witnesses, and it would make little sense in practice to make the jurors read and 
evaluate complicated documentary evidence.68 
 
This assumption no longer holds good, however, as the jury system was abolished 
in South Africa in 1969,69 which theoretically opened the door for a more liberal 
approach with regard to the admission of evidence normally excluded in a jury trial.70 
In addition, it should be remembered that much of the stress experienced by children 
in court stems from the very insistence that oral evidence needs to be given 
personally in court at the trial.71 This insistence has serious implications for child 
witnesses. Not only must the child testify personally in the courtroom, but there are 
usually long delays between the actual event that the child experienced or witnessed 
and the trial at which he or she has to testify about it.72 
These delays before trials create two major issues for children, in terms of both their 
psychological welfare and the quality of their evidence. The waiting causes stress 
                                            
68 Van der Merwe 1991 Stell LR 281 at 298. 
69 See the Abolition of Juries Act 34 of 1969. 
70 Van der Merwe in Schwikkard & Van der Merwe Principles of Evidence 1 3. 
71 Except as otherwise provided in terms of ss 158 and 170(A). See also Zeiff 1991 SACJ 7-38; 
Iyer & Ndlovu “Protecting the child victim in sexual offences: is there a need for special 
separate legal representation?” 2012 Obiter 72 at 80. 
72 The existence of court delays is well documented in most countries. In New Zealand children 
on average wait fifteen months between committal and trial while in England the average 
period is thirteen months. See Henderson “Alternative routes: other accusatorial jurisdictions 
on the slow road to best evidence” in Spencer & Lamb (ed) Children and Cross-examination: 
Time to Change the Rules? (2012) 44. In South Africa delays of up to five years can occur. In 
Woij v Santam Insurance Co Ltd 1980 (2) SA 971 (SE) the two witnesses testified five years 
after the actual occurrence of the event. The waiting period in Namibia ranges between 12 
months and eight years. See Theron The Impact of the Namibian Judiciary System on the 
Child Witness (Master dissertation in Diaconology, Unisa 2005) 54.  
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and the question that is raised is whether the child should receive therapy in the 
intervening period. In addition, time erodes children’s memories and this raises the 
further question of how to preserve the child’s memory of events with the lapse of 
time.73 
 
Where a child has been either the victim of or a witness to a crime, the child requires 
some form of therapy to cope with the situation. In the experience of psychologists 
and social workers, in order to be able to deal with the trauma of the situation a child 
victim or child witness must be able to deal with the actual experience. This is usually 
achieved by either talking through the experience or dealing with it through play 
therapy.74 In South Africa no rules exist that prevent a child from receiving therapy 
before the trial. However, therapy before the trial presents the danger that a child’s 
evidence may become contaminated by suggestion as interviewing techniques 
employed by therapists may include leading questions. A leading question is one 
that implies or suggests an answer or assumes the existence of certain facts which 
might be in issue.75 Because children naturally want to comply with the wishes of 
adults, a child may find it hard to resist the pressure to give the questioner the 
answer he or she wants to hear simply to please the adult or because the child may 
be confused or frightened.76 The problem presented by leading questions is that 
they may result in “new” information being incorporated into the memory of the child 
which did not form part of the actual event. This happens if an interviewer’s words 
move the child to imagine events or some details of an event and the child thereafter 
accepts the fantasy as memory. This could alter the child’s report.77  
                                            
73 Müller The Judicial Officer and the Child Witness 9; Zieff 1991 SACJ 21 at 36; Simon “Pre-
recorded videotaped evidence of child witnesses” 2006 SACJ 56 at 60; Thoman 2013 Nevada 
LJ 237 at 243. 
74 Müller “The effects of the accusatorial system on child victims” 2000 CARSA 13 at 18; Narsee 
“Some magistrates and attorneys believe that abused children should not be given therapy 
before the trial of the abuser” Times Live 15/09/2015 available at http://www. 
timeslive.co.za/thetomes/2015/09/05/Dont-help-abused-kids (accessed 16/09/2015). Narsee 
reported that Shaheda Omar, Director of the Teddy Bear Clinic for abused children, confirmed 
that it was critical that children get pre-trial therapy. 
75 Van der Merwe in Schwikkard & Van der Merwe Principles of Evidence 18 3 1.  
76 Spencer “Conclusion” in Spencer & Lamb (ed) Children and Cross-examination: Time to 
Change the Rules? (2012) 178. 
77 Stolzenberg & Lyon “How attorneys question children about the dynamics of sexual abuse 
and disclosure in criminal trials” 2014 Psychology, Public Policy and Law 19 at 20; 
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Conversely, to prevent a child who desperately needs therapy from receiving such 
therapy (sometimes for five to eight years) just to preserve evidence can be 
devastating to the child’s wellbeing.78 A case study encountered in the course of 
research on pre-trial therapy conducted by Fouche of North-West University and Le 
Roux of the University of Pretoria79 involving 34 respondents in Gauteng, including 
social workers, magistrates, prosecutors and attorneys, relates the case of a child 
who reported to a social worker that she was allowed to see a therapist every week 
but was not allowed to talk about the sexual abuse. The child stated the following:80 
 
I really want to tell that lady [the therapist] that I see every week but I’m not allowed 
to talk to her about it … And then two years later, when I am trying my best to bury 
it, now I have to go and tell some strange lady [in court] the things that happened 
after you have been telling me for two years that we’re not allowed to talk about it. 
Research by Plotnikoff and Woolfson in a 2009 study81 based on interviews with 
182 young witnesses indicates that adjournments are one of the primary reasons 
for witnesses becoming frustrated, less cooperative or even hostile towards the 
criminal justice system. Victims and witnesses want their court cases to be resolved 
                                            
Christiansen “The testimony of child witnesses: fact, fantasy and the influence of pre-trial 
interviews:”1987 Washington LR 705 at 709. See also Müller & Hollely Introducing the Child 
Witness at 209, where she illustrates the problem with leading questions and depicts the 
situation where a child witness was asked about a woman’s appearance and particularly 
whether she was wearing a cap or poncho while she was in fact not wearing anything on her 
head. Because of all the questions asked about the poncho and cap the child, although quite 
uncertain as to whether the woman was wearing anything, finally responded that it was a dark 
cap. 
78 Müller The Judicial Officer and the Child Witness 12; Davis & Saffy “Young witnesses: 
experiences of court support and court preparation” 2004 Acta Criminologica 17 at 18. 
79 Narsee “Some magistrates and attorneys believe that abused children should not be given 
therapy before the trial of the abuser” Times Live 15/09/2015 available at http://www. 
timeslive.co.za/thetimes/2015/09/05/Dont-help-abused-kids (accessed 16/09/2015). 
80 Narsee “Some magistrates and attorneys believe that abused children should not be given 
therapy before the trial of the abuser” Times Live 15/09/2015 available at http://www. 
timeslive.co.za/thetimes/2015/09/05/Dont-help-abused-kids (accessed 16/09/2015). 
81 Plotnikoff & Woolfson “Measuring Up? Evaluating implementation of government 
commitments to young witnesses in criminal proceedings” available at 
http://www.nspcc.org.uk/measuringup (accessed 24/02/2016). 
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as quickly as possible in order to “get on with their lives”. Through such delays 
children are forced to remember events they desperately want to forget.82 
 
The Commission identified delays as one of the sources of concern regarding child 
witnesses and suggested that cases involving children should be given priority in 
the interests of speed.83 In S v Mokoena; S v Phaswane84  Bertelsmann J held as 
follows: 
 
A child may forget facts more readily than an adult, but will not escape the stress 
that is caused by the uncertainty surrounding the pending trial and the fact that the 
child victim is often obliged to attend a number of court dates only to have the matter 
postponed again. This adds to the child’s trauma. There is no justification for this 
additional burden of heartache and frustration that is routinely heaped upon child 
victims and witnesses in this fashion … Whenever a child is involved as a victim or 
witness, such child is by virtue of the clear cut provisions of s 28(2) entitled to have 
his or her case given priority at every stage of the investigation and of the 
prosecution. 
 
The reality, however, is that delays are still a part of most present-day systems.85 
Henderson points out that one alternative is to pre-record children’s entire evidence 
                                            
82 Copen Preparing Child Witnesses for Court: A Practitioner’s Guide (2000) 15; Plotnikoff & 
Woolfson “Kicking and screaming: the slow road to best evidence” in Spencer & Lamb (ed) 
Children and Cross-examination: Time to Change the Rules? (2012) 23. 
83 South African Law Commission Report on the Protection of Child Witnesses Project 71 (1991) 
paras 5.77-5.80. 
84 2008 (2) SACR 216 (T) at paras [158] and [159]. 
85 A case in point is that of Carl Christiaan Lotter of Nelspruit who sexually molested two girls 
aged eight and nine for three years between 2006 and 2009. The case involved two different 
magistrates, four different prosecutors and over twenty-five postponements. Initially one child 
was forced to testify in the presence of the accused. With all the delays and the re-
traumatisation of the two girls, it was decided, in the interests of their emotional health, to drop 
the rape charges. The State was thus requested to close the case and to find Lotter guilty on 
his plea of sexual and indecent assault. Sentence was only handed down on 6 August 2013, 
almost five years later. See http://carteblanche.dstv.com/story/Sexual-Offences-Courts-2013-
09-08 (accessed 27/09/2013). Another case in point is that of the rape of a 9 year old girl in 
Nkomazi, Mpumalanga. The case has been dragging on for three years and has been 
postponed 18 times. Outstanding DNA reports, dysfunctional CCTV court cameras and the 
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(in chief and upon cross-examination, in other words full pre-recording) at a pre-trial 
hearing well in advance of the actual hearing.86 Many countries in the common law 
world, with the exception of South Africa and the USA, already pre-record children’s 
evidence-in-chief.87 This means, however, that children still have to come to court 
at the actual trial to be cross-examined and must still contend with delays. On the 
other hand, with full pre-recording the hearing is recorded and played at the trial. 
The accused and his or her lawyer are entitled to be present at the pre-recording 
and to view the interview. They are also entitled to request the interviewer to put 
certain questions to the witness and the interview is governed by the ordinary rules 
of court. The advantage of this approach is that the child witness need not return to 
court unless new evidence arises; experience indicates that this happens only in 
exceptional cases.88 
 
The first country with an accusatorial trial system to introduce pre-recording into 
their system was Israel in 1955. In terms of Israeli law a child under the age of 
fourteen years who is a complainant or a witness to certain crimes (sex, violence, 
prostitution, or vice offences and parental abuse or neglect) is interviewed by a 
trained investigator. The majority of investigators are women and they are either 
trained psychologists or welfare officers. The child’s evidence is presented at trial 
                                            
defense lawyer changing five times are some of the reasons cited for the delay. See Pillay 
“Justice denied for 9- year- old- girl raped 18 times” SABC News 31/05/2016 available at 
http://www.sabc.co.za/news/a/c0eb52804cf75035bee7ff00ab 741406/Justice-denied-fo... 
(accessed 01/06/2016). 
86 See Henderson in Spencer & Lamb (ed) Children and Cross-examination: Time to Change 
the Rules? 46. 
87 Countries that successfully use pre-recordings include six states in Australia, New Zealand 
and Israel (Henderson in Spencer & Lamb (ed) Children and Cross-examination: Time to 
Change the Rules? 46-55). England introduced a six-month pilot project in April 2014 which 
allowed the use of pre-recordings for children under the age of sixteen years as well as for 
vulnerable adults in three Crown Courts with a view to extending the project if it proved to be 
successful (see BBC News 28/04/ 2014 “Vulnerable witnesses allowed to give evidence pre-
trial” available at http://www.Bbc.com/news/uk-27156660 (accessed 25/02/2016)). Although 
the formal evaluation period ended in October 2014, having involved 200 cases, it continues 
to be used. The English government has undertaken to complete the national implementation 
of the project (see Plotnikoff & Woolfson Intermediaries in the Criminal Justice System: 
Improving Communication for Vulnerable Witnesses 237). Although the USA has had 
legislation permitting full pre-recordings for years, this is seldom used because of the 
emphasis that is placed on the right to confrontation (see for example Maryland v Craig 497 
US 836 (1990) at 679). 
88 Henderson in Spencer & Lamb (ed) Children and Cross-examination: Time to Change the 
Rules? 46-55. 
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via video recordings of the interview and the investigators testify as a “surrogate 
witness” on behalf of the child.89 
 
The use of pre-recordings was introduced in Western Australia in 1992. It met with 
such success that five of the other Australian states have since followed suit.90 An 
academic study conducted in 2002 by Eastwood and Patton, comparing the position 
of Western Australia with that of Queensland and New South Wales, indicated the 
following:91 
 
All children in Western Australia (except one child who chose not to) gave evidence 
via CCTV – 70 per cent gave evidence at trial and 30 per cent fully pre-recorded 
their evidence months prior to the trial. Therefore, complainants gave evidence only 
once. In Western Australia, the use of CCTV for an “affected child” under the age of 
16 years at the time of the complaint is mandatory where it is available, unless the 
child chooses to give evidence in court … In practice CCTV facilities in Western 
Australia are of a very high standard and widely used. 
 
The findings in Western Australia contrasted with the uncertainty and trauma 
suffered by children in eastern jurisdictions who faced the possibility or the reality 
[that] they would give evidence in court in the presence of the accused … In contrast, 
prosecutors, defence lawyers and judges in Western Australia commented on the 
effectiveness of the legislation and the mandatory use of CCTV. Prosecutors 
reported it facilitated the child’s evidence because the child exhibits better 
concentration, is more attentive and less traumatised by the experience. Defence 
                                            
89 The approach adopted by the Israelis has, however, been criticised in that it is too prejudicial 
towards an accused as it does not afford the accused a right to challenge the evidence (see 
for example McEwan “Child evidence: more proposals for reform” 1988 CLR 813). In 
comparison, systems such as that used by Australia allow the accused to put questions to the 
witness via the defense team at the pre-recording interview. 
90 These include the states of Victoria, Queensland, South Australia, Australian Capital Territory 
and the Northern Territory (see Henderson in Spencer & Lamb (ed) Children and Cross-
examination: Time to Change the Rules? 46-55). 
91 Jackson “Children’s evidence in legal proceedings – the position in Western Australia” in 
Spencer & Lamb (ed) Children and Cross-examination: Time to Change the Rules? (2012) 75 
at 87. 
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counsel in Western Australia noted it has not affected the rights of the accused, 
understood it was designed to prevent further damage to the child and believed its 
use does not affect conviction rates. 
 
Children in other jurisdictions would benefit from similar legislation which protects 
them from facing the accused in the courtroom.92  
 
The second danger or issue associated with court delays is the effect they have on 
a child witness’s memory.93 Research findings show that children, especially young 
ones, have difficulty in recalling the details of events with accuracy as a result of 
long delays.94 Memory is not static and may be influenced by thinking about past 
events. This may result in children being more susceptible to suggestion and 
coaching.95 It is thus imperative to obtain a factual account of the events as early as 
possible. The use of pre-recording presents such an opportunity. Not only will the 
evidence be fresh and untainted but the child will be able to receive counselling 
afterwards. The court will also be able to hear the child’s own words, accompanied 
by the child’s non-verbal behaviour.96 Jones illustrates this with reference to a case 
in which the victim was a three-year-old child. The child’s evidence was video-taped 
fourteen to seventeen days after the incident. Other interviews followed, with the 
deposition being taped six months after the interview. The most poignant details of 
the events were recorded at the initial interview. The later interviews were not as 
detailed or “realistic”, clearly showing that the best evidence is presented while the 
                                            
92 Jackson in Spencer & Lamb (ed) Children and Cross-examination: Time to Change the Rules? 
75 at 87. 
93 Simon 2006 SACJ 56 at 60; Woij v Santam Insurance Company Ltd 1980 (2) SA 972 (E); 
Damba v AA Mutual Insurance Association Ltd 1981 (3) SA 740 (E). 
94 In a study conducted by Theron (The Impact of the Namibian Judiciary System on the Child 
Witness (Master dissertation in Diaconology, Unisa 2005) at 69), an eighteen-year-old victim 
indicated during an interview that he could not testify about the events as they had taken place 
eight years previously and he simply could no longer remember the details well enough to go 
and give evidence.  
95 Plotnikoff & Woolfson Intermediaries in the Criminal Justice System: Improving 
Communication for Vulnerable Witnesses 161; Warren & McGough “Research on children’s 
suggestibility: implications for the investigative interview” in Bottoms & Goodman (eds) 
International Perspectives on Child Abuse and Children’s Testimony (1996) 30; Henderson in 
Spencer & Lamb (ed) Children and Cross-examination: Time to Change the Rules? 44.  
96 Müller The Judicial Officer and the Child Witness 15. 
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memory of the events is still fresh in the child’s mind and the child’s recollection of 
the events is at its best.97 
 
In S v Baleka98 the court was asked to consider the admissibility of video-taped 
recordings of a public meeting as evidence of such meeting. The court came to the 
conclusion that the video-taped evidence was admissible as real evidence. Van 
Dijkhorst J pointed out that although there are risks involved in allowing videos as 
evidence, these risks should not be overemphasised. He held as follows:99 
 
I am convinced that the video can be a very helpful tool to arrive at the truth. It does 
not suffer from fading memory as do witnesses. The camera may be selective, but 
so is the witness’ recollection, even more so. The best word artist cannot draw his 
verbal picture as accurately and as clearly as does the cold eye of the camera. Not 
to mention the faltering witness who has difficulty in expressing himself. The tape 
records and retains for the benefit of the Court not only the words but also the 
intimation and emphasis of the speaker and the reaction of the audience. A tape 
recording can often be more reliable than the recollection of a witness. 
In its 1989 Working Paper on the Protection of Child Witnesses,100 the Commission 
stated that the use of video recordings could be of great practical value to the police 
and the prosecution, but that according to the rules of evidence a video recording 
would not carry any weight in view of the fact, inter alia, that a child witness must 
testify viva voce in person in court and the accused must be given the opportunity 
to cross-examine the maker of the statement. However, after receiving numerous 
comments on the matter the Commission stated in its 1991 Report on the Protection 
of Child Witnesses that video recordings could in fact be proven to be admissible 
evidence.101 The Commission was nonetheless of the opinion that this proposal did 
                                            
97 Jones “The evidence of a three-year-old child” 1987 Criminal LR 677. 
98 1986 (4) 192 (T). 
99 S v Baleka 1986 (4) 192 (T) at 194H-195A. 
100 See para 5.5 of the South African Law Commission Protection of Child Winesses Project 71 
Working Paper 28 (1989). 
101 See paras 5.58-5.63 of the South African Law Commission Report on the Protection of Child 
Witnesses Project 71 (1991). The use of videotaped evidence of child witnesses as evidence 
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not warrant any statutory amendments but that the use of video recordings was a 
matter for the police to decide.102 The use of pre-recorded interviews for child 
witnesses was revisited by the Commission in 2001 in respect of Project 107 on 
Sexual Offences. The Commission again acknowledged the benefits of the use of 
pre-recorded video testimony as evidence during a trial but refrained from 
recommending its use. The main reasons for not recommending pre-recordings at 
trial were a possible lack of resources and the likelihood that children would still 
have to be cross-examined at trial. The Commission did, however, state in its Sexual 
Offences Report of December 2002 that the use of videotaped evidence was an 
intricate issue which warranted more detailed research.103 
 
The possible use of pre-recordings warrants further serious consideration by the 
Commission and/or legislature as this will ensure that the child need not appear in 
court, eliminates the need for multiple interviews,104 alleviates problems with delays, 
guards against a possible later memory lapse on the part of the child, may enhance 
fair decision-making, allows the child to put the incident behind him or her and may 
even “prompt” a guilty plea from the accused where the child’s pre-recorded 
evidence proves strong.105 
                                            
at a trial has been challenged under the rule prohibiting hearsay evidence. Zieff points out that 
an exception to the hearsay rule in terms of section 3(1)(c) of the Law of Evidence Amendment 
Act 45 of 1988 or an additional statute regulating the admissibility of extrajudicial declarations 
could be offered as a possible solution to the objection to the use of pre-recorded videotaped 
evidence (see Zieff 1991 SACJ 21 at 31-33). The hearsay rule has also been criticised by 
Spencer as being needlessly complicated in cases where children are concerned and 
prevents the best available evidence from being presented in court (see Spencer & Flin The 
Evidence of Children: The Law and the Psychology 2 ed (1993) 159-160). 
102 See paras 5.58-5.63 of the South African Law Commission Report on the Protection of Child 
Witnesses Project 71 (1991). 
103 South African Law Commission Sexual Offences Report Project 107 (2002) at 118. See also 
Simon 2006 SACJ 56 for a more detailed discussion of the use of pre-recorded videotapes as 
evidence for child witnesses.  
104 Brannon points out that on average by the time a case reaches trial, a child victim has repeated 
her or his account of the events as many as fourteen to sixteen times. The more interviews 
there are the more harm the child will suffer. Decreasing the number of interviews will therefore 
drastically decrease the trauma suffered by such victims (Brannon “The trauma of testifying in 
court for child victims of sexual assault v the accused’s right to confrontation” 1994 Law and 
Psychology Review 439). 
105 South African Law Commission Report on the Protection of the Child Witness Project 71 
(1991) para 5.61.  
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In contrast to the accusatorial system, other legal systems following the inquisitorial 
model, such as the French and German systems, rely heavily on analytical 
assessment of the content of the evidence. French criminal courts, for example, use 
written transcripts of pre-trial interviews. These transcripts supplement adult oral 
evidence and where children are concerned, replace it completely. These legal 
orders consider the emphasis placed on appearance to be primitive.106 According 
to Van der Merwe there is merit in this view: 
 
The assessment of credibility has to take into account the general context, the 
probabilities, the witness’s intelligence, level of development and education, 
memory, power of observation and opportunity, language and ability to express him- 
or herself, as well as the presence or absence of a motive, the compatibility of the 
witness’s version with the other evidence, and such like. Of course credibility can be 
assessed according to demeanour, and it must be so assessed. Fluent and relaxed 
conduct can indeed indicate reliability, while hesitation, uneasiness or nervousness 
can point in the opposite direction. But the weight attached to the witness’s 
demeanour must not be overestimated, and the surrounding factors should not be 
ignored … It is for that reason that impressions of the appearance of a witness are 
sometimes described as an unsafe guide.107 
 
It is therefore emphasised that children should be allowed to give evidence in a way 
that accommodates aspects such as their age, intelligence, level of development 
and education, memory, power of observation, language and ability to express 
themselves. This can be achieved by the use of screens, closed circuit television 
(CCTV), through an intermediary or perhaps even by way of pre-recorded 
interviews.108 
                                            
106 Kruger et al Hiemstra’s Criminal Procedure Issue 2 (loose-leaf) 24-3. 
107 Own emphasis added. See also Kruger et al Hiemstra’s Criminal Procedure Issue 2 (loose-
leaf) 24-3. 
108 Refer to ch 5 paras 3.4 and 3.5 for a discussion on intermediaries and intermediary facilities. 
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It should be noted that with regard to the actual viva voce evidence the Criminal 
Procedure Act has made some allowances in section 161(2) for witnesses who are 
unable to communicate in the normal way.109 A witness who is unable to speak, 
such as a deaf-and-dumb witness, may communicate by sign language, through an 
interpreter or may write down his or her answers, which are then read out.110 The 
law thus does not necessarily require a witness to speak, but requires a witness to 
communicate with the court. In the case of a witness under the age of eighteen 
years section 161(2) states that evidence shall be deemed to include 
“demonstrations, gestures or any other form of non-verbal expression”.111 The 
rationale for the qualification of section 161(1) by section 161(2) is to make provision 
for the fact that children often nod or shake their heads or make gestures when 
answering questions. Allowance is thus made for children who have insufficient 
vocabulary to describe certain acts or who are too embarrassed to use words of a 
sexual nature. Although not specifically stated in the Act, the wording of section 
161(2) is wide enough to permit children to point to certain parts of their bodies, 
imitate actions and use anatomically correct dolls for purposes of demonstration.112 
Hence, the witness must be allowed to give evidence in their own words, in their 
own way and at their own speed. This is of particular importance where the witness 
is less knowledgeable or sophisticated113 or may be a disabled child or have 
communication difficulties.114 
 
                                            
109 Subsection 2 was substituted by section 1 of Act 135 of 1991 and came into force on 
30/07/1993. 
110 Joubert et alThe Law of South Africa Vol 9 Evidence para 774. 
111 S 161 (2). 
112 Songca “The reliability of anatomically correct dolls in child abuse cases” 1993 SACJ 83. See 
also paras 3.7 and 4.7 of the Department of Justice and Constitutional Development Report 
on the Re-Establishment of Sexual Offences Courts (2013) for respectively a discussion on 
the use of anatomically correct dolls and the proposed standards for their usage. 
113 S v Hendriks 1974 (2) PH H91 (C). 
114 Ministry of Justice, Welsh Assembly Government “Achieving best evidence in criminal 
proceedings: guidance on interviewing victims and witnesses, and guidance on using special 
measures” (August 2013) available at http://www.justice.gov.uk/downloards/victims-and-
witnesses/vulnerable-witnesses/achieving-best-evidence-criminal-proceedings.pdf 
(accessed 30/10/2013). 
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In S v Roux115 the court held that it was not the intention of the legislature to set out 
a numerus clausus in section 161(2) of what would constitute viva voce evidence, 
but that the courts have over the years adopted a wide interpretation of the said 
concept. It was further held that criminal courts should not create obstacles to the 
giving of evidence by witnesses who could not convey their evidence in the usual 
manner by narrowly interpreting legislation or legal principles. The purpose of the 
section is precisely the prevention of the exclusion of evidence simply because it is 
not understandable to the court, if an alternative method exists to render it 
comprehensible. In S v Roux the complainant in an indecent assault case was a 
ten-year-old boy with Down’s syndrome. He was able to speak. However, he could 
not speak in sentences and words comprehensible to the court. A speech therapist 
was able to interpret his communication and the court subsequently held that there 
was no reason why the complainant could not testify with the assistance of the 
speech therapist.116 
 
If we continue to insist that children present their testimony orally, regardless of 
whether this is done by way of CCTV, through an intermediary or perhaps even by 
way of pre-recorded videotaped evidence, allowances should be made for children 
to do so in terms of the provisions of section 161(2). This will not only accommodate 
children’s special needs but will also contribute to their successful participation in 
the process. 
 
2.3 Two opposing parties 
 
The accusatorial system is party-centred, with each party having to present its case 
to the court for adjudication. The two opposing parties are responsible for the 
collection, selection and submission of evidence in support of their respective cases 
                                            
115 2007 (1) SACR 379 (C). 
116 S v Roux 2007 (1) SACR 379 (C) at 383 f-j. 
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and for deciding on the order of its presentation.117 Both the prosecutor and the 
accused play an aggressive role in their presentation and interrogation of witnesses, 
while the judge plays a relatively neutral role.118 The opposing parties do not, 
however, have the same responsibility for proving their case. The burden of proof 
lies with the prosecution, which has to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt while 
the accused need only cause the court when reaching its decision to have a 
reasonable doubt concerning his or her guilt. An accused may do this by pointing 
out the weaknesses in the State’s case.119 
 
The essence of the adversarial system has consequently been described by 
Herrmann as a “dialectic dispute and challenge”.120 Snyman also points out that the 
adversarial system has been branded as being too Parteiverhafen – a contest 
between two parties, and that these parties can “manipulate” the truth for their own 
purposes in order to “win the case” regardless of truth and justice.121 It is precisely 
this sparring or aggressive challenge that child witnesses find extremely stressful 
and difficult to handle. 
The inquisitorial model is judge-centred in comparison. The prosecution and 
defence play a comparatively insignificant role. The judge decides on the order of 
vidence and on who will be called as witnesses. All questioning is conducted by the 
judge, who questions both the accused and the witnesses.122 The judge furthermore 
ascertains the relevance of the facts and neither the defence nor the prosecution 
has any burden of proof.123 The essence of the inquisitorial trial has accordingly 
been described as “a seeking of the truth by interrogation”.124 This process has, 
however, been criticised for the fact that the judge has to fulfil three roles in one. He 
or she has to conduct the examination-in-chief and the cross-examination and also 
                                            
117 See ss150-151 of the Criminal Procedure Act. 
118 S 166 of the Criminal Procedure Act. 
119 Schwikkard “The standard and burden of proof and evidential duties in criminal trials” in 
Schwikkard & Van der Merwe Principles of Evidence (2009) 3 1 2.  
120 Herrmann 1978 SACC 6. 
121 Snyman 1975 CILSA 108. 
122 Herrmann 1978 SACC 13; Steytler 2001 Law, Democracy & Development 2-3; Roodt 2004 
Fundamina 140. 
123 McEwan Evidence and the Accusatorial Process: The Modern Law 2 revised ed (1998) 4. 
124 Herrmann 1978 SACC 6. 
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has to access the evidence. As a result the judge may have to decide on the efficacy 
of his or her own questioning. This is problematic as research has shown that even 
though an interviewer strives to remain impartial, subconsciously questions are 
formulated according to the hypothesis that the interviewer has formed regarding 
the facts.125 
 
Despite the fact that both the accusatorial and the inquisitorial systems have their 
advantages and disadvantages, in the context of the child witness, especially those 
who are very young or highly vulnerable, the advantages of the inquisitorial method 
and particularly those of a neutral inquisitorial examination seem to outweigh its 
disadvantages.126 A possible solution to the adversarial two-party system is to allow 
the child victim to testify with the help of a “go between” or intermediary. However, 
the role assigned by law to an intermediary puts a damper on this solution as an 
intermediary is not allowed to question the witness independently. The power of an 
intermediary to interfere is curtailed as this can only be exercised in response to 
questions put by one of the parties. The parties are still in control of the process as 
they confine the witness and the intermediary to those aspects of the case they wish 
to investigate.127 This raises the question of whether serious consideration should 
not be given to the role of an intermediary with a view to extending this role. This 
will be explored in more detail later in this thesis.  
 
2.4 Confrontation 
 
The right of an accused to confront his or her accuser has a long history and may 
possibly date back to the historic Roman ordeal of “trial by combat”. In a biblical 
                                            
125 Herrmann 1978 SACC 13. 
126 Spencer in Spencer & Lamb (ed) Children and Cross-examination: Time to Change the Rules? 
15. 
127 Van der Merwe “Cross-examination of the (sexually abused) child witness in a 
constitutionalized adversarial trial system: is the South African intermediary the solution?” 
1995 Obiter 194 at 199. 
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passage Festus, the Roman Governor, while discussing the treatment of Paul during 
his imprisonment, wrote as follows: 
 
It is not the manner of the Romans to deliver any man up to die before the accused 
has met his accusers face to face, and has been given the chance to defend himself 
against the charges.128 
 
This right to confrontation has traditionally been deemed by the accusatorial system 
to be fundamental to a fair trial and essential to due process.129 Under the 
accusatorial system this is accomplished in the following ways. Firstly, the right 
reflects a preference for a face-to-face encounter at a trial. Although the witness 
need not look at the accused (he or she may look elsewhere), witnesses must 
normally testify in the defendant’s physical presence as it is believed that witnesses 
are less likely to lie in the presence of an accused.130 Secondly, the witness must 
testify under oath or affirmation, and this impresses the seriousness of the matter 
on the witness. Thirdly, the accused as well as the court is able to witness, at first 
hand, not only the content of the witness’s testimony but also the demeanour of the 
witness while testifying.131 Fourthly, the right also includes the right to cross-
examine the witness.132 This right is considered so fundamental that any violation 
thereof is regarded as an irregularity and will result in a conviction being 
overturned.133  
 
                                            
128 Thomas “The confrontation clause and New Mexico’s short lived acceptance of surrogate 
forensic witnesses” 2012 New Mexico LR 266. 
129 Van der Merwe 1995 Obiter 195. See Coy v Iowa US, 1012 (1988) 865-866 where it was held 
that there is “something deep in human nature that regards face-face confrontation between 
accused and accuser as … essential to a fair trial in a criminal prosecution”. 
130 Schwikkard “The abused child: a few rules of evidence considered” 1996 Acta Juridica 148 at 
156.  
131 This includes facial expression, body language and vocal inflections. 
132 Myers Myers on Evidence in Child, Domestic and Elder Abuse Cases Vol 2 (2005) 630-631. 
133 S v Motlata 1975 (1) SA 814 (TPD) at 815. 
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Research conducted by Saywitz and Nathanson as well as by Hill and Hill has 
shown that one of the most traumatic aspects of the legal process for the child victim 
is having to face his or her assailant.134 Consequently the most negative and 
frightening aspect of testifying in court, as perceived by children, is the face-to-face 
confrontation with the assailant, especially if that person is a family member. This 
also influences the quality of their evidence.135 Confrontational testimony leads to 
extreme emotional distress for a child, who may display signs of nervousness, fear 
and anxiety while testifying. This could be coupled with emotional consequences 
such as feelings of betrayal, helplessness and powerlessness.136 Confronting the 
accused could also bring the memory back vividly. In addition the child may 
experience feelings of shame or guilt, particularly if the perpetrator stands in an 
intra-familiar relationship with the child. This decreases the willingness and ability of 
a child witness to give an accurate description of the events.137 Empirical evidence 
has in fact shown that this fear and intimidation do not encourage children to tell the 
truth but make them more likely to say, “I don’t know” or whatever they believe their 
perceived tormentor wants to hear just to put an end to the ordeal. They may even 
refrain from answering at all.138 The presence of an accused may thus have both 
traumatic and inhibiting effects on the child who is testifying. 
 
Adler139 describes an instance where a little girl of eleven had a complete 
breakdown in court after being asked to point out the man who had attacked her. 
She was so disturbed that she was unable to return to court. The following day the 
court was informed that she was undergoing psychiatric treatment and would not be 
available for further questioning. Key140 likewise described the case of a twelve-
                                            
134 Saywitz & Nathanson “Children’s testimony and their perceptions of stress in and out of the 
courtroom” 1993 Child Abuse and Neglect 614; Hill & Hill “Videotaping children’s testimony: 
an empirical view” 1987 Michigan LR 809-833. 
135 Saywitz & Nathanson Child Abuse and Neglect 614; Hill & Hill1987 Michigan LR 809-833. 
136 Brannon 1994 Law & Psychology Review 439 at 442-443. 
137 Brannon 1994 Law & Psychology Review 439 at 442-443. 
138 Schwikkard 1996 Acta Juridica 149 at 158. See also Müller’s reference to a number of studies 
on the effect of the stress of court appearance on child witnesses (Müller 2000 CARSA 13 at 
15-17); Thoman 2013 Nevada LJ 240. 
139 Adler Rape on Trial (1987) 51-52. 
140 Key “The child witness: the battle for justice” 1988 (1) De Rebus 54. 
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year-old boy who had, over a period of time, been sodomised by his father, as 
follows: 
 
 Throughout the hearing the boy demonstrated signs of severe anxiety. He held his 
hand against his face to blinker out the sight of his father. When asked why he was 
so upset he said that his father has, on numerous occasions, produced a knife and 
threatened to kill him if he ever told anyone about what he had done to him.  
 
Key also questions the wisdom of subjecting children to this confrontation and goes 
so far as to assert that:  
 
had I known then what I know now, I would have doubted the wisdom of laying 
charges which would result in this young boy being subjected to the horrendous 
secondary abuse he received in court.141 
 
Procedures to reduce the stress suffered by child witnesses are therefore essential. 
This will not only benefit the child, but will also ensure that the truth-seeking process 
is not impeded as a result of the child’s inability to give effective testimony in the 
presence of the accused.142 This can be achieved by rearranging the courtroom so 
that a child does not see the accused, by placing a screen between the child and 
the accused, by having special children’s courtrooms, by allowing the child to give 
evidence in another room via CCTV, or by allowing a pre-recorded video of the 
child’s evidence as evidence-in-chief.143 
 
                                            
141 Key 1988 (1) De Rebus 54 
142 Brannon 1994 Law & Psychology Review 439 at 446. 
143 Refer to the Department of Justice and Constitutional Development Report on the Re-
establishment of Sexual Offences Courts (2013) at 55 for a description of a best practice 
model for a child-sensitive court as well as proposed standards for testifying rooms.   
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This, however, raises the question of whether the rights of the child victim take 
precedence over the confrontational rights of an accused. Courts in the United 
States of America (USA) have also wrestled with this issue. The Sixth Amendment 
to the Constitution of the USA provides inter alia that in all criminal proceedings an 
accused shall enjoy the right “to be confronted with the witnesses against him” and 
is generally referred to as the “confrontation clause”.144 This right is firmly rooted in 
federal jurisprudence and has been the subject of consideration in various court 
cases. According to the US Supreme Court, this right is not absolute but may give 
way to certain exceptions. This would be the case where it is justifiable to exclude 
a witness, and public policy considers it to be necessary to achieve more compelling 
goals, such as the protection of sexually abused child victims.145 
 
The issue of the rights of a child victim versus the right of an accused to 
confrontation was specifically addressed in two prominent US cases, namely Coy v 
Iowa146 and Maryland v Craig.147 In Coy v Iowa the question arose whether a screen 
placed between the accused and the child witness violated the accused’s right to 
confrontation and consequently to a fair trial. The court held that the Iowa statutes, 
allowing the use of a screen in order to avoid trauma for a child victim witness, 
created a legislatively imposed presumption of trauma, which was not sufficient to 
create an exception to the confrontation clause. According to the court the exception 
had to further an important public policy and a finding of trauma to the child had to 
be case-specific. The court held that in the present case the child witness did not 
require special protection and that the right of the accused to confrontation had 
consequently been violated.148 The court stated that: 
 
                                            
144 Brannon 1994 Law & Psychology Review 439 at 446. 
145 See Mattox v US 156 US 237 (1895); California v Green 399 US 149 158 (1970). 
146 486 US 1012 (1988). 
147 497 US 836 (1990). 
148 Maryland v Craig 497 US 836 (1990) at 1020-1022. 
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face-to-face presence may, unfortunately, upset the truthful rape victim or abused 
child; but by the same token it may confound and undo the false accuser, or reveal 
the child coached by a malevolent adult.149 
 
Not surprisingly, this decision has been criticised by Watkins and other academics 
for not being supportive of child abuse victims who are called upon to testify to the 
event in open court.150 
 
In Maryland v Craig151 the court came to a contrary conclusion and allowed the child 
victim to testify by way of one-way CCTV. The court held that the right guaranteed 
by the confrontation clause was not absolute, but could be satisfied if an alternative 
procedure advanced a compelling public policy interest (protecting the child victim), 
and that the state’s interest in avoiding emotional trauma to the child outweighed 
the right of an accused to confront the child witness. The court pointed out, however, 
that the need for protective measures had to be determined on a case-by-case basis 
and that a child’s general anxiety about the courtroom would not suffice to disallow 
personal appearance. The court held that in order to make a finding of necessity 
that would deny an accused the right to confrontation, the emotional distress or 
trauma to the child witness had to result not from being in the courtroom but from 
testifying in the presence of the accused and had to be more than de minimis, in 
other words more than mere nervousness or some reluctance to testify.152 
 
The approach followed by the court in Maryland v Craig is also not beyond criticism. 
Bloe153 questions the court’s constitutional standard for determining the admissibility 
                                            
149 Maryland v Craig 497 US 836 (1990) at 1020. 
150 See Watkins “The double victim: the sexually abused child and the judicial system” 1990 Child 
and Adolescent Social Work Journal 29 at 33; Cassim “The right of child witnesses versus the 
accused’s right to confrontation” 2003 CILSA 65 at 74.   
151 497 US 836(1990). 
152 At 856. 
153 Bloe “Maryland v Craig: the court’s use as evidence of videotaped testimony of a child who 
has been sexually abused is declared not to violate a criminal defendant’s sixth amendment 
right to confront his accuser” 1991 Southern Law University LR 275 at 290-291.  
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of CCTV. He contends that “allowing judges to use their personal experience to 
determine the psychological fitness of a child witness on such a critical issue as a 
defendant’s constitutional right is unjust”. He furthermore maintains that the 
constitutional standards of not being able to testify in the “presence of the accused” 
and suffering emotional stress that exceeds “mere nervousness or excitement or 
reluctance to testify” are too broad and that the court should have laid down specific 
guidelines for determining the necessitous circumstances and degree of 
psychological trauma that would trigger the exception. He also raises the question 
whether protection of this kind will also be extended to victims of other crimes, such 
as rape victims, and whether witnesses will likewise be protected.154 Henderson,155 
concurring, points out that although Maryland v Craig confirmed that the door 
remains open to special measures, it sets a high threshold of serious emotional 
distress for their admission. She also highlights the dangers inherent in the judicial 
discretion by quoting Hoyana and Keenan, who state that “the necessity for a ‘harm 
hearing’ [psychological trauma] is a strong disincentive to prosecutors using 
innovative measures to protect the child whilst testifying”.156 
 
Shortly after Maryland v Craig Congress enacted the Child Victim’s and Child 
Witnesses’ Rights (CVCWR) Statute in a bid to remedy the situation. This statute 
provides for two-way CCTV and videotaped depositions. Not long after, the 
protection afforded to child victims was also extended to child witnesses in Gonzales 
v State157 where the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals allowed a child witness, who 
was not the victim, to testify via CCTV. In addition the constitutionality of the CVCWR 
statute was upheld in US v Farley.158 This clearly illustrates the significance of public 
interest in protecting child victims and/or witnesses when they are testifying in open 
court. 
                                            
154 Bloe 1991 Southern Law University LR 275 at 290-291.  
155 Henderson in Spencer Children and Cross-examination: Time to Change the Rules? 53. 
156 Hoyana & Keenan Child Abuse: Law and Policy Across Boundaries (2010) 652 as quoted by 
Henderson in Spencer Children and Cross-examination: Time to Change the Rules? 53.  
157 818 SW 2d 756 757 (Texas Criminal Appeals 1991). 
158 992 F2d 1122 (10 cir 1993). 
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The right to confrontation is presently also a procedural right in terms of the South 
African adversarial system. It not only entitles an accused to be present at the trial 
but also to defend himself or herself face-to-face against the charges brought by his 
or her accusers, except where this has been expressly excluded by any other law.159 
In S v Motlatla160 Coleman J remarked that:  
 
every criminal trial shall take place, and the witness shall give their evidence, viva 
voce, in open court in the presence of the accused. That is a very important provision 
of our criminal law and it means more than that an accused must know what the 
State witnesses are saying or have said about him. It means even more than that 
he shall be able to hear them saying it. There must be a confrontation: he must see 
them as they depose against him so that he can observe their demeanour. And they 
for their part must give their evidence in the face of the accused.  
 
This right is also entrenched in the Constitution of South Africa in that section 35(3)(i) 
provides that “every accused person has a right to a fair trial, which includes the 
right to adduce and challenge evidence”. The right to challenge evidence includes 
the right to confront one’s adversary through cross-examination and may thus 
include the right to confrontation.161 
 
However, as a result of the State’s awareness of the hardship experienced by child 
victims and witnesses in the South African adversarial court system, the South 
African legislature on the recommendation of the Commission enacted evidentiary 
rules designed to reduce the emotional distress experienced by victims of and/or 
witnesses to crime. This entails the appointment of an intermediary in certain cases 
                                            
159  See ss 158 and 166 of the Criminal Procedure Act. 
160 1975 (1) SA 814 (TPD) at 815 E-F. 
161 See S v Msimango 2010 (1) SACR 544 (GSJ) at para [27] and Cassim 2003 CILSA fn 5. 
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and the elimination of face-to-face confrontation by means of CCTV or other 
electronic devices.162 
 
In terms of section 158(2) and (3) a court may, subject to certain conditions, order 
that a witness may give evidence by means of CCTV or similar electronic media if it 
appears to the court that to do so would be in the interests of justice or the public, 
or if it is likely to prevent prejudice or harm that might result to any person if he or 
she testifies at the proceedings.163 In terms of section 170A(2) of the Criminal 
Procedure Act no examination, cross-examination or re-examination, except an 
examination by the court, may take place other than through an intermediary. In 
such an instance the court may direct that the relevant witness shall give his or her 
evidence at any place that is informally arranged; that any person whose presence 
may upset the witness must be outside the sight and hearing of that witness and 
that any such testimony must proceed through the medium of any electronic device 
or other devices.164 In terms of both the procedure laid down in section 158 and the 
“intermediary system” a witness can therefore be observed by the accused by 
means of CCTV aids, but the witness is entitled not to observe the accused. Direct 
confrontation between the two parties is excluded in this way. 
 
The constitutionality of section 170A of the Criminal Procedure Act was challenged 
in K v Regional Court Magistrate.165 The court held inter alia that a child witness 
may often find it traumatic and stressful to give evidence in the adversarial 
atmosphere of a courtroom. Sound reasons therefore exist why the procedure 
contemplated in section 170A might enable a child to participate properly in the 
judicial system and could lead to a furthering of the truth-seeking function of the 
                                            
162 See ss 158 (2) and 170A of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977. S 158 was enacted in 
1996 by s 7 of the Criminal Procedure Amendment Act 86 of 1996; s 170A was inserted into 
the Criminal Procedure Act in 1991 by s 3 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act 135 of 1991. 
163 This may for example be the case where the witness does not necessarily require an 
intermediary but would suffer prejudice or harm if confronted by the accused. See also S v F 
1999 (1) SACR 571 (C). 
164 Own emphasis. See ss 170(A)(2)(a) and (3)(a)-(c) of the Criminal Procedure Act. 
165 1996 (1) SACR 434 (E). 
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court. The court also held that the constitutional rights of an accused to a fair trial 
are not infringed if the complainant gives evidence in a separate room. The court 
referred to the following remarks by O’Conner in Maryland v Craig at 683: 
 
We likewise conclude today that a State’s interest in the physical and psychological 
well-being of child abuse victims may be sufficiently important to outweigh, at least 
in some cases, a defendant’s right to face his or her accusers in court. That a 
significant majority of States have enacted statutes to protect child witnesses from 
the trauma of giving testimony in child abuse cases attests to the widespread belief 
in the importance of such a public policy.166 
 
The court also pointed out that as the section does not prevent an accused from 
challenging the testimony of a child witness the provision does not infringe an 
accused’s right to a fair trial. The court therefore concluded that section 170A of the 
Criminal Procedure Act was not unconstitutional, but that a “proper balance between 
the protection of a child witness and the rights of an accused to a fair trial can … be 
achieved by permitting the witness to testify in congenial surroundings and out of 
sight of the accused.”167 Section 170A consequently modifies the established rules 
of evidence in such a manner that it does not deny an accused the right to question 
a witness or to observe the demeanour of the witness. One may argue that the 
accused is still able to “confront” the child witness albeit not in a face-to-face 
manner. In this respect there has been no real or critical deviation from the 
adversarial model. What is precluded is the potential harmful effect on the child. 
 
In addition notice should be taken of the fact that although much emphasis is placed 
on the demeanour of a witness, the demeanour of a witness can in fact be very 
misleading. In S v Kelley168 the Court of Appeal pointed out that: 
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there can be little point in comparing the demeanour only of one witness with that of 
another seeking the truth. In any event as counsel conceded in a homely metaphor 
demeanour is, at best, a tricky horse to ride. There is no doubt that demeanour – 
‘that vague and indefinable factor in estimating a witness’s credibility’ (per 
HORWITZ AJ in R v Lekaota 1947 (4) SA 258 (O) at 263) – can be most misleading. 
The hallmark of a truthful witness is not always a confident and courteous manner 
or an appearance of frankness and candour … [A]n honest witness may be shy or 
nervous by nature, and in the witness-box show such hesitation and discomfort as 
to lead the court into concluding wrongly, that he is not a truthful person. 
 
In S v Vilikazi169 the Supreme Court of Appeal likewise pointed out that “even honest 
witnesses have the capacity for error and reconstruction and at times place events 
in the incorrect sequence”. This may be even truer of child witnesses, especially 
those that are very young or highly vulnerable. 
 
In comparison with the accusatorial system, in the inquisitorial system the presiding 
officer elicits the evidence by questioning the child witness. There is no cross-
examination and the presiding officer tests the reliability and accuracy of the 
witness. Direct confrontation between the accused and the child witness is therefore 
unknown. In terms of the French criminal justice system, for example, child 
witnesses are questioned in chambers during the pre-trial phase by a specialist 
interviewer and the investigating judge. Children thus rarely “testify” and are never 
cross-examined either by the court or by an unrepresented accused. As the 
proceedings resemble an inquiry children find this process considerably less 
traumatic than a confrontational “battle” in an accusatorial court system.170 
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It is thus imperative that the accusatorial system be balanced by employing 
alternative means through the use of technological innovations and child aids such 
as screens, CCTV and/or the use of intermediaries to alleviate the trauma 
experienced by children while testifying. 
 
While delivering the Bar Council’s annual law reform lecture,171 the former Lord 
Chief Justice of England and Wales, Lord Igor Baron, expressed the opinion that 
child victims and child witnesses should no longer have to give evidence or be cross-
examined in court as the advances in video technology could be exploited to spare 
victims of sexual offences the ordeal of appearing in a courtroom. He told the legal 
audience at Inner Temple in central London the following:172 
 
[I]f the criminal justice system cannot adjust to such practices, the UK’s long tradition 
of adversarial justice needs to be reviewed … [T]he day will surely come and in my 
view it has already arrived, when the physical presence of a child witness or victim 
in the court building will be, and should be regarded as an antediluvian hangover 
from laughable far off days of the quill pen and ink well. 
He emphasised that justice can be done by examining the evidence of the child via 
video recording, and begged the question why the child has to be present in court. 
He expressed the view that our long-term ambition must be that the impact of the 
unhappy event of which child victims and witnesses have to speak should not be 
exacerbated by the process, but should be reduced and kept to an irreducible 
minimum.173 
 
                                            
171 “The evidence of child victims: the next stage” in Bowcott “Child victims and witnesses should 
no longer appear in court, says Lord Judge” The Guardian (21/11/2013) available at 
http://theguardian.com/law/2013/nov/21/child-victims-witnesses-court-lord-judge (accessed 
10/01/2104). 
172 Bowcott The Guardian (21/11/2013) available at http://theguardian.com/law/2013/nov/21/ 
child-victims-witnesses-court-lord-judge (accessed 10/01/2104).  
173 Bowcott The Guardian (21/11/2013) available at http://theguardian.com/law/2013/nov/21 
child-victims-witnesses-court-lord-judge (accessed 10/01/2104). 
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I strongly concur with Lord Baron that child victims and children should no longer 
have to give evidence or be cross-examined in court in the presence of the accused 
as the advances in video technology could be exploited to spare victims of sexual 
offences the ordeal of appearing in a courtroom. The possibility that children may 
not have to be present in the courtroom or even the court building already exists in 
the South African context. As was indicated above, in terms of section 170A(3) of 
the South African Criminal Procedure Act the court may direct that the relevant 
witness should give his or her evidence at any place that is informally arranged; that 
any person whose presence could upset the witness should be outside the sight 
and hearing of that witness and that any such testimony should proceed through the 
medium of any electronic or other devices.174 The use of what has been labelled 
“virtual courtrooms” that enable a child to testify by means of a live video link from 
any place as an alternative to the present system should therefore receive serious 
consideration. Such a facility, away from the court building, has the advantage of 
being more child-friendly and ensures that the child witness will not run the risk of 
coming face-to-face with the alleged perpetrator.175 
 
 
 
2.5 Cross-examination 
 
Cross-examination lies at the heart of the accusatorial system and represents the 
“weapon” in the battle between the two opposing parties. By implication, adversarial 
examination has been described as “combative or aggressive”.176 Despite being 
combative or perhaps because of it, it is regarded by the system as fundamental to 
the discovery of the truth and the establishment of credibility. Enormous value and 
                                            
174 Own emphasis. See ss 170(A)(2)(a) and (3)(a)-(c) of the Criminal Procedure Act. 
175 See para 3.5 of ch 5 below for a further discussion on intermediary facilities and virtual courts. 
176 Volkmann-Schluck “Continental European criminal procedures: true or illusive model? 1981 
American Journal of Criminal Law 1. 
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importance is attributed to cross-examination. Wigmore described it as the “greatest 
legal engine ever invented for the discovering of the truth” while nevertheless 
conceding that “it might be that in more than one sense it takes the place in our 
system which torture occupied in the medieval system of the civilians”.177 
 
In K v The Regional Court Magistrate178 the South African judiciary reiterated this 
importance by stating that “cross-examination is a powerful weapon: it may, and 
often does play an important part in the decision of a trial court. The effect of a telling 
and efficient cross-examination should not be underestimated.”   
 
The underlying purpose or object of cross-examination in terms of the accusatorial 
system is: 
 
to impeach the accuracy, credibility and general value of the evidence in chief; to 
sift the facts already stated by the witness, to detect and expose discrepancies or to 
elicit suppressed facts which will support the case of the cross-examining party.179 
 
The object of cross-examination is thus two-fold: to elicit information that is 
favourable to the party on whose behalf the cross-examination is conducted and to 
cast doubt upon the accuracy of the evidence-in-chief given against such party.180 
The essence of any defence is accordingly introduced during cross-examination as 
it represents the process whereby an opponent’s witness is questioned. Cross-
examination differs from examination-in-chief in that the cross-examiner may put 
leading questions to the witness.181 The questions need not be relevant to the issues 
                                            
177 Evidence in Trials at Common Law on Evidence (1974) 1367. 
178 1996 (1) SACR 434 (E) at 442. 
179 Caroll v Caroll 1947 (4) SA 37 (D) at 40. 
180 K v Regional Court Magistrate 1996 (1) SACR 434 (E) at 442. 
181 A leading question is one that implies or suggests an answer or assumes the existence of 
certain facts which might be in issue, eg “You went to his house, didn’t you?” whereas specific 
non-leading questions ask the child to provide information in a direct manner, eg “What 
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raised during the examination-in-chief. The questions may, however, not be 
completely irrelevant or amount to a “fishing expedition”.182 The right to cross-
examine a witness arises as soon as a witness has been sworn in or has made an 
affirmation.183 
 
This right is provided for in South African Law in section 166 of the Criminal 
Procedure Act and is entrenched in the Constitution in section 35(3)(i), which 
guarantees an accused the right to a fair trial and includes the right to adduce and 
challenge evidence. Section 166 of the Criminal Procedure Act provides as follows: 
An accused may cross-examine any witness called on behalf of the prosecution at 
criminal proceedings or any co-accused who testifies at criminal proceedings or any 
witness called on behalf of such co-accused at criminal proceedings, and the 
prosecutor may cross-examine any witness, including an accused, called on behalf 
of the defence at criminal proceedings, and a witness called at such proceedings on 
behalf of the prosecution may be re-examined by the prosecutor on any matter 
raised during the cross-examination of that witness, and any witness called on 
behalf of the defence at such proceeding may likewise be re-examined by the 
accused. 
 
The right to cross-examination is, however, not an absolute right. The Criminal 
Procedure Act limits the right in sections 166(3)184 and 170A. In addition the courts 
                                            
happened in the room?” or “Was it day or night?” or “What was the man wearing?”. See 
Plotnikoff and Woolfson Intermediaries in the Criminal Justice System: Improving 
Communication for Vulnerable Witnesses 155-156; Müller “Clinical and forensic interviews 
and the child witness” 2001 CARSA 8 at 11-12; Zajac “Investigative interviews in the 
courtroom: child witnesses and cross-examination” in Bull, Valentine and Williamson 
Handbook of Psychology of Investigative Interviewing: Current Developments and Future 
Directions (2009) 162 at 163. 
182 Joubert et al The Law of South Africa Vol 9 Evidence para 776. It should be noted that the 
presiding officer has the right to control the proceedings and to limit or curtail cross-
examination (K v Regional Court Magistrate 1996 (1) SACR 434 (E) at 445). See for example 
s 166(3) of the Criminal Procedure Act. 
183 R v Ndawo 1961 (1) SA 16 (N). 
184 Section 166(3) provides that if it appears to a court that any cross-exanimation is being 
protracted unreasonably and is thereby causing the proceedings to be delayed unreasonably, 
the court may request the cross-examiner to disclose the relevancy of any particular line of 
examination and may impose reasonable limits on the examination. The authority of a 
presiding officer to control cross-examination will be further strengthened once section 342A 
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have a discretion to disallow questioning that is irrelevant, unduly repetitive, 
oppressive or otherwise improper.185 Furthermore, the right to “challenge evidence” 
does not guarantee an entitlement to subject all evidence to cross-examination.186 
 
In addition the judiciary has provided some guidance on what constitutes proper 
cross-examination. In S v Gidi the court held the following:187 
 
A proper cross-examination does not permit the gratuitous intimidation of an 
accused. A prosecutor should not bully an accused by insulting him, brow-beating 
him or adopting an overbearing attitude … A prosecutor should not unnecessarily 
ridicule an accused or taunt him or offend his sensibilities or provoke him to anger, 
or play upon his emotions in order to place him at an unfair disadvantage and 
incapacitate him from answering questions to the best of his ability. In the case of 
many a witness it calls for no skill to intimidate or confuse or distress a witness who 
does not have the resources of intellect, language or personality to defend himself 
against a bullying prosecutor. Conduct of this kind offends against good manners, 
politeness and humanity.  
 
In this regard it should be remembered that the witness is assisting the court in its 
search for justice. The following sentiments of Snyman J in S v Azov remind us of 
the duty to bear this in mind:188 
 
I think it must be made clear to him, and perhaps to others, that the witnesses who 
come into court, be they police witnesses or any other kind of witness, are entitled 
to the ordinary courtesy one extends to decent people. Witnesses who give 
                                            
of the Criminal Procedure Act comes into operation. Section 342A empowers presiding 
officers to award costs against a party that is responsible for unduly delaying the completion 
of proceedings, whether through irrelevant cross-examination or otherwise. 
185 K v Regional Court Magistrate 1996 (1) SACR 434 (E) at 442.  
186 S v Ndhlovu 2002 (2) SACR 325 (SCA) at 340. 
187 1984 (4) SA 537 (C) at 539I-540B. 
188 1974 (1) SA 808 (T) at 810. 
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evidence are assisting the court at arriving at the truth and in carrying out the 
administration of justice. No cross-examiner is entitled to insult a witness or to treat 
him in the manner in which these witnesses are treated, without there being a very 
good reason. Witnesses must be treated with courtesy and respect.  
 
Cross-examination need not amount to bullying and insulting behaviour, however. 
The case of S v M189 represents an excellent example of proper cross-examination: 
 
[The] [c]omplainant at the time of testifying was some 13 years old. I endeavoured 
to make [the] complainant feel at ease whilst testifying, conveying to her the 
significance of the oath and the telling of the truth. Her mother was present and the 
court was cleared. She appeared to me to be at ease although she was tearful from 
time to time…She was given the assurance that should she in any way feel 
uncomfortable the court would adjourn so as to enable her to compose herself 
should the need arise. Bearing in mind her youthfulness, the examination of the 
complainant, albeit at times of a searching nature, was generally conducted in a 
gentle manner and both counsel are to be complimented in this regard in that the 
questioning, albeit searching, was gentle in nature. There was no raising of voices 
and every effort was made to put the complainant at ease. The court at all times 
bore in mind that she was a young girl and that a court appearance is indeed a 
daunting experience.  
 
Some guidance as to proper cross-examination can be found in the ethical rules of 
the legal profession. The Code of Conduct: Uniform Rules of the Professional Ethics 
of the General Bar Council of South Africa190 requires advocates to observe certain 
                                            
189 2000 (1) SACR 484 (W). In contrast to the possible harmful effects of legal proceedings, it has 
been argued by some that the same procedure may be beneficial to a child. Phynoos & 
Eths1984 Journal of Social Issues 98 at 109 argue that testifying can serve as a coping 
strategy and can provide the child with a sense of psychological closure. The abovementioned 
case illustrates such an opportunity. Levett “Contradictions and confusions in child sexual 
abuse” 1991 SACJ 9 at 17 agrees that if properly conducted, the outcome of a case may be 
vindicating for a child but points out that from a South African point of view these cases are in 
the minority.  
190 See para 3.3 of the Code of Conduct: Uniform Rules of the Professional Ethics of the General 
Bar Council of South Africa. 
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ethical rules while cross-examining witnesses. Non-compliance with these rules 
may lead to certain sanctions such as removal from the Roll of Advocates. 
Particularly relevant to this thesis is the rule that questions which affect the credibility 
of a witness, but are not otherwise relevant, should not be asked by an advocate, 
unless the advocate has reasonable grounds for thinking that the imputation 
conveyed by the question is true or well-founded. Likewise, questions that relate to 
matters so remote in time or of such a character that they would not affect the 
credibility of the witness should not be asked. Advocates should also guard against 
putting questions which are only intended to incense or annoy the witness.191 
 
In contrast to advocates, attorneys have to respect the rules of their respective 
provincial law societies. These rules vary from province to province regarding the 
extent to which and the manner in which misconduct is prohibited.192 The rules of 
the Law Society of the Northern Provinces, for example, do not regulate cross-
examination in as much detail as the rules of the Bar Council do. As attorneys and 
advocates are equally involved in the cross-examination of child witnesses, it is 
submitted that a uniform code of conduct, prescribing proper conduct to all members 
of the legal profession, should be considered. This would enhance the quality of 
cross-examination and assist presiding officers in exercising their discretionary duty 
in curtailing unbecoming cross-examination.  
                                            
191 See para 3.3 (a) and (d). 
192 The Cape Law Society Rules in terms of Rule 14.3 provide that members should at all times 
conduct themselves in the following ways: 
14.3.1 maintain the highest standards of honesty and integrity; 
14.3.2 treat the interests of their clients as paramount, provided that their conduct shall be 
subject to  
14.3.2.1  their duty to the court; 
14.3.2.2  the interests of justice; 
14.3.2.3  the observation of the law; 
14.3.2.4 the maintenance of the ethical standards prescribed by this rule and generally 
recognised by the profession.  
The Law Society Rules of the Northern Province provide in Rule 89 that unprofessional or 
dishonourable or unworthy conduct on the part of a practitioner shall include, inter alia, the 
following acts and omissions: 
89.15 neglecting to give proper attention to the affairs of his/her client; 
89.30 without reasonable cause or excuse, failing to perform professional work, or work of 
a kind commonly performed by a practitioner, with such degree of skill, care or 
attention, or of such a quality or standard as in the opinion of the Council may be 
reasonably expected.   
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These rules and guidelines clearly illustrate that the cross-examination of witnesses 
is by implication open to abuse.193 This abuse has even been described by 
Schwikkard194 as “a treadmill of repetition and a quagmire of irrelevancies”. 
Vexatious, abusive or discourteous cross-examination is not allowed and presiding 
officers should see to it that the discretion afforded them to disallow this is exercised 
in the interests of justice.195 As was pointed out earlier,196 research has shown that 
because of the neutral role assigned to presiding officers in terms of the adversarial 
system, they are wary of exercising this discretion for fear of compromising judicial 
neutrality. Although in theory presiding officers have the authority to limit offensive, 
abusive and humiliating cross-examination, in practice this may prove a difficult task 
to perform as a denial of the right to cross-examination will almost without exception 
lead to a conviction being set aside on appeal.197 
 
Parties to the accusatorial process have a duty to cross-examine witnesses as 
failure to do so may lead to an inference against such party.198 Failure by a court to 
allow cross-examination may amount to an irregularity even if the refusal to do so is 
aimed at protecting a witness.199 In R v Ndawo200 an eight-year-old boy was called 
to testify against his own father in a housebreaking case. He indicated that he did 
not want to give evidence. The magistrate assured him that he need not be afraid. 
After being warned by the court to tell the truth, the boy burst into tears and was 
unable to testify. The magistrate dispensed with his testimony owing to the fact that 
the boy was “very distressed and frightened” and “had given no evidence in 
                                            
193 S v Booi 1964 (1) SA 224 (E); S v Omar 1982 (2) SA 357 (NPD); S v Hendricks 1997 (1) 
SACR 17 (C) at 177g-j; Africa Solar (Pty) Ltd v Divwatt (Pty) Ltd 2002 (4) SA 681 (SCA). 
194 Schwikkard Principles of Evidence 18 6 5 6. 
195 S v Cele 1965 (1) SA 82 (A) at 91. 
196 See para 1 of ch 3 above. 
197 Distillers Korporasie v Kotze 1956 (1) SA 557 (A); S v Cele 1965 (1) SA 82 (A). 
198 S v Boesak 2000 (1) SACR 633 (SCA); S v Fortuin 2008 (1) SACR 511 (C) at paras [13]-[15]; 
S v Naidoo 2010 (1) SACR 369 (KZP) at para [15]. 
199 Distillers Korporasie (SA) Bpk v Kotze 1956 (1) SA 357 (A); R v Ndawo 1961 (1) SA 16 (N) & 
S v Mugundu 2008 (1) SACR 71 (N) at 77. See also Van der Merwe in Schwikkard & Van der 
Merwe Principles of Evidence 18 6. 
200 1961 (1) SA 16 (N) at 16-18. 
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connection with the case”.201 The magistrate therefore did not consider it necessary 
for the boy to be examined by the accused. The Supreme Court on review held that 
even though the prosecutor was entitled to abandon the testimony of the child and 
the magistrate had acted in the child’s interests, the boy was already a Crown 
witness at that stage. To have disallowed the accused to cross-examine the witness 
had resulted in an irregularity, hence the conviction and sentence were set aside.202 
 
It is widely accepted that cross-examination is stressful for witnesses and there can 
be no doubt that it is even more so for children. It therefore comes as no surprise 
that much of the criticism concerning the treatment of child victims and child 
witnesses is directed against the vigorous cross-examination of the accusatorial 
system. This criticism is so often repeated that I shall refer to a few examples only. 
Key,203 in her description of the case of a twelve-year-old boy who had been 
sodomised by his father over a period of time, highlights some of the problems faced 
by the boy during the court process. She states that: 
 
the older boy first gave evidence in court at the beginning of April 1986; eight months 
after the charges were laid. He was subjected to one and a half days of persistent 
and detailed cross-examination about appalling sexual abuse to which he had been 
subjected by his father for as far back as he could remember. Throughout the 
hearing the boy demonstrated signs of severe anxiety. He held his hands against 
his face to blinker out the sight of his father. When asked why he was so upset he 
said that his father had on numerous occasions, produced a knife and threatened to 
kill him if he ever told anyone about what his father had done to him. The case was 
remanded for two months and then remanded again because of a change in defence 
counsel. Finally, in October 1986, 14 months after the original charge was laid this 
unfortunate child was once again required to stand in the witness box for hour upon 
hour of gruelling cross-examination. Within 10 minutes of the first day he was in 
tears. As before, he held his hands against his face to avoid seeing his father. He 
                                            
201 At 17. Own emphasis. 
202 At 18. 
203 Key 1988 (1) De Rebus 54. 
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was bullied about details he could not remember. He was accused of being a liar. 
At this stage he broke down completely and pleaded to know why the defence did 
not believe him.  
 
Key points out that the object of cross-examination is to establish whether a child 
witness is lying.204 She emphasises that if the accused conducts the cross-
examination himself or herself the effect on the child can be terrifying. In this case 
a child may agree with the questions put to him or her by the accused out of mere 
fear of punishment for disagreeing. If the cross-examination is conducted by a 
lawyer the result is usually even more distressing for the child. She expresses deep 
concern over the adversarial process and states: 
 
The child will be taken through her evidence in the most intimate details. The cross-
examination will tend to bring out facts that are so grotesque that the child could 
never have imagined them. On the other hand, the child will be bullied for placing 
events, often months after they occurred, out of sequence and at times when they 
could not have occurred and for not being able to remember important details 
concerning an event. In addition the child will be subjected to the trauma of relating 
in the minutest detail the particulars of the sexual abuse.205 
 
In a feature on Carte Blanche206on the planned implementation of Sexual Offences 
Courts presented on 8 September 2013, one of the family members of a victim of 
sexual abuse described the cross-examination of the victim as follows:207 
 
And then they [the witnesses] said to my mom, ‘You won’t understand – they jump 
in from sentence number one, then they are coming back to sentence number four, 
                                            
204 Key 1988 (1) De Rebus 55. 
205 Key 1988 (1) De Rebus 55. 
206 A programme on the MNet TV channel. 
207 http://carteblance.dstv.com/story/Sexual-Offences-Courts-2013-09-8 (accessed 27/09/2013). 
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then they are jumping up and down … we can’t take it, it is too much.’ And then they 
just freak out and he is a free man. 
 
When asked whether there was any justice, she indicated that there was none, 
instead only deep trauma, and that “he [the victim] tried to commit suicide twice”. 
 
In the same broadcast in an interview on Carte Blanche with the father of two 
Nelspruit girls who had been sexually abused by Christiaan Lotter, he conveyed a 
similar experience with regard to the court process and stated:  
 
My child burst out into tears and had a nervous breakdown … We as parents and 
the new State prosecutor took the decision to save the children further trauma and 
requested that the State close the case at that stage and Mr Lotter be found guilty 
and sentenced on what he had already pleaded guilty on. 208 
 
In South Africa, as in most other countries with an adversarial system, the defence 
might initially proceed tactfully and gently in its cross-examination, but if the line of 
cross-examination does not yield the desired results the “forensic dual” is all too 
often employed.209 The adversarial nature of the cross-examination places the child 
in a position where the child finds himself or herself under attack. In order to achieve 
the desired aims a particular and highly specialised form of legal language, with very 
few modifications being made to accommodate children, is used. Children 
experience severe problems because the questions are complex, confusing, 
characterised by high-register vocabulary, legal terminology and sentences 
                                            
208 http://carteblance.dstv.com/story/Sexual-Offences-Courts-2013-09-8 (accessed 27/09/2013). 
209 Van der Merwe 1995 Obiter 194 at 200. 
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containing complicated grammatical constructions.210 Brennan and Brennan 
describe this as follows:211 
 
Questions of linguistic appropriateness, comprehensibility and concern for the 
psychology of the child witness are peripheral at best, and totally exploited at worst. 
The language format for cross-examination has a linguistic life of its own, 
independent of the age or status of the witness.  
 
In K v Regional Court Magistrate212 Müller explains in an affidavit that the child’s 
communication skills and the context in which questions are asked may distort the 
meaning attached to the child’s language. She also explains that this language 
problem becomes even more acute in cases of criminal prosecution for sexual 
offences because “it is overlaid by a range of emotional stresses and fears which 
flow from the traumatic events about which the child is called to testify”.213 In addition 
a number of techniques or tactics common to cross-examination cause serious 
difficulties with comprehension for child witnesses. These include the use of leading 
questions, hypothetical questions, age-inappropriate vocabulary, complex syntax, 
general ambiguity, a focus on peripheral detail and the posing of questions in an 
unpredictable sequence. Another technique used in cross-examination is either to 
accuse the child of lying or to cast doubt on the child’s testimony by stating that the 
child’s memory is faulty or questioning their certainty. These techniques are sure to 
confuse and disorientate children. Spencer and Glaser point out that “calling a child 
a liar rapidly reduces most children to tears” and that the “stress induced by this 
makes it hard for the child to remember accurately and think clearly”.214 
 
                                            
210 For an in-depth discussion on the issue, see Müller Prosecuting the Child Sex Offender (2001) 
176-203.  
211 Brennan & Brennan Strange Language – Child Victims under Cross-examination (1988) 31. 
212 1996 (1) SACR 434 (E). 
213 At 443. 
214 Spencer & Glaser “Sentencing, children’s evidence and children’s trauma” 1990 Criminal LR 
371 at 378. 
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In S v Tswai215 Marais J describes the nature of the questioning to which one of the 
accused was subjected as follows:  
 
The nature of the questioning to which No 1 was subjected is certainly a cause for 
concern. He was often asked badly phrased questions which were either very 
difficult to understand or so ambiguous that they were likely to be misunderstood. 
He was required to listen to long statements which contained a number of 
propositions and then to respond unqualifiedly. He was sometimes wrongly accused 
of not having answered the question which he had in fact answered. He was also 
wrongly accused of having answered previous questions in a particular manner 
when the record showed he did not.   
 
That this line of questioning presents serious problems for all witnesses, let alone 
children, is widely acknowledged across the accusatorial world.216 These 
techniques and this particular form of language make it impossible for children to 
communicate effectively and arguably go beyond testing their evidence.  
 
Fortunately the Commission has acknowledged this problem and in its Report on 
the Protection of Child Witnesses states the following:217 
 
It must be accepted that aggression towards witnesses, intimidation, the eliciting of 
contradictions, clever wordplay and the setting of traps do occur in the adversarial 
system and there is without a doubt a need to protect child witnesses by providing 
them with the assistance of professional people in court. The question is however 
whether the existing protection measures, namely objections and control by the 
presiding officer, are sufficient to protect the child witness from unfair cross-
                                            
215 1988 (1) SA 851 (C) at 858C. 
216 Henderson in Spencer & Lamb (ed) Children and Cross-examination: Time to Change the 
Rules? 55. 
217 South African Law Commission Report on the Protection of Child Witnesses Project 71 (1991) 
para 5.48. 
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examination. The Commission’s view is that the presiding officer’s power to curtail 
sharp and aggressive questioning, leading or suggestive questioning or protracted 
questioning is limited. 
 
The Commission has accepted that this aggressive and intimidating cross-
examination was neither necessary nor conducive to ascertaining the truth. The 
Commission has therefore recommended that a procedure of “translated” cross-
examination be used to curtail the negative effects of the adversarial system. This 
entails the use of an intermediary in certain circumstances. It has also 
recommended that in the event of such an appointment face-to-face confrontation 
should be eliminated through the use of CCTV or other electronic devices. The 
Commission was of the view that the use of “translated” cross-examination through 
an intermediary would not result in the loss of tactical cross-examination, but would 
limit aggressiveness towards and intimidation of child witnesses.218 As a result of 
the Commission’s recommendations section 170A of the Criminal Procedure Act 
was accordingly introduced. In terms of subsection (1), whenever it appears to a 
court in criminal proceedings that a witness under the mental or biological age of 
eighteen years would be exposed to undue mental stress or suffering if he or she 
testified in court, the court may appoint a competent person to act as an 
intermediary. In terms of section 170A(2) no examination-in-chief, cross-
examination or re-examination shall take place in any manner other than through 
the intermediary. Therefore neither the accused nor his or her attorney may question 
the child witness directly.  
 
In K v Regional Court Magistrate219 the court analysed the background and purpose 
of section 170A. The court acknowledged that children experience significant 
difficulties in dealing with the adversarial environment of a courtroom; that young 
persons may experience difficulties in fully comprehending the legal language of 
                                            
218 South African Law Commission Protection of the Child Witness Project 71 Working Paper 28 
(1989) para 4.2.  
219 1996 (1) SACR 434 (E). 
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legal proceedings and the role of the various participants; and that the adversarial 
procedure involves confrontation and cross-examination. The court held that it 
was:220 
 
quite convinced that a child witness may often find it traumatic and stressful to give 
evidence in the adversarial atmosphere of a court room and that the forceful cross-
examination of a young person by skilled counsel may be more likely to obfuscate 
than to reveal the truth. Moreover, criminal prosecution may be thwarted because of 
the unwillingness of young witnesses to subject themselves to the ordeal of the court 
hearing even if the proceedings are in camera. From these remarks it seems to me 
obvious that the ordinary procedures of the criminal justice system are inadequate to 
meet the needs and requirements of the child witness. Section 170A is designed to 
address the imbalance and to provide protection for the young witness. 
 
The court also had to decide whether, in so doing, it was violating the right of an 
accused to a fair trial, because, inter alia, it was depriving the accused of the right 
to cross-examine the witness. The court held that section 170A does not exclude 
the right to cross-examination; it merely states that no cross-examination may take 
place in any manner other than through an intermediary. The court per Melunsky J 
held that “the witness may still be questioned on all aspects and the right to 
challenge the evidence is not impaired”.221 The court concluded that the purpose of 
protecting the child witness was balanced against the alleged infringement of the 
accused’s right to cross-examination; that the procedure would further the truth-
seeking process; and that sound reasons existed why such procedure would enable 
a child to participate properly in the accusatorial system.222 Section 170A 
consequently modifies the established adversarial rules of evidence in such a 
manner that it does not deny an accused the right to cross-examine a witness. It 
only limits the way in which the cross-examination is conducted. What is precluded 
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is the potential harmful effect on the child witness of rigorous, aggressive and 
intimidating cross-examination.  
 
Although section 170A is an improvement on the previous adversarial procedure 
and is greatly welcomed, in practice some serious concerns still prevail. In terms of 
section 170A an intermediary “may, unless the court directs otherwise, convey the 
general purport of any question to the witness”. The intermediary is not allowed to 
question a witness independently. The intermediary’s power to interfere in the 
process is hence restricted. The intermediary does not have the authority to 
comment on a question or give an opinion as to whether a child understands a 
question or not. Furthermore, the intermediary may not argue that questions should 
not be formulated in a certain manner or presented in a particular sequence.223 The 
parties are therefore broadly speaking still in control of the cross-examination of the 
witness, and in this regard there has been no true deviation from the adversarial 
model.224 Schwikkard225 correctly argues that, although section 170A provides some 
relief for child witnesses, it does not remove the traumatic effect of the adversarial 
nature of the trial process for the witness. She points out that it is the adversarial 
nature of the proceedings that is at the core of the problem and that even the use of 
CCTV will not prevent a child from being traumatised as long as the trial is viewed 
as a contest and not as an inquiry into the truth.226 
 
According to Müller, the application of section 170A in its present form in essence 
“amounts to a plaster that is being used to cover the cracks of a system that is not 
                                            
223 Müller 2001 Crime Research in South Africa 1 at 4. It should be noted that this is due to the 
incorrect perception that an intermediary is nothing more than an interpreter as well as the 
specific intermediary model used by South Africa. For a discussion on the issue and 
specifically the functions of an intermediary, refer to para 3.4 of ch 5 below. 
224 Schwikkard in Schwikkard & Van der Merwe Principles of Evidence 18 11 1. 
225 Schwikkard “The abused child: a few rules of evidence considered” 1996 Acta Juridica 148 at 
156. 
226 Schwikkard “The child witness: assessment of a practical proposal” 1991 SACJ 44 at 49. See 
also Davies et al Questioning Child Witnesses: Exploring the Benefits and Risks of 
Intermediary Models (2011) for a discussion of some of the reactions of the participants on 
being exposed to the different intermediary models. The study albeit an exploratory one 
showed that exposure to more inquisitorial proceedings leads to a change in viewpoint as to 
the benefits of a more inquisitorial model for child witnesses by some of the participants.  
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capable of dealing with child witnesses”. She bases this argument on the fact that 
research in the field of child development and language clearly indicates that 
children are not capable of giving accurate evidence when cross-examined in an 
adversarial environment. Müller argues that the introduction of statutory exceptions 
to ameliorate the position of the child witness on an ad hoc basis only gives rise to 
further confusion.227 
 
It could be asked whether the Commission in its recommendations and the 
legislature by the use of the words “may, unless the court directs otherwise, convey 
the general purport” had such a restricted application of section 170A in mind. 
Firstly, the word “may” instead of “must” suggests some leniency and secondly the 
words “unless the court directs otherwise” confirm that the court has a discretion to 
allow an intermediary to point out difficulties and discrepancies. This is particularly 
relevant if one takes into account that the whole purpose of section 170A is to reduce 
the traumatic effect of forceful cross-examination on child witnesses.228 
Furthermore, in DPP v Minister of Justice229 the court held that the legal and judicial 
process must always be child-friendly; that statutes must be interpreted in a manner 
which favours protecting and advancing the interests of children and that courts are 
bound to give effect to the provisions of section 28(2) in matters that come before 
them and that involve children. The court pointed out that this is equally true of the 
position of child witnesses within the criminal justice system and that section 28(2) 
should be regarded as the starting point which provides the constitutional context 
within which section 170A should be understood and construed.230 
 
Davies et al231 emphasise the following: 
                                            
227 Müller 2001 Crime Research in South Africa 1 at 4. 
228 K v Regional Court Magistrate1996 (1) SACR 434 (E) at 443. 
229 2009 (2) SACR 130 (CC) at paras [74]-[75]. 
230 DPP v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development 2009 (2) SACR 130 (CC) at paras 
[74]-[75]. 
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The whole point of the exercise [the use of an intermediary] is that there should 
never be a question which is unfair to a child witness. … And so that’s why it has to 
be re-crafted. And it’s not about the theatre and it’s not about having an argument 
with the witness or confusing the witness. The whole idea is that we are trying to 
establish a system … where the witness is not confused. That’s the point.  
 
It appears that the restricted use of an intermediary232 was possibly not intended, 
but developed in court as a result of an initial uncertainty regarding the role of an 
intermediary and out of fear on the part of presiding officers of compromising judicial 
neutrality. In that sense, one can concur with Müller’s view that “[i]t does not make 
sense to modify a system to suit children when the system itself does not support 
children”.233 
In comparison with the adversarial system, the inquisitorial system is judge-centred. 
The judge questions the witness and the distinction between examination-in-chief 
and cross-examination is unknown in this system. The defence and the prosecution 
play minor roles at the trial and any questions to the witness may only be directed 
to the judge, who has the authority to put them to the witness in the manner he or 
she deems fit.234 In the French system, the witness is allowed to narrate his or her 
evidence with little or no interruption. From the perspective of the inquisitorial model, 
cross-examination is viewed as a means by which “evidence can easily be distorted 
through skilful and selective manipulation by counsel”.235 One prominent German 
writer even suggests that “by cross-examination anything can be achieved, except 
the discovery of the truth”.236 Although the inquisitorial system may be preferred for 
its lack of cross-examination, it is not without its drawbacks. The interviewing of 
children, especially vulnerable or very young children, is a highly specialised task, 
for which presiding officers may not be best suited. Child interviewers should be 
                                            
232 Refer to para 3.2 of ch 5 below for a discussion of the requirements for a competent 
intermediary. 
233 Müller 2001 Crime Research in South Africa 1 at 4. 
234 Herrmann 1978 SACC 3 at 5-6. 
235 Brouwer 1981 Australian LJ 207 at 220. 
236 Snyman 1975 CILSA 100 at 109. 
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highly trained in developmental psychology, language acquisition and 
communication with children. To train legal practitioners to such a level of 
competence may prove to be too time-consuming and may not be cost-effective 
since the questioning of child witnesses only forms a relatively small portion of their 
duties.237 In this regard the use of professional intermediaries may again prove a 
solution to this dilemma.238 
 
2.6 Rules of evidence 
 
The accusatorial system is characterised not only by confrontation and cross-
examination but by a very formalistic and rigid adherence to rules of evidence. 
Emphasis is placed on the admissibility of evidence, with strict rules leading to the 
exclusion of certain types of evidence. For example, hearsay evidence which cannot 
be tested by cross-examination is inadmissible. The rules of evidence also influence 
the evidence of child witnesses in that a child must be found to be competent before 
the child’s testimony will be heard by a court. The cautionary rule warns against the 
dangers of convicting on the evidence of a child and requires corroboration in certain 
circumstances.239 A proper evaluation of the accusatorial system and its effect on 
child witnesses therefore includes an evaluation of the testimonial competence of 
children, the cautionary rule and the rule against hearsay. 
 
2.6.1 The testimonial competence of children 
 
                                            
237 Müller 2001 Crime Research in South Africa 1. This would be more feasible in specialised 
courts such as the Sexual Offences Courts.  
238 Refer to para 3.2 of ch 5 below for more on the plans of the Department of Justice and 
Constitutional Development to establish the permanent structure of intermediaries within the 
department as a separate profession. 
239 S v Director of Public Prosecutions 2000 (2) SACR 711 (T). 
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Competence has been described as “central to the workings of the adversarial 
trial”.240 In terms of the accusatorial system a witness needs to be competent before 
evidence may be presented to the court. The general rule, in terms of the South 
African accusatorial system, is that everyone (including a child) is presumed to be 
a competent witness. In this regard section 192 of the Criminal Procedure Act states 
the following: 
 
 Every person not expressly excluded from this Act from giving evidence shall, 
subject to the provisions of s 206, be competent and compellable to give evidence 
in criminal proceedings.241 
 
The question of compellability and competence is decided by the court in which the 
criminal proceedings are to be conducted.242 This involves a trial-within-a trial at 
which the witness may be questioned by the presiding officer. Witnesses may also 
be called to give testimony as to the competence of the witness. No universal test 
for the determination of competence exists. An investigation into the competence of 
a witness involves questions of fact and usually includes an investigation into 
whether the witness understands and appreciates the nature of an oath.243 
 
Children are regarded as competent witnesses if in the opinion of the court they are 
able to understand the difference between the truth and a lie and have an 
appreciation of the seriousness of the occasion and the consequences of lying. In 
this regard it should be noted that an examination of the South African criminal 
justice system reveals that age itself is not a discernible factor in the determination 
of children’s competency. Children as young as three or four years have given 
                                            
240 Du Toit et al Commentary on the Criminal Procedure Act 22-20A. 
241 In terms of s 206, the law as to competency, compellability or privilege of witnesses which was 
in force in respect of criminal proceedings on the thirteenth day of May 1961 shall apply in any 
case not expressly provided for by this Act or any other law. 
242 S 192 of the Criminal Procedure Act. 
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testimony.244 In R v J,245 a case of indecent assault, the court found the complainant, 
a four-year-old girl, to be “a bright little girl who gave her evidence readily without 
prompting or leading”. Although the question of a child’s competency should, 
according to Zeffert and Piazes, not be confused with the question whether the child 
should be required to take the oath or affirmation or be admonished to speak the 
truth, in practice owing to the requirements of section 162 (that all witnesses must 
testify under oath) a test for competency has by implication resulted in an enquiry 
into these aspects.246 
 
When a child is called to testify, the presiding officer first has to determine whether 
the child understands the nature of the oath. In S v L247 the court held that it is the 
duty of the presiding officer to determine whether the child has sufficient intelligence 
to appreciate the consequences of the religious obligation and sanctity of the oath; 
the capacity to understand the difference between the truth and a lie as well as the 
ability to understand the import of telling the truth. Only if a “child is capable of giving 
a truthful and intelligible account of the matter upon which he is called” should he or 
she be allowed to testify.248 
 
If the presiding officer is of the opinion that the child does not have a sufficient 
understanding of the nature and import of an oath, a finding to this effect should be 
                                            
244 R v Manda 1951 (3) SA 158 (A); R v Bell 1929 CPD 478; R v J 1958 (3) SA 699 (SR). 
245 1958 (3) SA 699 (SR) at 701A. 
246 A test for competency should include the child’s ability to communicate, observe and recall. 
The examination by the courts seems, however, to be focused on the child’s ability to 
distinguish between a truth and a lie. In Woji v Santam Insurance Co Ltd 1981 (1) SA 1021 
(A) the court accepted the relevance of the aforementioned principles but attributed them to 
credibility rather than competence. See also S v B 2003 (1) SACR 52 (SCA) at para [14]; S v 
Sikhipha 2006 (2) SACR 439 (SCA) at para [13]; DPP v Minister of Justice and Constitutional 
Development 2009 (2) SACR 130 (CC) at paras [165]-[167]; S v Swartz 2009 (1) SACR 452 
(C). 
247 1973 (1) SA 344 (KPA) at 348A-H. 
248 At 348E. See also S v T 1973 (3) SA 794 (A); Chaimowitz v Chaimowitz (1) 1960 (4) SA 818 
(K); S v N 1996 (2) SACR 225 (C) at 229I; S v B 2003 (1) SACR 52 ( SCA) at para [14]; S v 
Gallant 2008 (1) SACR 196 (E); DPP v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development 
2009 (2) SACR 130 (CC) at paras [165]-[167]. The religious sanction of the oath has been 
watered down since the 19th century in view of the fact that not all children receive religious 
instruction at school (see Lyon “Child witnesses and the oath: empirical evidence” 2000 South 
California LR 1017 at 1020). 
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made.249 It is recommended that this finding (even if it is not a formal one) as well 
as the reasons therefore should be recorded.250 The presiding officer then has to 
determine whether the child is competent to give unsworn testimony in terms of 
section 164 of the Criminal Procedure Act. Section 164 states the following: 
 
Any person, who is found not to understand the nature and import of the oath or the 
affirmation, may be admitted to give evidence in criminal proceedings without taking 
the oath or making the affirmation: Provided that such person shall, in lieu of the 
oath or affirmation, be admonished by the presiding officer to speak the truth. 
 
In terms of section 164 a child may nevertheless be a competent witness even if he 
or she does not understand the nature of the oath, provided the child has been 
admonished by the court to speak the truth.251 The fact that the child’s evidence is 
unsworn does not necessarily mean that it will be accorded less weight or that it 
becomes less reliable.252 In Chaimowitz v Chaimowitz253 the court reaffirmed that a 
child must be either sworn or warned to speak the truth and stated with reference to 
Scoble: 
 
Obviously, a child whose intellect is so immature that he is incapable of giving a 
rational or coherent account of his observation, or is unable to distinguish the 
difference between fact and fancy, or cannot realise the necessity of telling the truth, 
must be regarded as an incompetent witness. 
                                            
249 S v Malinga 2002 (1) SACR 615 (N). In S v B 2003 (1) SACR 52 (SCA) 563 the court held, 
however, that an inquiry (although desirable) is not always necessary to make a finding in 
terms of section 164, as a child’s youthfulness may justify such a finding. In S v Gallant 2008 
(1) SACR 196 (E) Revelas J held, however, that a failure to make a finding that the witness 
was unable to understand the oath or admonition rendered the evidence inadmissible. See 
also S v Williams 2010 (1) SACR 493 (E) where the court relied on S v B 2003 (1) SACR 52 
(SCA).  
250 S v Stefaans 1999 (1) SACR 182 (C) at 185E. 
251 S v BM  2012 (2) SACR 507 (FB). 
252 Schwikkard 1996 Acta Juridica 148 at 149. See also R v Manda 1951 (3) SA 158 (A); S v BM 
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Müller254 correctly points out that according to Scoble the test entails more than just 
being able to distinguish between truths and lies. The test requires that a child 
should be capable of making observations and giving a rational and coherent 
account of these observations. In addition a child should know the difference 
between facts and fantasy. The test for a child’s competency therefore involves four 
fundamental issues which should all be addressed by the presiding officer in his or 
her determination of a child’s competency, namely: 
 
 the child’s mental capacity to observe an event; 
 the child’s capacity to remember the event about which he or she has to testify; 
 the child’s capacity to communicate about the event; 
 the child’s possession of sufficient intelligence to appreciate the obligation to 
speak the truth.255 
 
Zeffert and Paizes256 point out, however, that the competency test entails that:  
 
if he [a child] does not have the intelligence to distinguish between what is true or 
false, and to recognise the danger and wickedness of lying, he is incompetent and 
incompetence cannot be cured by admonishing him to tell the truth.  
 
                                            
254 Müller The Judicial Officer 149. 
255 Refer to Müller The Judicial Officer 149-151 for a detailed discussion of the issues. Also note 
that in S v Swartz 2009 (1) SACR 452 (C) at para [21] the court held that the competency 
requirements are not satisfied if a child can give an accurate and coherent account of the 
events, but cannot distinguish between the truth and a lie. 
256 Zeffert & Paizes Essential Evidence 259. 
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According to this test, even though a child may have the capacity to observe, recall 
and communicate, such child cannot be admonished if he or she does not know the 
difference between a truth and an untruth. Scwikkard257 argues that the 
abovementioned competency test amounts to a presumption of incompetence as 
the evidence of children is only permissible once children have been found to be 
competent witnesses. She correctly contends that no such presumption applies to 
convicted perjurers or other persons convicted of crimes involving elements of 
dishonesty. She emphasises that this may lead to reliable testimony being excluded 
and may inhibit effective prosecution. While the evidence of adults falling into the 
aforementioned categories would be admissible, even if it is full of lies, inaccuracies 
and improbabilities, children’s evidence would not be admissible. If adults’ evidence 
is found to be unreliable, it would merely be rejected.258 Erasmus259 and McEwan260 
suggest, which suggestion is supported, that this presumption of incompetence 
may, despite research findings to the contrary, be the result of the perception that 
young children are as a rule untruthful. Yet there is no evidence that children are 
more likely than adults to lie.261 Ovens et al point out, with reference to Quinn,262 
that “children do lie, just as adults do lie” but that “often children make statements 
that are not factually accurate, but they are not ‘lies’ because the child lacks the 
intention to wilfully mislead or deceive”.263 Wigmore likewise draws attention to the 
fact that one must accept the “rooted ingenuity of children and their tendency to 
speak straightforwardly what is in their mind”.264 
 
Schwikkard furthermore calls attention to the fact that truth and the duty to tell the 
truth are abstract notions which young children may not be able to understand or 
explain, but that this does not mean that children cannot give a reliable account of 
                                            
257 Schwikkard 1996 Acta Juridica 148 at 149. 
258 Ibid. 
259 Erasmus “ʻThe truth, the whole truth or nothing…’ Is the competency inquiry applicable to child 
witnesses an evidentiary barrier to truth finding?” 2010 Speculum Juris 103 at 109. 
260 McEwan 1988 CLR 813 at 815. 
261 McEwan 1988 CLR 815. 
262 Quinn “The credibility of children’s allegations of sexual abuse” 1988 Behavioral Science & 
The Law 181 at 185. 
263 Ovens, Lamprechts & Prinsloo “Child witnesses in the criminal justice system” 2001 Acta 
Criminologica 25 at 29. 
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the events in question. She advocates that children should still be allowed to testify, 
stressing that in assessing credibility the court will give little weight to the fact that a 
witness took the oath or was admonished to tell the truth, but will instead look to 
factors such as coherence under cross-examination, evidence of surrounding 
circumstances and demeanour.265 Wigmore also believes that “the sensible way 
would be to put the child upon the stand and let it tell its story for what it may seem 
worth”.266 
 
This aspect was specifically addressed in S v Mokoena; S v Paswane.267 In the said 
case Bertelsmann J reasoned along similar lines to Wigmore and Scwikkard and 
held the proviso to section 164(1) to be unacceptable and unconstitutional because 
it does not: 
 
take into account that a witness who, for whatever reason, may not be able to 
understand or to verbalise an understanding of the abstract intellectual concepts of 
truth or falsehood, may nonetheless be perfectly able to convey the general 
experience that has led to the witness becoming involved in the criminal case.268 
 
This finding was not confirmed by the Constitutional Court, however. In DPP v 
Minister of Justice269 the court acknowledged that questioning may at times be very 
confusing and even terrifying for a child. The court also conceded that some of the 
questions put to children by the judicial officers “are very theoretical and seek to 
determine the child’s understanding of the abstract concepts of truth and 
falsehood”.270 The result of such questions may leave the judicial officer with the 
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impression that the child does not understand what it means to speak the truth and 
may lead to a child’s being disqualified from giving evidence.271 
 
The Constitutional Court pointed out that the reason for receiving evidence under 
oath or affirmation is to ensure that the evidence given is reliable and does not 
undermine the accused’s right to a fair trial. The court held that the evidence of a 
child who does not understand what it means to tell the truth is unreliable. 
Accordingly, when a child cannot convey his or her appreciation of the abstract 
concepts of truth and falsehood, the solution does not lie in allowing every child to 
testify in court.272 The solution according to the court lies in the proper questioning 
of children and in particular of younger children. The purpose of the questioning is 
to determine whether the child understands what it means to speak the truth and 
not to get the child to demonstrate knowledge of the abstract concepts of truth and 
falsehood.273 
The court concedes that this questioning requires special skill and that although 
some judicial officers may have this skill, they are the minority. In this regard the 
court underlines the significant role of intermediaries in that “everything seems to 
turn upon the need for intermediaries when young children testify in court”.274 
Properly trained intermediaries have particular skill in questioning and 
communicating with children. This skill, along with their integrity, is vital in ensuring 
both that innocent people are not wrongly convicted and that guilty people are held 
to account. The court therefore concluded that the conclusion by the High Court that 
the proviso to section 164(1) is inconsistent with the Constitution cannot be 
upheld.275 
                                            
271 Para [165]. 
272 Paras [166]-[167]. 
273 Paras [166]-[167]. See also S v BM 2012 (2) SACR 507 (FB) where the State’s case in a 
prosecution of rape rested on the evidence of a nine-year-old complainant and her eleven-
year-old friend. With reference to DPP v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development it 
was held by the Court of Appeal at para [8.3] that although the two witnesses might not have 
had an appreciation of the “abstract concepts of truth and falsehood” they were nevertheless 
able to and in fact did convey to the court a quo what had happened to them. 
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The current legal position is therefore that the presiding officer is still obliged to 
decide on the competency of a witness before testimony can be accepted. In terms 
of section 165 of the Criminal Procedure Act, this inquiry “may” or “shall” be 
administered by the presiding officer through an intermediary if the person 
concerned is to give evidence through an intermediary.276 It is regrettable that the 
court, despite highlighting the fact that intermediaries are key to the questioning of 
children in the determination of competency, did not provide any guidelines in DPP 
v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development as to the circumstances in 
which an intermediary should assist in this process.277 Are we to assume that this 
will only be applicable in a section 170A application?278  
Furthermore, although the notion of the use of intermediaries in the determination 
of competency is supported,279 it should be noted that this solution fails to address 
the situation where the questioning of a young witness through an intermediary may 
be vital, but such an intermediary is not available. It is general knowledge that 
intermediaries are not always available and the court even referred to this problem 
in DPP v Minister of Justice.280 This may still result in a situation where the truthful 
                                            
276 Note that the heading of section 165 of the Act uses the word “may” whereas the section itself 
uses the word “shall”. This leaves uncertainty as to whether the use of an intermediary in this 
context is compulsory or subject to the discretion of the presiding officer. 
277 The only indication was with reference to “young children”. See DPP v Minister of Justice and 
Constitutional Development 2009 (2) SACR 130 (CC) at para [168].  
278 See S v BM 2012 (2) SACR 507 (FB) where the state’s case in a prosecution of a rape case 
rested on the evidence of a nine-year-old complainant and her eleven-year-old friend. At trial 
the complainant in the case testified with the aid of an intermediary and the magistrate satisfied 
himself of her competence by “virtue of questions put through the medium of the intermediary” 
(at para [8.2]), while the eleven-year-old witness testified in open court in the presence of the 
accused and the inquiry into the competence of the child witness was conducted by the 
magistrate (at para [8.1]). The differentiation in the court’s approach between the complainant 
and the child witness is not explained, since while the complainant testified to the rape, the 
child witness was called to testify about knowing the accused and about being requested by 
the accused to call the complainant to the house that the accused visited. One could possibly 
assume that the presiding officer and/or prosecutor was of the opinion that the child witness 
would not suffer undue mental stress or suffering as a result of having to testify in open court. 
Whether this was the case and whether the child witness was in fact assessed prior to the 
hearing remains unclear from the record of the reported case. The abovementioned question 
can therefore not be answered with any certainty. 
279 In this regard an intermediary may assist the presiding officer with information pertaining to 
the child’s cognitive and emotional developmental level.  
280 2009 (2) SACR 130 (CC) at para [246]. 
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and reliable evidence of a child may be excluded as a result of poor, inadequate 
and developmentally inappropriate questioning by a presiding officer.281 
 
The competency of child witnesses was revisited by the Commission in its 
discussion paper on sexual offences.282 The Commission opined that the exclusion 
of evidence of a witness as a result of that witness not meeting the requirements of 
sections 162, 163 or 164 of the Criminal Procedure Act seems to run counter to the 
goal of bringing all relevant evidence before the court. It also ignored the ability of 
the presiding officer to decide on the weight and credibility to be accorded such 
evidence.283 The Commission submitted that all witnesses should be regarded as 
competent to testify if they are able to understand the questions put to them and the 
court can understand their answers. If the evidence appears to be unsatisfactory the 
presiding officer can exercise his or her statutory power to exclude the evidence as 
irrelevant. Despite their recommendations, the Commission nevertheless 
acknowledged the seriousness and solemnity of the proceedings and retained the 
requirement that a witness be enjoined to tell the truth. The Commission thus 
recommended that:284 
section 164(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act be amended that all witnesses should 
be regarded as competent to testify if they can understand the questions put to them 
and can in return give answers that the court can understand. Further that a new 
section be inserted in the Sexual Offences Act clearly establishing that any child in 
a sexual offence trial is competent to testify. 
 
The Commission’s proposal therefore entails a completely new test for competency, 
namely the ability to understand and answer questions. The test focuses largely on 
the cognitive abilities of a child and relates to language development and 
communication skills.285 What is required of the court is to determine whether the 
                                            
281 See for example S v Raghubar 2013 (1) SACR 389 (SCA) at para [7]. 
282 South African Law Commission Sexual Offences Report Project 107 (2002) at 99. 
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child is able to communicate and give a coherent and comprehensible account of 
matters in relation to his or her testimony. Again, the role of skilled questioners is 
vital to the successful implementation of such a test. 
 
The proposals of the Commission have not been implemented yet. In S v Swartz286 
the court pointed out that an examination of most Anglo-American jurisdictions 
shows that what these competency tests should account for is the likelihood that the 
child has an accurate memory of the events, is able to recall those memories and 
can communicate the recalled information accurately. The court pointed out that our 
criminal system still requires competency (the ability to distinguish between truth 
and falsehood) when dealing with child witnesses as opposed to intelligibility, as 
required by some other Anglo-American jurisdictions.287 In S v Swartz288 Steyn AJ 
held that this competency requirement cannot be abandoned simply because it 
appears to operate unfairly. 
 
It is widely submitted,289 which submission is supported, that the competency test 
does in fact operate unfairly and that the use thereof warrants serious 
reconsideration. If the courts insist on a competency test of some kind in the 
meantime, it is imperative that such an inquiry should be child-sensitive and 
developmentally age-appropriate.290 If this is the case the child will be a competent 
witness and as accurate as an adult, if not more so.291 Cashmore292 sums up this 
phenomenon clearly by stating that the competence of children to interact with the 
legal system is a function of the competence of those dealing with them within that 
legal system. 
                                            
286 2009 (1) SACR 452 (C) at para [16]. 
287 See for example s 52 of England’s Criminal Justice Act 1991. 
288 2009 (1) SACR 452 (C) at para [21]. 
289 South African Law Commission Sexual Offences Report Project 107 (2002) at 102 fn 11. 
290 Erasmus 2010 Speculum Juris 103 at 114. 
291 Müller Prosecuting the Child Sex Offender 161. 
292 Cashmore “Problems and solutions in lawyer-child communication” 1991 CLJ 193 as quoted 
by Müller in The Judicial Officer at 161.  
The accusatorial system in South Africa and its effect on child witnesses and child victims within 
the system 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
121 
 
In comparison with the accusatorial system, the rules of evidence of the inquisitorial 
system are less restrictive. In terms of the inquisitorial system the presiding officer 
has the task of determining the probative value of evidence placed before him. The 
presiding officer sifts through the evidence presented and tests the reliability and 
accuracy of witnesses, including child witnesses, in the course of a comprehensive 
interrogation.293 The French inquisitorial system, for example, examines all 
evidence given by a witness, provided it is relevant. The presiding officer would only 
exclude evidence if its probative value was outweighed by other risks.294 The 
general principle is therefore that nearly all evidence is admissible. This does not 
imply that no exclusionary rules exist. In order for the evidence to be admissible it 
has to be relevant. The focus of the inquisitorial system is therefore on the weight 
of the evidence and not on its admissibility.295 In terms of the inquisitorial system a 
child will present his or her evidence, after which the presiding officer will weigh the 
relevance of the evidence. In Norway, for example, the oath has been replaced by 
a solemn declaration that the witness is telling the truth. However, a declaration is 
not required if the witness is under the age of fourteen. There is also no age limit for 
the competency of a child to give evidence. The competency of a child is determined 
with regard to whether the child has sufficient understanding and ability to express 
                                            
293 Herrmann 1978 SACC 3 at 5; Henderson “Innovative practices in other jurisdictions” in Hanna 
et al Child Witnesses in the New Zealand Criminal Courts: A Review of Practice and 
Implications for Policy (2011) 156. It should be noted that the presiding officer is sometimes 
assisted in this task by an expert such as a psychologist who makes a psychological 
evaluation and reports on the child’s credibility – see for example the position in France as 
described by Henderson in Hanna et al Child Witnesses in the New Zealand Criminal Courts: 
A Review of Practice and Implications for Policy 156-157. 
294 Brouwer 1981 Australian LJ 207-222.  
295 Andaneas “The Scandinavian countries” in Spencer et al (eds) Children’s Evidence in Legal 
Proceedings (1989)9-10; Henderson in Hanna et al Child Witnesses in the New Zealand 
Criminal Courts: A Review of Practice and Implications for Policy 156-157. 
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himself or herself.296 A child who is too young to give evidence at the trial may be 
able to give intelligible evidence in an informal interview out of court.297 
 
This correlates with the aforementioned proposal by Wigmore and Schwikkard, 
namely to allow a child to testify and then to evaluate the child’s evidence for what 
it may seem to be worth. If the evidence is found to be unreliable, the court may 
reject such evidence.298 This underlines the notion that children may be inadequate 
witnesses in the same way that adults may be inadequate witnesses, but that the 
court should be allowed to come to an “intelligent conclusion” on the evidence of the 
children concerned.299 The essence of the inquisitorial trial has thus been called “a 
seeking of the truth by interrogation”.300 
 
 
2.6.2 The cautionary rule and children’s testimony 
 
The origin of the cautionary rule stems from the practice of warning the jury against 
certain kinds of witnesses, notably accomplices, complainants in sexual cases and 
young children. This stems from the notion that these witnesses could not safely be 
relied upon without some kind of corroboration or other form of evidence confirming 
                                            
296 Andaneas in Spencer et al Children’s Evidence in Legal Proceedings 9-10. See also ss 131-
132 of the unofficial translation by Walford et al (2006) of the Lov om rettergangsmåten i 
straffesaker (Straffeprosessloven) 22, mai 1981 nr 25 [The Criminal Procedure Act of 22 May 
1981 No 25] of the Criminal Procedure Act (with the amendments of 30/06/2006 No 53), 
available at www.ub.uio.no/ujur/ulovdata/lov-19810522-025-eng.pdf (accessed 04/03/ 2016). 
It should be noted that English material on the Norwegian criminal justice system is quite 
limited and that reliance had to be made on the available secondary sources.  
297 Andaneas in Spencer et al (eds) Children’s Evidence in Legal Proceedings 9-10. See also ss 
234 and 239 of the unofficial translation by Walford et al (2006) of the Lov om 
rettergangsmåten i straf fesaker (Straffeprosessloven) 22, mai 1981 nr 25 [The Criminal 
Procedure Act of 22 May 1981 No 25] of the Criminal Procedure Act (with the amendments of 
30/06/2006 No 53) available at www.ub.uio.no/ujur/ulovdata/lov-19810522-025-eng.pdf 
(accessed 04/03/2016). 
298 Erasmus 2010 Speculum Juris 108-109. 
299 S v S 1995 (1) SACR 50 (ZS) at 60. 
300 Herrmann 1978 SACC 3 at 6. 
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their trustworthiness. The presiding officer was also required to show that he or she 
had kept the warning given to the jury in mind. In this way the cautionary rule 
persisted even when the jury system was abolished.301 
 
The starting point in any criminal matter is that the State must prove the guilt of the 
accused beyond any reasonable doubt. This must never be lost sight of even where 
a number of cautionary rules apply.302 The purpose of the cautionary rule is to assist 
the court in deciding whether or not the onus of the State has been discharged.303 
It should accordingly be borne in mind that satisfying the rule does not in itself 
guarantee a conviction. The rule is merely an aid in establishing the truth. The final 
analysis is whether the court is satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that all the 
evidence presented is essentially true.304 
 
The cautionary rule relating to the evidence of children entails that the presiding 
officer should fully appreciate the dangers of accepting the evidence of children. In 
this regard children’s evidence is considered in the same light as that of accomplices 
and complainants in sexual cases.305 In terms of the cautionary rule a court should 
not easily convict unless the evidence of the child has been treated with due caution. 
Where the child is also the sole witness the evidence will be regarded with even 
more caution.306 As a consequence the court will seek corroboration, even though 
corroboration of a child’s evidence is not required by law or by practice. A child’s 
                                            
301 Zeffert & Paizes Essential Evidence 308-309.  
302 S v Hanekom 2011 (1) SACR 430 (WCC) at para [8]. 
303 S v Hanekom 2011(1) SACR 430 (WCC). 
304 S v Francis 1991 (1) SACR 198 (A) at 205f. 
305 Prior to 1998, the law took the view that the cautionary rule as it applies to accomplices had 
to be applied to the evidence of complainants in sexual cases. This rule was, however, 
abolished by the Supreme Court of Appeal in S v Jackson 1998 (1) SACR 470 (A). It was 
further held in S v M 1999 (2) SACR 548 (SCA) at 554-555 that the approach applied in the 
former case also applied to all cases in which an act of a sexual nature was an element and 
thus also to the evidence of children. Section 60 of the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and 
Related Matters) Amendment Act 32 of 2007 now also provides that a court may not treat the 
evidence of a complainant in a sexual offence with caution on account of the nature of the 
offence.    
306 S v Mokoena 1932 OPD 79 at 80. 
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evidence, if not corroborated, will therefore be scrutinised with great care in terms 
of this rule and will be accepted with great caution.307 
 
There is no particular age below which the cautionary rule applies. The degree of 
corroboration or other factors required to reduce the danger of reliance on the child’s 
evidence will vary with the age of the child and the other circumstances of the 
case.308 The court does not enumerate the factors that could increase or lessen the 
danger, nor does it define the class of children to whom the danger of reliance on 
the child’s evidence is applicable.309 However, the younger the child the greater the 
likelihood that the court will require substantial confirmation of the evidence.310 
 
In R v Manda311 the court emphasised that the dangers inherent in reliance upon 
the uncorroborated evidence of a young child should not be underrated. The court 
explained that the danger involved in the evidence of children can be attributed 
(among a number of factors) to their “imaginativeness and suggestibility” … “that 
require their evidence to be scrutinised with care, amounting perhaps to 
suspicion”.312 However, in R v J313 the court held that although there may be 
circumstances that necessitate special caution, “the exercise of caution should not 
be allowed to displace the exercise of common sense”.314 
 
                                            
307 R v Manda 1951 (3) SA 158 (A).  
308 R v Manda 1951 (3) SA 158 (A); Woij v Santam Insurance Co Ltd 1981 (1) SA 1020 (A). Note 
that a child means a person under the age of eighteen years. Refer to s 28(3) of the 
Constitution. 
309 Joubert et al The Law of South Africa Vol 9 Evidence para 832. 
310 R v Bell 1929 CPD 478; De Beer v R 1933 NPD 30; R v W 1949 (3) SA 772 (A) ; R v J 1958 
(3) SA 699 (SR). 
311 1951 (3) SA 158 (A) at 163. 
312 At 163. The court did not elaborate on the other factors. 
313 1958 (3) SA 699 (SR). 
314  At 90. 
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The manner in which the evidence of young children should be approached is set 
out in the judgment of Diemont JA in the civil case of Woij v Santam Insurance Co 
Ltd, where the learned judge stated the following:315 
 
The question which the trial Court must ask itself is whether the young witness’s 
evidence is trustworthy. Trustworthiness … depends on factors such as the child’s 
power of observation, his power of recollection, and his power of narration on the 
specific matter to be testified. In each instance the capacity of the particular child is 
to be investigated. His capacity of observation will depend on whether he appears 
“intelligent enough to observe”. Whether he has the capacity of recollection will 
depend again on whether he has sufficient years of discretion “to remember what 
occurs” while the capacity of narration or communication raises the question 
whether the child has “the capacity to understand the question put, and to frame and 
express intelligent answers” ... There are other factors as well which the Court will 
take into account in assessing the child’s trustworthiness in the witness-box. Does 
he appear to be honest – is there a consciousness of the duty to speak the truth? 
 
It should be noted that although Woij recognised children’s individuality, the court’s 
decision was based on the premise that children are inherently unreliable 
witnesses.316 A further useful discussion of the evidence of children appears in S v 
S,317 a Zimbabwean case per Ebrahim AJ. Drawing on the work of Spencer and 
Flin,318 he refers to six of the objections which are raised against the evidence of 
children:319 
 
 a) children’s memories are unreliable; 
b) children are egocentric; 
                                            
315      1981 (1) SA 1020 (A) at 1027H-1028A. 
316 Schwikkard 1996 Acta Juridica152.  
317 1995 (1) SACR 50 (ZS). 
318 Evidence of Children: The Law and Psychology (1990). 
319 1995 (1) SACR 50 (ZS) at 54. 
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c) children are highly suggestible; 
d) children have difficulty distinguishing fact from fantasy; 
e) children make false allegations, particularly of sexual assault; and 
f) children do not understand the duty to tell the truth. 
 
He then evaluates each of these objections and provides useful guidelines. He 
highlights the fact that research has shown, contrary to earlier belief, that children 
generally have a good recall of events and points out that children respond better to 
questioning by a sympathetic questioner. He furthermore states that all human 
beings are egocentric and that this is not a problem unique to children.320 He points 
out that reliable psychological research shows that children, like adults, can be 
suggestible, but that this can be minimised by questions especially designed to 
overcome the known pitfalls. With regard to children’s fantasising over events, he 
emphasises that children do not fantasise over things that are beyond their own 
direct or indirect experience. He also suggests that the incidence of false allegations 
is much lower than is generally believed. He believes that the question of credibility 
should be answered by considering each case on its own individual merits. With 
regard to the last objection, that children do not understand the duty to tell the truth, 
he says that this is a sweeping statement that ignores differences in age, intelligence 
and morality between children.321 
He concludes by calling for a new, more specific approach instead of merely seeking 
corroboration. He warns that “in approaching cases with a single minded eye 
towards seeking corroboration … the courts tend to lose sight of the reason for 
seeking it”.322 What is required to reach a rational and intelligent conclusion on the 
credibility of a child witness is a proper analysis of likely shortcomings in such 
                                            
320 At 54-55. 
321 At 55-59. 
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evidence, in which a certain amount of psychology and a recent awareness of 
advances in that discipline are applied.323 
 
In S v Director of Public Prosecutions324 the court followed the approach of S v 
Jackson325 and, referring to trends in countries such as Canada, Ireland, the United 
Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand, held that the proper approach was not to 
insist on the application of the cautionary rule as though it was a matter of rote, but 
to consider each case on its own merits. Although the evidence in a particular case 
might call for a cautionary approach, this was not a general rule. The court stressed 
that it could not be said that the evidence of children, in sexual and other cases, 
where they were sole witnesses, obliged the court to apply the cautionary rules 
before a conviction could take place.326 What was required of the State was to prove 
the accused’s guilt beyond all reasonable doubt. This might require the court to 
apply the cautionary rule. In S v M327 Shakenovsky AJ also held that the correct 
approach was not to apply a general cautionary rule, but to look at the evidence as 
a whole and the reliability of what had been placed before the court. 
 
Despite what appeared to be the application of a more enlightened approach by the 
judiciary, case law suggests the contrary. In the case of S v Hanekom328 the 
magistrate was criticised for not taking sufficient notice of the two cautionary rules 
applicable to the case (the complainant was both a sole witness and a child) and for 
failing to apply them with the degree of attention to detail demanded by the particular 
circumstances of the case. According to Saner AJ the magistrate had merely paid 
                                            
323 At 59-60. 
324 2000 (2) SA 711 (T). 
325 1998 (1) SACR 470 (A). 
326 2000 (2) SACR 711 (T) at 715A-B. In the case under discussion the court a quo applied the 
cautionary rule in respect of all three aspects, namely the evidence of children in sexual cases 
where they are single witnesses (see Director of Public Prosecutions v S 2000 (2) SACR 711 
(T) at para 715G-H). 
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lip service to the rules.329 The court referred to R v Manda330and S v Viveiros,331 
stating that because of the potentially unreliable and untrustworthy nature of the 
evidence, it fully intended to follow the warning against accepting the evidence of 
children.332 In Maema v S333 the Supreme Court of Appeal per Shongwe JA, 
referring also to R v Manda, uncritically accepted the application of the cautionary 
rule to the evidence of children. In S v Raghubar334 as well the trial court was 
criticised for merely paying lip service to the cautionary rule in respect of a sole child 
witness aged fourteen. 
 
It is unsurprising that the rule has its critics. Whitear-Nel335 expresses her concern, 
and rightly so, over the fact that the court in the Hanekom case did not refer to recent 
research in the arena of child psychology and development, which shows that 
children’s ability to give reliable evidence has been greatly underestimated.336 
Schwikkard also points out that the trend internationally has been to abolish this 
cautionary rule.337 She furthermore emphasises that as the rule is based on 
discredited beliefs, its application is more likely to lead to error than to the discovery 
of truth.338 A strong argument was therefore made by Schwikkard, which is 
supported, that just as the cautionary rule applicable to complainants in sexual 
cases was found to be irrational and based on stereotyped notions and was 
therefore abolished, so too should the cautionary rule applicable to children be 
abolished.339 She submits that the cautionary rules applicable to children are prima 
facie discriminatory in that witnesses are disadvantaged on the basis of age and 
                                            
329 Para [7].  
330 1951 (3) SA 158 (A). 
331 [2000] 2 All SA 86 (SCA). 
332 2011 (1) SACR 430 (WC) at para [9] and [10]. 
333 [2011] ZASCA 175 (unreported case 147/, 2011, 29/09/2011) at para [14]. 
334 2013 (1) SACR 389 (SCA). 
335 2011 SACJ 382 at 396. 
336 See Schwikkard “Getting somewhere slowly” in Artz & Smythe (eds) Should we Consent? 
Rape Law Reform in South Africa (2008) 79.  
337 Schwikkard in Artz & Smythe (eds) Should we Consent? Rape Law Reform in South Africa 
79. 
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that this infringement of the equality clause will not pass constitutional scrutiny in 
terms of the limitation clause.340 
 
In 2002, the Commission341 also acknowledged the vast amount of research 
indicating that children are no more unreliable than adults and recommended the 
abolition of the cautionary rule applicable to children. Whitear-Nel342 states that in 
the light of the acceptance of the cautionary rule in cases such as the Hanekom 
case and Maemu v S it is becoming evident that the cautionary rule is not likely to 
be abolished without a constitutional challenge. She emphasises that the time is 
ripe for change and that South Africa’s crime rate with high levels of child abuse and 
low rates of conviction for such crimes demands that the issue be reconsidered.343 
She stresses, and rightly so, that it is inappropriate or even irresponsible to continue 
to blindly rely on the authority of old cases such as R v Manda344 and Woij v Santam 
Insurance Co Ltd345 to justify the application of the cautionary rule to children.346 
 
It should be noted that the advocates for the abolition of the cautionary rule do not 
suggest that there may not be good reason for treating a child’s evidence with 
caution, but argue that the issue should be decided on the basis of the case before 
the court and not on a generalised and unsubstantiated perception that children are 
unreliable witnesses.347 
 
                                            
340 Schwikard 1996 Acta Juridica 154. 
341 South African Law Commission Sexual Offences Report Project 107 (2002) 100-101. 
342 2011 SACJ 382 at 398. 
343 Refer to para 1.1 fn 15 and 17 of ch 1 above for more on the crime rate pertaining to children 
in South Africa.  
344 1951 (3) SA 158 (A). 
345 1981 (1) SA 1020 (A). Note above that although the court recognised the individuality of 
children in the case of Woij v Santam Insurance Co Ltd the court’s decision was still based on 
the premise that children are inherently unreliable witnesses. 
346 2011 SACJ 382 at 398. 
347 2011 SACJ 382 at 396. This is in line with the notion held in S v Jackson 1998 (1) SACR 470 
(A) where the court stated with regard to the former cautionary rule relating to sexual cases at 
476 that although “evidence in a particular case might call for a cautionary approach, but that 
is a far cry from the application of a general cautionary rule”. 
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In comparison with the accusatorial system, the rules of evidence of the inquisitorial 
system are less restrictive, with few exclusionary rules of evidence existing. French 
law, for example, allows all the evidence a witness gives, provided it is relevant, and 
then sifts through it.348 Likewise, in terms of Austrian law, hardly any evidentiary 
rules apply and no need for corroboration exists. The rules that do exist apply to 
evidence given by all witnesses. No irrelevant or prejudicial rules are applied. 
Instead, the Austrian inquisitorial system applies the principle of “free assessment 
of evidence”. This entails that presiding officers are to be guided solely by scientific 
knowledge and the principles of logic and common sense. Presiding officers are 
trusted to weigh the evidence correctly and distinguish between trustworthy and 
unreliable evidence.349 This correlates with the aforementioned proposal advocated 
by Scwikkard and Whitear-Nel, namely that decisions should be taken on the basis 
of the case before the court. 
 
2.6.3 The hearsay rule and children’s testimony 
 
Hearsay evidence is evidence of a statement by a person other than a witness which 
is relied upon to prove what the statement asserts. The term “hearsay” originates 
from the fact that the witness says in court what he or she has heard (or read).350 
The term is known to both the inquisitorial and the accusatorial systems, but plays 
a less important role in the inquisitorial system, where the hearsay nature of 
evidence affects only its weight. Various reasons have been advanced for the 
exclusion of hearsay evidence, the most compelling being that it is unreliable 
evidence and may therefore mislead the court. It is said to be unreliable because 
the person who witnessed the facts at first hand is not present to tell the court what 
he or she observed. In terms of the accusatorial system the person testifying should 
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349 Murschetz “Child witnesses in Austria” in Spencer et al Children and Cross-examination: Time 
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testify under oath and there should be an opportunity for cross-examination. This is 
not the case with hearsay testimony nor is the court in a position to challenge the 
reliability of the first-hand witness. It is therefore not possible to test the evidence as 
is required by the accusatorial system. For this reason the rule developed that 
testimony so given should be excluded uncompromisingly unless it could be 
accommodated within a recognised exception.351 
 
This rule also found its way into South African law by means of legislative 
enactments that in effect incorporated the English common-law position on the 
matter. This remained the position until 1988, when the Law of Evidence 
Amendment Act 45 of 1988 brought about some changes, replacing the system with 
a more flexible approach. Although there is still a general rule against hearsay, the 
new approach gives courts the power to admit hearsay evidence in cases where the 
traditional hearsay dangers are either satisfactorily accounted for or are insufficiently 
significant.352 Section 3 of the Law of Evidence Amendment Act353 has introduced 
three main exceptions to the rule against hearsay. In terms of this section hearsay 
may be admitted by agreement, where the person upon whose credibility the 
probative value of the proceedings depends himself or herself testifies at such 
proceedings or where the court, having regard to seven listed factors, is of the 
opinion that such evidence should be admitted in the interests of justice.354 
A child may be unable to give evidence at a trial because he or she has either been 
found incompetent or is too afraid. A report made to a mother, guardian, social 
worker or police officer depicting the event will amount to hearsay and will not be 
admissible.355 In terms of the three exceptions such a report may be admissible if 
the other party agrees, the child himself or herself testifies at the trial or the court 
allows it within its discretion. It is doubtful whether any opposing party in a criminal 
proceeding would consent to such evidence. The second category is not applicable 
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as the child does not want to testify or is not allowed to do so, having being declared 
incompetent. The third category may hence prove to be the vehicle through which 
to submit children’s hearsay evidence. 
 
Section 3(1)(c) affords the court a wide discretion to admit hearsay evidence if this 
is in the interests of justice. In considering the interests of justice and in deciding 
how much weight should be afforded to the hearsay evidence, the courts must take 
into account the nature of the proceedings, the nature of the evidence, the purpose 
for which the evidence is tendered, the reason why the evidence is not being given 
by the person upon whose credibility the probative value of such evidence depends, 
any prejudice to a party which the admission of such evidence might entail and any 
other factor which should in the opinion of the court be taken into account. The court 
therefore has to weigh up all the factors in exercising its discretion to admit the 
hearsay evidence. This provision is the most far-reaching of the three exceptions.356 
Everything depends on how far the courts are prepared to go in exercising their 
discretion to introduce evidence of this nature. The response has been mixed, with 
some courts expressing reluctance, especially in criminal cases, to exercise a wide 
discretion.357 
 
In S v Ramavhale358 the court stated that it has an “intuitive reluctance to permit 
untested evidence to be used against an accused” in a criminal case as an accused 
person “usually has enough to contend with without expecting him to engage in 
mortal combat with an absent witness”. It also emphasised that “a Judge should 
hesitate long in admitting or relying on hearsay evidence which plays a decisive or 
even significant part in convicting an accused, unless there is compelling justification 
                                            
356 Zeffert & Paizes Essential Evidence 139. 
357 Zeffert & Paizes Essential Evidence 139. See for example also S v Dyimbane 1990 (2) SACR 
502 (SE) where evidence as to the statements of the two deceased were admitted, in 
comparison to S v Cekiso 1990 (4) SA 20 (E) at 22A, where hearsay evidence on 
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for doing so”.359 The importance of this caution was emphasised in S v Ndholovu360 
where Cameron JA held that a trial court, in applying the hearsay exceptions, must 
be scrupulous in ensuring respect for the fundamental right of the accused to a fair 
trial. Cameron JA concluded, however, that where the interests of justice require the 
admission of hearsay, the provision “does not require the absence of all 
prejudice”.361 In S v Shaik,362 a case where the conviction of the appellants on some 
of the charges depended heavily on hearsay evidence, the Supreme Court of 
Appeal received the evidence, stating that “sight should not be lost of the true test 
for the evidence to be admitted, and that is whether the interest of justice demands 
its reception”.363  
 
The importance of allowing the hearsay evidence of children has recently been 
highlighted albeit in a Labour Court dispute. In the case of Minister of Police v M,364 
a case of the rape of a child was connected with a dismissal dispute in the Labour 
Court. The employee (RM) was dismissed because he had raped his daughter over 
a period of time starting when she was fourteen years old. Her father (RM) was 
employed in the VIP protection unit of the South African Police Service (SAPS). 
After his arrest in 2009 he faced both a criminal trial and a disciplinary hearing in 
which it was alleged that he had contravened the SAPS code of conduct.365 The 
daughter (K) testified against her father at the internal disciplinary hearing. Her 
testimony was corroborated by two other witnesses who were present in the house 
where some of the sexual assaults/rape allegedly occurred. RM was represented at 
the disciplinary hearing by a union representative. The witnesses were cross-
examined by the representative. RM also testified in his own defence and was cross-
examined.366 The presiding officer at the disciplinary hearing found RM guilty on the 
charges and he was dismissed. RM lodged an internal appeal, but was 
unsuccessful. He then referred an unfair dismissal dispute to the Safety and Security 
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Sectoral Bargaining Council (SSSBC) for arbitration.367 As the arbitration constituted 
a new hearing the evidence had to be introduced de novo.  At this point the victim, 
K, refused to testify again. Consequently the employer had to rely on the transcripts 
of the internal disciplinary hearing to prove the substantive fairness of RM’s 
dismissal. SAPS applied to have the transcripts admitted as hearsay in terms of one 
of the exceptions listed in section 3 of the Law of Evidence Amendment Act,368 
namely that of in the interests of justice. The commissioner agreed to admit the 
transcripts but found the weight of the evidence derived from the transcripts against 
RM to be “minimal without additional testimony or documents substantiating the 
allegations”. As the arbitration was a hearing de novo, the commissioner 
consequently found RM’s dismissal substantively unfair and reinstated him. The 
Minister of Police challenged this decision in the Labour Court before Judge 
Whitcher.369 
 
In evaluating the matter, Judge Whitcher emphasised that the commissioner had 
correctly admitted the transcripts as hearsay evidence, but that the matter rested on 
the question of what weight this hearsay evidence should be afforded.370 The judge 
stated that she had some sympathy for the approach adopted by the commissioner 
in not readily admitting hearsay evidence. She however pointed out that while it may 
be unreasonable to give hearsay evidence too much weight, the opposite is also 
true. Not giving hearsay evidence sufficient weight may also constitute a material 
error or irregularity.371 
 
According to Whitcher J the present case represented an example of a case in which 
the hearsay evidence was not given enough weight in that the commissioner did not 
seem to realise that the transcripts were no ordinary hearsay but were “hearsay of 
                                            
367 Para [5]. 
368 Act 45 of 1988. 
369 Minister of Police v M (JR 56/14) [2016] ZALCJHB 314 (19/08/2016) at paras [5]-[7]. 
370 Para [35]. 
371 Para [37]. 
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a special type”.372 The reason for this is that the transcripts comprised a bilateral 
and comprehensive record of earlier proceedings in which the child victim’s 
evidence was corroborated by at least two other witnesses, with the evidence 
withstanding rigorous cross-examination and in which RM’s own defence was 
“ventilated and exposed as being implausible”.373 The learned judge stated that 
transcripts such as the ones in this case must be afforded greater intrinsic weight 
than simple hearsay because they constitute a comprehensive and reliable record 
of a prior quasi-judicial encounter between the parties.374 
 
Whitcher J also commented on the child victim’s unavailability as a witness at the 
SSSBC hearing. She pointed out that, to the extent that this refusal may have 
influenced the commissioner’s decision, it should be noted that K did not simply 
refuse to testify but gave two cogent reasons for not testifying, namely that she was 
no longer “prepared to go through this trauma” and that she was undergoing therapy 
which would be disrupted if she reopened old wounds.375 Although not specifically 
stated by Whitcher J, it is submitted that this implies that not only the refusal to testify 
but also the reasons therefore should be given the necessary consideration by the 
presiding officer when weighing up hearsay evidence. 
 
Whitcher J furthermore commented on the fact that the situation in which the SAPS 
found itself in this case may not be unique, as the labour relations system is 
designed to give dismissed employees a fresh opportunity to fight their case in 
another forum. This system therefore envisages that vulnerable classes of victims, 
such as children, would have to testify at least twice before an offending employee 
can finally be removed from service.376 She highlighted that one way of avoiding this 
                                            
372 Para [37]. 
373 Para [37]. 
374 Para [37]. 
375 Para [48]. 
376  Although not addressed in the case, the fact that the employee/accused RM was also 
criminally charged may in all likelihood result in the victim (K) having to testify in the criminal 
trial. The acceptance of the transcripts as an exception to the hearsay rule in the criminal trial 
may thus prove to be equally important to the victim and may protect her from secondary 
traumatization.  
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and of minimising the secondary traumatisation of vulnerable witnesses is to ensure 
that a good record is created of a procedurally fair enquiry. This would enable the 
employer in appropriate factual circumstances to rely on the transcript of the initial 
internal hearing should the original witness not be in a position to testify again at 
arbitration.377 
 
The case of Minister of Police v M378 again highlights the importance of allowing the 
hearsay evidence of child victims in appropriate circumstances and affording it the 
weight it deserves. However, the admission of hearsay evidence remains within the 
discretion of the presiding officer. It is for this very reason that academics such as 
Zeiff and Müller argue that an additional statutory provision should be introduced, 
creating a general exception to the hearsay rule for the statements of children in 
sexual abuse cases.379 In making this proposal they refer to similar child victim 
hearsay legislation in the United States of America, especially the model created by 
the Washington legislature in 1982.380 Under the Washington statute evidence 
which is sufficiently reliable may be admitted if the child testifies at the trial and is 
subjected to cross-examination. If, however, the child is unavailable as a witness, 
the hearsay evidence may only be admitted if there is evidence to corroborate the 
act or events. The corroboration requirement may be fulfilled through eyewitness 
testimony; an admission or confession by the defendant; physical evidence that the 
child was abused; expert psychological testimony that the abuse occurred or any 
other evidence that corroborates the child’s statement.381 
 
                                            
377 Minister of Police v M (JR 56/14) [2016] ZALCJHB 314 (19/08/2016) at paras [49]-[50]. 
Whitcher J subsequently ordered at para [52] that the arbitration be set aside and that the 
matter be heard de novo before a new commissioner. 
378 (JR 56/14) [2016] ZALCJHB 314 (19/08/2016). 
379 Zeiff 1991 SACJ at 32; Müller The Child Witness in the Accusatorial System (PhD Rhodes 
University 1998) 304. 
380 WASH. REV.CODE: 9A.44.120 (1982) available at http://apps.leg.wa.gov/rcw/default.aspx? 
cite=9A.44.120 (accessed 05/03/2016). 
381 Zeiff 1991 SACJ at 32; Müller The Child Witness in the Accusatorial System 304. 
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The United Kingdom has also reformed its law with regard to hearsay evidence in 
Chapter 2 of Part 11 of the Criminal Justice Act of 2003.382 Under the reformed law 
the hearsay rule is retained for the purpose of criminal proceedings, but made 
subject to a more general and wider statutory list of exceptions. One of these 
exceptions, set out in section 116 of the Act, provides for hearsay evidence to be 
allowed where the original witness is “unavailable” due to a specified list of reasons. 
One of these reasons includes unavailability“ through fear”. The courts have also 
been granted an “exclusionary discretion” to allow evidence that falls outside the 
explicit exceptions where a court is satisfied that it is in the interests of justice to 
admit such evidence.383 In the last instance the court has to consider a list of nine 
factors set out in section 114(2) of the Act as well as any other factor it considers 
relevant.  
 
Spencer384 points out that despite the fact that the hearsay rules are couched in 
what appear to be extremely cautious terms, the last-mentioned reform of the 
hearsay rule is potentially significant for child abuse cases. This was vividly 
illustrated in the case of R v J (S).385 In the said case the defendant was accused of 
grave sexual assault on his partner’s baby daughter, who was aged two-and-a-half 
at the time. While she was lying in bed, someone entered her room and penetrated 
her vagina to such an extent that she required surgical intervention. The only two 
people who had access to her room were her mother and the defendant. In the days 
following the event several people asked her what had happened and she told them 
that Sid had hurt her. The judge ruled this evidence admissible under the 
aforementioned exclusionary discretion. This decision was upheld by the Court of 
Appeal. In his judgment, Lord Justice Hooper on behalf of the Court of Appeal stated 
that “[w]e have no doubt that the judge was right to rule the evidence in”.386 
                                            
382 See Chapter 2 of Part 11 of the UK Criminal Justice Act of 2003 available at 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2003/44/part/11/chapter/2 (accessed 05/03/2016). 
383 See s 112 (2) of Chapter 2 of Part 11 of the UK Criminal Justice Act of 2003 available at 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2003/44/part/11/chapter/2 (accessed 05/03/2016). 
384 Spencer in Spencer et al Children and Cross-examination: Time to Change the Rules? 6. 
385 R v J (S) [2009] EWCA Crim 1869. 
386 R v J (S) [2011] EWCA Crim 3021. 
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Müller points out that although the factors listed in the Washington statute (and,  as 
indicated above, in that of the United Kingdom) may sound very similar to those in 
section 3(1)(c) of the Law of Evidence Amendment Act, the real advantage of 
introducing a new statutory provision would be emphasis on the admissibility of 
children’s hearsay evidence, in other words, the intention of the legislature would be 
that the hearsay evidence of children should, where shown to be reliable, be 
admissible. This would impose a more stringent duty on the court to make the 
statements admissible. She advocates that the court should evaluate the hearsay 
evidence placed before it and accord it the weight it deserves.387 
 
This is in line with the inquisitorial system, where hearsay evidence, provided it is 
relevant, is admissible. In terms of this model nothing prevents the court from 
hearing testimony from a parent, guardian, doctor, social worker or police officer, for 
example, about the child’s initial statement. The focus of the court would then be on 
how much weight should be attributed to the hearsay evidence and not on whether 
or not it should be admissible.388 Zeiff389 expresses the view that although the 
enactment of a new statutory exception allowing children’s hearsay evidence to be 
accepted as evidence would probably be opposed on the grounds that it goes 
against the common-law tradition or its basic principles, the law of evidence, like the 
legal system as a whole, must adapt to modern social requirements and attitudes. 
He believes that the proposed reform will strike a balance between the welfare of 
the child, the rights of the accused and the needs of society.390 
 
3 CONCLUSION 
 
                                            
387 Müller The Child Witness in the Accusatorial System 305. 
388 Andaneas in Spencer & Flin Children’s Evidence in Legal Proceedings 9. 
389 Zeiff 1991 SACJ 33. 
390 Zeiff 1991 SACJ 33. 
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An evaluation of the elements of the accusatorial system, especially those of 
confrontation and cross-examination, clearly illustrates that children find it 
problematic to give evidence within this system. It is precisely for this reason that 
some commentators have suggested doing away with the accusatorial procedure 
and adopting an inquisitorial approach to solve the dilemmas facing child witnesses 
in the courtroom.391 In this regard McEwan suggests that it would be a great step 
forward if they “[the legislature] investigate the possibility of a completely different 
procedure, rather than look for flexibility within the straitjacket of the traditional 
criminal trial”.392 
 
The inquisitorial system is not without its problems, with the presiding officer having 
to fulfil the roles of both prosecutor and adjudicator. Perhaps the solution to the 
problem lies not in choosing between the two different systems but in finding the 
middle ground. One possible way of doing so would be to combine inquisitorial 
elements with accusatorial elements. In this regard the Norwegian model is an 
excellent example of such a system. 
 
Norway’s criminal justice system is similar to the adversarial model in the pre-trial 
stages in that the police are in charge of the investigation and the prosecution 
decides whether to prosecute or not. The judge does not initiate any proceedings 
and plays no substantive role in the investigation.393 Norway also has a strong 
preference for oral evidence and examination. However, there is no tradition of 
aggressive, adversarial cross-examination. In terms of the Norwegian model 
children below the age of sixteen years of age are entitled to give their evidence by 
way of a pre-trial deposition in the form of a forensic interview under judicial 
supervision.394 This interview is conducted by highly trained police officers in 
specially designed video interview suites. The interviewer is trained in cognitive child 
                                            
391 See Zieff 1991 SACJ 21 at 37; McEwan 1988 CLR 813. 
392 McEwan 1988 CLR 813. 
393 Brienen & Hoegen Victims of Crime in 22 European Criminal Justice Systems (2000) 722-723.  
394 Henderson in Hanna et al Child Witnesses in the New Zealand Criminal Courts: A Review of 
Practice and Implications for Policy 159. 
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development and language acquisition. This pre-trial deposition replaces the child’s 
evidence-in-chief and cross-examination. The pre-trial deposition is conducted in a 
manner similar to that prescribed in section 170A in that the interviewer sits with the 
child in another room which is linked to the court via CCTV.395 The accused, his 
legal representative and the court are able to watch the interview. The accused is 
therefore still entitled to hear the child’s testimony and is able to observe the child’s 
demeanour. The Norwegian system differs from the system utilised in terms of 
section 170A in that the interview is firstly conducted by the interviewer in 
accordance with his or her professional judgment. The interviewer then takes a 
break while the camera is still running and consults with counsel, the prosecutor and 
the judge. This affords both parties the opportunity to challenge any evidence by 
suggesting topics or identifying contradictions they want investigated further.396 This 
should not be seen by the court as an opportunity to “cross-examine” the witness, 
but rather as an opportunity to raise matters that have not been covered or have 
created confusion.397 The interviewer returns to the interviewing room and 
addresses these issues. This process continues until all parties involved are 
satisfied that all aspects have been addressed. The interview is transcribed and the 
video together with the transcription is accepted as evidence-in-chief. The child 
need not attend court. If further evidence is required the child may be re-interviewed 
using the same process as described above. Re-interviewing is, however, very 
rare.398 
 
This system protects the child witness against rigorous cross-examination while 
avoiding the objection raised by adversarial advocates to the inquisitorial process, 
namely that the right to challenge evidence is infringed. It also retains the two-party 
character of the adversarial proceedings.399 The use of such a system hence 
warrants further investigation. The possible introduction of such a system into the 
                                            
395 Müller 2001 Crime Research in South Africa 1 at 7 
396 Myklebust “The Position in Norway” in Spencer & Lamb (ed) Children and Cross-examination: 
Time to Change the Rules? (2012) 147-159. 
397 Müller 2001 Crime Research in South Africa 1 at 7. 
398 Myklebust in Spencer & Lamb (ed) Children and Cross-examination: Time to Change the 
Rules? 147-159. 
399 Myklebust in Spencer & Lamb (ed) Children and Cross-examination: Time to Change the 
Rules? 147-159. 
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South African system and consequential amendments to section 170A will be 
discussed in more detail later in this thesis.400 
 
It is important to note that although a move from an accusatorial system to a more 
inquisitorial form of procedure in certain circumstances may entail a significant 
change this does not mean that we should shy away from such a change.  
 
In delivering the Bar Council’s annual law reform lecture the former Chief Justice of 
England and Wales, Lord Igor Baron, expressed the following view:401 
 
We have to face the reality that if the adversarial system does not do proper justice 
– that is, justice to everyone involved in the process – it will have to be re-examined 
and it should be re-examined. If it fails to do justice then the system requires to be 
changed … [He had] great faith in the adaptability of our system, and the ability of 
those involved in it, whether judges or advocates, to recognize when change is 
necessary, and to change. 
 
This is equally applicable to South Africa.  
 
                                            
400 Refer to paras 3.1.4-3.1.6; 3.4 and 4 of ch 5 below. Note this system is also preferred as an 
alternative to the current position in New Zealand. Refer to ch 7 para 2.6.4 below. 
401 Bowcott The Guardian (21/11/2013) “Child victims and witnesses should no longer appear in 
court, says Lord Judge” The Guardian (21 November 2013) available at 
http://theguardian.com/law/2013/nov/21/child-victims-witnesses-court-lord–judge (accessed 
10/01/2104). 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
The protection of child victims and witnesses in terms of the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, and 
international instruments 
 
By the present Declaration of the Right of the Child, commonly known as the 
“Declaration of Geneva”, men and women of all nations, recognising that mankind 
owes to the Child the best it has to give, declare and accept it as their duty …1 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Children’s rights in South Africa have undergone a significant change since 1994. 
This can be attributed to the enactment of a democratic Constitutional legal order, 
as well as South Africa’s ratification and adoption of principal international 
instruments protecting the rights of children.2 The principles encompassed in the 
Constitution and these international instruments enhance the level of protection 
afforded to children in South Africa. This also applies to the rights of child victims 
and child witnesses3 within the criminal justice system. 
 
This chapter accordingly consists of an in-depth discussion of the rights of the child 
victim and child witness encompassed in the Constitution and international 
                                            
1  United Nations “Geneva Declaration of the Rights of the Child 1924” http://www.un-
documents.net/gdrc1924.htm (accessed 27/05/2014). 
2  See for example the Convention on the Rights of the Child (hereinafter referred to as the CRC) 
(1989), the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (1990) and the Hague 
Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction (1980). 
3  Refer to fn 3 of ch 1 above for a definition of child victims and child witnesses. 
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instruments. The protection of child victims and child witnesses in the criminal justice 
system is of vital importance, not only at national level but also at international level. 
The purpose of this in-depth discussion of South Africa’s constitutional and 
international obligations is to enable me to determine whether the current protection 
afforded to child victims and child witnesses while testifying in criminal proceedings 
in South Africa is in line with South Africa’s constitutional and international 
obligations. Strong emphasis will therefore be placed on the constitutional and 
international obligations relating to the protection of child victims and child witnesses 
while testifying in criminal proceedings. In line with the focus of this study, the role 
of an intermediary in the upholding of these rights will also receive particular 
attention.  
 
2 CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION OF CHILDREN 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
The South African Constitution incorporates an extensive Bill of Rights which has 
been internationally acclaimed as a good example of a Constitution that provides 
for the advancement and protection of children’s rights.4 In this regard the Bill of 
Rights includes a special section or children’s clause, namely section 28, which 
affords specific protection to children.5 In so doing, the Constitution recognises that 
                                            
4  Skelton “Constitutional protection of children’s rights” in Boezaart Child Law in South Africa 
(2009) 265. 
5  S 28 provides as follows: 
1) Every child has the right— 
(a) to a name and a nationality from birth; 
(b) to family care or parental care, or to appropriate alternative care when removed from the 
family environment; 
(c) to basic nutrition, shelter, basic health care services and social services; 
(d) to be protected from maltreatment, neglect, abuse or degradation; 
(e) to be protected from exploitative labour practices; 
(f) not to be required or permitted to perform work or provide services that— 
(i) are inappropriate for a person of that child’s age; or 
(ii) place at risk the child’s well-being, education, physical or mental health or spiritual, 
moral or social development;  
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children are particularly vulnerable to violations of their rights and are in need of 
unique and distinct protection. Section 28 gives effect to the recognition of this 
vulnerability and embodies a dedicated commitment to the realisation of children’s 
rights.6  
 
Children are also included under “all people” in South Africa. They are thus afforded 
all the rights in the Bill of Rights7 except for those rights that are expressly restricted 
to adults, such as the right to vote and to seek public office.8 The rights in the Bill of 
Rights are repeated in section 28 to some degree. These rights therefore provide 
the context for the rights contained in section 28.9 Children are not only protected in 
general as “persons or people” in the Bill of Rights but are also specifically protected 
in terms of section 28.10  
 
In order to throw light on the impact of the Bill of Rights on child victims and child 
witnesses in the criminal justice system, a general overview of the constitutional 
rights in the Bill of Rights relating to child victims and child witnesses will be given. 
Thereafter the specific constitutional rights of child victims and child witnesses in 
section 28 of the Bill of Rights will be discussed.  
                                            
(g) not to be detained except as a measure of last resort, in which case, in addition to the rights 
a child enjoys under sections 12 and 35, the child may be detained only for the shortest 
appropriate period of time, and has the right to be— 
(i) kept separately from detained persons over the age of 18 years; and 
(ii) treated in a manner, and kept in conditions, that take account of the child’s age; 
(h) to have a legal practitioner assigned to the child by the state, and at state expense, in civil 
proceedings affecting the child, if substantial injustice would otherwise result; and 
(i) not to be used directly in armed conflict, and to be protected in times of armed conflict. 
(2) A child’s best interests are of paramount importance in every matter concerning the child. 
(3) In this section “child” means a person under the age of 18 years.” 
6  Bekink & Brand “Constitutional protection of children” in Davel (ed) Introduction to Child Law 
in South Africa (2000) 177. 
7  S 7(1) of the Constitution. See also Teddy Bear Clinic for Abused Children v Minister of Justice 
and Constitutional Development 2014 (1) SACR 327 (CC) at para [38]. 
8  S 19(3)(a) and (b). See also Teddy Bear Clinic for Abused Children v Minister of Justice and 
Constitutional Development 2014 (1) SACR 327 (CC) at para [38]. 
9  Bekink & Brand in Davel (ed) Introduction to Child Law in South Africa 178. 
10  Friedman, Pantazis & Skelton “Children’s rights” in Woolman et al (eds) Constitutional Law of 
South Africa 2 ed loose–leaf updates 47-1; Skelton in Boezaart Child Law in South Africa 277. 
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2.2 The rights in the Bill of Rights as they relate to child victims and child 
witnesses within the criminal justice system 
 
The Bill of Rights enshrines the fundamental rights of all people in South Africa.11 
These rights are not mere guidelines; on the contrary the State is obligated “to 
respect, promote and fulfil” these rights. The Bill of Rights places an unambiguous 
obligation on the State with regard to the promotion, protection and realisation of 
children’s rights.12 These include the rights to equality;13 dignity,14 life;15 freedom 
and security of the person;16 individual autonomy construed from the rights to 
privacy,17 freedom of religion,18 freedom of expression19 and freedom of 
association;20 property;21 housing;22 health care services; food, water and social 
security;23 education;24 just administrative action25 and the rights of arrested, 
detained and accused persons to a range of protections.26 The rights that are the 
most important or have the most significant impact on the child victim and child 
witness are the rights to equality, human dignity, freedom and security of the person 
(specifically the right to be free from all forms of violence) and the right to individual 
autonomy (specifically the right to privacy and freedom of expression). These rights 
are discussed separately below.  
 
                                            
11  S 7(2) of the Constitution. See also Bekink & Brand in Davel (ed) Introduction to Child Law in 
South Africa 173 & Christian Lawyers Association v Minister of Health 2005 (1) SA 509 (T) 
where the court held at 528D that ss 10, 12(2)(a) and (b), 14 and 27(1)(a) of the Constitution 
apply to everyone. 
12  S v M (Centre for Child Law as amicus curiae) 2007 (2) SACR 539 (CC) at para [14]. 
13  S 9. 
14  S 10. 
15  S 11. 
16  S 12. 
17  S 14. 
18  S 15. 
19  S 16. 
20  S 17. 
21  S 25. 
22  S 26. 
23  S 27. 
24  S 29. 
25  S 33. 
26  S 35. 
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2.2.1 The rights to equality, human dignity and freedom and security of the person 
 
Section 9 of the Constitution affords everyone the right to equality, and section 9(1) 
guarantees the right to equality before the law and equal protection and benefit of 
the law. Section 9(3) and 9(4) describes how this equality should be realised, 
namely by prohibiting unfair discrimination by the state and by private entities on a 
non-exclusive list of grounds. One of the grounds listed in section 9(3) is “age”. The 
effect of this is that any distinction between children and others based on their age 
will be scrutinised in terms of the Constitution to determine whether it complies with 
the prohibition on unfair discrimination.27 In Christian Lawyers Association v Minister 
of Health28 the High Court considered age as a ground for discrimination. In the case 
in question the applicants challenged the validity of the provisions of the Choice on 
Termination of Pregnancy Act,29 on the grounds that girls under the age of 18 years 
should not be able to choose to terminate their pregnancies without parental consent 
as they were not capable of making the decision alone. The court rejected this 
challenge and concluded that the Act made informed consent, and not age, the 
basis for its regulation of access to termination of pregnancy. Mojapelo J 
emphasised that everyone is equal before the law and has the right to equal 
protection and benefit of the law and that any distinction between women on the 
grounds of age would infringe these rights.30 
 
The Constitutional Court has developed a detailed test to be followed when 
confronted with claims of unfair discrimination. This test assists the court in its 
decision on whether the state or a private party has unfairly discriminated against 
                                            
27  Bekink & Brand in Davel (ed) Introduction to Child Law in South Africa 178; Albertyn & 
Goldblatt “Equality” in Woolman et al (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa 2 ed loose–leaf 
updates 35-69. 
28  2005 (1) SA 509 (T). 
29  Act 92 of 1996. 
30  Christian Lawyers Association v Minister of Health 2005 (1) SA 509 (T) at 528E. 
The protection of child victims and witnesses in terms of the Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa, 1996, and international instruments 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
148 
any person. The test was first set out in Harksen v Lane.31 The Constitutional Court 
tabulated the test along the following lines:32 
 
(a) Does the challenged law or conduct differentiate between people or 
categories of people? If so, does the differentiation bear a rational connection 
to a legitimate government purpose? If it does not then there is a violation of 
section 9(1). Even if it does bear a rational connection, it might nevertheless 
amount to discrimination. 
(b) Does the differentiation amount to unfair discrimination? This requires a two-
stage analysis: 
(i) Firstly, does the differentiation amount to “discrimination”? If it is on a 
specified ground, then discrimination will have been established. If it 
is not on a specified ground, then whether or not there is 
discrimination will depend upon whether, objectively, the ground is 
based on attributes and characteristics which have the potential to 
impair the fundamental human dignity of persons as human beings or 
to affect them adversely in a comparably serious manner. 
(ii) Secondly, if the differentiation amounts to “discrimination”, does it 
amount to “unfair discrimination”? If it has been found to have been 
on a specified ground, then unfairness will be presumed. If on an 
unspecified ground, unfairness will have to be established by the 
complainant. The test of unfairness focuses primarily on the impact 
of the discrimination on the complainant and others in his or her 
situation. If, at the end of this stage of the enquiry, the differentiation 
is found not to be unfair, then there will be no violation of sections 
9(3) and 9(4). 
                                            
31  1998 (1) SA 300 (CC) at para [54]. It should be noted that although the test was developed 
under the Interim Constitution it has been followed under the Final Constitution. See National 
Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Justice 1999 (1) SA 6 (CC), 1998 (12) 
BCLR 1517 (CC) at para [15]. 
32  1998 (1) SA 300 (CC) at para [53]. 
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(c) If the discrimination is found to be unfair then a determination will have to be 
made as to whether the provision can be justified under the limitations 
clause. 
 
In essence, the test means that a preliminary enquiry must be conducted to 
establish whether the provision or conduct differentiates between people or 
categories of people. This is a threshold test in that if there is no differentiation then 
there can be no question of a violation of section 9(1). If a provision or conduct does 
differentiate between people or categories of people, a two-stage analysis must 
follow. The first stage concerns the question whether the differentiation amounts to 
discrimination. The test here is whether the law or conduct has a rational basis. This 
is the case where the differentiation bears a rational relation to a legitimate 
government purpose. If the answer is no, the law or conduct violates section 9(1) 
and fails at the first stage. If, however, the differentiation is shown to be rational the 
second stage of the enquiry is activated, namely whether the differentiation, even if 
it is rational, nevertheless amounts to unfair discrimination under section 9(3) or 
9(4).33 If the discrimination is on a specified ground, it would be presumed to be 
unfair. If the discrimination occurs on an unspecified ground the complainant will 
have to establish that the discrimination was unfair.34  
 
If the discrimination is found to be unfair a court will proceed to the final stage of the 
enquiry as to whether the provision can be justified under section 36 of the 
Constitution, the limitation clause.35 This final stage, according to the Constitutional 
Court, “involve[s] a weighing of the purpose and effect of the provision in question 
                                            
33  Ngcukaitobi “Equality” in Currie & De Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook 6 ed (2013) 209 at 
216. Note, however, that the Constitutional Court held in National Coalition for Gay and 
Lesbian Equality v Minister of Justice 1999 (1) SA 6 (CC), 1998 (12) BCLR 1517 (CC) at para 
[18] that this does not mean that in all cases the rational connection enquiry of the first stage 
must inevitably precede the second stage. According to the Constitutional Court the rational 
connection enquiry would clearly be unnecessary in a case in which a court holds that the 
discrimination is unfair and unjustifiable. A court need not perform both stages of the enquiry. 
34  Albertyn & Goldblatt “Equality” in Woolman et al (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa 2 ed 
loose-leaf updates 35-75. 
35  Albertyn & Goldblatt in Woolman et al (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa 2 ed loose-leaf 
updates 35-80. 
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and a determination as to the proportionality thereof in relation to the extent of its 
infringement of equality”.36 However, this stage only applies to discrimination in 
terms of law of general application since it is only such discrimination that can be 
justified under the limitation clause.37 
 
Chapter 3 of this thesis contains a discussion of the cautionary rule and children’s 
testimony.38 This rule stems from the practice of warning the jury (presiding officer) 
against a certain kind of witness, notably accomplices, complainants in sexual cases 
and young witnesses. The cautionary rule originated from the notion that the 
evidence of these witnesses could not safely be relied upon without some kind of 
corroboration in the form of other evidence confirming their trustworthiness. This 
rule differentiates between children and other witnesses on the grounds of age. 
Although the rule is no longer applicable in our law,39 recent case law suggests 
otherwise.40 In the case of S v Hanekom41 the magistrate was criticised for failing to 
give sufficient weight to the two cautionary rules applicable to the case (the 
complainant was both a single witness and a child) and for failing to apply them with 
the degree of attention to detail demanded by the particular circumstances of the 
case. According to Saner AJ the magistrate had merely paid lip service to the 
cautionary rules.42 The court referred to R v Manda43 and S v Viveiros44 stating that 
because of the potentially unreliable and untrustworthy nature of such evidence, it 
fully intended to heed the warning against accepting the evidence of children. 
According to the learned judge, the court must have proper regard to the danger of 
an uncritical acceptance of the evidence of both a single witness and a child 
witness.45 
                                            
36  Harksen v Lane 1998 (1) SA 3009 (CC) at para [52]. 
37  Albertyn & Goldblatt in Woolman et al (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa 2 ed loose-leaf 
updates 35-81. 
38  Refer to para 2.6.2 of ch 3 above. 
39  See S v M 1999 (2) SACR 548 (SCA); Director of Public Prosecutions v S 2000 (2) SA 711 
(T).  
40  See S v Hanekom 2011 (1) SACR 430 (WCC). 
41  2011 (1) SACR 430 (WCC). 
42  Para [7].  
43  1951 (3) SA 158 (A). 
44  [2000] 2 All SA 86 (SCA). 
45  2011(1) SACR 430 (WCC) at paras [9]-[10]. 
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Schwikkard, in criticising this state of affairs, points out that the trend internationally 
has been to abolish this cautionary rule.46 She furthermore stresses that as the rule 
is based on discredited beliefs, a strong argument can be made that, just as the 
cautionary rule applicable to complainants in sexual cases was found to be irrational 
and based on stereotyped notions and hence abolished, so too should the 
cautionary rule applicable to children be abolished. 47 Schwikkard submits, which 
submission is supported, that in the absence of a clear rationale it becomes difficult 
to justify the cautionary rule’s inconsistency with a constitutional commitment to 
equality.48   
 
It should be kept in mind that equality is a very contentious and intricate issue when 
it comes to children’s rights. Skelton points out that, as a general rule, the children’s 
rights sector petitions for the special protection, rather than the equality of children. 
She emphasises, however, that despite this call, there is a strong case to be made 
for the position that children should not receive less protection than adults would in 
the same circumstances.49 In addition, cognisance should be taken of the fact that 
children’s inequality is often the very cause of their need for special protection. Birch 
comments that child abuse occurs in part because of the inequalities between a 
child and an adult in size, knowledge and power, and that these inequalities have 
been institutionalised by one-sided rules of evidence.50 The cross-examination of 
child victims and child witnesses during a criminal trail serves as an example. For 
cross-examination to be fair and just the parties to the proceedings should have 
equal standing.51 It goes without saying that, when exposed to harsh cross-
examination by adults, children are in an unequal position to that of the adults and 
                                            
46  Schwikkard “Getting somewhere slowly” in Artz & Smythe (eds) Should We Consent? Rape 
Law Reform in South Africa (2008) 79. 
47  Schwikkard “The abused child: a few rules of evidence considered” 1996 Acta Juridica 148 
at154. 
48  Schwikkard “The evidence of sexual complainants and the demise of the 2004 Criminal 
Procedure Act” 2009 Namibia LJ 5 at 14. 
49  Skelton in Boezaart (ed) Child Law in South Africa 277. 
50  Birch “Children’s evidence” 1992 CLR 262 at 269. 
51  South African Law Commission Simplification of Criminal Procedure Project 73 (2001) para 
2.11. 
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may find it difficult to protect themselves. In order to uphold children’s right to 
equality and to ensure equality of outcome, it may therefore be necessary to treat 
children differently from everyone else.52 This type of differentiation is 
acknowledged by section 9(2) of the equality clause, which provides that legislative 
and other measures designed to protect or advance persons or categories of 
persons disadvantaged by unfair discrimination may be taken in order to promote 
equality.53 It is submitted that the application of section 170A of the Criminal 
Procedure Act 51 of 1977, which allows for children to be cross-examined by an 
intermediary, could level the playing field in this regard. The use of an intermediary 
therefore provides an enabling environment for the child witness and child victim to 
present his or her testimony and should be regarded as an example of an equalising 
measure. 
 
The right to dignity is enshrined in section 10 of the Constitution. The Constitutional 
Court in S v Makwanyane54 stated as follows: 
 
The rights to life and dignity are the most important of all human rights, and the 
source of all other personal rights in chap 3. By committing ourselves to a society 
founded on the recognition of human rights we are required to value these two rights 
above all others. 
 
The Constitutional Court further pointed out that the right to dignity is intricately 
linked to other human rights.55 According to the Constitutional Court: 
Recognising a right to dignity is an acknowledgement of the intrinsic worth of human 
beings: human beings are entitled to be treated as worthy of respect and concern. 
                                            
52  Currie & De Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook 6 ed (2013) 210-211. 
53  Elphick et al “Substantive equality and caregiver responses to discrimination against children 
with disabilities in Orange farm” 2014 SAJHR 221 at 227.  
54  1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) at para [144]. 
55  Para [328]. 
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This right therefore is the foundation of many of the other rights that are specifically 
entrenched in chap 3.56 
 
In Dawood v Minister of Home Affairs57 the Constitutional Court further elaborated 
on the importance of this right by stating that “dignity is not only a value fundamental 
to our Constitution, it is a justiciable and enforceable right that must be respected 
and protected”. Currie and De Waal point out that although we can be certain of the 
pivotal importance of human dignity in the Constitution we can be less certain of the 
meaning of the concept. This is because neither the Constitution nor the 
Constitutional Court has ventured to offer a comprehensive definition of human 
dignity.58 Instead, the court has stated it has “a wide meaning which covers a 
number of different values” and which gives a person “infinite worth”.59 
 
It goes without saying that children are also entitled to the right to dignity. In S v 
Mokoena; S v Phaswane60 Bertelsmann J with reference to Sachs J in S v M (Centre 
for Child Law as amicus curiae)61 pointed out that every child has a dignity of his or 
her own, which entails that a child is to be constitutionally regarded as an individual 
with a distinctive personality and not merely as a miniature adult waiting to reach full 
size. The court emphasised that the importance of the right to dignity for the child 
victim and child witness demands the following:62  
 
At the very least the criminal procedure and the courts should administer the criminal 
justice system in such a fashion that children who are caught up in its workings are 
                                            
56  Para [328]. 
57  2000 (3) SA 936 (CC) at para [35]. 
58  See Woolman “Dignity” in Woolman et al (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa 2 ed loose-
leaf updates 36.2 where he identifies five definitions of dignity in the Constitutional Court’s 
jurisprudence.  
59  Currie & De Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook 251; Le Roux v Dey 2011 (3) SA 274 (CC) at 
para [138]; S v Dodo 2001 (3) SA 382 (CC) at para [38]. 
60  2008 (2) SACR 216 (T) at para [50] (hereinafter referred to as S v Mokoena). 
61  2007 (2) SACR 539 (CC) at para [18]. 
62  2008 (2) SACR 216 (T) at para [50]. 
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protected from further trauma and are treated with proper respect for their dignity 
and their unique status as vulnerable young human beings. 
 
This position was reiterated by the Constitutional Court in Director of Public 
Prosecutions, Transvaal v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development63 
when it held the following:  
 
Each child must be treated as a unique and valuable human being with his or her 
individual needs, wishes and feelings respected. Children must be treated with 
dignity and compassion. In my view these considerations should also inform the 
principle that the best interest of the child are of paramount importance in all matters 
concerning the child as envisaged in s 28(2) of the Constitution. 
 
In Teddy Bear Clinic for Abused Children v Minister of Justice and Constitutional 
Development64 the Constitutional Court, in addition to reaffirming the importance of 
dignity in recognising the inherent worth of children, emphasised that children’s 
dignity rights are not dependent on the rights of their parents, nor is the exercise of 
these rights held in abeyance until children reach a certain age. 
  
It is clearly not only important that the child victim and child witness be treated with 
the necessary dignity and compassion, but also essential that the child victim and 
child witness should not be exposed to treatment such as demeaning cross-
examination while testifying. Once again, the use of an intermediary may prove to 
be invaluable in this regard. 
                                            
63  2009 (2) SACR 130 (CC) at para [79] (hereinafter referred to as DPP v Minister of Justice and 
Constitutional Development). 
64  2014 (2) SA 168 (CC) at para [52]. 
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Section 12 of the Constitution guarantees the right to freedom and security of the 
person.65 Of particular importance to the child victim and child witness is the right 
guaranteed in section 12(1)(c) of the Constitution, namely the right to be free from 
violence66 as well as that guaranteed in section 12(1)(e), namely not to be treated 
or punished in a cruel, inhuman or degrading way.67 
 
Although sections 12(1)(c) and 12(1)(e) may normally not be associated with court 
proceedings, it is submitted that it can be argued that exposing a child in open court 
to aggressive cross-examination by the alleged perpetrator or legal representative 
may amount to (secondary) violence or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment. In 
support of this argument the Constitutional Court in DPP v Minister of Justice and 
Constitutional Development68 acknowledged that a child complainant who relates in 
open court in graphic detail in the presence of the accused the abusive acts 
perpetrated upon him or her will in most instances experience undue stress and 
suffering. This is exacerbated when the child is subjected to intensive and at times 
aggressive cross-examination by the accused or his or her legal representative. The 
Constitutional Court emphasised that cumulatively these experiences [treatment] 
are often “as traumatic and as damaging to the emotional and psychological 
wellbeing of the child complainant as the original abusive act” or may even expose 
                                            
65  S 12 states that:  
(1) Everyone has the right to freedom and security of the person, which includes the right – 
(a) not to be deprived of freedom arbitrarily or without just cause; 
(b) not to be detained without trial; 
(c) to be free from all forms of violence from either public or private sources; 
(d) not to be tortured in any way; and 
(e) not to be treated or punished in a cruel, inhuman or degrading way. 
(2) Everyone has the right to bodily and psychological integrity, which includes the right – 
(a) to make decisions concerning reproduction; 
(b) to security in and control over their body; and  
(c) not to be subjected to medical or scientific experiments without their informed consent.  
66  Although one may normally not associate court proceedings with violence, cognisance should 
be taken of the fact that General Comment No 13 (2011) of the CRC defines violence as 
including all forms of physical or mental violence, including psychological maltreatment. It calls 
on all States Parties to introduce legislation and other measures to implement the rights of 
children in its guidelines, including treating child victims in a child-friendly and sensitive 
manner. Refer also to para 4.3.2.1 below for more on General Comment No 13. 
67 Own emphasis added. 
68   2009 (2) SACR 130 (CC) at para [108]. 
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the child to “further trauma, possibly as severe as the trauma caused by the crime” 
itself. 
Currie and De Waal define violence against an individual as a grave invasion of that 
individual’s personal security.69 Bishop and Woolman70 point out, however, that the 
violence contemplated in section 12(c) should not be narrowly construed as “grave” 
violations, as this would fail many of the people whom the right is meant to protect. 
In support of their argument they point out that women for example (or men) trapped 
in abusive relationships may suffer from psychological as well as physical violence 
that could probably not be successfully categorised as grave but could still entitle 
them to the protection of section 12(1)(c).   
 
Section 12(1)(c) guarantees the right to be protected against such an invasion, 
whether by the state or by private individuals. It therefore places an obligation on 
the state to protect individuals, both negatively by itself refraining from such invasion 
and positively by restraining or discouraging private individuals from any invasion.71  
 
With specific reference to the child victim and child witness, Bertelsmann J in S v 
Mokoena72 emphasised that “foundational to the enjoyment of the right to childhood 
is the promotion of the right as far as possible to live in a secure and nurturing 
environment free from violence, fear and avoidable trauma”.73 The learned judge 
pointed out that both individually and collectively all children have the right to:  
 
express themselves as independent social beings, to have their own laughter as 
well as sorrow, to play, imagine and explore in their own way, to themselves get to 
                                            
69  Currie & De Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook 281. 
70  Bishop & Woolman “Freedom and security of the person” in Woolman et al (eds) Constitutional 
Law of South Africa 2 ed loose-leaf updates 40-49. 
71  Currie & De Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook 282; Bishop & Woolman in Woolman et al (eds) 
Constitutional Law of South Africa 40-49, 40-54. 
72  2008 (2) SACR 216 (T) at para [19]. 
73  Para [19]. 
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understand their own bodies, minds and emotions, and above all to learn as they 
grow how they should conduct themselves and make choices in the wide social and 
moral world of adulthood.74 
 
He furthermore stressed that, although no constitutional injunction can in and of 
itself isolate children from the shocks and peril of harsh family and neighbourhood 
environments, the law can create conditions that protect children from abuse. The 
state should create positive conditions for recovery to take place and diligently seek 
to avoid conduct by its agencies that has the effect of placing children in peril.75  
 
It can be argued that this means that the State has an obligation to protect children 
from further trauma; to develop conditions for the child to testify in a child-friendly 
environment conducive to recovery and to refrain from placing the child in further 
peril by for example requiring the child to testify in the sight of an alleged perpetrator. 
It is precisely this secondary trauma that section 170A(1) seeks to prevent,76 and 
accordingly the application of section 170A(1) could play an invaluable role in 
fulfilling this obligation. 
 
2.2.2 The right to individual autonomy 
 
Like everyone else, children are entitled to the rights to privacy,77 freedom of 
religion,78 freedom of expression79 and freedom of association.80 Of particular 
                                            
74  Para [19] 
75  Para [20]. 
76  Para [108]. 
77  S 14. 
78  S 15. 
79  S 16. 
80  S 17. 
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importance to the child victim and child witness is the right to privacy and the right 
to freedom of expression. 
Section 14 of the Constitution provides that everyone has the right to privacy, which 
includes the right not to have their person, property or home searched, their 
possessions seized or the privacy of their communications infringed. This right in 
the Bill of Rights closely relates to the common-law personality right to privacy, 
which forms part of a person’s dignitas.81 Neethling et al, in confirmation of the 
importance of the right to privacy, point out that a lack of privacy may negate the 
whole physical disposition of a person.82 A breach of a person’s right to privacy may 
occur in two ways, namely when there is an unlawful intrusion of a person’s personal 
privacy (for example where electronic equipment is used to eavesdrop on a private 
conversation) or an unlawful disclosure of private facts about a person (for example 
where a doctor relates his patient’s ills to friends).83 This infringement must be 
subjectively contrary to the person’s will and must also be objectively contrary to the 
contemporary boni mores and the general sense of justice of the community, as 
perceived by the courts.84  
 
The importance of protecting the privacy of the child victim and child witness in 
criminal proceedings is recognised by our law in that sections 153 and 154 of the 
Criminal Procedure Act respectively make provision for children to testify “in 
camera” and prohibit the publication of information which might reveal the identity 
of the complainant or the witness at such criminal proceedings. In S v Mokoena85 
Bertelsmann J describes the rationale for the protection of the privacy of the child 
victim and witnesses while testifying in criminal proceedings as follows: 
 
                                            
81  Currie & De Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook 296. 
82  Neethling et al Law of Personality (2005) 29. 
83  Prinsloo v Bramley Children’s Home 2005 (5) SA 119 (T); Neethling et al Law of Personality 
33. 
84  Currie & De Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook 296. 
85  2008 (2) SACR 216 (T) at para [101]. 
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Vulnerable witnesses must be protected from public exposure, either because 
disclosure of their identity may endanger their life or limb or because the sense of 
embarrassment and discomfort at having to testify before an audience, particularly 
concerning traumatic and sexually sensitive events, may expose the witness to 
emotional and psychological harm. 
 
The need to protect such a child victim and child witness from possible harm 
therefore warrants the court’s excluding the public or certain members of the public 
from attending the hearing and from revealing the identity of the child witness to the 
public.86 
 
The child victim’s right to privacy was examined by the court in Prinsloo v Bramley 
Children’s Home.87 The applicants in the case were facing criminal charges for 
indecent assault and the possession of child pornography. The applicants launched 
a civil application for an order granting them access to the personal files, held by the 
Bramley Children’s Home, of the two minor complainants in the criminal case. The 
applicants were suggesting that the children might have been involved in previous 
sexual misbehaviour or other improper conduct. They hoped to discover facts or 
suggestions in the children’s personal files that might enable them, inter alia, to 
confront the minors during cross-examination with innuendos or allegations of 
misbehaviour of this nature.88 
 
As to the merits of the application for access to the information, the court noted that 
there was no suggestion that the applicants had any knowledge that any such 
impropriety had occurred in the past and that they had intended to launch a dragnet 
                                            
86  See for example Prinsloo v Bramley Children’s Home 2005 (5) SA 119 (T), where the 
applicants cited the minors individually and by name. The court held at 123C-D that the minors 
could be seriously harmed if they were identified regardless of the outcome of the application. 
The court accordingly ordered at 123I that the minors were not to be identified by the media 
or anybody else, by name or otherwise, either directly or indirectly.  
87  2005 (5) SA 119 (T). 
88  At 123D-E. 
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operation to uncover anything of this nature to discredit the complainants’ 
characters.89 The court furthermore stated that the information being sought was of 
a very personal nature and it was clear that the mere launching of such an 
application, even if nothing relevant was found in the personal files, might cause the 
children considerable distress. The children’s involvement in the criminal trial would 
be traumatic in itself without having to face the additional prospect of an attack of 
this nature being launched upon their credibility, morals and probity.90  
 
The court stressed that it was of paramount importance that the children’s interests 
should be safeguarded by the court and that to allow access to the information would 
result in the infringement and limitation of the rights of the children and in particular 
their right to privacy, to emotional and psychological integrity and to dignity.91  
 
The court therefore resolved that the applicants bore the onus of proving to the court 
that their right to a fair trial justified the limitation of the children’s aforementioned 
rights. The court held that in order to succeed with such an application, the 
applicants had to persuade the court, on a balance of probabilities, that it was 
essential for the preparation of their defence to have access to the information.92 In 
this instance the applicants had chosen not to disclose the nature of their defence 
and had failed to show any basis for the relief sought; instead the grounds presented 
by them were “vague, superficial and unsupported by factual allegations”. The 
application was accordingly dismissed.93 It is submitted that unless very strong 
factual grounds are presented, the application of the best interests of the child 
criteria will prevent any limitation of the child’s right to privacy. 
 
                                            
89  At 123 E-H. 
90  At 123E-H. 
91  At 128 B-C. 
92  At 128 B-C. 
93  At 123I-J; 130 B-C. 
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Children’s right to privacy and dignity (albeit in a civil matter) was examined by the 
Constitutional Court in Johncom Media Investments Limited v M.94 The applicants 
sought an order declaring section 12 of the Divorce Act,95 which prohibited the 
publication of “any particulars of a divorce action or any information which comes to 
light during the course of such an action” unconstitutional on the grounds that it 
limited their right to freedom of expression. The section was declared invalid by the 
High Court on the grounds that it was an infringement of the media’s freedom of 
expression.96 After weighing up the competing constitutional rights (the right to 
freedom of expression versus the right to privacy and the right to dignity) the 
Constitutional Court confirmed the invalidity of the impugned provision due to its 
inconsistency with section 16 (the right to freedom of expression) of the 
Constitution.97  
 
The Constitutional Court held that the restriction imposed on the media to report on 
matters of public interest arising from divorce proceedings was disproportionate to 
the aim of the restriction, namely to protect the privacy and dignity of parties involved 
in divorce proceedings, in particular children. The protection of the privacy and 
dignity of children caught up in divorce proceedings was, however, still of grave 
concern to the court. The Constitutional Court consequently included an order 
prohibiting, save in exceptional circumstances, the publication of any information 
that could reveal the identity of any party or child in any divorce proceedings. Failure 
to comply with such an order would amount to contempt of court.98  
 
Although the privacy and dignity of children caught up in divorce proceedings were 
protected by the said court, the case has been criticised by Albertus99 for failing to 
provide guidance as to what information would be seen as “leading to the revealing 
                                            
94  2009 (4) SA 7 (CC). 
95  Act 70 of 1979. 
96  2009 (4) SA 7 (CC) at paras [2], [13]. 
97  Para [31]. 
98  Paras [42]-[45]. 
99  Albertus “Has the balance been struck? The decision in Johncom Media Investments Limited 
v M” 2009 (4) SA 7 (CC) 2011 PER 216 at 227-230.  
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of the identities of the parties” or as to what would amount to “exceptional 
circumstances”. She points out that it therefore remains up to the High Court to 
determine the contravention of such an order and to develop precedents as to what 
would constitute exceptional circumstances.100 Kruger,101 who agrees with Albertus’ 
criticism, points out that although the Constitutional Court may be criticised for its 
choice of remedy to cure the constitutional defects of section 12, it should be 
commended for basing its decision of unconstitutionality on the privacy rights of the 
children of divorcing parents, inter alia.  
 
The right to privacy of children also played a significant role in another leading 
decision of the Constitutional Court, namely Teddy Bear Clinic for Abused Children 
v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development.102 The case concerned an 
application for confirmation of a ruling by the High Court that certain provisions of 
the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and Related Matters) Amendment Act103 relating 
to the criminalisation of consensual sexual conduct with children of a certain age 
were unconstitutional and accordingly invalid. 
 
It is important to note that in considering the matter the Constitutional Court 
emphasised from the outset that the case was not about whether children should or 
should not engage in sexual conduct, nor was it about whether Parliament may set 
a minimum age for consensual sexual conduct. Rather it dealt with the question 
whether it was constitutionally permissible for children to be subjected to criminal 
sanction in order to deter early sexual intimacy and combat the risks associated 
therewith.104  
 
                                            
100  Albertus PER 216 at 230. 
101  “Protection of a child’s right to privacy in South African law” in Potgieter, Knobel & Jansen 
Essays in Honour of Johann Neethling (2015) 269 at 278.  
102  2014 (2) SA 168 (CC). 
103  Act 32 of 2007 (hereinafter the Sexual Offences Act). 
104  2014 (2) SA 168 (CC) at para [3]. 
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The Teddy Bear Clinic for Abused Children v Minister of Justice and Constitutional 
Development case was primarily concerned with Part 1 of Chapter 3 of the Sexual 
Offences Act, which criminalises the performance of certain consensual sexual acts 
(by adults and children) with children who are between the ages of twelve and 
sixteen years (adolescents).105 Section 15 of the Sexual Offences Act deals with the 
offence of “statutory rape”. In terms of this section a person who commits an act of 
sexual penetration with a child is guilty of the offence, despite the consent of the 
child. If both parties were adolescents at the time of the commission of the offence 
the National Director of Public Prosecutions is obliged to authorise the institution of 
a prosecution and must charge both parties with a contravention of the subsection. 
The term “sexual penetration” is given a wide definition.106 
 
Section 16 creates the offence of “statutory sexual assault”. In terms of this section 
a person who commits an act of sexual violation with a child is guilty of this offence 
despite the consent of the child to the commission of such an act. As under section 
15, if both parties were adolescents at the time of the commission of the offence, 
the children involved must be prosecuted by the National Director of Public 
Prosecutions. The term “sexual violation” is also defined in very broad terms and 
refers to any direct or indirect contact between the parties, including petting, kissing 
and hugging.107 
 
Section 56 of the Sexual Offences Act provides a child who has been charged with 
statutory sexual assault with a close-in-age defence. This is not available to a child 
who has been charged with statutory rape.108 In terms of section 56 it is a valid 
defence for the accused child to contend that both the accused persons were 
                                            
105  Note that a “child” is defined for the purposes of sections 15 and 16 of the Sexual Offences 
Act as “a person 12 years or older but under the age of 16 years”. For ease of reference the 
Constitutional Court refers to children that fall into this category as adolescents. See Teddy 
Bear Clinic for Abused Children v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development 2014 (2) 
SA 168 (CC) fn 5 at para [15]. 
106  Teddy Bear Clinic for Abused Children v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development 
2014 (2) SA 168 (CC) at para [12]. 
107  Para [22]. 
108  Sexual Offences Act s 56(2)(b). 
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children and that the age difference between them was not more than two years at 
the time of the alleged commission of the offence. For the purposes of section 56 a 
child is defined as a person under the age of eighteen years. It would seem that the 
defence is available to children under the age of eighteen years.109 However, if a 
sexual violation has been committed and the parties have an age difference of more 
than two years between them no defence is available. Consequently, if a twelve-
year-old and a fifteen-year-old engage in kissing or petting, they are both committing 
an offence in terms of section 16 and neither may claim the close-in-age defence.110  
 
Sections 50(2)(a)(i) and 54 of the Sexual Offences Act are also pertinent to the 
discussion. In terms of section 50(2)(a)(i) a court that convicts a person of a sexual 
offence against a child must make an order to the effect that the particulars of the 
person are to be included in the National Register for Sex Offenders. Section 54 
creates an obligation and an offence in relating to the reporting of, or failure to report, 
sexual offences against children. 
 
The main question before the Constitutional Court was whether the impugned 
sections were inconsistent with the Constitution insofar as they limited adolescents’ 
fundamental rights.111 The court found that sections 15 and 16 of the Sexual 
Offences Act did in fact constitute an encroachment on adolescents’ rights and 
specifically their rights to human dignity (section 10), privacy (section 14), and the 
best interests of the child principle (section 28(2)) as set out in the Constitution.112 
The court also found that these limitations were not reasonable and justifiable in 
terms of section 36 of the Constitution.113 
 
                                            
109  Teddy Bear Clinic for Abused Children v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development 
2014 (2) SA 168 (CC) at para [24]. 
110  Para [24]. 
111  Para [37]. 
112  Paras [58], [64] and [79]. 
113  Paras [94], [100]. 
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In considering whether the impugned sections infringed adolescents’ right to privacy 
the Constitutional Court referred to Bernstein v Bester NNO114 where the court 
identified the “inner sanctum” of personhood that is protected by the right to privacy. 
This inner sanctum includes a person’s “family life, sexual preference and home 
environment, which is shielded from erosion by conflicting rights of the 
community”.115 The Constitutional Court also referred to National Coalition for Gay 
and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Justice,116 where it was held as follows: 
 
Privacy recognises that we all have a right to a sphere of private intimacy and 
autonomy which allows us to establish and nurture human relationships without 
interference from the outside community. The way in which we give expression to 
our sexuality is at the core of this area of private intimacy. If, in expressing our 
sexuality, we act consensually and without harming one another, invasion of that 
precinct will be a breach of our privacy. 
 
The Constitutional Court held that the principled basis of reasoning followed in the 
National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Justice applied with 
equal force to the consensual sexual conduct of adolescents.117 This was due to the 
fact that the criminal offences under sections 15 and 16 of the Sexual Offences Act 
apply to the most intimate sphere of personal relationships and inevitably involve 
adolescents’ constitutional right to privacy.118 The offences allow police officers, 
prosecutors and judicial officers to scrutinise and assume control of the intimate 
relationships of adolescents, thereby intruding into the personal realm of their lives. 
This intrusion, the court pointed out, is exacerbated by the reporting provisions set 
out in section 54, which oblige third parties to disclose information which may have 
been shared with them in the strictest confidence.119  
                                            
114  1996 (2) SA 751 (CC) at para [32]. 
115  Bernstein v Bester NNO 1996 (2) SA 751 (CC) at paras [67] and [79]. 
116  1999 (1) SA 6 (CC) at para [32]. 
117  2014 (2) SA 168 (CC) at para [60]. 
118  Para [60]. 
119  Para [60]. 
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The Constitutional Court accordingly declared sections 15 and 16 of the Sexual 
Offences Act inconsistent with the Constitution and invalid to the extent that they 
impose criminal liability on children under the age of sixteen years.120 This 
declaration of invalidity was suspended for a period of eighteen months, allowing 
Parliament to correct the defects in the Sexual Offences Act. A moratorium was 
furthermore placed on all investigations into, arrests of, prosecution of, and criminal 
and ancillary proceedings pending against children under the age of sixteen years 
in relation to sections 15 and 16 of the Sexual Offences Act. The Minister of Justice 
and Constitutional Development was also ordered to expunge any existing 
conviction and sentence or diversion orders made in terms of sections 15 and 16 
relating to children under the age of sixteen years. The details of such children were 
also not to appear in the National Register of Sex Offenders.121 
 
The two aforementioned constitutional cases, namely Johncom Media Investments 
Limited v M and Teddy Bear Clinic for Abused Children v Minister of Justice and 
Constitutional Development, are welcomed in that they contribute to developing a 
jurisprudence that recognises children as independent rights-holders of 
fundamental rights such as the right to privacy.122 
 
Section 16 of the Constitution guarantees everyone, including children, the right to 
freedom of expression.123 This includes the freedom of the press and media, 
freedom to receive or impart information and ideas, artistic creativity and academic 
freedom and scientific research. Of particular importance to the child witness is the 
freedom to receive or impart information and ideas.124  
                                            
120  Para [110]. 
121  Para [117]. 
122  Kruger in Potgieter, Knobel & Jansen Essays in Honour of Johann Neethling 283. 
123  Milo et al “Freedom of expression” in Woolman et al (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa 
2 ed loose-leaf updates 42-30. 
124  S 16(1)(b) of the Constitution. 
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Currie and De Waal contend that as section 16(1) protects free expression in 
principle one could argue that every act by which a person attempts to express some 
emotion, belief or grievance should qualify as “expression”.125 According to them the 
wide, almost unlimited, conception of expression in section 16 means that protection 
is accorded in many problematic forms of speech that would be left out of 
constitutional consideration in other jurisdictions.126 In the context of the child victim 
and child witness, one could accordingly argue that this provision guarantees the 
child witness the right to express himself or herself in a variety of ways, including in 
a non-conventional, novel or creative manner.127 This correlates with section 161(2) 
of the Criminal Procedure Act, which states that in the case of a witness under the 
age of eighteen years evidence shall be deemed to include “demonstrations, 
gestures or any other form of non-verbal expression”.  
 
In addition child witnesses should be able to express themselves “freely” when 
giving testimony in the criminal justice setting.128 The possibility of doing so for 
children in an adversarial criminal justice system has been questioned by 
professionals and academics.129 Empirical evidence has in fact shown that the 
confrontational setting decreases the child’s willingness and ability to give an 
accurate description of the events he or she has to testify about. Children are more 
likely to say “I don’t know” or may even refrain from answering at all.130    
 
Section 170 of the Criminal Procedure Act recognises the context within which a 
child complainant or child witness has to testify. It accepts that testifying in court 
carries with it a certain degree of mental stress or suffering for the child. Its objective 
                                            
125  Currie & De Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook 341. 
126  Currie & De Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook 342. 
127  Milo et al in Woolman et al (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa 42-33. Children may 
therefore express themselves in a manner that takes their childhood into account, for example 
by way of anatomic dolls or with the aid of drawings. 
128  S 161(2) of the Criminal Procedure Act. 
129  Schwikkard 1996 Acta Juridica 148 at 158 
130  Schwikkard 1996 Acta Juridica 148 at 158. 
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is to reduce to the minimum the degree of stress experienced by the child and to 
create an atmosphere that is conducive to allowing the child to speak freely about 
the events relating to the offence committed against the child. The provision of an 
intermediary is intended to create this atmosphere for the child.131 One could 
therefore argue that, in order to ensure that a child has full realisation of the right to 
freedom of expression, the presiding officer should give serious consideration to the 
desirability of appointing an intermediary when exercising his discretion on whether 
or not to appoint an intermediary.  
 
2.3 Section 28(1): Specific children’s rights 
 
Section 28(1) of the Bill of Rights affords children specific protection in that it 
provides as follows: 
 
(1) Every child has the right -  
 (a)  to a name and a nationality from birth; 
(b)  to family care or parental care, or to appropriate alternative care when 
removed from the family environment; 
(c)  to basic nutrition, shelter, basic health care services and social services; 
(d)  to be protected from maltreatment, neglect, abuse or degradation; 
(e) to be protected from exploitative labour practices; 
(f)  not to be required or permitted to perform work or provide services that - 
 (i) are inappropriate for a person of that child’s age; or 
                                            
131  DPP v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development at para [96].  
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 (ii) place at risk the child’s well-being, education, physical or mental 
health or spiritual, moral or social development; 
(g) not to be detained except as a measure of last resort, in which case, in 
addition to the rights the child enjoys under sections 12 and 35, the child may 
be detained only for the shortest appropriate period of time, and has the right 
to be - 
 (i) kept separately from detained persons over the age of 18 years; and 
(ii) treated in a manner, and kept in conditions, that take account of the 
child’s age; 
(h)  to have a legal practitioner assigned to the child by the state, and at state 
expense, in civil proceedings affecting the child, if substantial injustice would 
otherwise result; and 
(i)  not to be used directly in armed conflict, and to be protected in times of armed 
conflict. 
(2)  A child’s best interests are of paramount importance in every matter 
concerning the child. 
 
A perusal of the above section reveals that section 28(1) does not afford the child 
victim and child witness a specific right to protection as a victim or witness. 
Nevertheless, the right not to be subjected to neglect, abuse or degradation as set 
out in section 28(1)(d) is of particular importance to the child victim and child witness. 
This right will accordingly be discussed in more detail below. 
 
2.3.1 The right not to be subjected to neglect, abuse or degradation 
 
Section 28(1)(d) of the Constitution provides that a child has a right to be protected 
from maltreatment, neglect, abuse or degradation. This right reflects society’s belief 
that children are vulnerable and can be seen as a domestic endorsement of article 
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19 of the CRC.132 According to Bekink and Brand section 28(1)(d) imposes a 
constitutional duty on private persons, as well as the State, to refrain from these 
forms of treatment and in addition imposes a positive obligation on the State to 
prevent harm to children.133 
 
The second obligation is of particular importance in two possible instances. Firstly, 
the state is required to put an end to situations of on-going maltreatment, neglect, 
abuse and degradation in the family or any other context by means such as 
removing the child from such a situation.134 This duty is given specific legislative 
effect in the Children’s Act.135 For instance, Chapter 7 of the Children’s Act provides 
special measures for reporting cases of abuse or neglect of children,136 while 
Chapter 9 of the Children’s Act provides the legal machinery to intervene when a 
child is in need of care and protection, such as the removal of the child to temporary 
safe care.137  
 
Bekink and Brand point out that, in order to meet this positive constitutional duty to 
intervene in situations of on-going abuse to protect a child, the State in many 
instances acts in conflict with the child’s right to family or parental care. They argue 
that this creates the need for a flexible test against which to decide whether the 
decision by the State to intervene in a situation of abuse is constitutionally sound.138 
Kruger139 maintains that this infringement of the child’s right to family or parental 
                                            
132  Refer to ch 4 para 4.3.2 below. 
133  Bekink & Brand in Davel (ed) Introduction to Child Law 188. The authors point out that the fact 
that the right is phrased as a right to be protected against maltreatment, abuse, neglect or 
degradation whereas a comparable right in the interim Constitution (s 30(1)(d))) only said a 
child should not be subjected to such treatment underscores the fact that s 28(1)(d) imposes 
a positive obligation to protect children against such treatment. This view is also held by 
Friedman et al in Woolman et al (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa 47-24. See also s 
7(2) of the Constitution, which states that “[t]he state must respect, protect and fulfil the rights 
in the Bill of Rights.” 
134  Bekink & Brand in Davel (ed) Introduction to Child Law 188.  
135  Act 38 of 2005 (hereinafter “the Children’s Act”). 
136  See s 110 of the Children’s Act. 
137  See ss 151-152 of the Children’s Act. 
138  Bekink & Brand in Davel (ed) Introduction to Child Law in South Africa 189. 
139  Kruger “The protection of children’s rights in the South African Constitution: reflections on the 
first decade” 2007 THRHR 239 at 256. 
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care is probably justified in terms of the limitation clause in situations of on-going 
abuse.  
The second context within which the State must act to prevent the neglect, abuse, 
maltreatment and degradation of children is the general context of legislative and 
policy protection of rights. In this regard the State is under a constitutional duty to 
create legislative and other measures to protect children against potential 
maltreatment, neglect, abuse and degradation. Examples of such legislation include 
the Children’s Act140 as well as the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and Related 
Matters) Amendment Act,141 which introduces a whole range of new offences aimed 
at protecting children from violence. These statutory instruments bear witness to an 
increasing awareness of and concern on the part of the legislature for the need to 
ensure that children are protected against the increasing atmosphere of violence 
that engulfs our society.142  
 
Of particular consequence to the topic of this thesis are the various amendments 
made by the latter Act to the Criminal Procedure Act to provide for special measures 
for children to testify, such as the use of an intermediary.143 In so doing the 
legislature has tried to ameliorate, if not eradicate, those aspects of the criminal 
process that tend to expose the child to secondary psychological trauma or 
emotional harm.144  
 
                                            
140  Ch 7 and 9 of Act 38 of 2005. The National Child Protection Register serves as an example 
of a measure to protect children against potential abuse or maltreatment. See ss 111-128A of 
the Children’s Act.  
141  Ch 6 of Act 32 of 2007. 
142  S v Mokoena 2008 (2) SACR 216 (T) at para [41]. 
143  Refer to ss 158 and 170A of the Criminal Procedure Act. S 170A was inserted by s 3 of the 
Criminal Law Amendment Act 135 of 1991. This amendment came into operation on 30 July 
1993. Subsection (1) was later substituted by s 68 of the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and 
Related Matters) Amendment Act 32 of 2007 by the insertion of the words “biological or 
mental” before “age of eighteen years”, making it clear that it is not only chronological age that 
is contemplated. Section 158 was enacted in 1996 by s 7 of the Criminal Procedure 
Amendment Act 86 of 1996. 
144  S v Mokoena 2008 (2) SACR 216 (T) at para [63]. 
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In S v Mokoena145 Bertelsmann J emphasised that in the light of the occurrence of 
this secondary trauma (the child having to give evidence in court about his or her 
experience), it is incumbent upon the criminal law and criminal procedure and upon 
the courts along with their functionaries and practitioners to administer the criminal 
justice system in such a fashion that children who are caught up in its workings are 
protected from further harm and are treated with proper respect. The appointment 
of an intermediary goes a long way to ensuring that this right not to be subjected to 
(further) harm or abuse is accomplished.146 This view is particularly apposite if one 
takes into account that the Children’s Act includes in its definition of “abuse” the 
prevention of “exposing or subjecting a child to behaviour that may harm the child 
psychologically or emotionally”.147 In DPP v Minister of Justice and Constitutional 
Development148 the Constitutional Court acknowledged that for a child witness to 
relate the graphic details of the abusive acts in open court in the presence of the 
accused combined with aggressive cross-examination, sometimes by the accused, 
will often be as traumatic and damaging to the psychological and emotional 
wellbeing of the child as the original abusive act.149 To subject the child to the normal 
adversarial process of testifying in court may accordingly fall squarely within the 
definition of abuse in the Children’s Act. 
 
The Constitutional Court has dealt with the right (among others) not to be subjected 
to maltreatment, neglect, abuse or degradation in two cases dealing with the 
corporal punishment of children in public settings. While these cases were brought 
on grounds that included the right to be protected against maltreatment, neglect, 
abuse or degradation as stipulated in section 28(1)(d), the court did not make any 
significant pronouncements on the meaning of the subsection in either of the 
judgments.150  
                                            
145  2008 (2) SACR 216 (T) at paras [49]-[50]. 
146  Paras [50] and [87]. 
147  S 1 of the Children’s Act. 
148  2009 (2) SACR 130 (CC). 
149  2009 (2) SACR 130 (CC) at para [108]. 
150  Skelton “Children” in Currie & De Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook (2013) 613. 
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In S v Williams151 the court declared the section of the Criminal Procedure Act that 
allowed for the corporal punishment of juvenile delinquents to be invalid, owing to 
its being a violation of the right to be protected from cruel and degrading punishment. 
The court unfortunately did not find it necessary to examine the right in any detail.  
 
The second case, Christian Education SA v Minister of Education152 was decided 
after the promulgation of the South African Schools Act,153 which banned corporal 
punishment in schools. In dealing with the matter the Constitutional Court did not 
decide whether corporal punishment was in violation of the Bill of Rights, but instead 
focused on the right to freedom of religion, and subjected the infringement of the 
right to a limitations analysis in terms of section 36 of the Constitution.154 The court 
came to the conclusion that although the parents’ right to freedom of religion was 
being violated by the ban on corporal punishment, the limitation was justifiable.155 
 
Of value, however, for the child victim and child witness is the emphasis placed by 
Sachs J in his judgment on the fact that the State has a constitutional obligation to 
protect all people and especially children from maltreatment, abuse or 
degradation.156 He added that by ratifying the CRC the State undertook to take all 
appropriate measures to protect the child from violence, injury or abuse and stated 
that one of the reasons for the provisions banning corporal punishment was “to 
protect the learner from physical and emotional abuse”.157  
 
                                            
151  1995 (3) SA 632 (CC). 
152  2000 (4) SA 757 (CC). 
153  Act 84 of 1996. 
154  Skelton in Currie & De Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook 613. 
155  Skelton in Currie & De Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook 613. 
156  2000 (4) SA 757 (CC) at para [40]. 
157  2000 (4) SA 757 (CC) at para [50]. 
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Prinsloo158 points out that when child victims and child witnesses are subjected to 
“necessary” stress in open court and confronted by their alleged assailants, their 
right to be protected from maltreatment, neglect, abuse or degradation is 
overlooked. I therefore argue that the use of an intermediary as contemplated in 
section 170A of the Criminal Procedure Act will not only increase the potential for 
successful prosecution, but will also buttress a child victim’s and child witness’s 
constitutional right to security and freedom from abuse. 
 
2.3.2 The paramountcy of the child’s best interests  
 
The best interests principle was established in South African law in the 1940s.159 Its 
influence was, however, previously limited to family law proceedings. In emulation 
of international instruments,160 the application of the best interests of the child 
principle has been expanded to all aspects of the law affecting children. In Minister 
of Welfare and Population Development v Fitzpatrick161 Goldstone J pointed out that 
section 28(1) is not exhaustive of children’s rights, but that: 
 
section 28(2) requires that the child’s best interests have paramount importance in 
every matter concerning the child. The plain meaning of the words clearly indicates 
that the reach of section 28(2) cannot be limited to the rights enumerated in section 
28(1) and section 28(2) must be interpreted to extend beyond those provisions. It 
creates a right that is independent of those specified in section 28(1). 
 
This makes it clear that section 28(2) should not be limited to the rights enumerated 
in section 28(1), but that section 28(2) is a right on its own. It should therefore not 
                                            
158  Prinsloo “In the best interest of the child: the protection of child victims and witnesses in the 
South African Criminal Justice system” 2008 CARSA 49 at 53. 
159  Fletcher v Fletcher 1948 (1) SA 130 (A). 
160  A 3 of the CRC, a 4 of the ACRWC. 
161  2000 (3) SA 422 (CC) at para [17]. 
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be regarded as a mere guideline.162 In addition to being an independent right, this 
right also reinforces other rights.163 This has been confirmed by the Constitutional 
Court’s application of the best interests principle in a variety of cases involving 
children’s rights, such as the right to family or parental care,164 the adoption of 
children by unmarried fathers,165 the right to social assistance,166 the right of children 
to privacy and dignity,167 as well as in cases involving the testimony of child victims 
and witnesses.168  
 
The best interests principle has furthermore been used to determine the ambit of, 
as well as to limit, other competing rights.169 The Constitutional Court, for example 
in De Reuck v Director of Public Prosecution170 has found that although the law 
banning child pornography limits the applicant’s rights to privacy and freedom of 
expression, this limitation is justifiable in view of the importance of the purpose of 
protecting the child’s best interests.  
 
It should, however, be noted that, despite the emphatic word “paramount” coupled 
with the far-reaching phrase “in every matter concerning the child” in section 28(2), 
this right does not automatically trump all other rights. In the High Court judgment 
of De Reuck v Director of Public Prosecution171 Epstein AJ held as follows: 
 
The fact that the Constitution regards the child’s best interest of paramount 
importance must be emphasised. It is the single most important factor to be 
                                            
162  As was done in Du Toit v Minister of Welfare and Population Development 2003 (3) SA 198 
(CC). 
163  Skelton in Currie & De Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook 620. 
164  Sonderup v Tondelli 2001 (1) SA 1171 (CC). 
165  De Reuck v Director of Public Prosecution 2004 (1) SA 406 (CC). 
166  Khoza v Minister of Social Development; Mahaule v Minister of Social Development 2004 (6) 
SA 505 (CC). 
167  Johncom Media Investments Limited v M 2009 (4) SA 7 (CC). 
168  DPP v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development 2009 (2) SACR 130 (CC). 
169  Sonderup v Tondelli 2001 (1) SA 1171 (CC); De Reuck v Director of Public Prosecution 2004 
(1) SA 406 (CC). 
170  2004 (1) SA 406 (CC) at paras [88]-[91]. 
171  2003 (3) SA 389 (WLD) at para [10]. 
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considered when balancing or weighing competing rights and interests concerning 
children. All competing rights must defer to the right of children unless unjustifiable.  
 
This decision was, however, overruled by the Constitutional Court. The court held 
that to say that “s 28(2) of the Constitution ‘trumps’ other provisions of the Bill of 
Rights … would be alien to the approach adopted by this Court that constitutional 
rights are mutually interrelated and interdependent and form a single constitutional 
value system”. 
 
The court therefore stated that “s 28(2), like the other rights enshrined in the Bill of 
Rights, is subject to limitations that are reasonable and justifiable in compliance with 
s 36”.172 It follows, then, that the fact that the best interests of the child are 
paramount does not mean that they are absolute.173 Section 28(2) should be treated 
in a manner comparable to other constitutional rights. Like all rights in the Bill of 
Rights, this right should be balanced against other rights and is capable of limitation 
by section 36 of the Bill of Rights.174 
 
The concept of the best interests of the child has in the past been criticised as being 
inherently indeterminate, providing little guidance to those given the task of applying 
it to matters concerning children.175 This was partly due to the absence of a statutory 
checklist of factors to be taken into account when assessing what is in a child’s best 
interests.176 For the Law Reform Commission,177 and some commentators,178 this 
                                            
172  2004 (1) SA 406 (CC) at para [55]. 
173  DPP v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development 2009 (2) SACR 130 (CC) at para 
[72]. 
174  S v M 2007 (2) SACR 539 (CC) at para [26]. 
175  Boezaart “General principles” in Davel & Skelton (eds) Commentary on the Children’s Act 
loose-leaf (revised service 6, 2013) 2-6; S v M 2007 (2) SACR 539 (CC) at para [23]. 
176  Note, however, that a comprehensive list of factors was proposed in McCall v McCall 1994 (3) 
SA 201 (C) at 205B-G which identified 13 factors in an open-ended list specifically designed 
for resolving custody disputes. 
177  South African Law Commission The Review of the Child Care Act Project 110 (2002) at para 
3.3. 
178  Bekink & Bekink “Defining the standard of the best interest of the child: modern South African 
perspectives” 2004 De Jure 21 at 22; Heaton “Some general remarks on the concept ‘best 
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proved to be an unacceptable shortcoming in child law legislation.179 A statutory 
checklist of the best interests of the child standard was accordingly included in the 
Children’s Act. Section 7 of the Children’s Act sets out a list of fourteen factors180 
that must, where relevant, be considered by every decision maker who applies this 
principle. Boezaart181 points out that regrettably the list provided in the Act is a 
                                            
interest of the child’” 1990 THRHR 95; Ferreira “The best interests of the child: from complete 
indeterminacy to guidance by the Children’s Act” 2010 THRHR 201. 
179  Schäfer Child Law in South Africa: Domestic and International Perspectives (2011) 155. 
180  S 7(1) states as follows: “Whenever a provision of this Act requires the best interests of the 
child standard to be applied, the following factors must be taken into consideration where 
relevant, namely - 
(a) the nature of the personal relationship between - 
(i) the child and the parents, or any specific parent; and 
(ii) the child and any other care-giver or person relevant in those circumstances; 
(b) the attitude of the parents, or any specific parent, towards - 
(i) the child; and 
(ii) the exercise of parental responsibilities and rights in respect of the child; 
(c) the capacity of the parents, or any specific  parent, or of any other care-giver or person, to 
provide for the needs of the child, including emotional and intellectual needs; 
(d) the likely effect on the child of any change in the child’s circumstances, including the likely 
effect on the child of any separation from - 
(i) both or either of the parents; or 
(ii) any brother or sister or other child, or any other care-giver or person, with whom the 
child has been living; 
(e) the practical difficulty and expense of the child having contact with the parents, or any 
specific parent, and whether that difficulty or expense will substantially affect the child's 
right to maintain personal relations and direct contact with the parents or any specific parent 
on a regular basis; 
(f) the need for the child - 
(i)  to remain in the care of his or her parent, family and extended family; and 
(ii) to maintain a connection with his or her family, extended family, culture or tradition; 
(g) the child’s - 
(i) age, maturity and stage of development; 
(ii) gender; 
(iii) background; and 
(iv) any other relevant characteristics of the child; 
(h) the child's physical and emotional security and his or her intellectual, emotional, social and 
cultural development; 
(i) any disability that a child may have; 
(j) any chronic illness from which the child may suffer; 
(k) the need for a child to be brought up within a stable family environment and, where this is 
not possible, in an environmental resembling as closely as possible a caring family 
environment; 
(l) the need to protect the child from any physical or psychological harm that may be caused 
by - 
(i) subjecting the child to maltreatment, abuse, neglect, exploitation or degradation or 
exposing the child to violence or exploitation or other harmful behaviour; or 
(ii) exposing the child to maltreatment, abuse, degradation, ill-treatment, violence or 
harmful behaviour towards another person; 
(m) any family violence involving the child or a family member of the child; and 
(n) which action or decision would avoid or minimise further legal or administrative 
proceedings in relation to the child. 
181  In Davel & Skelton (eds) Commentary on the Children’s Act 2-8. 
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closed list in that it does not provide for “any other factor that may be relevant” as 
was the case in McCall v McCall182 and that this may prove to be a limitation in 
practice. However, she underscores, judicial officers can and should use their 
judicial discretion to consider any other factor where relevant.183 Although no 
checklist can fully eliminate the indeterminate nature of the best interests of the child 
standard, the use of the checklist helps to ensure that relevant considerations are 
taken into account and that the decision-making process follows a rational and 
structured approach. 
 
In S v M184 the Constitutional Court acknowledged the difficulties with the 
indeterminate nature of the best interests standard. Sachs J noted that the very 
expansiveness of the paramountcy principle creates the risk of appearing to promise 
everything in general while actually delivering little in particular. The court pointed 
out, however, that it is precisely this contextual nature and inherent flexibility of 
section 28 that constitutes the source of its strength. With reference to Minister of 
Welfare and Population Development v Fitzpatrick185 the court emphasised that the 
best interests principle has never been given exhaustive context, but that it is 
necessary that the standard should be flexible as individual circumstances will 
determine which factors secure the best interests of a particular child. Viewed in this 
light, indeterminacy of outcome should, according to the court, not be regarded as 
a weakness. On the contrary, to apply a predetermined formula for the sake of 
certainty, irrespective of the circumstances, would not be in the best interests of the 
child concerned.186  
 
In DPP v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development187 the court likewise 
found that it was neither necessary nor desirable to define with any precision the 
                                            
182  1994 (3) SA 201 (C) at 205 B-G. 
183  Boezaart in Davel & Skelton (eds) Commentary on the Children’s Act 2-8 
184  2007 (2) SACR 539 (CC) at para [23]. 
185  2000 (3) SA 422 (CC). 
186  2007 (2) SACR 539 (CC) at para [24]. 
187  2009 (2) SACR 130 (CC) at para [73]. 
The protection of child victims and witnesses in terms of the Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa, 1996, and international instruments 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
179 
contents of the right to have the child’s best interests given paramount importance 
in matters concerning the child. This provision, the court noted, provides a 
benchmark for the treatment and protection of children in the form of an expansive 
guarantee and imposes an obligation on all those who make decisions concerning 
a child to ensure that the best interests of the child enjoy paramount importance. 
Courts are hence obliged to give consideration to the effect that their decisions will 
have on the rights and interests of children. The legal and judicial process must 
accordingly always be child-sensitive and statutes must be interpreted in a manner 
which favours protecting and advancing the interests of children.188  
 
As stated previously, the best interests principle also plays an important role in 
jurisprudence relating to the testimony of child victims and child witnesses in criminal 
trials. In S v Mokoena189 Judge Bertelsmann declared section 170A(1) of the 
Criminal Procedure Act to be unconstitutional in that the subsection grants a 
discretion to a court to appoint or not to appoint an intermediary when a child witness 
has to present testimony in a criminal trial. Bertelsmann J relied on section 28 of the 
Constitution, which demanded that a child should be exposed to as little stress and 
mental anguish as possible, particularly in the case of a child witness who has been 
the victim of a sexual attack.190 The learned judge noted that it was difficult to 
understand why the legislature should insist that the child victim should be exposed 
to undue stress and suffering before the services of an intermediary may be 
considered. In his view, this threshold provision places a limitation upon the best 
interests of the child that is neither rational nor justifiable when weighed up against 
the legitimate concerns of the accused, the court and the public interest. In his view, 
to demand an extraordinary measure of stress or anguish before the assistance of 
an intermediary can be called upon clearly discriminates against the child and is 
constitutionally untenable. In addition, according to him, this section infringes upon 
the child victim’s right to equal treatment, dignity and a fair trial.191 
                                            
188  2009 (2) SACR 130 (CC) at para [74]. 
189  2008 (2) SACR 216 (T). 
190  Para [78]. 
191  Paras [79]-[80]. 
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However, in DPP v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development192 the 
Constitutional Court refused to confirm the order of invalidity. The Constitutional 
Court dealt with the matter by looking at four interrelated questions:193 
 
  the object of section 170A(1); 
  the proper meaning of the phrase “undue mental stress or suffering”; 
  whether this subsection is capable of being implemented in a manner that is 
consistent with the Constitution;  
  whether this subsection is unconstitutional to the extent that it gives discretion to 
the judicial officer whether or not to appoint an intermediary. 
 
Firstly, the Constitutional Court confirmed that the object of section 170A(1) is to 
protect child complainants in sexual offence cases and other child witnesses from 
undergoing the undue mental stress or suffering that may be caused by testifying in 
court. This object is consistent with the principle that the best interests of children 
are of paramount importance in criminal trials involving child witnesses. The court 
pointed out that section 170A(1) recognises the context in which a child complainant 
testifies in court and aims to prevent a child from undergoing undue mental stress 
or suffering while giving testimony by permitting the child to testify through an 
intermediary. Section 170A(1) must therefore be construed so as to give effect to 
this object, namely to protect child complainants from the hardship and trauma that 
may result from their participation in the criminal justice system.194 
 
                                            
192  2009 (2) SACR 130 (CC) at para [132]. 
193  Para [92]. 
194  Para [98]. 
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Secondly, with regard to the meaning of the phrase “undue mental stress or 
suffering” the Constitutional Court stressed that, as the phrase is not defined, the 
meaning of the phrase must be understood in the context of the objectives of section 
170A(1)195 as informed by section 28(2) of the Constitution, and the atmosphere in 
which a child is testifying in court.196 The court highlighted that courts have come to 
accept that the giving of evidence in cases involving sexual offences exposes 
complainants to further trauma that may be as severe as the trauma caused by the 
crime. In addition the Constitutional Court pointed out that it is accepted by the court 
that a child complainant in a sexual offence case who testifies without the assistance 
of an intermediary faces a high risk of exposure to undue mental stress or suffering. 
The object of section 170A(1) read with section 170A(3) is precisely to prevent this 
risk of exposure.197  
 
Thirdly, the Constitutional Court has emphasised that this risk of exposure was also 
the reason why, contrary to the reasoning of the High Court, the subsection does 
not require that the child first be exposed to undue mental stress or suffering before 
the provision may be invoked. Such an interpretation of the implementation of 
section 170A(1) would be inimical to the objectives of both section 28(2) and section 
170A(1) as well as article 3(1) of the CRC. What subsection 170A(1) contemplates 
is that the child should be assessed prior to testifying in court in order to determine 
whether the services of an intermediary are required. If such an assessment reveals 
that the services of an intermediary are needed, then the State must see to it that 
                                            
195  The Constitutional Court in DPP v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development  2009 
(2) SACR 130 (CC) at paras [94]-[97] lists the objectives of section 170A(1) as: 
 aiming to prevent a child from undergoing undue mental stress and suffering while 
giving evidence; 
 recognising the context in which a child witness testifies in court; 
 aiming to reduce to the minimum the degree of stress or mental suffering and creating 
an atmosphere that is conducive for a child to speak freely about the events; 
 recognising that children are often intimidated by the court environment, especially if 
they must confront their alleged abuser;  
 recognising the role of an intermediary in fulfilling the objectives.   
196  Para [100]. 
197  Paras [108]-[109]. See also the court’s description from para [101] onwards, of the difficulties 
experienced by the child witness and child victim while testifying. These include multiple 
interviews, an imposing court atmosphere and severe cross-examination. 
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an application for the appointment of an intermediary in terms of section 170A(1) is 
made before the child testifies.198 
 
According to the Constitutional Court this procedure should be followed in all matters 
involving child complainants in sexual offence cases and should become a standard 
pre-occupation of our criminal courts dealing with complainants in sexual offence 
cases. In applying the best interests principle, judicial officers should therefore 
consider how the child’s rights and interests are, or will be, affected if the child 
complainant in a sexual offence case has to testify without the aid of an intermediary. 
Where the prosecutor fails to raise this matter it follows that the judicial officer must, 
of his or her own accord, raise the need for an intermediary to assist the child in 
giving testimony.199  
 
Furthermore, it should be noted that, according to the Constitutional Court,200 the 
nature of an enquiry into the need for an intermediary is not akin to that of a civil 
trial, which attracts a burden of proof, as was found in the case of S v F.201 Rather, 
it is an enquiry which is conducted in the interests of a person (the child) who is not 
a party to the proceedings but who possesses constitutional rights.202 What is 
required of the judicial officer is therefore to consider whether, on the evidence 
presented to him or her, viewed in the light of the objectives of the Constitution and 
section 170A(1), it is in the best interests of the child that an intermediary be 
appointed.203  
                                            
198  Paras [110]-[112]. This is precisely what was done in the matter of S v Mokoena 2008 (2) 
SACR 216 (T). 
199  Paras [112]-[113]. 
200  Para [114]. 
201  1999 (1) SACR 571 (C). In the said case, the court equated an enquiry into the desirability of 
appointing an intermediary with a trial in which the State bears the burden of proof to establish 
the need for the appointment of an intermediary on a balance of probabilities. 
202  DPP v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development 2009 (2) SACR 130 (CC) at para 
[114]. It is precisely for this reason that the need for separate legal representation for the child 
victim has been advocated – see for example Iyer & Ndlovu “Protecting the child victim in 
sexual offences: is there a need for separate legal presentation?” 2012 Obiter 72.  
203  Para [115]. 
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Fourthly, in considering the question whether the discretion given to judicial officers 
to appoint intermediaries renders section 170A(1) unconstitutional, Ngcobo J stated 
that the conferral of a discretion on judicial officers “cannot be unconstitutional 
simply because some judicial officers may exercise the discretion incorrectly”.204 
Ngcobo J emphasised the importance of judicial discretion and stated that “what is 
required is individualised justice, that is, justice which is appropriately tailored to the 
needs of the individual case”.205 Moreover, Ngcobo stated, discretion is a flexible 
tool which enables judicial officers to decide each case on its own merits. In the 
context of the appointment of an intermediary the conferral of judicial discretion 
recognises the existence of a wide range of factors, such as the age, gender, 
disability and level of maturity of a specific child and the nature of the offence, that 
could influence the appointment of an intermediary in a particular case.206 The 
exercise of this discretion is, however, circumscribed in that it must be exercised 
with due regard to the objective of protecting the child from the undue stress or 
suffering that may arise from testifying in court and the principle that the child’s best 
interests are of paramount importance in criminal proceedings concerning a sexual 
offence against a child.207 The exercise of this discretion must therefore be so 
construed as to give effect to the aforementioned objective and the principle of the 
best interests of the child. The Constitutional Court therefore intertwines the test of 
undue mental stress or suffering with the best interests test.208 This approach was 
also followed in Kerkhoff v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development209 
where Southwood J stated with reference to DPP v Minister of Justice and 
                                            
204  Para [119]. 
205  Para [120]. 
206  Paras [122]-[124]. Refer also to Heaton “An individualized, contextualized and child-centred 
determination of the child’s best interests, and the implications of such an approach in the 
South African context” 2009 Journal for Juridical Science 1 for a discussion of an 
individualised, contextualised and child-centred determination of the child’s best interests. She 
submits that an individualised, contextualised and child-centred determination of the child’s 
best interests is one that takes into account the cultural and religious circumstances, interests 
and needs of the individual child. She concludes that all factors that are relevant because they 
have or could have either a negative or positive impact on the individual child should be taken 
into account when assessing a child’s best interests. 
207  Paras [126]-[128]. 
208  Bekink “Defining the phrase: ‘undue mental stress and suffering’ in terms of section 170A of 
the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977” 2014 CARSA 39 at 41. 
209  2011 (2) SACR 109 (GP) at para [7]. 
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Constitutional Development that “[i]t is clear that the enquiry has a narrow focus: to 
determine whether it is in the best interests of the child that an intermediary be 
appointed”.      
 
The Constitutional Court concluded that, if section 170A(1) fails to meet the 
objective of section 28(2), the fault lies not in the provision itself but in the manner 
in which it is interpreted and implemented. In the words of Ngcobo J an incorrect 
interpretation or implementation of the provision does not render it unconstitutional. 
The solution, according to the Constitutional Court, does not lie in making the 
appointment of an intermediary compulsory in every sexual offence case in which a 
child complainant is involved, but in making judicial officers and prosecutors aware 
of their constitutional obligations to ensure that the best interests of children are of 
paramount importance in criminal trials involving child complainants. In this context 
judicial education and the training of prosecutors and other officials who deal with 
victims of sexual offences are of vital importance.210 
 
Although it may be argued, which argument is supported, that by issuing the above-
mentioned dictum the Constitutional Court has effectively reduced the best interests 
of the child principle to essentially a matter of statutory interpretation,211 the 
importance of the role of the best interests principle and the objective of section 
170A(1), namely to prevent children from being exposed to undue mental stress or 
suffering while testifying, have been reaffirmed by the Constitutional Court beyond 
any doubt.  
 
                                            
210  Paras [131]-[132]. 
211  Prinsloo “The rights of child victims and witnesses of crime: an international analysis” 2012 
CARSA 74 at 75. 
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In Kerkhoff v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development212 Southwood J 
stated with regard to the inquiry into what is in the best interests of the child when 
deciding on the appointment of an intermediary that the inquiry:  
 
is not concerned with whether the child is competent to give evidence or whether 
the child’s evidence is admissible, credible and reliable. These are issues which will 
arise in the trial and will be decided by the court in the light of all the evidence. It is 
significant that section 170A makes provision for a simple procedure for the 
appointment of an intermediary and essential jurisdictional fact: i.e. when it appears 
to the court that the relevant witness would be exposed to undue mental stress and 
suffering.  
 
This, however, places an enormous responsibility on the courts and those dealing 
with child victims and child witnesses within the criminal justice system to ensure 
that section 170A is correctly interpreted and implemented, as an incorrect 
interpretation or implementation might result in a child who is in need of assistance 
being left out in the cold.   
 
3 THE PROTECTION OF CHILDREN IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
 
The body of international law pertaining to children’s issues consists of a multitude 
of instruments. These instruments include treaties, inter-state agreements and 
statements of general principle accepted by governments.213 Some of these 
instruments deal explicitly with children,214 whereas others have only an indirect 
                                            
212  2011 (2) SACR 109 (GP) at para [7]. 
213   Olivier “Status of international children’s rights instruments in South Africa” in Davel et al 
Introduction to Child Law in South Africa (2000) 198.  
214  See for example the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989) UN Doc 
A/44/49. The text of the Convention appears in Mtshaulana et al (eds) Documents on 
International Law (1996) 266. 
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impact on children.215 Also, it should be noted that none of these instruments, with 
the exception of the UN Economic and Social Resolution 2005/20 (“Guidelines on 
Justice in Matters involving Child Victims and Witnesses of Crime”), deals 
specifically with child victims and/or witnesses. However, they may have an implicit 
application, as will be demonstrated in each instance.   
 
In view of their importance, the international and regional child instruments, namely 
the League of Nations Declaration of the Rights of the Child, 1924, the Declaration 
of the Rights of the Child 1959, the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the 
Child and the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, that deal 
specifically with children will be discussed in detail.  
 
4 INTERNATIONAL CHILDREN’S RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS 
 
4.1 The League of Nations Declaration of the Rights of the Child 1924 
 
Historically children were not regarded as the bearers of rights but were seen as 
non-entities or the possessions of their parents.216 The turn of the 20th century, 
however, saw the emergence of an international movement towards the recognition 
of children’s rights and the subsequent drafting of children’s rights instruments. In 
1924 the fifth Assembly of the League of Nations adopted the Declaration of the 
Rights of the Child, also known as the “1924 Declaration” or the “Geneva 
Declaration”.217 This Declaration proclaimed that “mankind owes to the child the best 
                                            
215  See for example the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (GA RES 217(11) 1948). The text 
of the Declaration appears in Mtshaulana et al (eds) Documents on International Law 172. 
216  Hart & Pavlovic “Children’s rights in education: a historical perspective” 1991 School 
Psychology Review 345. 
217  United Nations “Geneva Declaration of the Right of the Child 1924” http://www.un-
documents.net/gdrc1924.htm (accessed 27/05/2014). 
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it has to give” and set out five principles which were principally concerned with the 
provision of children’s economic, social and psychological needs.218 
Despite being termed a “Declaration of the Rights of the Child”, this declaration can 
be regarded as a welfare document rather than a rights document, in that children 
were seen as the recipients of welfare rather than the holders of specific rights. 
Furthermore, there is no reference in the text to the obligation on states to ensure 
its fulfilment; instead the responsibility for fulfilment is placed on the “men and 
women of all nations”. Despite these shortcomings it is still of great value as it lays 
the foundation or groundwork for the proposition that the welfare of children can best 
be served through the protection of their rights.219 It also served as the basis for the 
slightly expanded declaration adopted by the General Assembly of the newly formed 
United Nations in 1959.  
 
4.2 The Declaration of the Rights of the Child, 1959 
 
A further step towards the protection of children was taken in 1959 when the General 
Assembly of the United Nations adopted the Declaration of the Rights of the Child, 
1959 (“the 1959 Declaration”).220 The preamble to the 1959 Declaration reaffirmed 
the 1924 Declaration’s commitment of mankind to give “the Child the best it has to 
give” and called upon voluntary organisations, local authorities and national 
                                            
218  The five principles are: 
I. The child must be given the means requisite for its normal development, both materially 
and spiritually; 
II. The child that is hungry must be fed; the child that is sick must be helped; the child that 
is backward must be helped; the delinquent child must be reclaimed; and the orphan and 
the waif must be sheltered and succoured; 
III. The child must be the first to receive relief in times of distress; 
IV. The child must be put in a position to earn a livelihood and must be protected against 
every form of exploitation; 
V. The child must be brought up in the consciousness that its talents must be devoted to the 
service of its fellow men. 
219  Kaime The Convention on the Rights of the Child: A Cultural Legitimacy Critique (2011) 13; 
Van Bueren International Documents on Children (1993) xv. It should be noted that the 
acknowledgement of children as the bearers of rights preceded the eventual protection of the 
rights.  
220  The text of the United Nations Declaration of the Rights of the Child 1959 appears in Van 
Bueren International Documents on Children 4.  
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governments to recognise and strive for the observance of the rights of children set 
out in the document through legislative and other means progressively taken.221  
 
The specific value of the document lies in the fact that it represents a serious first 
attempt to rationally catalogue the rights of children.222 It comprises ten principles 
and includes the rights to protection;223 to a name and nationality;224 to social 
security;225 to special protection for the handicapped;226 to full and harmonious 
development;227 to education;228 to be among the first to receive relief and 
protection;229 to protection from neglect or exploitation230 as well as to protection 
from abusive cultural or religious practices.231 
 
Of particular importance is the fact that the 1959 Declaration contains a general non-
discrimination clause protecting children from practices that may foster racial, 
religious or any other form of discrimination. It was also the first international 
instrument to incorporate the principle that “the best interests of the child shall be 
the paramount consideration” in the protection and implementation of children’s 
rights.232 In addition, the 1959 Declaration, although it was a non-binding resolution 
of the General Assembly, represented great progress in conceptual thinking on 
children’s rights, in that it marked a transformation in the conception of children as 
mere beneficiaries of charity, to that of children as distinct subjects of international 
                                            
221  Preamble to the United Nations Declaration of the Rights of the Child 1959, as set out in Van 
Bueren International Documents on Children 4.  
222  Kaime The Convention on the Rights of the Child: A Cultural Legitimacy Critique 15. 
223  Principle 2. 
224  Principle 3. 
225  Principle 4. 
226  Principle 5. 
227  Principle 6. 
228  Principle 7. 
229  Principle 8. 
230  Principle 9. 
231  Principle 10. 
232  Principles 1 and 2. 
The protection of child victims and witnesses in terms of the Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa, 1996, and international instruments 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
189 
law, whose ability to enjoy the benefits of individual rights and freedoms was 
recognised.233 
 
4.3 The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, 1989 
 
Building on the 1959 Declaration, child advocates came to believe that a more 
comprehensive and binding document was needed to protect the rights of 
children.234 The first step in creating such a document took the form of a first draft 
of the Convention, submitted by Poland to the Commission on Human Rights in 
1978, as a way of celebrating the International Year of the Child in 1979. In many 
respects this draft resembled the 1959 Declaration. However, it took ten years of 
deliberation by the States Parties of the UN before a final report was produced. This 
report was unanimously adopted by the General Assembly on 20 November 1989. 
It was ratified by the required twenty states in record time, bringing the Convention 
on the Rights of the Child (“the CRC”)235 into force on 2 September 1990, less than 
a year after its adoption.236  
 
The CRC applies to “every human being below the age of eighteen years”237 and 
includes 41 substantive articles, providing for rights ranging from civil and political 
to economic, social and cultural rights, as well as 13 procedural and administrative 
articles. The CRC establishes the child as a rights-bearing person and makes 
provision for almost every aspect of a child’s life. It may rightly be described as the 
                                            
233  Van Bueren The International Law on the Rights of the Child (1995) 12.  
234  Hart et al “A new age of child protection – General comment 13: Why it is important, how it 
was constructed, and what it intends?” 2011 Child Abuse and Neglect 970 at 972. 
235  United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989) UN Doc A/44/49. The text of the 
Convention appears in Mtshaulana et al Documents on International Law 266. South Africa 
ratified the CRC on 16 June 1995. 
236  Kaime The Convention on the Rights of the Child: A Cultural Legitimacy Critique 16. 
237  A 1, save where under the law applicable to the child majority is attained earlier. 
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“greatest qualitative leap in history in the conceptualisation of and respect for the 
child”,238 “forming the core of the international law on the rights of the child”.239   
 
4.3.1 The CRC principles 
 
Broadly speaking, the CRC is concerned with what has been labelled the four P’s 
or “pillars” of the CRC which serve as the common overall classification of all the 
rights in the Convention: the participation of children in decisions affecting them; the 
protection of children against discrimination and all forms of exploitation and neglect; 
the prevention of harm to children and the provision of assistance to meet children’s 
needs. The Committee on the Rights of the Child240 has also identified four general 
principles, which are held to be fundamental to the implementation of the whole 
Convention.241 These four principles accord children: 
 
 the right to protection against non-discrimination (art 2); 
 the right to have their best interests made a primary consideration in all actions 
concerning them (art 3); 
 the inherent right to life (art 6); and 
 the right of a child who is capable of forming his or her own views to express those 
views freely in all matters affecting the child (art 12).  
 
                                            
238  Hart et al 2011 Child Abuse and Neglect 970 at 972. 
239  Fortin Children’s Rights and the Developing Law (2003) 35. 
240  This committee is established in terms of art 43 of the CRC. 
241  Mahery “The United Nation Convention on the Rights of the Child: maintaining its value in 
international and South African law” in Boezaart (ed) Child Law in South Africa (2009) 315. 
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The breakdown of the CRC in this way is useful as it makes the treaty easy to 
comprehend for both children and adults and accordingly furthers proper 
implementation of the rights contained therein by States Parties to the CRC.242  
 
For present purposes, three principles of the CRC are of particular importance when 
considering child victims and/or child witnesses, namely the best interests of the 
child (art 3), the right of the child to be heard (art 12) and the right of the child to 
freedom from all forms of violence (art 19). Article 19 will be discussed first, after 
which the specific relevance of articles 12 and 3 to the protection of child victims 
and witnesses will be discussed. The General Comments on articles 19, 12 and 3, 
developed by the Committee on the Rights of the Child,243 will also be discussed as 
these comments serve to guide the interpretation of the specific articles in the CRC 
and constitute an authoritative interpretation as to what is expected of States Parties 
as they implement the obligations contained in the CRC. 
 
4.3.2 Article 19 
 
Article 19 of the CRC reads as follows: 
 
1. States Parties shall take all appropriate legislative, administrative, social and 
educational measures to protect the child from all forms of physical or mental 
violence, injury or abuse, neglect or negligent treatment, maltreatment or 
exploitation, including sexual abuse, while in the care of parent(s), legal guardian(s) 
or any other person who has the care of the child.  
                                            
242  Van Bueren “The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child: an evolutionary 
revolution” in Davel (ed) Introduction to Child Law in South Africa (2000) 203. 
243  See General Comment 12 (GC 12) of the Committee on the Rights of the Child (20/07/2009); 
General Comment 13 (GC 13) of the Committee on the Rights of the Child (18/04/2011) & 
General Comment 14 (GC 14) of the Committee on the Rights of the Child (29/05/2013), 
available at http://www2.ohcr.org/english/bodies/crc/comments.htm (accessed 06/06/2014). 
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2. Such protective measures should, as appropriate, include effective procedures 
for the establishment of social programmes to provide necessary support for the 
child and for those who have the care of the child, as well as for other forms of 
prevention and for identification, reporting, referral, investigation, treatment and 
follow-up of instances of child maltreatment described heretofore, and, as 
appropriate, for judicial involvement. 
 
Article 19 encapsulates the CRC’s central and most comprehensive 
conceptualisation of the protection of children against all forms of violence. In doing 
so it clearly places a legal obligation on States Parties to the CRC to establish 
measures for the protection of children against all forms of violence. Such protective 
measures should include a range of interventions, namely legislative, 
administrative, social and educational measures as well as social programmes of 
support for the child and his or her caregivers, proactive prevention against the 
experience of violence and treatment for those who have been the victims of 
violence. 
 
4.3.2.1 General Comments 13: the right of the child to freedom from all forms 
of violence 
 
In its introduction to General Comment No 13 (2011) The right of the child to be free 
from all forms of violence (hereafter “GC 13”)244 the Committee on the Rights of the 
Child (“the Committee”) highlights the unfortunate factual situation that despite 
numerous initiatives developed by States Parties to the CRC and others to prevent 
and respond to violence against children, high rates of violence against children still 
prevail.245 In recognition of this fact and with a view to improving the current 
                                            
244  General Comment 13 (GC 13) of the Committee on the Rights of the Child (18/04/2011), 
available at http://www2.ohcr.org/english/bodies/crc/comments.htm (accessed 06/06/ 2014). 
245  World Health Organisation (2011a) Violence and Injury Prevention and Disability, available at 
http://www.who.int/violence_injury_prevention/violence/child/en (accessed on 09/06/ 2014); 
Svevo-Cianci et al “ʽThe right of the child to freedom from all forms of violence’ - Changing 
how the world conceptualises child protection” 2011 Child Abuse and Neglect 979 at 980. 
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situation, the Committee issued a general comment on article 19, known as General 
Comment 13, which was adopted on 11 February 2011. In this regard GC 13 states 
that the “legal frameworks in a majority of States still fail to prohibit all forms of 
violence against children, and where laws are in place, their enforcement is often 
inadequate”. GC 13 therefore bears testimony to a need for a complete change in 
the manner in which violence against children is understood and provides the basis 
for a transformation in child protection towards a child’s rights-based approach.246 
 
In order to effect such a transformation the Committee set forth certain objectives in 
the guidelines. These objectives, directed to States Parties and other relevant 
stakeholders, are to: 
 provide guidance in understanding their obligations 
 outline legislative, judicial, administrative, social and educational measures that 
have to be adopted; 
 overcome isolated, fragmented and reactive initiatives which have limited impact; 
 promote a holistic approach; 
 provide a basis on which to develop a coordinating framework; and 
 highlight the need to move quickly towards the fulfilment of article 19 obligations.247  
 
Major elements of these objectives are described below. Particular attention is given 
to those elements that affect child victims. 
 
Human rights imperative  
                                            
246  Hart et al 2011 Child Abuse and Neglect 970 at 973. 
247  GC 13 para 11. 
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The Committee in paragraph 13 of the GC 13 emphasises that in order to address 
and eliminate the widespread prevalence and incidence of violence against children, 
it is imperative that any strategies and systems aimed at preventing and responding 
to violence should adopt a child’s-rights approach rather that a welfare approach. 
The goal of States Parties should therefore be not only to provide child protection, 
but to do so in a way that secures and promotes children’s fundamental rights to 
respect for their human dignity and physical and psychological integrity. 
 
 
 
 
Holistic approach 
 
Although article 19 forms the core provision for discussions and strategies against 
all forms of violence, the Committee clearly recognises the importance of the 
Convention as a whole. All rights proclaimed in the Convention are to be respected 
in their collective and individual synergistic meaning. In this regard the Committee 
points out that in addition to the fact that article 19 is strongly linked to a broad range 
of provisions in the Convention beyond those relating directly to violence, the 
implementation of article 19 must be situated in the context of articles 5, 9, 18 and 
27 of the CRC.248 The holistic approach applied to the protection of children 
therefore requires that their protection should be accomplished in a manner that 
gives priority to the wellbeing of the child on a physical, spiritual, mental, moral and 
social level.249    
                                            
248  GC 13 para 7. 
249  Hart et al 2011 Child Abuse and Neglect 970 at 974. 
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Primary prevention 
 
The Committee emphasises in the strongest terms that child protection must begin 
with proactive prevention of all forms of violence, stating that “primary prevention, 
through public health, education, social services and other approaches is of 
paramount importance”.250 Essential preventative measures are identified which 
include particular support to children and their families as well as educational 
measures.251 The Committee points out that the commitment to prevention 
nonetheless does not lessen the State’s obligation to respond to violence when it 
does occur.252   
 
Children to whom GC 13 applies 
 
In terms of article 1 of the CRC, a child means “every human being below the age 
of eighteen years unless under the law applicable to the child, majority is attained 
earlier”. The Committee has determined that “while respecting the evolving 
capacities and progressive autonomy of the child”, GC 13 should nevertheless apply 
to all children below the age of eighteen years who are “in the care of primary or 
proxy caregivers, or in the de facto care of the State” or who have “attained majority 
or emancipation through early marriage and/or forced marriage”.253 GC 13 therefore 
covers all children emancipated inadequately or improperly and includes young 
persons in vulnerable positions such as child-headed households, street children, 
children of migrating parents or unaccompanied children outside their country or 
region of origin.254  
                                            
250  GC 13 para 3g and 46. 
251  GC 13 para 47 and 44. 
252  GC 13 para 46. 
253  GC 13 para 33 and fn 13. 
254  GC 13 para 34 and 35. 
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Violence defined 
 
Article 19 of the CRC establishes that the child must be protected from all forms of 
violence. General Comment 13 defines violence as meaning “all forms of physical 
or mental violence, injury or abuse, neglect or negligent treatment or exploitation 
including sexual abuse”. The Committee emphasises that it has consistently 
maintained the position that all forms of violence, without exception, are 
unacceptable and that the choice of the term violence must in no way be interpreted 
as minimising the impact of and need to address non-physical and/or non-intentional 
forms of harm (such as neglect or psychological maltreatment). While choosing not 
to attempt to list all forms of violence, helpful descriptions of a wide variety of forms 
of violence such as neglect, mental violence, corporal punishment and sexual abuse 
are given.255 Additionally, the Committee recognises the influence and role of the 
mass media, information and communications technologies and institutions in the 
emergence of violence against children.256   
 
Definition of caregivers 
 
Article 19 of the CRC promotes the protection of children from all forms of violence 
“while in the care of parent(s), legal guardian(s), or any person who has the care of 
such child”. In defining caregivers the Committee follows an inclusive interpretation 
and states that article 19 applies to those with clear, recognised, legal, professional-
ethical and/or cultural responsibility for the safety, health, development and well-
being of the child. The numerous examples provided include parents, foster parents, 
adoptive parents, guardians, extended family and community members, 
educational, school and early childhood personnel, recreational and sports coaches 
                                            
255  GC 13 paras 4 and 17-32. 
256  GC 13 paras 30-32. 
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and institutional personnel. In the case of unaccompanied children, the State is 
identified as the de facto caregiver.257   
 
Comprehensive intervention 
 
The Committee reaffirmed the States’ strict obligation to undertake all appropriate 
measures to fully implement this right for children. States Parties are reminded that 
the term “appropriate” refers to the broad range of measures cutting across all 
sectors of government and all levels – national, provincial and municipal.258 
Adequate budget allocations for the implementation of legislation and other 
measures are expected to be put in place by the States Parties.259 Of particular 
interest to the present study is the role of judicial intervention. In this regard the 
Committee emphasises that:260 
 
 the protection and further development of the child and his or her best interests must 
form the primary purpose of any decision making;  
 children and their parents should be promptly and adequately informed of the judicial 
process; 
 child victims should be treated in a child-friendly and sensitive manner; 
 judicial involvement should be prevented where possible; and 
 in all proceedings involving child victims, the celerity (speed/haste) principle must 
be applied, while respecting the rule of law. 
 
                                            
257  GC 13 para 33. 
258  GC 13 paras 37-56. 
259  GC 13 para 41(e). 
260  GC 13 para 54. 
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In addition the Committee indicates that judicial involvement may consist of an order 
to ensure compensation and rehabilitation for child victims. States are also 
encouraged to establish specialised juvenile or family courts as well as tailor-made 
criminal procedures for child victims. This could include the establishment of 
specialised units within the police, the judiciary and the prosecutor’s office. All 
professionals working with and for children involved in such cases should, according 
to the Committee, receive specific inter-disciplinary training on the rights and needs 
of children of different age groups as well as on proceedings that are adapted to 
them.261     
 
 
 
 
National coordinating framework 
 
States Parties to the CRC have previously been encouraged to adopt national plans 
of action to implement the rights of the child. While contributing to greater enjoyment 
of their rights by children, such plans of action have nevertheless been faced with 
challenges in the areas of implementation, monitoring, evaluation and follow-up. In 
order to achieve a more feasible and flexible solution, the Committee proposes to 
introduce a coordinating framework on violence against children. A coordinating 
framework of this nature can be used where a national plan does not exist or can 
complement an effective existing national plan by stimulating discussion and 
generating new ideas.262 
                                            
261  GC 13 paras 55 and 56. 
262  GC 13 para 68. Although recognising that there is no single model for a framework of this 
nature the Committee nevertheless recommends that the following ten elements should be 
included in such a national coordinating framework: child rights approach; gender dimension 
of violence against children; primary prevention; primary position of families in care-giving and 
protection strategies; resilience and protective factors; risk factors; children in potentially 
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4.3.3 Article 12 
 
Article 12 of the CRC reads as follows: 
 
1. States Parties shall assure to the child who is capable of forming his or her 
own views the right to express those views freely in all matters affecting the 
child, the view of the child being given due weight in accordance with the age 
and maturity of the child. 
2. For this purpose, the child shall in particular be provided the opportunity to 
be heard in any judicial and administrative proceedings affecting the child 
either directly, or through a representative or an appropriate body, in a 
manner consistent with the procedural rules of national law. 
Article 12 of the CRC addresses the legal status of children who on the one hand 
lack the full autonomy of adults, but on the other are the subjects of individual rights. 
Article 12 accomplishes this by assuring every child capable of forming his or her 
views the right to express those views freely in all matters affecting the child, which 
views should be given due weight in accordance with the age and maturity of the 
child. Paragraph 2 in particular affords the child this right in any judicial or 
administrative proceedings affecting the child.  
 
The right of a child to be heard constitutes one of the fundamental core values of 
the CRC. Not only is the right established in article 12 as a right in itself but it should 
also be considered in the interpretation and implementation of other rights, thereby 
enhancing its importance.263 
                                            
vulnerable situations; resource allocations; coordinating mechanism; accountability (GC 13 
paras 71-72). 
263  GC 12 paras 1-3. 
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4.3.3.1 General Comment 12: the right of the child to be heard 
 
Despite States Parties’ commitment to the realisation of article 12, implementation 
of the child’s right to express his or her views freely continues to be impeded by 
many long-standing practices and attitudes as well as by political and economic 
barriers. This is particularly true for certain groups of children, such as younger boys 
and girls, as well as children belonging to marginalised and disadvantaged groups. 
In recognition of this fact, the Committee on the Rights of the Child deemed it 
important and necessary to issue a general comment on article 12.264 The 
Committee therefore issued General Comment No 12 (2009) The right of the child 
to be heard (hereafter “GC 12”), which was adopted on 20 July 2009.265  
 
According to the Committee the overall objective of the general comments is to 
support States Parties in their effective implementation of the right. In so doing the 
Committee seeks to: 
 
a) improve understanding of the meaning of article 12 and its implications for 
States Parties and other stakeholders; 
b) elaborate on the scope of legislation, policy and practice necessary to 
achieve the full implementation of article 12; 
c) emphasise positive approaches in implementing article 12; and 
d) propose basic requirements for appropriate ways to give due weight to 
children’s views in matters affecting them.266 
                                            
264  GC 12 para 4. 
265  General Comment 12 (GC 12) of the Committee on the Rights of the Child (20/07/2009), 
available at http://www2.ohcr.org/english/bodies/crc/comments.htm (accessed 06/06/2014). 
266  GC 12 para 8. 
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In order to achieve the first objective, namely to have a clear understanding of the 
meaning of article 12, the Committee provides an in-depth analysis of article 12.267 
Major elements of this analysis are described below. Particular attention is given to 
those elements that affect child victims. 
 
(a) Paragraph 1 of article 12 
 
(i) “shall assure” 
 
Article 12, paragraph 1, provides that States Parties “shall assure” the right of 
children to freely express their respective views in all matters affecting them. States 
Parties are reminded by the Committee that this places a positive obligation on them 
to ensure that mechanisms are in place for children to express their views and for 
due weight to be given to such views.268 
 
(ii) “capable of forming his or her views” 
 
The Committee states that this phrase should not be seen as a limitation, but rather 
as an obligation on States Parties to assess the capacity of the child as far as 
possible. In this regard States Parties should presume that a child is capable of 
expressing his or her views, and has the right to express them. In terms of the 
principles of the article, it is therefore not up to the child to prove his or her capacity. 
                                            
267  GC 12 paras19-38. 
268  GC 12 para 19. 
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The Committee furthermore emphasises that article 12 imposes no age limit on the 
right of the child to express his or her views. States Parties are discouraged from 
introducing any age limits either in law or in practice that would disqualify children 
from exercising this right. In this regard the Committee underlines certain important 
factors: 
 
 That even very young children are capable of expressing their views. The full 
implementation of article 12 thus requires recognition of, and respect for, non-
verbal forms of communication, such as play, body language and drawing and 
painting, through which young children can demonstrate and express their views. 
 It is not necessary for a child to have a comprehensive knowledge of all aspects of 
the matter affecting him or her, but rather a sufficient understanding to be able to 
appropriately form his or her views on the matter. 
 States Parties are under an obligation to ensure the implementation of the right for 
children experiencing difficulties in expressing their views, such as disabled 
children or children who do not speak the majority language. 
 States Parties must be aware of the potential negative consequences of an 
inconsiderate application of article 12, drawing particular attention to cases 
involving very young children or to instances where the child has been the victim 
of a criminal offence, sexual abuse, violence or another form of mistreatment.269 
 
(iii) “the right to express those views freely” 
 
The Committee points out that “freely” implies that a child can choose whether or 
not he or she wants to exercise his or her right to be heard. A child should therefore 
not be manipulated or subjected to undue influence or pressure. States Parties 
                                            
269  GC 12 paras 20-21. 
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should hence provide the child with an environment in which the child feels 
respected and secure when freely expressing his or her views. Children should also 
not be interviewed more often than necessary and should be informed of any matter 
affecting them, such as the conditions under which the child will be asked to express 
his or her views.270 
 
(iv) “in all matters affecting the child” 
 
If a matter under discussion affects a child, the child has a right to be heard and 
must be heard. This basic condition has to be respected and understood by States 
Parties in a broad sense.271  
 
(v) “being given due weight in accordance with the age and maturity of the child” 
 
The Committee stresses that the term “being given due weight” implies that simply 
listening to the child is not sufficient; the views of the child have to be taken seriously. 
In addition they point out that by referring to the age and maturity of the child it is 
clear that age alone cannot determine the significance of the child’s views. The 
views of each child should therefore be determined on a case-by-case basis, taking 
the maturity of the child into account.272  
 
(b) Paragraph 2 of article 12 
                                            
270  GC 12 paras 22-25. 
271  GC 12 paras 26-27. It should be noted that the Open-ended Working Group established by 
the Commission on Human Rights, which drafted the text of the Convention, rejected a 
proposal to define these “matters” by a list limiting the considerations of a child’s or children’s 
views. Instead, it was decided that the right of the child to be heard should refer to “all matters 
affecting the child”. 
272  GC 12 paras 28-31.  
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(i) The right “to be heard in any judicial and administrative proceeding affecting 
the child”  
 
The Committee emphasises that the provision applies to all relevant judicial and 
administrative proceedings affecting the child, without limitation, including, for 
example, the separation of parents, care and adoption issues as well as children 
who have fallen victim to physical or psychological violence, sexual abuse and other 
crimes.  
 
The Committee also states that a child cannot be heard effectively where the 
environment is intimidating, hostile, insensitive or inappropriate to the child’s age. 
Proceedings must also be both accessible and child-appropriate. Particular 
attention needs to be paid by States Parties to the provision and delivery of child-
friendly information, adequate support for self-advocacy, appropriately trained staff, 
design of courtrooms, clothing of judges and lawyers, sight screens, and separate 
waiting rooms.273 
 
(ii) “either directly, or through a representative or an appropriate body” 
 
According to article 12 the child has a right to decide how to be heard, namely either 
directly or through a representative or appropriate body. The Committee 
recommends, however, that, where possible, the child should be given the 
opportunity to express his or her views directly. If the child’s hearing is undertaken 
through a representative, it is of the utmost importance that the child’s views should 
be transmitted correctly to the decision maker by the representative. Such 
                                            
273  GC 12 paras 32-34. 
The protection of child victims and witnesses in terms of the Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa, 1996, and international instruments 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
205 
representatives must have sufficient knowledge and understanding of the various 
aspects of the decision-making process and should be experienced in working with 
children. The representative must be aware of the fact that she or he represents the 
interests of the child exclusively and not the interests of other persons (for example 
parent(s), institutions or society). The Committee accordingly recommends that a 
code of conduct be developed for such representatives.274 
 
(iii) “in a manner consistent with the procedural rules of national law” 
 
The Committee points out that this clause is not to be interpreted as permitting 
States Parties the use of procedural legislation which restricts or prevents 
enjoyment of this fundamental right. On the contrary, States Parties are urged to 
comply with the basic rules of fair procedure, such as the right to a defence.275 
 
With regard to the Committee’s second objective stated above, namely to elaborate 
on the scope of legislation, policy and practice necessary to achieve the full 
implementation of article 12, the Committee provided a five-step plan that needs to 
be followed by States Parties. This entails preparation, the hearing itself including 
the assessment of the capacity of the child (ie evidentiary issues), information about 
the weight given to the views of the child (feedback) as well as complaints, remedies 
and redress. In terms of these steps children should be informed of their right to 
express their views, which views should be taken seriously at the hearing itself. 
Furthermore, the child’s views must be given due weight by those assessing them, 
while taking the child’s capacity into account. This should take place on a case-by-
case basis. Once the child has expressed his or her views, feedback must be 
provided on the outcome of the process and the way in which his or her views were 
                                            
274  GC 12 paras 35-37. 
275  GC 12 para 38. 
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considered. Lastly, legislation must also be enacted to enable children to complain 
if this right has been disregarded or violated.276 
 
The Committee also deemed it necessary to remind States Parties of their core 
obligations in terms of article 12, namely to amend legislation in order to introduce 
mechanisms providing children with access to appropriate information, adequate 
support, if necessary, feedback on the weight given to their views, and procedures 
for complaints, remedies or redress. In order to fulfil these obligations, States Parties 
should adopt the following strategies: 
 
 Review and withdraw restrictive declarations and reservations in terms of article 
12. 
 Establish independent human rights institutions, such as children’s ombudsmen or 
commissioners with a broad children’s rights mandate. 
 Provide training on article 12 and its application in practice for all professionals 
working with and for children, such as lawyers, judges, police, social workers, 
community workers, psychologists and caregivers. 
 Ensure appropriate conditions for supporting and encouraging children to express 
their views, and make sure that these views are given due weight. 
 Combat negative attitudes that impede the full realisation of the child’s right to be 
heard, through inter alia public campaigns, opinion leaders and the media.277 
 
In addition the Committee sets out specific obligations with regard to judicial (civil 
and penal) and administrative proceedings that need to be adhered to. Regarding 
child victims in the penal judicial proceedings, the Committee states that the child 
victim of a crime must be given an opportunity to fully exercise his or her right to 
                                            
276  GC 12 paras 40-47. 
277  GC 12 paras 48-49. 
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freely express his or her views. This should be done in accordance with the United 
Nations Economic and Social Council resolution 2005/20 (“Guidelines on Justice in 
Matters involving Child Victims and Witnesses of Crime”). Every effort must 
therefore be made to ensure that child victims are consulted on the relevant matters 
with regard to involvement in the case under scrutiny, and enabled to express freely, 
and in their own manner, views and concerns regarding their involvement in the 
judicial process. 
 
The right of child victims to express their views is also linked to the right to be 
informed about relevant issues such as the availability of health, psychological and 
social services, the role of the child victims in the process, the ways in which 
“questioning” is conducted, existing support mechanisms in place for the children 
when submitting a complaint and participating in investigations and court 
proceedings, the specific places and times of hearings, the availability of protective 
measures, the possibilities of receiving reparation, and the provisions for appeal.278 
 
The Committee then explains the right to be heard in relation to the other provisions 
of the Convention (in part B of GC 12) and gives an explanation of the way in which 
the right can be implemented in different situations and settings, such as the family, 
alternative care, health care, education and the school, et cetera (in part C of GC 
12).279 The Committee concludes its comments by listing the basic requirements for 
the proper implementation of the right (in part D of the GC 12). In this regard all 
processes in which a child is heard must be transparent and informative; voluntary; 
respectful; relevant; child-friendly; inclusive; supported by training; safe and 
sensitive to risk and accountable.280   
 
                                            
278  GC 12 paras 62-64. 
279  GC 12 paras 68-131. 
280  GC 12 paras 132-134. 
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4.3.4  Article 3 
 
Article 3 of the CRC reads as follows: 
 
In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social 
welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the 
best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration. 
 
Article 3 of the CRC gives the child the right to have his or her best interests 
assessed and taken into account as a primary consideration in all actions or 
decisions that concern the child, in both the public and the private spheres. 
Moreover, it expresses one of the fundamental values of the CRC and has been 
identified by the Committee as one of the four general principles of the Convention 
for interpreting and implementing all the rights of the child.281 
 
4.3.4.1 General Comment 14: the right of the child to have his or her best 
interests treated as a primary consideration 
 
It is widely accepted that the “best interests of the child” principle is a dynamic 
concept that encompasses various issues which are continuously evolving. This 
makes the application of the concept cumbersome. In recognition of this fact the 
Committee on the Rights of the Child issued General Comment No 14 on the right 
of the child to have his or her best interest taken as a primary consideration (art 3, 
para 1) (“GC 14”), which was adopted on 1 February 2013.282 In so doing the 
                                            
281  GC 14 para 1. 
282  See General Comment 14 (GC 14) of the Committee on the Rights of the Child (29/05/2013), 
available at http://www2.ohcr.org/english/bodies/crc/comments.htm (accessed 06/06/ 2014). 
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Committee seeks to provide a framework for assessing and determining the child’s 
best interests, thereby promoting the application of the right.283 
 
The main objective of GC 14 as stated by the Committee is therefore to strengthen 
the understanding and application of the right of children to have their best interests 
assessed and taken into consideration as a primary consideration or, in some cases, 
the paramount consideration.284 General Comment 14 defines the requirements for 
due consideration, especially in judicial and administrative decisions as well as in 
other actions concerning the child, and at all stages of the adoption of laws, policies, 
strategies, programmes, plans, budgets, legislative and budgetary initiatives and 
guidelines.285 For this reason the Committee expects that GC 14 will guide decisions 
by all those concerned with children, including parents and caregivers.286 
 
The Committee starts out by underlining the fact that the child’s best interest is a 
threefold concept, namely a substantive right; a fundamental interpretive legal 
principle and a rule of procedure. General Comment 14 covers all three of these 
dimensions.287 
 
The Committee then reaffirms States Parties’ obligation to undertake all appropriate 
measures to fully implement this right for children. The nature and scope of these 
obligations are accordingly outlined. The Committee also emphasises that article 3, 
paragraph 1 establishes a framework with three different types of obligations to 
States Parties, namely to ensure the following: 
 
                                            
283  GC 14 para 11. 
284  GC 14 paras 36-40. 
285  GC 14 para 10. 
286  GC 14 paras 6, 7 and 10. 
287  GC 14 paras 6 and 7. 
The protection of child victims and witnesses in terms of the Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa, 1996, and international instruments 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
210 
 The child’s best interests are appropriately integrated and consistently applied in 
every action taken by a public institution, especially in all implementation 
measures, administrative and judicial proceedings which directly or indirectly 
impact on children. 
 All judicial and administrative decisions as well as policies and legislation 
concerning children demonstrate that the child’s best interests have been a primary 
consideration. This includes describing how the best interests have been examined 
and assessed, and what weight has been ascribed to them in the decision. 
 The interests of the child have been assessed and treated as a primary 
consideration in decisions and actions taken by the private sector, including those 
providing services, or any other private entity or institution making decisions that 
concern or impact on a child. 
To further States Parties’ understanding and application of the right of children to 
have their best interests assessed and treated as a primary consideration, the 
Committee sets out a legal analysis of the concepts and indicates links to the 
general principles of the Convention.288 Major elements of this analysis are 
described below. Particular attention is given to those elements that affect child 
witnesses and child victims. 
 
(a) “in all actions concerning children” 
 
The Committee emphasises that article 3 seeks to ensure that the right is 
guaranteed in all decisions and actions concerning children and therefore includes 
conduct, proposals, services, procedures and other measures. This legal duty 
applies to all decisions and actions that either directly or indirectly affect children 
and must accordingly be understood in a very broad sense. The term “children”, 
                                            
288  GC 14 paras 17-83. This includes the right to non-discrimination, to life, survival and 
development as well as the right to be heard. 
The protection of child victims and witnesses in terms of the Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa, 1996, and international instruments 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
211 
according to the Committee, refers to all persons under the age of 18 within the 
jurisdiction of the State Party, without any discrimination of any kind. 
 
(b) “by public or private welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative 
authorities or legislative bodies” 
 
The obligation of States Parties to duly consider the child’s best interests is a 
comprehensive obligation in that it encompasses all public and private social welfare 
institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities and legislative bodies involving 
or concerning children. 
 
The Committee states that “courts” refer to all judicial proceedings, in all instances, 
irrespective of whether they are staffed by professional judges or lay persons, and 
all relevant procedures concerning children, without restriction. This includes the 
processes of conciliation, mediation and arbitration. The Committee states that in 
criminal cases the best interests principle applies to children in “conflict (i.e. alleged 
to have infringed, or accused or recognised as having infringed the law) or in contact 
(as victims or witnesses) with the law, as well as children affected by the situation 
of their parents in conflict with the law.”289 
 
(c) “the best interest of the child” 
 
The Committee expressed its awareness of the fact that the concept of the best 
interests of the child is complex and that its content should therefore be determined 
on a case-by-case basis, taking into account the child or children’s personal 
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situation, context and needs. In individual decisions, the child’s best interests must 
be assessed and determined in the light of the specific circumstances of the 
particular child, whereas for collective decisions (such as by the legislator) the best 
interests of children in general must be assessed and determined in the light of the 
circumstances of the particular group and/or children in general. As the principle of 
the child’s best interests should be applied to all matters concerning the child or 
children, particular attention should, according to the Committee, be given to 
resolving any possible conflicts among the rights enshrined in the Convention and 
other human rights treaties with a view to identifying possible solutions which are in 
the child’s best interests. This implies that States Parties are under an obligation to 
clarify the best interests of all children when adopting implementation measures. 
The Committee also acknowledges most unfortunately the flexibility of the concept 
has been abused by, among others, governments to justify racist policies, 
professionals who see the assessment of the child’s best interests as irrelevant or 
unimportant and even parents in defending their own interests in custody 
disputes.290 
 
(d) “shall be a primary consideration” 
 
The words “shall be” place a strong legal obligation on States Parties. States Parties 
are reminded by the Committee that they do not have the right to exercise discretion 
as to whether children’s best interests are to be assessed and given the proper 
weight as a primary consideration in any action undertaken. The expression 
“primary consideration” entails that the child’s best interests may not be considered 
on the same level as all other considerations. This strong position is justified by the 
special situation of the child, such as dependency, maturity, legal status and, often, 
voicelessness. In respect of specifically the adoption (art 21) of children, the best 
interests principle is further strengthened in that the Committee specifically states 
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that the principle should not simply be regarded as “a primary consideration” but as 
“the paramount consideration”.291  
 
Nonetheless, the Committee recognises that the best interests of the child might 
conflict with other interests or rights (eg of other children, the public, parents, etc). 
Potential conflicts between the best interests of a child, considered individually, and 
those of a group of children or children in general, have to be resolved on a case-
by-case basis. The authorities and decision makers should accomplish this by 
carefully balancing the interests of all parties with a view to finding a suitable 
compromise. If harmonisation is not possible, authorities and decision makers will 
have to analyse and weigh the rights of all those concerned, taking into 
consideration that the right of children to have their best interests treated as a 
primary consideration means that a child’s interests have high priority and should 
not be regarded as just one of several considerations.292  
 
To ensure compliance with the “best interests of the child” right, the Committee calls 
attention to the fact that States Parties should undertake a number of 
implementation measures in accordance with articles 4, 42 and 44, paragraph 6, of 
the Convention, as well as those stipulated in paragraphs 15 and 16 of GC 14.293 
According to the Committee such measures include a proper assessment and 
determination of the best interests of the child and entail that: 
 
 the specific factual context of the case should be determined; and 
 this should be accomplished through a procedure that ensures legal guarantees 
and proper application of the right.  
                                            
291  GC 14 paras 36-38. 
292  GC 14 para 39. 
293  GC 14 paras 13-16. 
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In order to determine the factual context of the case the Committee recommends 
that certain elements should be taken into account, such as: the child’s views; the 
child’s identity (sex, sexual orientation, national origin, religion and beliefs, cultural 
identity and language); preservation of the family environment and maintenance of 
relations; care, protection and safety of the child; situation of vulnerability; right to 
health; and right to education. In addition States Parties should pay special attention 
to the following procedural safeguards: the right of the child to express his or her 
views; establishment of facts through well-trained professionals; time perception 
(procedures impacting on children should be prioritised and completed in the 
shortest time possible); use of qualified professionals; legal representation; legal 
reasoning; mechanisms to revise decisions and a child-rights impact assessment.294 
In conclusion the Committee recommends that States Parties widely disseminate 
the general comments to all stakeholders including children. This should include 
translations of the GC into all languages in child-friendly versions. States are also 
urged by the Committee to include information in their periodic reporting to the 
Committee on the challenges they face and the measures they have taken to apply 
and respect the child’s best interests in all judicial and administrative decisions and 
other actions concerning the child or children in general. 
 
4.4 UN Economic and Social Council Resolution 2005/20 “Guidelines on 
Justice in Matters involving Child Victims and Witnesses of Crime” 
 
Building on the UN Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime 
and Abuse of Power adopted by the General Assembly of 29 November 1985,295 
                                            
294  GC 14 paras 52-99. 
295  Refer to http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/40/a40r034.htm (accessed 23/07/2014) for 
more on the Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of 
Power. As the Guidelines on Justice in Matters involving Child Victims and Witnesses of Crime 
incorporate/build on the principles of the former document while specifically focusing on child 
victims and child witnesses, the former document is not discussed in this dissertation as it 
might amount to a repetition of some of the principles. 
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the provisions of the CRC, as well as the Optional Protocol to the CRC on the sale 
of children, child prostitution and child pornography, the UN Economic and Social 
Council in its resolution 2005/20 of 22 July 2005 adopted the Guidelines on Justice 
in Matters involving Child Victims and Witnesses of Crime (“the Guidelines”).296 In 
its Guidelines the Economic and Social Council (“the Council”) draws specific 
attention to the vulnerability of child victims and witnesses. Emphasis is also placed 
on the fact that millions of children throughout the word suffer harm as a result of 
crime and the abuse of power, and that the rights of these children are not 
adequately recognised. The Council furthermore states that they are mindful of the 
fact that the participation of child victims and witnesses in the criminal justice 
processes is necessary for effective prosecutions, in particular where the child victim 
may be the only witness. Recognition is also given to the fact that child victims and 
witnesses are in need of special protection, assistance and support appropriate to 
their age, level of maturity and unique needs in order to prevent possible hardship 
and trauma that may result from their participation in the criminal justice process.297 
The Council fittingly reaffirms that every effort should be made to prevent the 
victimisation of children and calls on all those involved in the judicial process to 
assist children in all possible ways in the unfortunate situation where those children 
have been the subject of victimisation.298   
 
The Guideline to the resolution, as stated by the Council, sets forth good practices 
based on the consensus of contemporary knowledge and relevant information and 
regional norms, standards and principles and is meant as a framework to assist  
Member States in enhancing the protection of child victims and witnesses in the 
criminal justice system.299 According to the Council the Guidelines also serve as a 
practical framework to achieve the following objectives: 
                                            
296  Guidelines on Justice in Matters involving Child Victims and Witnesses of Crime (the 
Guidelines), available at http://www.un.org/.../guidelines_on_justice_in_matters_ involving_ 
child_victims_and.pdf (accessed 12/06/2014). 
297  Preamble to the Guidelines. 
298  Guidelines para 7. 
299  Guidelines para 1. 
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 To assist in the review of national and domestic laws, procedures and practices to 
ensure the full respect of the rights of child victims and witnesses of crime; 
 To assist governments and other stakeholders in designing and implementing 
legislation, policy, programmes and practices that address key issues related to child 
victims and witnesses; 
 To guide professionals and volunteers working with child victims and witnesses in 
their day-to-day practice within the juvenile justice process at a national, regional 
and international level. This should be in accordance with the principles of the 
Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power; 
and 
 To assist and support those caring for child victims and witnesses of crime.300  
 
In order to achieve these objectives, the Council sets forth four cross-cutting 
principles that should be adhered to by professionals and those responsible for the 
wellbeing of child victims and child witnesses, namely:  
 
 the right to dignity; 
 the right to non-discrimination;  
 the best interests of the child (which include the right to protection and to the 
opportunity for harmonious development) and; 
 the right to participation.301   
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In its Guidelines the Council also sets out a valuable in-depth analysis of certain 
rights of child victims and witnesses. Major elements of each of these rights are 
described below:  
 
 The right to be treated with dignity and compassion 
 
In the view of the Council, this right entails that child victims and witnesses of crime 
should be treated in a caring and sensitive manner throughout the judicial 
process.302 This will ensure that child victims and witnesses play a meaningful role 
throughout the process.303 All interactions with the child or witness should be 
conducted in a child-sensitive manner.304 This may be achieved by treating children 
according to their individual needs and evolving capacities. Children should 
therefore be treated according to their age and level of maturity. Children also have 
the right to be treated with compassion, which implies understanding of and 
sensitivity to their feelings, needs, beliefs, communicative style and individual 
experiences. Anyone dealing with child victims and witnesses of crime should 
recognise that the child may not be in a position at a given time to fully understand 
and recount events that happened or to comprehend the full impact of the crime.305 
Appropriate support should be provided to the child in this respect and all interviews 
in this regard should be conducted by trained professionals.306 Ideally, the training 
of those dealing with child victims and witnesses of crime should include, in addition 
to their professional training, special multidisciplinary training on how to deal with 
children in a child-friendly manner.307 The Council furthermore emphasises that 
                                            
302  Guidelines paras 10-14. 
303  UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) Handbook for Professionals and Policymakers on 
Justice in Matters involving Child Victims and Witnesses of Crime (2009), available at https:// 
www.unodc.org/documents/justice-and-prison-reform/hb_justice_in_matters professionals. 
pdf1 at 13 (accessed 16/03/2016). 
304  Guidelines paras 10-14. 
305  UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) Handbook for Professionals and Policymakers on 
Justice in Matters involving Child Victims and Witnesses of Crime14-15. 
306  Guidelines para 13. 
307  UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) Justice in Matters involving Child Victims and 
Witnesses of Crime. Model Law and Related Commentary (2009), available at 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/4a096ce42.html 1 at 39 (accessed 16/03/ 2016). 
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every child should be treated as an individual and those interacting with the child 
should be mindful to keep any interference with the child’s private life to the 
minimum.308 
 
 The right to be protected from discrimination 
 
The Council places particular emphasis on the right of a child to be protected from 
discrimination of any kind and states in its Guidelines that child victims and 
witnesses have the right to have access to support within the justice system 
regardless of factors such as race, colour, gender, language, religion, political or 
other opinion, nationality, ethical origin, or other status.309 Attention should also be 
drawn to the fact that the list of discriminatory grounds in paragraph 15 of the 
Guidelines is non-exhaustive, as shown by the final reference to the words “other 
status”. Such a broad approach is desirable, since it gives this provision of the 
Guidelines the necessary flexibility to be adapted to a specific situation and allows 
judges the discretion to include in the protection from discrimination specific grounds 
that may not be part of the relevant Member States’ domestic legislation.310 The 
justice process and support services should in fact be sensitive to a child’s individual 
characteristics. In certain cases, such as sexual assault, special services and 
protection will be needed to take account of the gender and specific offence directed 
against the child. According to the Council this right furthermore entails that age 
should not be regarded as a barrier to a child’s right to participate fully in the judicial 
process. Each child should be treated as a capable witness, and the child’s 
testimony should be presumed to be valid and trustworthy, unless otherwise 
proven.311 This implies that the child’s competency to testify should be regarded as 
a criterion of the reliability of the child’s testimony, rather than the admissibility of 
                                            
308  Guidelines paras 11-12. 
309  Guidelines para 15. 
310  UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) Handbook for Professionals and Policymakers on 
Justice in Matters involving Child Victims and Witnesses of Crime 23. 
311  Guidelines para 15-18. 
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such evidence.312 The child’s age should accordingly not be an exclusionary factor 
but rather a factor to be taken into account in the assessment of the reliability of the 
child’s testimony. Such an evolution may require the amendment of some States’ 
domestic legislation.313 
 
 The right to be informed 
 
As stated by the Council in its Guidelines, the right to be informed requires those 
involved with the child victim and witness within the judicial system to inform the 
child victim and witness and their parents and/or guardians of inter alia the 
availability of health, psychological, social and other relevant services, the justice 
process and the role of the child during such process as well as of the support and 
protective measures available to the child.314 It should be noted that child victims 
and witnesses have the right not only to be informed in general on the assistance 
they are entitled to and the way the justice process is organised, but also to receive 
information on the specific case in which the child is involved. This implies being 
informed about aspects such as the progress of the case, the scheduling of the 
proceedings, what is expected of the child, the decisions rendered and the outcome 
of the case. It is also important to emphasise that any information offered to the child 
needs to be provided in a language that the child is able to understand.315 Child 
victims and witnesses and their parents and/or guardians also have the right to be 
informed of the mechanisms for judicial review as well as of opportunities to obtain 
reparation from the offender.316  
                                            
312  It should be noted that the admissibility of testimony relates to whether a judge can accept the 
presentation of the evidence and take it into account in the determination of the case whereas 
the reliability of the evidence relates to the weight the judge will attach to previously admitted 
evidence. 
313  UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) Handbook for Professionals and Policymakers on 
Justice in Matters involving Child Victims and Witnesses of Crime 25. 
314  Guidelines para 19-20. 
315  UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) Handbook for Professionals and Policymakers on 
Justice in Matters involving Child Victims and Witnesses of Crime 32. 
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 The right to be heard and to express views and concerns 
 
In keeping with the provisions of article 12 of the CRC, the Council emphasises that 
every effort should be made to enable child victims and witnesses to express their 
views or concerns relating to their involvement in the judicial process. In so doing 
professionals should ensure that child victims and witnesses are appropriately 
consulted and are able to express their views freely and in their own manner.317  
 
Cognisance should be taken of the fact that the right to be heard goes well beyond 
giving evidence or being present at a trial as a victim or witness. It includes the right 
to express, beyond a formal statement of the facts, views and concerns on the 
impact of the offence, on the way the proceedings are conducted and on the child’s 
needs and expectations. The right to be heard and to express views and concerns 
implies not only that those dealing with child victims and witnesses give them an 
opportunity to express themselves fully, but that they listen to the child victims and 
witnesses, and give due regard to their views. This right also implies that when, for 
any good reason, the expectations of the child cannot be met, this is explained to 
the child. A child victim or witness often has his or her own perception of the 
importance of certain aspects of the crime and of his or her testimony. It needs to 
be explained to the child, in a child-friendly way, why certain decisions are made, 
why certain facts are not discussed in court and why certain views are not taken into 
consideration. It is important to show respect for elements that a child may find 
important in his or her account of the events, but that may not necessarily be 
relevant as evidence.318 
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 The right to effective assistance  
 
In discussing this right, the Council not only highlights the importance of providing 
assistance to child victims and witnesses and, where appropriate, family members, 
but points out that such assistance should be provided by trained professionals. The 
Council also set out recommendations in paragraphs 40 to 42 of the Guidelines on 
how such training should be conducted. A non-exclusive list of possible assistance 
that may be rendered to child victims and witnesses, such as financial, legal, 
counselling, health, social and educational services and services to promote 
physical and psychological recovery et cetera is also provided. Professionals are 
also urged to make every effort to coordinate support, so as not to subject the child 
to excessive interventions; and to develop and implement measures to make it 
easier for children to testify.319  
 
As stated in paragraph 22 of the Guidelines, effective assistance for child victims 
and witnesses may include State-provided access to legal assistance. This 
unfortunately has serious cost implications and may prove to be problematic for 
developing countries. States should nevertheless consider providing legal 
assistance, free of charge, to child victims during the criminal justice process. The 
main consideration in deciding whether such assistance should be provided is the 
principle of the best interests of the child.320 
 
 The right to privacy 
 
The dissemination of information about a child victim or witness, in particular in the 
media, could have grave consequences for the child. It could endanger the child’s 
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safety, cause the child intense shame and humiliation, discourage the child from 
telling what happened and could also put a strain on the relationships of the child 
with his or her family, peers and community, especially in cases of sexual abuse. In 
some cases it might even lead to stigmatisation by the community, thereby 
aggravating secondary victimisation of the child.321 
 
It therefore comes as no surprise that the Council emphasises the protection of the 
privacy of child victims and witnesses as a matter of primary importance.322 
Protection could be ensured by maintaining confidentiality and by restricting 
disclosure of information that could lead to the identification of the child victim or 
witness.323 Measures should be taken to protect the child from undue exposure to 
the public, by for example excluding the public and the media from the courtroom 
when the child is testifying.324 
 
 
 The right to be protected from hardship during the justice process 
 
Mindful of the fact that children find the judicial process particularly onerous, the 
Council points out in its Guidelines that throughout the judicial process professionals 
should take measures to prevent children from experiencing hardship.325 In so doing 
professionals326 should treat the child with sensitivity and take care to provide the 
                                            
321  UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) Handbook for Professionals and Policymakers on 
Justice in Matters involving Child Victims and Witnesses of Crime 59. 
322  Guidelines para 26. 
323  Guidelines para 27. 
324  Guidelines para 28. 
325  Guidelines para 29. 
326  “Professionals” are defined in para 9(b) of the Guidelines as: “persons who, within the context 
of their work, are in contact with child victims and witnesses of crime or are responsible for 
addressing the needs of children in the justice system and to whom these Guidelines are 
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following: support to the child throughout his or her involvement in the justice 
process; certainty about the process, including clear expectations as to what to 
expect during each stage of the process and the avoidance of delays by ensuring 
that the trial takes place as soon as is practicable, unless such delays are in the 
interests of the child.327 Child-sensitive measures should also be used, such as 
special interview rooms, modified courtrooms, CCTV, limiting the number of 
interviews and protecting the child from being interviewed by the alleged perpetrator. 
All questioning should be conducted in a child-sensitive manner, for example by 
using testimonial aids or appointing psychological experts such as intermediaries or 
communicators to assist with the questioning of child victims and witnesses.328  
 
 The right to safety 
 
Involvement as a victim or witness in a criminal process may be a dangerous or 
risky experience, especially when organised crime is involved. In such instances 
victims and witnesses may fear a threat to their lives or may be at risk of intimidation 
because of their involvement in the justice process.329 Where the safety of a child 
victim or witness is at risk the Council stresses that appropriate measures should 
be taken to report such risks to appropriate authorities and to protect the child from 
the risk, be it before, during or after the justice process. Professionals should be 
trained to recognise risks of this nature and should be required to notify authorities 
if they suspect any possible risk to the child.330 Paragraph 33 of the Guidelines 
therefore contemplates the mandatory reporting of offences against children 
immediately upon the discovery of the offence.331 Appropriate safeguards should 
                                            
programme staff; magistrates and judges; court staff; law enforcement officials; probation 
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327  Guidelines para 30. 
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then be put in place to ensure the safety of the child. Such safeguards could include: 
avoidance of direct contact with the alleged perpetrator, restraining orders, pre-trail 
detention of the accused or protection of the child by the police or other relevant 
authorities.332 It should be noted that the list of appropriate safeguards as set out in 
paragraph 34 of the Guidelines is not exhaustive, as shown by the words “[s]uch 
safeguards could include” and that the relevant authorities may implement such 
measures as they deem fit to protect the child victim or witness.333  
 
 The right to reparation 
 
According to the Guidelines, child victims and witnesses should, whenever possible, 
receive reparation in order to ensure full redress, reintegration and recovery. 
Procedures to accomplish such reparation should be readily accessible and should 
be child-sensitive. Reparation could include aid from victim compensation 
programmes334 or restitution335 from the offender, where so ordered by the criminal 
court.336  
 
 The right to special preventative measures 
 
The Council states that, in addition to preventative measures that should be in place 
for all children, special strategies are required for child victims and witnesses, who 
                                            
332  Guidelines para 32-34. 
333  UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) Handbook for Professionals and Policymakers on 
Justice in Matters involving Child Victims and Witnesses of Crime 90. 
334  Compensation may include cover for treatment and rehabilitation for physical and 
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are particularly vulnerable to recurring victimisation or offending.337 Children are 
more at risk of repeated victimisation than adults because they are often vulnerable 
and unable to properly assert or protect themselves against an adult or are 
perceived by a potential perpetrator to be so.338 Professionals should accordingly 
develop and implement comprehensive and specially tailored strategies and 
interventions in cases where children may be at risk of further victimisation.339  
 
The Council concludes its Guidelines by calling on professionals to make every 
effort to adopt an interdisciplinary and cooperative approach when aiding child 
victims and witnesses. States and all sectors of society, at both the national and the 
international level, are urged in addition to enhance international cooperation, 
including mutual assistance for the purpose of facilitating the collection and 
exchange of information and the detection, investigation and prosecution of 
transnational crimes involving child victims and witnesses.340   
 
In conclusion, the aforementioned Guidelines serve as a valuable tool to aid 
governments in drafting relevant national legislation, policies or protocols involving 
child victims and witnesses in conformity with the principles contained in the 
Guidelines and other relevant international legal instruments such as the CRC. They 
should accordingly be consulted as such.  
 
5 REGIONAL CHILD INSTRUMENTS 
 
5.1 The Declaration on the Rights and Welfare of the African Child, 1979 
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The Assembly of Heads of Government of the Organisation of Africa Unity (“the 
OAU”) at its meeting of the sixteenth ordinary session adopted the Declaration on 
the Rights and Welfare of the African Child.341 In so doing the OAU specifically 
recognised the 1959 UN Declaration on the Rights of the Child as well as the UN 
General Assembly Resolution A/31/169 proclaiming 1979 as the International Year 
of the Child (“the IYC”). In this regard the OAU called on all AOU member states to 
be cognisant of the IYC and to implement all possible programmes to promote the 
welfare of the child at national, sub-regional and regional levels, in conjunction with 
national and international organisations.342  
 
In addition, in its African Children’s Declaration the OAU expressed deep concern 
for the future of African children as inheritors and keepers of the African cultural 
heritage. However, at the same time, the Declaration underlined the fact that the 
recognition of cultural values should not assume primacy over the protection of the 
rights of the child.343 Rather, the two concepts should complement one another in 
achieving adequate protection for the rights of the children of Africa.344 
 
5.2 The African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child 1990 
 
Following closely on the CRC, the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the 
Child (“the African Children’s Charter”) was adopted by the Assembly of the Heads 
of State and the OAU in July 1990 and came into force in November 1999.345  
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A separate regional African Children’s Charter was adopted for political and legal 
reasons. On a political level the adoption of the document is the result of the 
perception by the OAU of the initial exclusion and marginalisation of African states 
in the drafting process of the CRC.346 From a legal standpoint, a desire was 
identified by the OAU to address certain problems pertinent to African children, for 
example the fact that children were living under apartheid, the deployment of child 
soldiers, female genital mutilation and circumcision, that were not sufficiently 
addressed in the UN instrument.347 The African Children’s Charter therefore 
represents the “African” concepts of children’s rights and strives to promote and 
protect the rights and welfare of the African child. It should be noted, however, that 
the African Children’s Charter is not opposed to the CRC; rather, the two documents 
are complementary and both provide a framework for the enhanced protection of 
African children.348   
 
The African Children’s Charter defines a child as “every human being below the age 
of 18 years” and therefore applies to everyone below the age of eighteen years, thus 
ensuring that young people in ratifying states where adulthood is attained earlier still 
enjoy a favourable position. Part I of the Charter includes 31 articles, covering both 
the substantive and the procedural rights of the child. These rights include what are 
termed survival rights, community rights, self-assertion rights, protection rights and 
development rights.349 The Charter stipulates certain responsibilities of the child as 
well as duties on the part of parents and States Parties.350 The remainder of the 
Charter deals with certain administrative and procedural matters, and provides for 
the establishment and organisation of the African Committee of Experts on the 
                                            
346  The African involvement in the drafting process was limited, in that in five of the nine years in 
which the working group took a final proposal to draft only three African states participated. 
By 1989 nine African states were participating.  
347  Viljoen “The African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child” in Boezaart (ed) Child 
Law in South Africa (2009) 335.  
348  Kaime The Convention on the Rights of the Child 25. 
349  Viljoen in Boezaart (ed) Child Law in South Africa 337-339. 
350  A 31. 
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Rights and Welfare of the Child.351 This Committee is tasked with promoting and 
protecting the rights contained in the African Children’s Charter.352   
 
5.2.1 Main features 
 
According to Viljoen, the African Children’s Charter is best understood with 
reference to three pivotal principles, namely the child’s best interests, the principle 
of non-discrimination and the primacy of the Charter over harmful customs and 
cultural practices.353 This entails that in all actions concerning the child, the best 
interests of the child must be the primary consideration.354 Children are furthermore 
entitled to equal protection under the Charter, irrespective of their or their parents’ 
status.355 In addition the African Children’s Charter expressly asserts primacy over 
any customs or culture, such as female genital mutilation, arranged marriages and 
child marriages that are harmful or prejudicial to children.356   
 
For present purposes, two principles of the African Children’s Charter are of 
particular importance when considering the protection of child victims and child 
witnesses, namely the best interests of the child (art 4.1) and the right of the child 
to be heard (art 4.2). 
 
5.2.2 Article 4.1 
 
                                            
351  A 32-47. 
352  A 42. 
353  Viljoen in Boezaart (ed) Child Law in South Africa 336. 
354  A 4. 
355  A 3. 
356  A 1 and 21. 
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Article 4.1 of the African Children’s Charter reads as follows: 
 
 In all actions concerning the child undertaken by any person or authority the best 
interests of the child shall be the primary consideration. 
 
One of the most important features of the African Children’s Charter is that the 
child’s best interests are made the paramount consideration. While the CRC states 
that a child’s best interests shall be “a” primary consideration, the African Children’s 
Charter goes a step further by declaring these interests “the” primary consideration 
in all actions concerning the child. Although the use of the definite instead of the 
indefinite article may seem pedantic, it nonetheless has significant practical 
implications. Through this wording the Charter elevates the best interests principle 
to an overriding consideration and thereby offers better protection to children.357 
 
5.2.3 Article 4.2  
 
Article 4.2 of the African Children’s Charter reads as follows: 
 In all judicial or administrative proceedings affecting a child who is capable of 
communicating his/her own views, an opportunity shall be provided for the views of 
the child to be heard either directly or through an impartial representative as a party 
to the proceedings, and those views shall be taken into consideration by the relevant 
authority in accordance with the provisions of appropriate laws. 
 
                                            
357  Lloyd “Evaluation of the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child and the African 
Committee of Experts: Raising the gauntlet” 2002 International Journal of Children’s Rights 
179 at 183. 
The protection of child victims and witnesses in terms of the Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa, 1996, and international instruments 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
230 
Like the CRC, the African Children’s Charter recognises children as autonomous 
beings and guarantees them several participatory rights.358 This is of significance 
considering that in Africa children are not generally perceived as autonomous. In 
some communities, for example, decisions concerning children are made by the 
male elders. At most children are only heard indirectly through aunts, uncles or 
grandparents. The specific guarantee of participatory rights for children in the 
African Children’s Charter is therefore commendable.359  
 
Article 4.2, like the CRC, guarantees children the right to be given an opportunity to 
express their views in all judicial and administrative proceedings affecting them. 
However, this right as set out in the African Children’s Charter is qualified in that the 
child has to be capable of communicating his or her views. In this regard the similar 
provision in the CRC is preferable as it only requires that the child should be able to 
form a view. The right is further qualified in that the child has to be “a party to the 
proceedings”. This implies that if the child is not a party to the proceedings, but for 
instance only a witness, the right is not guaranteed. The provisions of the CRC are 
preferable here as well as it contains no such limitation. Furthermore, in terms of the 
African Children’s Charter the views of the child must be taken into consideration by 
the relevant authority in “accordance with the provisions of appropriate laws”, 
whereas the CRC only requires the “view of the child [to be] given due weight in 
accordance with the age and maturity of the child”. Here again the CRC is less 
restrictive.  
Unless the right expressed in article 4.2 is interpreted progressively,360 the 
qualifications to the child’s right to express a view in all judicial and administrative 
proceedings affecting him or her may be rendered meaningless. Furthermore, by 
                                            
358  Art 7, 8 and 9. 
359  Chirwa “The merits and demerits of the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child” 
2002 International Journal of Children’s Rights 157 at 160. 
360  The right expressed in art 4.2 should hence be interpreted with a view to increasing a child’s 
right to express himself or herself rather than applying this principle restrictively in national 
legislation.  
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equating the protection under international law to that provided for in national 
(appropriate) law, the higher protection afforded to the child may be negated.361   
 
6 THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INTERNATIONAL AND 
REGIONAL LEGAL INSTRUMENTS AND SOUTH AFRICAN 
CHILD LAW 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
An analysis of the principles encapsulated in the aforementioned international and 
regional instruments clearly illustrates their importance in South African child law. 
At the most basic level these instruments provide a set of standards against which 
all laws, legislative programmes, decisions, policies and all other government 
actions and inactions relating to children can be measured. The past fifteen years 
have also seen an increased commitment on the part of government towards the 
ratification of international and regional child law instruments. South Africa has 
ratified all the major human rights instruments dealing with children, such as the 
CRC and the African Children’s Charter, the most recent being the African Youth 
Charter (2006) and the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed conflict.362 The introduction of 
international child law into domestic law has also gained importance.363 This is 
especially noticeable in several recent Acts of parliament, such as the Children’s 
Act and the Child Justice Act 75 of 2008.364 International law has also gained 
                                            
361  Viljoen in Boezaart (ed) Child Law in South Africa 338. 
362  South Africa ratified the African Youth Charter on 28 May 2009 and the Optional Protocol to 
the CRC on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict on 24 September 2009. 
363  Schäfer Child Law in South Africa: Domestic and International Perspectives 82. 
364  Refer to the Preamble to the Children’s Act and the Preamble to the Child Justice Act, where 
special reference is made to inter alia the role of the CRC, the African Children’s Charter and 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and its importance in the protection of children’s 
rights. 
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importance as an interpretative tool in the hands of the judiciary, and has proved 
significant in the courts’ review of children’s rights.365   
 
6.2 International law as an interpretative source of fundamental rights 
 
Two constitutional directives, namely section 39(1) of the Bill of Rights and section 
233 of the Constitution, illustrate the significance of the interpretative role of 
international law in South African law. Section 39(1) of the Bill of Rights requires 
that when interpreting the Bill of Rights all courts, tribunals or forums must consider 
international law and may consider foreign law. This obligation provides the courts 
with a meaningful opportunity to interpret provisions of the Bill of Rights in line with 
international instruments such as the CRC, the African Children’s Charter and even 
General Comments issued by the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child. The 
value of such judicial notice cannot be underestimated and is clearly illustrated in 
case law.366 In Bhe v Magistrate, Kayelitsha367 for example, the Constitutional Court 
highlighted South Africa’s international obligations and referred in reaching its 
decision to article 2 of the CRC and article 3 of the African Children’s Charter on 
non-discrimination.368 
                                            
365  Schäfer Child Law in South Africa: Domestic and International Perspectives 82. Also refer for 
example to S v Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC); Government of the Republic of South 
Africa v Grootboom 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC) and DPP v Minister of Justice and Constitutional 
Development 2009 (2) SACR 130 (CC). 
366  See for example Centre for Child Law v Minister of Home Affairs 2005 (6) SA 50 (T); Rosen v 
Havenga [2006] 4 All SA 199 (C); S v M 2007 (2) SACR 539 (CC). 
367  2005 (1) BCLR 19 (CC). 
368  Paras [53] and [55]. The main point to consider in the case under discussion was whether the 
first two applicants, two female African persons, whose parents were not married or were 
married according to African law and customs, were entitled to inherit ab intestatio upon the 
death of their father. Intestate succession in terms of African customary law is based on the 
principle of primogeniture. The general rule is that only a male who is related to the deceased 
through a male line qualifies as an intestate heir. The court held that irrespective of whether 
the two female children were legitimate or not, this did not alter the consequences flowing 
from the status of the legal relationship between the parents at the time of the father’s death. 
The court held further that the only reason why the two applicants could not inherit from their 
father’s estate was that they were black and they were females. This was per se discrimination 
on the grounds of race and gender. It was prima facie unfair and therefore offended against 
the provisions of section 9(1) and (3) of the Constitution. The court was thus bound to declare 
such law unconstitutional and invalid. The court accordingly held that the first two applicants 
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In addition, section 233 of the Constitution states that, when interpreting any 
legislation, every court must prefer any reasonable interpretation of the legislation 
that is consistent with international law to any interpretation that is inconsistent with 
international law. Section 233 widens the application of international law, in that it 
governs the interpretation of “any legislation” and not only that of the Bill of Rights. 
For present purposes this implies that international law principles may assume 
jurisprudential relevance in relation to the interpretation of any legislation pertaining 
to children, including section 170A of the Criminal Procedure Act.  
 
6.3 The National Programme of Action for Children 
 
By ratifying the CRC on 16 June 1995, the South African government 
(“government”) committed itself not only to the promotion and protection of children’s 
rights in South Africa, but also to implementing the principle of a “first call for 
children”. In view of having ratified the CRC and in accordance with its obligation as 
a signatory to the CRC to develop a Plan of Action for children, government 
developed its National Programme of Action for Children (“the NPAC”).369 
 
The NPAC is the instrument through which South Africa’s commitments to children 
are put into practice, and as such it outlines the actions that government intends to 
take to implement these commitments. In so doing, it provides a holistic framework 
for the integration of all policies, programmes, strategies and plans developed by 
government departments and non-governmental organisations to promote the well-
being of children.370 It has fittingly been described as the vehicle for ensuring that 
                                            
had to be declared to be the sole heirs of the deceased’s estate and were entitled to inherit 
equally. 
369  “National Programme of Action for Children in South Africa: Framework” 31/05/1996, available 
at http://www.gov.za/documents/otherdocs/1996/chilprog.htm (accessed 15/08/ 2014). The 
NPAC framework was approved by Cabinet in April 1996 for implementation by the relevant 
ministries and departments. 
370  See the Introduction of the NPAC. 
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the rights of children outlined in the CRC and the Constitution do not become 
meaningless.371 
 
Of particular relevance to the topic under discussion is the fact that the NPAC makes 
special provision for the protection of children.372 The goals relating to child 
protection as stated in the NPAC are the following:373 
 
 To ensure that the best interests of the child are protected within the criminal and 
civil justice system.  
 To ensure that the child has the right  
o to security and the relevant social services;  
o not to be subject to neglect or abuse;  
o not to be subject to exploitative labour practices nor to be required or 
permitted to do work which is hazardous or harmful to the child’s education 
or well-being;  
o in criminal matters, to be treated in a way that takes account of his or her 
age.  
 Within the framework of 1 and 2 above, to:  
o establish a separate juvenile criminal justice system;  
o address the problems related to children who are involved in all forms of 
abuse, including sexual abuse;  
o protect children from using and trafficking in narcotic drugs;  
                                            
371  “National Programme of Action 2000 and Beyond”, available at http://www.children.gov.za/ 
Publications/policies2.htm (accessed 20/08/2014) fn 4. 
372  See para 9. Other goals set by the NPAC include nutrition, child health, water and sanitation, 
early childhood development and basic education, social welfare development (family 
environment, out-of-home care and social security), and leisure and cultural activities. 
373  See para 9 of the NPAC (1996). 
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o address problems relating to children of divorcing, divorced or separated 
parents and to children of single parents;  
o eliminate any form of racial, gender or geographic discrimination or 
imbalances still existing in the criminal and civil justice system in respect of 
children;  
o promote justice that is sensitive to children, with an emphasis on the training 
of personnel who work with children in the justice system.  
 In the attainment of the above, to promote and strengthen the partnerships within 
state departments and between state departments and organisations in civil 
society which are involved in the administration of justice.  
 To link the entire question of children in the civil and criminal justice system to 
broader developmental issues.  
 To promote the Convention on the Rights of the Child within a broader framework 
of a human rights culture and to make the public and people in the justice system 
aware of it.  
 
An analysis of the aforementioned paragraph of the NPAC confirms government’s 
commitment to upholding the best interests of the child in general as well as within 
the criminal justice system. In terms of its principles, not only should the child victim 
and child witness be treated in a way that takes account of the child’s age, but this 
should also take place in a child-friendly and sensitive manner. Emphasis is 
furthermore placed on the training of those involved with children in the justice 
system. 
 
A need to review the initial NPAC was identified by government in 2011 and this 
process gained momentum in line with the mandate of the Ministry for Women, 
Children and People with Disabilities. The National Plan of Action 2012-2017 
(“NPAC 2012”) was hence developed in close collaboration with government 
departments and non-governmental organisations, to ensure that existing priorities, 
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programmes and commitments are in line with government’s overall strategies in 
the realisation of children’s rights.374  
 
The National Plan of Action for Children 2012, like its predecessor, affirms its 
commitment to child protection.375 The goals relating to child protection as stated in 
NPAC 2012 are the following:376 
 
 To protect children against all forms of crime and violence in their homes, in the 
home, school and the community and in institutions were children are 
accommodated. 
 To protect children against sexual, physical and emotional abuse and neglect. 
 To protect children against maltreatment, torture and degrading treatment. 
 To ensure that the national integrated child protection system is effective, 
accountable and responsive. 
 To provide victim support to children who are abused and neglected.  
 
Of further significance is the fact that in NPAC 2012 special emphasis is placed inter 
alia on the role of the Department of Justice and Constitutional Development in 
ensuring that children’s courts are child-friendly; in building the capacity of the staff 
of the Department of Justice and Constitutional Development in fulfilling its role 
toward the applicable child-friendly legislation and in providing child-friendly victim 
support services. 
 
                                            
374  Department of Women, Children and People with Disabilities National Plan of Action for 
Children in South Africa (2012) s 1.  
375  Refer to part C of NPAC 2012. 
376  Refer to para C1 of NPAC 2012. 
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Both NPAC and NPAC 2012 clearly illustrate government’s commitment towards 
the realisation of the best interests of children in general, and that of the best 
interests of the child victim and child witness within the criminal justice system in 
particular 
 
6.4 The Service Charter for Victims of Crime  
 
In keeping with the spirit of the South African Constitution, and in compliance with 
the United Nations Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime 
and Abuse of Power, the South African government approved a Service Charter for 
Victims of Crime (the Victims’ Charter) on 1 December 2004.377 The Victims’ Charter 
is a product of the National Crime Prevention Strategy of 1996 and the National 
Victim Empowerment Programme of 1998 and is part of government’s commitment 
to dealing with crime by focusing on the important role that victims play within the 
criminal justice system.378 
 
The Victims’ Charter aims to ensure that victims remain central to the criminal justice 
process in South Africa; to eliminate secondary victimisation in the criminal justice 
process; to clarify the service standards to be accorded to victims by the criminal 
justice system; and to provide avenues of recourse for victims when these standards 
are not met.379 In order to facilitate the effective implementation of the Victims’ 
Charter it is imperative that those providing service to victims clearly understand 
who is regarded as a victim of crime. In this regard the Victims’ Charter provides a 
well-defined definition of a victim. A victim is defined in term of the Victims’ Charter 
as a person who has suffered harm, including physical or mental injury, emotional 
suffering, economic loss or substantial impairment of the person’s fundamental 
rights through acts or omissions that are in violation of criminal law. The term “victim” 
                                            
377  Available at www.justice.gov.za/VC/docs/vc/vc-eng.pdf (accessed 5/01/2015). 
378  Refer to the Introduction to the Victims’ Charter. 
379  Refer to the Preamble to the Victims’ Charter. 
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furthermore includes, where appropriate, the immediate family or dependants of the 
direct victim.380 A person may also be considered a victim regardless of whether the 
perpetrator has been identified, apprehended, prosecuted or convicted and 
regardless of the familial relationship between the perpetrator and the victim.381 The 
Victims’ Charter therefore gives a broad interpretation to the term “victim”. Although 
the Victims’ Charter does not refer to children per se, it is clear that children are 
included within the ambit of the charter as direct victims, children of adult victims, 
siblings of child victims and witnesses to crimes committed against adults or 
children.382 
 
In terms of the Victims’ Charter a victim of crime has the right to insist that the 
following seven rights, as contained in the Constitution and relevant legislation, are 
upheld when interacting with the criminal justice system: 
 
 The right to be treated with fairness and with respect for dignity and privacy;  
 The right to offer information; 
 The right to receive information; 
 The right to protection; 
 The right to assistance; 
 The right to compensation; 
 The right to restitution383 
                                            
380  Department of Justice and Constitutional Development Minimum Standards on Services for 
Victims of Crime (2004) 3, available at www.justice.gov.za/VC/docs/vc/vcms-eng.pdf 
(accessed 5/01/2015).  
381  Department of Justice and Constitutional Development Minimum Standards on Services for 
Victims of Crime 3 
382  Van der Merwe “Children as victims and witnesses” in Boezaart (ed) Child Law in South Africa 
(2009) 563 at 564. 
383  Own emphasis added. Refer to the Victims’ Charter 6-10.  
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As indicated in the document itself, the Victims’ Charter does not create any new 
rights but aims to consolidate the legal framework in South Africa relating to the 
rights of and services provided to victims of crime.384 For example, with regard to 
child victims, the right to protection includes a prohibition on the publication of the 
identity of the child victim, the possibility of the trial being held in camera, and the 
child being placed in a witness protection programme. As part of the right to 
assistance, child victims have the right, inter alia, to request assistance and where 
relevant to have access to social, health and counselling services as well as legal 
assistance, while the right to offer information refers to the possibility of making a 
victim’s statement.385 
 
If a victim is of the opinion that any of the aforementioned seven rights has not been 
observed or that the service received has not complied with the principles of the 
Victims’ Charter, the victim has the right, in terms of the Victims’ Charter, to complain 
to the government department or service provider concerned. The victim could also 
inter alia contact organisations such as the Office of the Public Protector, the South 
African Human Rights Commission or the Commission on Gender Equality for 
assistance. 
Despite the fact that the standing of the Victims’ Charter is open to question since 
the Victims’ Charter itself does not provide a victim with a legally enforceable right, 
but only gives a victim the recourse of complaint or assistance when standards are 
not met, the importance of the Victims’ Charter should not be underestimated. The 
significance of the Victims’ Charter lies in the fact that it gives recognition to the 
serious impact of crime on victims and its potential for undermining a victim’s human 
rights. Furthermore, by highlighting victims’ rights in a charter, government has 
illustrated its commitment to promoting the equal enjoyment of all the rights and 
freedoms guaranteed in the Constitution to both victims and offenders.386 It also 
                                            
384  Victims’ Charter 6. 
385  Victims’ Charter 8.  
386  Refer to the Preamble to the Victims’ Charter. Also note that the Constitution gives special 
recognition to arrested, detained and accused persons in section 35, while no such provision 
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serves to create awareness, inform victims of the various stages of the criminal trial 
and of their involvement therein, provides minimum standards that victims can 
expect from all service providers involved and strives to minimise secondary 
victimisation.387 
 
6.5 Minimum Standards on Services for Victims of Crime 
 
A Minimum Service Standard for Victims of Crime (“Minimum Standards”) was 
approved by cabinet in 2004.388 This complementary document aims to explain the 
rights contained in the Victims’ Charter in more detail, and serves as a guideline for 
service providers (police, public protectors, social workers, magistrates, health and 
correctional services etc) when interacting with victims of crime. The Minimum 
Standards sets out the different processes and responsibilities victims can expect 
from a government department such as the South African Police Service, the 
National Prosecuting Authority, the Departments of Health, Justice and 
Constitutional Development, Social Development and Correctional Services, when 
presenting themselves at public institutions such as courts, police stations and 
hospitals. The Minimum Standards therefore serves to hold government 
accountable for providing the necessary services and assistance to the victims of 
crime. 
 
Documents such as the Victims’ Charter and the Minimum Standards are welcomed 
as they affirm the right of victims of crime, including those of child victims, and 
ensure that they are central to the criminal justice system. They also reflect 
government’s commitment to improving services for the victims of crime.  
                                            
is included in the Constitution for victims (Van der Merwe in Boezaart (ed) Child Law in South 
Africa 565). 
387  Victim’s Charter 4-9. 
388  Available at www.justice.gov.za/VC/docs/vc/vcms-eng.pdf (accessed 5/01/2015). 
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7 CONCLUSION 
 
The right of the child to freedom from violence provides the foundation for   children’s 
rights in the Constitution and international children’s rights instruments such as the 
CRC. This right is inherent in the human dignity of the child and stands as a crucial 
indicator of any government’s commitment to the safeguarding of their children’s 
human rights.389 A reflection on the aforementioned national implementation efforts 
of the South African government through the adoption of public policies and legal 
reforms reveals government's commitment to achieving this goal. Despite this 
positive trend, much still needs to be done to address the high levels of violence 
against children as this occurrence of violence directed against children remains a 
discernible barrier to the full realisation of their human rights as enshrined in our 
Constitution.390 
 
There can be no doubt that the international instruments, together with the 
Constitution and other national documents, are powerful tools in enhancing the lives 
of child victims and child witnesses in South Africa. These instruments and 
documents serve inter alia to guarantee child victims and child witnesses the right 
to respect for their human dignity and physical and psychological integrity, and 
advocate a criminal procedure that is tailored to their individual needs.  
 
However, it would be foolish to pretend that the answer to all the problems 
associated with child victims and child witnesses lies in international instruments 
and national documents. The theoretical exercise is only one part of the solution, 
                                            
389  Pais (the Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General on Violence against 
Children) “Foreword” in Matthews, Jamieson, Lake & Smith (eds) South African Child Gauge 
2014 (2014) (hereinafter Child Gauge 2014) 1 at 7. 
390  Dlamini (Minister of Social Development) “Reflections on the Prevention of Violence against 
Children” in Matthews et al Child Gauge 2014 1 at 10. 
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the other is to transcend the rhetoric of international and national documents and 
proceed to implement them, thereby making the rights of child victims and witnesses 
a reality.391 In DPP v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development392 the 
Constitutional Court remarked as follows with reference to the availability of 
intermediaries to child complainants in criminal cases: 
 
The record suggests a disturbing inconsistency between the promises that the laws 
make and implementation of the laws. Compliance with the Constitution requires not 
only that laws be enacted to give effect to the rights in the Constitution, but also 
requires that these laws be implemented. Failure to implement laws that protect 
Constitutional rights is a violation of the Constitution.  
 
                                            
391  Jamieson, Stein and Warehouse in their report on “Children and Law Reform” in Matthews et 
al (eds) South African Child Gauge 2014 (2014) 1 at 18, for example, comment on the new 
legislation safeguarding the on-going provisions of specialised Sexual Offences Courts. They 
point out that the Act is weak from an implementation perspective, in that it does not provide 
direction on the pace of implementation of the courts; does not require the Department to 
provide resources for the courts; and sets no standards in terms of infrastructure, staffing or 
support services to victims. Without these, they argue, there is no guarantee that Sexual 
Offences Courts will reduce secondary victimisation and improve conviction rights. 
392  2009 (2) SACR 130 (CC) at para [201]. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The intermediary system in South Africa 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
244 
CHAPTER 5 
 
The intermediary system in South Africa 
 
Everything seems to turn upon the need for intermediaries when young children 
testify in court. Properly trained intermediaries are key to ensuring the fairness of 
the trial. Their integrity and skill will be vital in ensuring both that innocent people 
are not wrongly convicted and that guilty people are properly held to account.1 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
 
It is clear from the discussion in the previous chapters that a steadfast awareness 
of the importance of the protection of children exists and that progress has been 
made in this regard in South Africa.2 One such legislative advancement at national 
level was effected in terms of the Interim Constitution and is central to the theme of 
this study, namely the introduction of the intermediary into the criminal justice 
system.3 
  
In this chapter, the historical background to the introduction and role of the 
intermediary in the South African criminal justice system will be discussed briefly. 
The appointment of an intermediary, the role and functions of an intermediary, 
categories of people qualified to act as an intermediary, as well as the problems 
                                            
1  Director of Public Prosecutions, Transvaal v Minister of Justice and Constitutional 
Development 2009 (2) SACR 130 (CC) at para [168] (hereinafter DPP v Minister of Justice 
and Constitutional Development). 
2  See ch 4 of this thesis. 
3  Note that although s 170A of the Criminal Procedure Act was introduced in 1993, under the 
interim Constitution, the constitutionality of the section was only confirmed in 1996 in K v 
Regional Court. Magistrate 1996 (1) SACR 434 (E).    
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experienced within the intermediary system will be analysed. Where relevant, 
measures to enhance the intermediary system will be considered.  
 
2 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND TO THE INTRODUCTION OF 
THE PERSONA OR FUNCTION OF AN INTERMEDIARY 
 
In 1989, the then Minister of Justice, Mr HJ Coetzee, requested the South African 
Law Commission (as it was then known) (the Commission) to conduct an 
investigation into the position of child witnesses in court proceedings.4 In this regard 
the Commission was requested to give particular consideration to the following 
possible protective measures and procedures:5 
 
 That a child giving evidence in a trial be assisted by a representative;  
 That the identification of the suspect by the child ought not to take place in open 
court, but from behind a one-way mirror; 
 That the evidence of a child be heard in an informal atmosphere, which includes the 
hearing of such evidence in a room other than a court of law, and which also includes 
the possibility of hearing the child’s evidence whilst the child is screened off by a 
one-way mirror or in the absence of the accused; 
 That a pre-trial questioning of the child be carried out by a psychologist appointed 
by the court, who must be entitled to express his or her opinion in court regarding 
the child’s credibility; such questioning to take place in consultation with the 
accused, the prosecution and the presiding officer; 
                                            
4  South African Law Commission Protection of the Child Witness Project 71 Working Paper 28 
(1989) at 18. 
5  South African Law Commission Protection of the Child Witness Project 71 Working Paper 28 
(1989) at 19-20. 
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 That videotapes relating to interviews between the child and social workers during 
the investigation stages of the case ought to be admissible in court and ought to be 
made available to the accused before the trial. 
The Commission came to the conclusion that child witnesses experience significant 
difficulties in dealing with the traditional adversarial court environment, comprising 
a presiding officer, an accused, legal representatives of the accused and a 
prosecutor (some of whom wear black robes). Furthermore, the ordinary procedures 
of the criminal justice system that involve confrontation and extensive cross-
examination have proved to be inadequate for the needs and protection of child 
witnesses. This, the Commission stated, results in the child witness “being afraid, 
uncertain and confused”.6 Consequently alternative procedures and mechanisms 
have had to be developed to facilitate the reception of the evidence of child 
witnesses in criminal proceedings. In this regard, the Commission looked at possible 
solutions such as the use of a child investigator, special courtrooms and “translated” 
cross-examination, legal assistance, and the video recording of the initial statement 
as admissible evidence.7 
 
In its final report on the matter,8 the Commission recommended that in certain 
circumstances a child should be allowed to give evidence via electronic means, in 
a place other than the courtroom, with the assistance of an intermediary. This 
recommendation gave rise to the introduction of section 170A into the Criminal 
Procedure Act.9 Section 170A of the Criminal Procedure Act provides as follows: 
 
                                            
6  South African Law Commission Protection of the Child Witness Project 71 Working Paper 28 
(1989) at 14. 
7  South African Law Commission Protection of the Child Witness Project 71 Working Paper 28 
(1989) at 20-24. 
8  South African Law Commission Report on the Protection of the Child Witness Project 71 
(1991).  
9   Act 51 of 1977 (hereinafter the Criminal Procedure Act). Section 170A was inserted by section 
3 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act 135 of 1991. This amendment came into operation on 
30 July 1993. Subsection (1) was later substituted by section 68 of the Criminal Law (Sexual 
Offences and Related Matters) Amendment Act 32 of 2007 by the insertion of the words 
“biological or mental” before “age of eighteen years” making it clear that not only chronological 
age is contemplated, as was held in S v Dayimani 2006 (2) SACR 594 (EC) at para [9]. 
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(1) Whenever criminal proceedings are pending before any court and it appears to 
such court that it would expose any witness under the biological or mental age of 
eighteen years to undue mental stress or suffering if he or she testifies at such 
proceedings, the court may, subject to subsection (4), appoint a competent person 
as an intermediary in order to enable such witness to give his or her evidence 
through that intermediary. 
(2)(a) No examination, cross-examination or re-examination of any witness in 
respect of whom a court has appointed an intermediary under subsection (1), except 
examination by the court, shall take place in any manner other than through that 
intermediary. 
(b) The said intermediary may, unless the court directs otherwise, convey the 
general purport of any question to the relevant witness. 
(3) If a court appoints an intermediary under subsection (1), the court may direct that 
the relevant witness shall give his or her evidence at any place - 
(a) which is informally arranged to set that witness at ease; 
(b) which is so situated that any person whose presence may upset that 
witness, is outside the sight and hearing of that witness; and 
(c) which enables the court and any person whose presence is necessary at 
the relevant proceedings to see and hear, either directly or through the 
medium of any electronic or other devices, that intermediary as well as that 
witness during his or her testimony. 
(4)(a) The Minister may by notice in the Gazette10 determine the persons or the 
category or class of persons who are competent to be appointed as intermediaries. 
                                            
10  The Minister of Justice in Government Notice R 137 Government Gazette 150 of 30 July 1990, 
as amended by Government Notice R 360 Government Gazette 1782 of 28 February 1997, 
as amended by Government Notice R 597 Government Gazette 2 2435 of 2 July 2001, made 
the following determination regarding the categories or classes of persons competent to be 
appointed as intermediaries: 
(a) Medical practitioners who are registered as such in the Medical, Dental and 
Supplementary Health Services Professions Act, 1974 (Act 56 of 1974), and against 
whose names the speciality paediatrics is also registered. 
(b) Medical practitioners who are registered as such under the Medical, Dental and 
Supplementary Health Services Professions Act, 1974, and against whose name the 
speciality psychiatry is also registered. 
(c) Family counsellors who are appointed as such under section 3 of the Mediation in 
Certain Divorce Matters Act , 1987 (Act 24 of 1987), and who are or were registered as 
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(b) An intermediary who is not in the full-time employment of the State shall be paid 
such travelling and subsistence and other allowances in respect of the services 
rendered by him or her as the Minister, with the concurrence of the Minister of 
Finance, may determine. 
(5)(a) No oath, affirmation or admonition which has been administered through an 
intermediary in terms of section 165 shall be invalid and no evidence which has been 
presented through an intermediary shall be inadmissible solely on account of the 
fact that such intermediary was not competent to be appointed as an intermediary 
in terms of a regulation referred to in subsection (4)(a), at the time when such oath, 
affirmation or admonition was administered or such evidence was presented. 
(b) If in any proceedings it appears to a court that an oath, affirmation or admonition 
was administered or that evidence has been presented through an intermediary who 
was appointed in good faith but, at the time of such appointment, was not qualified 
to be appointed as an intermediary in terms of a regulation referred to in subsection 
(4)(a), the court must make a finding as to the validity of that oath, affirmation or 
admonition or the admissibility of that evidence, as the case may be, with due regard 
to - 
(i) the reason why the intermediary concerned was not qualified to be 
appointed as an intermediary, and the likelihood that the reason concerned 
will affect the reliability of the evidence so presented adversely; 
                                            
social workers under sections 17 of the Social Services Professions Act, 1978 (Act 110 
of 1978), or who are or were educators as contemplated in paragraph (f) hereunder, or 
who are or were registered as clinical, educational or counselling psychologists under 
the Medical, Dental and Supplementary Health Services Professions Act, 1974. 
(d) Child care workers who have successfully completed a two-year course in child and 
youth care approved by the National Association of Child Care Workers and who have 
two years’ experience in child care. 
(e) (i) Social workers who are registered as such under section 17 of the Social Service 
Professions Act, 1978, and who have two years’ experience in social work; and 
(ii) persons who obtained a masters degree in social work and who have two years’ 
experience in social work. 
(f) (i) Persons who have four years’ experience as educators who have not at any stage, 
as a result of misconduct, been dismissed from service as educators. 
(ii) For the purposes of subparagraph (i) ‘educators’ means persons who teach, or train 
other persons, or who provide professional educational services, including provisional 
therapy and educational psychological services at a public independent, or private 
school as contemplated in the South African Schools Act, 1996 (Act 84 of 99), including 
former and retired educators. 
(g) Psychologists who are registered as clinical educators or counselling psychologists 
under the Medical, Dental and Supplementary Health Services Professions Act, 1974. 
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(ii) the mental stress or suffering which the witness, in respect of whom that 
intermediary was appointed, will be exposed to if that evidence is to be 
presented anew, whether by the witness in person or through another 
intermediary; and 
(iii) the likelihood that real and substantial justice will be impaired if that 
evidence is admitted. 
(6)(a) Subsection (5) does not prevent the prosecution from presenting anew any 
evidence which was presented through an intermediary referred to in that 
subsection. 
(b) The provisions of subsection (5) shall also be applicable in respect of all cases 
where an intermediary referred to in that subsection has been appointed, and in 
respect of which, at the time of the commencement of that subsection - 
(i) the trial court; or 
(ii) the court considering an appeal or review, has not delivered judgment. 
(7) The court shall provide reasons for refusing any application or request by the 
public prosecutor for the appointment of an intermediary in respect of child 
complainants below the age of 14 years, immediately upon refusal and such reasons 
shall be entered into the record of the proceedings. 
(8) An intermediary referred to in subsection (1) shall be summoned to appear in 
court on a specified date and at a specified place and time to act as an intermediary. 
(9) If, at the commencement of or at any stage before the completion of the 
proceedings concerned, an intermediary appointed by the court - 
(a) is for any reason absent; 
(b) becomes unable to act as an intermediary in the opinion of the court; or 
(c) dies, 
the court may, in the interests of justice and after due consideration of the arguments 
put forward by the accused person and the prosecutor - 
(i) postpone the proceedings in order to obtain the intermediary’s presence; 
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(ii) summons the intermediary to appear before the court to advance reasons 
for being absent; 
(iii) direct that the appointment of the intermediary be revoked and appoint 
another intermediary; or 
(iv) direct that the appointment of the intermediary be revoked and that the 
proceedings continue in the absence of an intermediary. 
(10) The court shall immediately give reasons for any direction or order referred to 
in subsection (9)(iv), which reasons shall be entered into the record of the 
proceedings. 
 
3 ANALYSIS OF THE INTERMEDIARY SYSTEM 
 
Although the introduction of section 170A has alleviated some of the stress 
experienced by child witnesses, it is nonetheless submitted that this section is still 
deficient in a number of respects. It is therefore necessary and important to conduct 
a proper analysis of the section to assess its full value and to provide possible 
solutions for shortcomings, thereby enhancing its application. 
 
3.1 The appointment of an intermediary 
 
Section 170A(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act provides that whenever criminal 
proceedings are pending before any court and it appears to the court that a witness 
under the biological or mental age of eighteen years would be exposed to undue 
mental stress or suffering by testifying at such proceedings, the court may appoint 
a competent person as an intermediary in order to enable such witness to give 
testimony through that intermediary.  
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3.1.1 When must an application be made and by whom? 
 
Section 170A(1) can be invoked whenever criminal proceedings are pending,11 and 
applies to all criminal proceedings.12 The subsection comes into operation once the 
prosecutor has made an application for the appointment of an intermediary. A single 
application may be made on behalf of one or more minor complainants.13 If the 
prosecutor fails to make such an application, the presiding judicial officer must 
initiate an enquiry into the desirability of appointing an intermediary.14 It should be 
noted that the Constitutional Court per Ngcobo J in DPP v Minister of Justice and 
Constitutional Development15 held that contrary to what was believed in S v 
Moekoena; S v Phaswane16 the subsection does not require that a child should first 
be exposed to undue mental stress or suffering before the provision may be invoked, 
as the object of the subsection is to prevent the child from being exposed to undue 
mental stress or suffering as a result of testifying in court. What this subsection 
contemplates is that a child would be assessed prior to testifying in court in order to 
determine whether the services of an intermediary should be used. If such an 
assessment reveals that the services of an intermediary are needed, the state must 
arrange for an intermediary to be present in court when the accused goes on trial.17  
 
Properly construed, therefore, the court held in DPP v Minister of Justice and 
Constitutional Development18 that section 170A(1), read with section 170A(3), 
                                            
11  Refer to S v Klink ECD case no RC 6/68/95, unreported. The court held that the proceedings 
in a summary charge commenced with the lodging of a charge sheet and that for the purposes 
of section 170A criminal proceedings were pending even before the accused had pleaded. An 
intermediary could therefore be appointed before the accused had pleaded. 
12  K v Regional Court Magistrate 1996 (1) SACR 434 (E) at 440. 
13  S v Peyani 2014 (2) SACR 127 (G). 
14  DPP v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development 2009 (2) SACR 130 (CC) at para 
[112]; See also Director of Public Prosecutions North Gauteng, Pretoria v Makhubela 
(unreported, GP case no A 91/2014 (06/08/2014) at para [14], where the court held that “[i]t is 
of fundamental importance to note that the interests of justice serve that the court is likewise 
obligated to invoke the provisions of section 170A mero motu if it appears to it at any stage of 
the trial that a child under the age of 18 years is or might be exposed to undue mental stress 
or suffering”. 
15  2009 (2) SACR 130 (CC) at para [112]. 
16  2008(2) SACR 216 (T) at para [79] (hereinafter S v Mokoena). 
17  2009 (2) SACR 130 (CC) at paras [110]-[111]. 
18  Para [111]. 
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contemplates that in every trial in which a child is to testify, the court will enquire into 
the desirability of appointing an intermediary. Ngcobo J explained that the nature of 
the enquiry that is required is not the same as in a civil trial, which attracts a burden 
of proof. It is an enquiry conducted on behalf of a person who is not a party to the 
proceedings but who possesses constitutional rights. Therefore, what is required of 
the judicial officer, according to Ngcobo J, is to consider whether, on the evidence 
presented to the judicial officer and viewed in the light of the objectives of the 
Constitution and section 170A(1), it is in the best interests of the child that an 
intermediary be appointed.19 In Director of Public Prosecutions North Gauteng, 
Pretoria v Makhubela20 the High Court again emphasised the importance of such an 
enquiry and pointed out that the court was obliged to consider or hear an application 
for the child to testify through an intermediary even though such an application may 
delay the process by a further postponement.  
 
3.1.2 Witness under the biological or mental age of eighteen years 
 
Section 170A may be invoked where the biological or mental age of the witness is 
below eighteen years. The age refers to the date on which the witness testifies and 
is not the age at the time of the commission of the crime.21 Before the amendment 
of subsection (1)22 the section only referred to “age”, which was taken to mean 
“biological age”. Subsection (1) now refers to “mental age” as well and therefore 
allows a witness above the age of eighteen years, but with a mental maturity that 
falls below that of a typical eighteen-year-old, to testify with the assistance of an 
intermediary. The term is not defined, which leaves the court with the task of making 
a finding on the level of mental maturity of the witness. Although this is not 
necessarily an easy task, given the purposes of the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences 
                                            
19  Paras [114]-[115]. Refer to the Preamble to the Constitution for the objectives of the 
Constitution and to para 2.2 of ch 4 above for a discussion of the constitutional rights of child 
victims and child witnesses.   
20  Unreported, GP case no A 91/2014 (06/08/2014) at para [15]. 
21  S v Dayimani 2006 (2) SACR 594 (EC) at para [10]. 
22  Subsection (1) was substituted by section 68 of the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and 
Related Matters) Amendment Act 32 of 2007 by the insertion of the words “biological or 
mental” before “age of eighteen years”. 
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and Related Matters) Amendment Act, such an interpretation is likely to be made by 
the courts, with the assistance of an expert witness, and may involve a liberal 
interpretation of the meaning of the term “mental maturity” of the witness.23 
 
However, cognisance should be taken of the fact that the biological age or mental 
maturity of the witness has to be below eighteen years before an intermediary may 
be appointed. S v Hewitt24 was an application for leave to appeal against the 
certification, on special review, that the proceedings in the magistrate’s court in a 
trial for rape were in accordance of justice. Pillay J had to consider whether allowing 
the complainant who was just over the biological age of eighteen years to testify 
with the aid of an intermediary resulted in an irregularity.25 The court held that no 
irregularity had occurred, but reasoned that “I interpret s170A (1) to mean that the 
age limit of 18 years to be a guideline. It is but one indication of the capability of a 
witness to testify, namely her biological level of maturity. Emotional and 
psychological maturity must also be factored into the discretion. By treating the 
section as a guideline assures its constitutional validity.”26    
 
Conversely, in a similar case (ZF v S27) where the High Court was confronted with 
the question whether allowing a complainant twenty years of age to testify with the 
aid of an intermediary resulted in an irregularity, the High Court correctly disagreed 
with the finding of S v Hewitt.28 With reference to the principles of interpretation of 
documents as set out in Cool Ideas 1186 CC v Hubbard,29 the court held that the 
ordinary grammatical meaning of the section is that the section applies only to those 
                                            
23  Van der Merwe et al Du Toit’s Commentary on the Criminal Procedure Act (loose-leaf, revised 
service ed 50, 2013) 22-110.  
24  Unreported review case no DR 349/11, KwaZulu-Natal Local Division, Durban, as referred to 
in ZF v S Unreported KZN case no AR 764/2014 (22/10/2015) at para [8].  
25  Own emphasis. Note that the mental maturity of the witness was not an issue in this case. 
26  Unreported review case no DR 349/11, KwaZulu-Natal Local Division, Durban, as referred to 
in ZF v S Unreported KZN case no AR 764/2014 (22/10/2015) at para [8]. 
27  Unreported KZN case no AR 764/2014 (22/10/2015). 
28  Paras [9]-[10]. 
29  2014 (4) SA 474 (CC) at para [28]. In terms of the approach followed by the court in Cool 
Ideas 1186 CC v Hubbard at para [28] “[a] fundamental tenet of statutory interpretation is that 
the words in the statute must be given their ordinary grammatical meaning, unless to do so 
would result in an absurdity”. 
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under the biological or mental age of eighteen years. The High Court also held that 
a finding that the legislature did not mean to limit the application of section 170A to 
those under the biological or mental age of eighteen would be contrary to the 
principles of the interpretation of documents. The High Court pointed out that by 
including the words “those under the mental age of eighteen years” in the section 
the legislature clearly intended to exclude all adults who have a mental age over 
eighteen years.30 Furthermore, such an interpretation does not lead to an absurdity 
and there are other forms of protection available to adults who do not qualify under 
section 170A to reduce possible trauma. An example is section 158(2) of the 
Criminal Procedure Act, which allows for protection to be given by means of CCTV 
or similar electronic media. In addition, the High Court stressed that the purpose of 
the section is “to ensure the paramountcy of the best interests of the child 
complainant in criminal proceedings in which the child testifies” and “that the 
constitutional validity of the section is not threatened by this approach”.31 
 
The High Court concluded that the use of an intermediary in the said case had 
resulted in an irregularity. Despite this the High Court held that the irregularity did 
not result in the evidence of the complainant being inadmissible as the evidence 
presented was still her evidence. The irregularity did not result in a failure of justice 
either, as the accused was still fairly tried and was afforded an opportunity to adduce 
and challenge evidence. The appeal against the convictions of the accused was 
therefore dismissed.32  
 
 
3.1.3 How is an intermediary appointed? 
 
                                            
30  Unreported KZN case no AR 764/2014 (22/10/2015) at para [10]. 
31  Unreported KZN case no AR 764/2014 (22/10/2015) at para [10]. 
32  Unreported KZN case no AR 764/2014 (22/10/2015) at paras [15]-[16] and [47]. 
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No formalities for the appointment of an intermediary are set out in the Criminal 
Procedure Act or any other statute. Whitear-Nel33 emphasises that for the 
appointment to take place general principles of law dictate that the court is required 
to form, and to communicate, the intention to appoint the intermediary irrespective 
of whether an application was made by the prosecutor or initiated by the judicial 
officer. The validity of an appointment will depend on an assessment of whether the 
criteria for the appointment of an intermediary set out in section 170A(1) are met. 
The competency of the person recommended will be assessed by the court. With 
reference to S v Booi34 Whitear-Nel points out that in order for such an assessment 
to be made the name of the intermediary and the intermediary’s qualifications should 
appear on the record. If this information is not present on the record, further 
evidence will have to be led in order for the High Court to assess the validity of such 
an appointment.35  
 
An intermediary is appointed for each case irrespective of whether the intermediary 
regularly fulfils this duty in the same court and is well acquainted with the court 
officials. Furthermore, an intermediary is not appointed on a permanent basis as is 
the case with court interpreters, who are court officials.36 
 
3.1.4 The discretion of the court to appoint an intermediary 
 
Section 170A(1) uses the expression “the court may”. This implies that the 
appointment of an intermediary is not automatic but suggests a discretion on the 
part of the trial court as to whether or not to allow the appointment of an intermediary. 
This discretion is subject to the prerequisites stated in section 170A(1). A trial court 
may accordingly only appoint an intermediary when it is apparent that a witness 
                                            
33  Whitear-Nel “Intermediaries appointed in terms of s 170A of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 
1977: new developments?” 2006 SACJ 334 at 335. 
34  2005 (1) SACR 599 (B). 
35  Para [7]. 
36  Para [24]. 
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under the biological or mental age of eighteen years will be exposed to undue mental 
stress or suffering if such witness testified at the proceedings without the use of an 
intermediary. The discretionary nature of section 170A has been the subject of a 
considerable amount of criticism.37 According to Schwikkard, the result of this 
discretion is that children testifying through intermediaries are viewed as the 
exception rather than the norm.38 According to Matthias and Zaal39 the problem 
appears to be that section 170A(1) is capable of being interpreted to mean that, 
even if an exceptional degree of stress in a witness can be proven, the presiding 
officer can nevertheless refuse an application. They point out that some critics argue 
that this renders the grounds pointless as well as difficult to understand, while 
contributing further to the lack of uniformity in appointments.40 Schwikkard and 
Müller41 are of the opinion that section 170A would be more effective if subsection 
(1) were amended to require a court to use an intermediary in all cases where a 
child (complainant)42 was required to testify; the court should only be excused from 
doing so where it was clear that the child would not be traumatised or where it was 
impossible to do so.43 This viewpoint is endorsed. 
 
In S v Mokoena44 the High Court reviewed the constitutionality of a number of 
sections pertaining to the position of children involved in criminal trials, as 
complainants, victims or witnesses. One of the issues was whether section 170A(1) 
is unconstitutional in so far as it confers a discretion on the judicial officer as to 
whether to appoint an intermediary. The High Court per Bertelsmann J held that 
                                            
37  Schwikkard “The abused child: a few rules of evidence considered” 1996 Acta Juridica 148 at 
159; Iyer & Ndlovu “Protecting the child victim in sexual offences: is there a need for separate 
legal presentation?” 2012 Obiter 72 at 82 and Müller “An inquisitorial approach to the evidence 
of children” 2001 Crime Research in South Africa 1 at 3.  
38  Schwikkard 1996 Acta Juridica 148. 
39  Matthias & Zaal “Intermediaries for child witnesses: old problems, new solutions and judicial 
differences in South Africa” 2011 International Journal of Children’s Rights 251 at 257. 
40  Matthias & Zaal 2011 International Journal of Children’s Rights 251 at 257. 
41  Schwikkard 1996 Acta Juridica 148 at 159; Müller 2001 Crime Research in South Africa 1 at 
3. 
42  Note that whereas Schwikkard argues for the amendment in favour of child complainants 
Müller advocates for all children ie victims as well as witnesses. The latter viewpoint is 
endorsed.  
43  Schwikkard 1996 Acta Juridica 148 at 159; Müller 2001 Crime Research in South Africa 1 at 
3. 
44  2008 (2) SACR 216 (T). This included sections 170A(1) and (7), 153(3) and (5), 158(5) and 
164 (1) of the Criminal Procedure Act. 
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section 170A(1) was unconstitutional on account of the provisions of section 28(2) 
of the Constitution. Section 28(2) states: “A child’s best interests are of paramount 
importance in every matter concerning the child.” Bertelsmann J stated that section 
28(2) of the Constitution demands that the child should be exposed to as little stress 
and mental anguish as possible. It is therefore difficult, according to the learned 
judge, to fathom why the legislature should insist that the child witness should be 
exposed to undue mental stress or suffering before the services of an intermediary 
may be considered by a court.45 Bertelsmann J furthermore stated: 46 
 
This threshold provision places a limitation upon the best interests of the child that 
is neither rational nor justifiable when weighed up against the legitimate concerns of 
the accused, the court and the public interest. The child is entitled as of right to a 
procedure that eliminates as much as possible of the anguish that accompanies the 
necessity of having to relive the horror of abuse, violation, rape, assault or 
deprivation the child experienced when he or she became a victim or witness. To 
demand an extraordinary measure of stress or anguish before the assistance of an 
intermediary can be called upon clearly discriminates against the child and is 
constitutionally untenable. 
 
Section 170A(1) was subsequently declared unconstitutional by the High Court  “in 
that it grants a discretion to the trial court to appoint or not to appoint an intermediary 
when a child witness is to be called in a criminal trial”.47 
 
The Constitutional Court in DPP v Minister of Justice and Constitutional 
Development,48 however, refused to confirm the order of invalidity but instead per 
Ngcobo J held as follows:  
                                            
45  2008 (2) SACR 216 (T) at para [78]. 
46  Para [79]. 
47  Para [185]. 
48  2009 (2) SACR 130 (CC) at para [79]. The Constitutional Court was confronted with a number 
of questions. The central question presented was whether the provisions of sections 153(3) 
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[T]he conferral of discretion on judicial officers cannot be unconstitutional simply 
because some judicial offices may exercise the discretion incorrectly. The question 
therefore is whether this subsection is unconstitutional merely because it confers 
discretion on judicial officers whether to appoint an intermediary.49 
 
Ngcobo J stressed the import of judicial discretion in that it permits judicial officers 
to take into account the unique facts and circumstances of a particular case.50 This 
is important because section 170A(1) deals with a wide range of witnesses who are 
under the age of eighteen years, such as complainants in sexual offence cases; 
child witnesses to sexual offence cases; and child witnesses to other offences 
generally. This means that the nature of the evidence given by the witnesses will 
differ from case to case and the stress caused by giving that evidence will also vary. 
In addition, the age of the child and his or her independence, level of maturity and 
feelings and wishes will also differ from case to case.51 He added the following:52 
 
A child who is 17 years old who is outspoken and assertive may consider it an affront 
to his or her dignity to suggest that he or she should testify through an intermediary. 
Similarly, it would be absurd to expect a child of that age whose only testimony 
relates to identifying his or her stolen cellular phone to testify through an 
intermediary. Yet a child who is of the same age who is a complainant in a rape 
case, who is shy and was severely traumatised by the rape, may need the services 
of an intermediary. The exercise of judicial discretion enables the court to apply the 
provisions in a flexible manner, bearing in mind that the primary objective is to give 
effect to the provisions of s 170A(1) and s 28(2) of the Constitution. 
 
Given these factors Ngcobo J emphasised that what is required is individualised 
justice, that is, justice which is appropriately tailored to the needs of the individual 
                                            
and (5), 158(5), 164(1), 170A(1) and  (7) of the Criminal Procedure Act were constitutionally 
compatible with section 28(2) of the Constitution. 
49  2009 (2) SACR 130 (CC) at para [118]. 
50  Para [120]. 
51  Para [124]. 
52  Para [125]. 
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case.53 This in the learned judge’s view conforms to the principle that the best 
interests of the child must be of paramount importance in matters concerning the 
child.54 
 
Ncgobo J cautioned, however, that the exercise of the discretion conferred by the 
subsection is constrained by the Constitution and the purposes for which it was 
conferred, namely to protect children from undue stress or suffering that may arise 
from testifying in court.55 He added that in his view the answer to the problems 
identified by the amici and the Department of Public Prosecution does not lie in 
making the appointment of an intermediary compulsory in every sexual offence case 
in which a child complainant is involved. According to the learned judge it would not 
be in the best interests of the child who wishes to confront his or her abusers in court 
to impose an intermediary on that child. Nor does the answer lie in making the 
appointment compulsory unless the circumstances of the child dictate otherwise. 
Ngcobo stated that this might undermine the right of the child to be treated as an 
individual with individual needs, wishes and feelings.56 
 
Ngcobo J concluded that the discretion conferred on judicial officers in respect of 
whether or not to appoint an intermediary was not inconsistent with section 28(2) 
and was therefore not unconstitutional.57 He added that if section 170A(1) is properly 
interpreted and applied it will comply with the principle that the child’s best interests 
are of paramount importance in criminal proceedings concerning a sexual offence 
against a child. If, however, the objectives of section 28(2) are not being achieved 
through the interpretation and application of section 170A(1), the fault lies not with 
the provision itself, but with the manner in which it is interpreted and implemented 
                                            
53  Para [120]. 
54  Para [123]. 
55  Para [126]. 
56  Para [127]. 
57  Paras [129]-[132]. 
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by prosecutors and judicial officers. This fault could be remedied, according to 
Ngcobo J, through judicial education and training.58 
 
The Constitutional Court’s view that section 170A(1) is not unconstitutional simply 
because it confers a discretion to appoint an intermediary on the courts has been 
the subject of some criticism. Freedman59 points out that the Constitutional Court’s 
reasons for rejecting the High Court’s view that section 170A(1) is unconstitutional 
because it confers a discretion to appoint an intermediary are not entirely 
convincing, at least in so far as sexual abuse cases are concerned. He points out, 
and rightly so, that while it is true that some child complainants may want to confront 
their abusers, it is very unlikely that the majority of child complainants will want to. 
Given this fact he finds it difficult to understand why a right that may be claimed by 
a small minority of child complainants should outweigh the danger that conferring a 
discretion on the court to appoint an intermediary poses for the majority of child 
complainants. He stresses that in this respect it is important to bear in mind that it 
was the High Court that misinterpreted section 170A(1) and diluted the protection it 
confers on child complainants. 60  
 
Similarly, Matthias and Zaal61 are of the opinion that the High Court’s approach is 
preferred for a society in which (as was generally agreed in both cases, according 
to them) the problems of insufficiently motivated and sensitised prosecutors and 
magistrates are extensive. The High Court’s approach would have compelled 
prosecutors and magistrates to supply a cogent justification for the avoidance of 
intermediaries. Bertelsmann J states that the substantial reason qualification62  in 
fact creates the flexibility which the Constitutional Court holds to be so vital.63  
                                            
58  Paras [130]-[131]. 
59  Freedman “Recent cases - Constitutional Law” 2010 SACJ 299 at 305. 
60  Freedman 2010 SACJ 299 at 305. 
61  Matthias & Zaal 2011 International Journal of Children’s Rights 251 at 265. 
62  What is required according to this principle is that the appointment of an intermediary should 
be subject to a standard norm which could be departed from only for a good reason found and 
reported. 
63  Matthias & Zaal 2011 International Journal of Children’s Rights 251 at 265. 
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Freedman is of the view that the High Court’s approach is flawed owing to its 
discretionary nature. With reference to Schwikkard64 he argues that the flawed 
approach adopted by the High Court towards section 170A(1) appears to have 
arisen out of a bias in favour of the accused’s right to confront and to cross-examine 
the child witness and it is not entirely clear whether this bias can be overcome 
through a process of judicial education, as the Constitutional Court suggested. In 
addition, the Constitutional Court gives no indication of who should take 
responsibility for developing and implementing such a program. Freedman points 
out, and rightly so, that the Constitutional Court’s suggestion has simply been left 
hanging in the air.65 
 
After considering the aforementioned arguments, the approach of the High Court is 
preferred in that it sets a standard norm for the appointment of intermediaries which 
can be departed from in the event that a child witness so wishes or cogent reasons 
can be found by the presiding judicial officer for not appointing an intermediary. This 
not only simplifies the process while allowing for flexibility but in addition ensures a 
more consistent interpretation and implementation of section 170A(1). Both the High 
Court and the Constitutional Court clearly accept as a point of departure the fact 
that testifying as a complainant in a criminal trial is stressful.66 It is therefore difficult 
to imagine how the interests of justice will not be best served by allowing for the 
appointment of an intermediary as a standard norm.  
 
3.1.5 Undue mental stress or suffering 
 
                                            
64  Schwikkard 1996 Acta Juridica 148 at 162. 
65  Freedman 2011 SACJ 299 at 305. 
66  S v Mokoena 2008 (2) SACR 216 (T) at para [77]; DPP v Minister of Justice and Constitutional 
Development 2009 (2) SACR 130 (CC) at para [108]. 
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In terms of section 170A(1) a court in exercising its aforementioned discretion has 
to decide whether a child will be exposed to “undue mental stress or suffering” in 
the event that such child testifies at the proceedings in the normal manner. This 
phrase is not defined in the Criminal Procedure Act, nor have any specific guidelines 
been laid down. Furthermore by their very nature the concepts included in the 
phrase are exceedingly vague, complex and difficult to give content to. Uncertainty 
also exists as to how acute mental stress or suffering must be before it can be 
classified as “undue”. The absence of a clear definition is problematic as it may lead 
to inconsistency in the meaning given to the phrase, with some courts interpreting 
the phrase in a narrow sense while others may not, thereby resulting in inconsistent 
application and consequential injustices.67  
 
Matthias and Zaal point out that, in the light of this difficulty some magistrates have 
adopted the position that the only way to establish whether a witness would 
experience undue stress is to call an expert witness to give evidence on the point. 
Since calling expert witnesses to deal with the grounds of undue mental stress and 
suffering delays proceedings and increases costs, this practice tends to be viewed 
as a reason not to use intermediaries.68  
 
It is precisely for these reasons that various commentators have advocated the 
amendment of subsection (1) to allow for all children to testify with the aid of an 
intermediary without the need to show “undue mental stress or suffering”, save 
where there are cogent reasons for not appointing an intermediary.69 Müller and 
Tait,70 for example, recommend that the appointment of an intermediary should be 
mandatory in all cases in which the witness is under the age of thirteen years but 
that if the child is thirteen years or older the court should retain its discretion to 
                                            
67  Müller & Tait “Section 158 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977: a potential weapon in the 
battle to protect child witnesses” 1999 SACJ 57 at 60. 
68  2011 International Journal of Children’s Rights 251 at 257. 
69  Schwikkard 1996 Acta Juridica 150 at 159; Müller & Tait “Little witnesses: a suggestion for 
improving the lot of children in court” 1999 THRHR 241 at 247; S v Mokoena 2008 (2) SACR 
216 (T) at para [185]. 
70  Müller & Tait 1999 THRHR 241 at 256-257. 
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appoint an intermediary if it appears to be in the interests of justice. This viewpoint 
was endorsed by the High Court in S v Mokoena71 where the court, with reference 
to the grounds of “undue mental stress and suffering”, held as follows: 
 
The child is entitled as of right to a procedure that eliminates as much as possible 
of the anguish that accompanies the necessity of having to relive the horror of abuse, 
violation, rape, assault or deprivation that the child experienced when he or she 
became a victim or witness. To demand an extraordinary measure of stress or 
anguish before the assistance of an intermediary can be called upon clearly 
discriminates against the child and is constitutionally untenable. This approach also 
infringes upon the child victim’s right to equal treatment, to dignity and to a fair trial.  
 
The High Court accordingly ordered that section 170A(1) should read as follows:72 
 
Subject to subsection (4), whenever criminal proceedings are pending before any 
court in which any witness under the biological or mental age of eighteen years is to 
testify, the court shall appoint a competent person as an intermediary for each 
witness under the biological age of eighteen years in order to enable such witness 
to give his or her evidence through that intermediary as contemplated in this section, 
unless there are cogent reasons not to appoint such intermediary, in which event 
the court shall place such reasons on record before the commencement of the 
proceedings; and the court may appoint a competent person for a witness under the 
mental age of eighteen years in order to give his or her evidence through that 
intermediary.  
 
In DPP v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development73 the Constitutional 
Court acknowledged the fact that the Criminal Procedure Act does not define the 
phrase “undue mental stress or suffering”. The Constitutional Court, however, did 
                                            
71  2008 (2) SACR 216 (T) at paras [79]-[80]. 
72  Para [185]. 
73  Para [100]. 
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not attempt to define the meaning of the phrase but held that it must be understood 
in the context of the objectives of section 170A(1), as informed by section 28(2) of 
the Constitution, and the atmosphere in which a child testifies in court. Ncgobo J 
pointed out that the objective is to protect children from the undue mental stress or 
suffering that may be caused by testifying in court. The Constitutional Court 
consequently refused to uphold the aforementioned order of the High Court but in 
fact held that the High Court had been incorrect in its understanding of the “undue 
stress or suffering” grounds for the appointment of an intermediary in terms of the 
subsection. The court found that the High Court had misread the ground as requiring 
proof that the child must already have experienced undue suffering before an 
intermediary could be appointed. This approach, the court stated, would be 
inconsistent with section 28(2) of the Constitution and the section itself.74 Rather, 
the objective of section 170A(1) is to prevent the child from being exposed to undue 
mental stress or suffering as a result of testifying in court. To overcome the problem 
of inconsistent applications, the Constitutional Court directed that all child 
complainants called to testify should be assessed prior to testifying in order to 
establish whether an intermediary was required.75 According to the court, the 
problem does not lie with the interpretation of section 170A(1) (or the definition of 
any of its concepts), but rather with its implementation.76  
 
Section 170A(1) therefore still stands as is on the statute books and the courts are 
still faced with the dilemma of determining the content of the phrase “undue mental 
stress or suffering”.77 
 
An analysis of the wording of the phrase indicates that the mental stress or suffering 
experienced by the child would have to exceed normal mental stress or suffering, 
                                            
74  Para [110]. 
75  Although the Constitutional Court did not indicate by whom such an assessment should be 
made, it is usually carried out by a social worker or psychologist. See for example S v Mokoena 
2008 (2) SACR 216 (T); K v Regional Court Magistrate 1996 (1) SACR 434 (E).  
76  2009 (2) SACR 130 (CC) at para [109]. 
77  Bekink “Defining the phrase: ‘undue mental stress and suffering’ in terms of section 170A of 
the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977” 2014 CARSA 39 at 40. 
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as the term “undue” is used to qualify the phrase “mental stress or suffering”. In S v 
Stefaans78 the court held that “undue” is “something in excess of ordinary stresses”. 
According to the court, section 170A(1) can therefore only be implemented if the 
witness would suffer more stress than is ordinarily experienced. Nonetheless, 
research has indicated that even the ordinary stress suffered by children when 
testifying in an adversarial court can be regarded as undue stress.79  
 
To complicate the matter further, the word “undue” has several meanings. In 
standard dictionaries the word undue is defined as “excessive, unwarranted, unjust 
or improper”80 or “inappropriate or disproportionate”.81 Schwikkard82 argues in 
favour of the meaning “not in accordance with what is right and just” since this 
definition accommodates a consideration of the best interests of the child witness. 
She furthermore points out that such an interpretation is also in line with the 
Afrikaans text of section 170A(1), which refers to “onredelike geestespanning of 
lyding” (unreasonable) and not to “excessive” stress or suffering. In view of the 
aforementioned, Schwikkard83 argues that it is therefore difficult to agree with the 
findings in S v Stefaans that “undue” requires “something in excess of ordinary 
stresses”84. This viewpoint is endorsed.  
 
To define “undue” as “not in accordance with what is right and just” also seems to 
be a more reasonable interpretation of section 170A(1) if one compares it to its 
counterpart, namely section 158 of the Criminal Procedure Act.85 Section 158 
provides for witnesses older than eighteen years (for example victims of violent 
crimes) to testify by means of closed circuit television (CCTV) or similar electronic 
                                            
78  1999 (1) SACR 182 (C) at 188. 
79  Schwikkard “Evidence” 1999 SACJ 259 at 262; Goodman & Helgeson “Child sexual assault: 
children's memory of the law” 1985 University of Miami LR 181. 
80  Fowler & Fowler Collins Concise Dictionary: 21st Century Edition (2004). 
81  Kavanagh South African Concise Oxford Dictionary (2008). 
82  Schwikkard & Van der Merwe Principles of Evidence (2009) 18 11 3. 
83  Schwikkard & Van der Merwe Principles of Evidence 18 11 3. 
84  See s 158(3) of the Act. Own emphasis added. 
85  Bekink 2014 CARSA 39 at 41. 
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media without having to be present in court. For section 158 to find application, the 
court should be convinced that to testify as such, will:  
(a) prevent unreasonable delay; 
(b) save costs;  
(c) be convenient;  
(d) be in the interests of the security of the State or of public safety or in the interests 
of justice or the public; or 
(e) prevent the likelihood that prejudice or harm might result to any person if he or 
she testifies or is present at such proceedings.86  
 
The distinction between the two tests has been criticised in that it would be more 
difficult for a child to make use of the procedure in terms of section 170A than it 
would be for an adult to make use of the provisions of section 158.87 The use of 
Scwikkard’s interpretation of “not in accordance with what is right and just” is 
therefore advocated as it would align the two tests more equitably.  
 
The latter interpretation is furthermore favoured as it encompasses an individual 
assessment of what is reasonable or unreasonable in the particular case and 
corresponds to the Constitutional Court’s approach in DPP v Minister of Justice and 
Constitutional Development,88 where the court held that “in every trial in which a 
child is to testify, the court will enquire into the desirability [reasonableness] of 
appointing an intermediary” and that in doing so the judicial officer is to consider 
whether on the evidence presented “viewed in the light of the objectives of the 
Constitution and the subsection, it is in the best interests of the child that an 
intermediary be appointed”.89 The court thus intertwines the test of undue mental 
stress or suffering with that of the best interests of the child. This approach was also 
                                            
86  Own emphasis added. 
87  Müller & Tait 1999 SACJ 57 at 61. 
88  2009 (2) SACR 130 (CC) at paras [114]-[115]. 
89  Paras [114]-[115]. 
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followed in Kerkhoff v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development,90 where 
Southwood J, after referring to DPP v Minister of Constitutional Development, added 
that “[i]t is clear that the enquiry has a narrow focus: to determine whether it is in the 
best interests of the child that an intermediary be appointed”.  
 
Despite these guidelines, the proper implementation of the section remains a 
challenge for judicial officers due to the vagueness and indeterminacy of the 
concepts of undue mental stress and suffering. Fortunately judicial precedent sheds 
some light on the factors that may be taken into account by the courts when 
exercising their discretion as to whether or not to appoint an intermediary. 
 
In S v Stefaans91 the Cape High Court regarded the following general principles as 
important: 
 
 Age – the younger the witness (and more emotionally immature) the more likely that 
the stress experienced will be undue.  
 Familiarity – where the witness is known to the accused and is nevertheless willing 
to testify the witness is less likely to be unduly stressed.92  
 
In S v Mathubula93 the court per Stafford J held that although the age of the 
complainant is important, it is only one of the factors that should be taken into 
account by the court. The learned judge pointed out that the court has to consider a 
                                            
90 2011 (2) SACR 109 (GNP) at para [7]. 
91  1999 (1) SACR 182 (C) at 188. 
92  This assumption has, however, been criticised as it is contrary to available research findings. 
See Schwikkard 1999 SACJ 260-261. See also S v Abrahams 2002 (1) SACR 116 (SCA) at 
125 where the court stated that a family victim may find it more difficult to testify because of 
conflicting feelings and loyalties. 
93  1996 (2) SACR 231 (T) at 234. 
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number of factors which may include the child’s intelligence, age, gender and 
personality, as well as the nature of the evidence.   
 
Apart from the two guiding principles set out by the court in DPP v Minister of Justice 
and Constitutional Development94 the court recognised that such an enquiry may 
include a wide range of factors such as the child’s personal situation, immediate 
needs, age, gender, disability, level of maturity, feelings and wishes, as well as a 
consideration of the nature of the offence and the nature of the evidence. 
 
These factors may assist presiding officers in their evaluation of section 170A(1) 
applications and are consequently of significant value. Nonetheless, a statutory 
section which sets out guidelines as to which factors a court should take into account 
in all criminal cases affecting children, when determining the concept of “undue 
mental stress or suffering”, would go a long way towards promoting the interests of 
justice in such cases.95  
 
The aforementioned dilemma of determining the meaning of the phrase “undue 
mental stress and suffering” brings to mind the “best interests of the child standard”, 
as this standard was similarly criticised for a long time for being vague and 
indeterminate.96 For years the best interests of the child standard had to be applied 
by the courts without recourse to a list of factors.97 Only with the enactment of the 
                                            
94  2009 (2) SACR 130 (CC) at paras [115] and [126]. These guiding principles are the objectives 
of the Constitution and in particular the best interests of the child principle as set out in section 
28(2) thereof; they are also the objectives of section 170A(1), namely to prevent the child from 
exposure to undue stress that may arise from giving evidence in court. 
95  Bekink 2014 CARSA 39 at 42. This would also be in line with the position in other foreign 
systems such as Scotland, the United Kingdom and New Zealand. For more on the position 
in foreign systems, refer to Bekink 2014 CARSA at 42-45. 
96  Bekink 2014 CARSA 39 at 42-45. 
97  Heaton “Some general remarks on the concept “best interests of the child” 1990 THRHR 53 
at 95; Clark “A golden thread? Some aspects on the application of the standard of the best 
interest of the child in South African law” 2000 Stell LR 3; Bekink & Bekink “Defining the 
standard of the best interest of the child: modern South African perspectives” 2004 De Jure 
21. 
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Children’s Act98 was a list of factors finally formalised.99 This development is 
believed to have significantly enhanced the position of children within the judiciary 
and would serve a similar purpose in terms of section 170A matters.  
When evaluating section 170A applications, cognisance should be taken of some 
reforms that have been introduced by the legislature in the Criminal Law (Sexual 
Offences and Related Matters) Amendment Act (“the Amendment Act”)100 as part 
of an effort to ameliorate the plight of child complainants in sexual cases. In this 
regard, special reference must be made to section 66(2)(a) of the Amendment 
Act, which provides as follows: 
 
The National Director of Public Prosecutions must, in consultation with the Minister 
and after consultation with the National Commissioner of the South African Police 
Services and Correctional Services and the Director-General: Health and Social 
Development, issue and publish in the Gazette directives regarding all matters 
which are reasonably necessary or expedient to be provided for and which are to 
be followed by all members of the prosecuting authority who are tasked with the 
institution and conducting of prosecutions in sexual offence cases, in order to 
achieve the objects of this Act as set out in section 2 and the Preamble, particularly 
those objects which have a bearing on complaints of such offences, including the 
following: 
(iii) the criteria to be used and circumstances in which the prosecution must request 
the court to consider appointing a competent person as an intermediary as provided 
for in section 170A of the Criminal Procedure Act, 1977, in respect of witnesses 
and, in particular, child complainants below the age of 16 years; 
 
                                            
98  Act 38 of 2005. 
99  See Children’s Act s 7(1). This section came into operation on 1 July 2007: GG 30030 of 29 
June 2007. See also para 2.3.2 of ch 4 above. 
100  Act 32 of 2007 (as amended by the Judicial Matters Second Amendment Act 43 of 2013). 
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In giving effect to the provisions of section 66(2)(a) of the Amendment Act the 
following directives with regard to the application of section 170A have been 
proposed and may soon be applicable:101 
 
1. The prosecutor must consider the application of this measure in all sexual offence 
matters involving complainants or witnesses under the biological or mental age of 
18 years, and should as a rule bring such application where the complainants or 
witnesses are under the biological or mental age of 14 years. 
2. If an application for a child complainant under the age of 14 years old is refused 
and the court fails to provide reasons as required in terms of the Act (s 170A(7) 
of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977), the prosecutor should remind the court 
to do so. 
3. The circumstances that should be considered when bringing an application in 
terms of s 170A include, but are not limited to - 
a) Where the witness is unwilling or unable to testify in the presence of the 
accused due to fear of the accused; 
b) Where the nature of the offence involved violence; 
c) Where the complainant is acquainted [with] or related to the accused; 
d) Where the courtroom environment intimidates the witness; 
e) Fear of being intimidated as a witness by the accused and or member of the 
public; 
f) Where the witness may be part of a witness protection programme in terms 
of the Witness Protection Act, 1988; 
g) The impact of the offence is so severe on the witness that he/she is unable 
to testify in open court; 
                                            
101   Directives issued in terms of section 66(2)(a) and (c) of the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences 
and Related Matters) Amendment Act, 2007 (Act 32 of 2007) 8 available at https:// 
www.npa.gov.za/sites/default/files/Library/Sexual%20Offences%20Directives%20tabled%20
in%20Parliament%2023%20September%202010%20final_0.pdf (accessed 30/04/2016). 
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h) That the quality of the testimony of the witness would be compromised should 
he/she testify in the presence of the accused; 
i) The mental age of the witness; and  
j) The youthfulness of the witness.  
 
It is submitted that the words in the proposed directives “but are not limited to” 
furthermore indicate that the list is not an inclusive one, but imply that other factors 
such as the feeling and wishes of the witness as well as the linguistic or cultural 
background of the witness may also be taken into consideration. The directives 
are welcomed as these guidelines may enhance the proper evaluation of the 
concept “undue metal stress and suffering” and may lead to more consistent and 
objective judgment.102 
 
The wording of section 66(2)(a) of the Amendment Act, “with the institution and 
conducting of prosecution in sexual offence cases in order to achieve the objects 
of this Act” suggests, however, that the criteria set out in the directives should only 
be considered when bringing an application in terms of section 170A in sexual 
offence cases and as such will not find application in other instances. This is 
regrettable as children may be equally traumatised when experiencing or 
witnessing other violent crimes (such as child abuse, assault or the witnessing of 
the assault or murder of a family member) that are not necessarily of a sexual 
character. One could possibly argue that the best interests of the child principle 
set out in section 28(2) of the Constitution may demand that judicial cognisance 
should be taken of the aforementioned directives, but here again the absence of 
clear guidelines could result in further uncertainty. Although the directives are 
welcomed as a positive first step in the right direction, serious consideration 
should be given by the legislature to extending the application thereof to other 
non-sexual cases.103   
                                            
102  Bekink 2014 CARSA 39 at 45. 
103  Bekink 2014 CARSA 39 at 46. 
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3.1.6 Reasons for refusal of the court to appoint an intermediary 
 
Section 170A(7) of the Act104 provides that a court must furnish reasons immediately 
upon refusal for refusing to appoint an intermediary where a child complainant is 
under the age of fourteen years. The High Court in S v Mokoena105 viewed the 
section as irrational and discriminatory and consequently unconstitutional in that it 
differentiates between children below the age of fourteen years and children above 
that age. Bertelsmann J pointed out as follows:  
 
It is a well-known fact that children develop mentally and physically at different rates 
of progress and that their cognitive abilities differ widely from individual to individual. 
Some 14-year-old victims may be much better equipped emotionally or mentally to 
deal with the horror of a sexual assault than some 17-year-old children in a 
comparable position.106  
 
[I]t is difficult to understand why the legislature should have decided to discriminate 
between children under the age of 14 and those above that age. [T]here is no 
apparent and rational basis for suggesting that the hurt, trauma and stress 
experienced by a 13- year-old who has to face an alleged attacker or rapist are in 
any way less than that suffered by the 17-year-old.107  
 
In addition the High Court found the section objectionable in that it does not cater 
for children who may not be victims (complainants), but have observed criminal 
conduct that has led to their being called as witnesses. Provisions of the Criminal 
                                            
104  Refer also to s 158(5) of the Criminal Procedure Act, which deals with a similar issue in that 
the court must provide reasons for refusing an application by the prosecutor for testimony to 
be given by means of closed circuit television or similar electronic media. 
105  2008 (2) SACR 216 (T) at paras [81]-[85]. 
106  Para [87]. 
107  Paras [121]-[122]. 
The intermediary system in South Africa 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
273 
Procedure Act that shield child victims must, according to the court, therefore be 
interpreted as though they relate to child witnesses as well.108  
 
In its evaluation of the constitutionality of the subsection the Constitutional Court in 
DPP v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development109 stated that to construe 
the subsection (as well as section 158(5)) as not requiring a court to furnish reasons 
for refusing the application in the case of children over the age of fourteen years, as 
the High Court did, renders this subsection inconsistent with the Constitution. Such 
a construction, the Constitutional Court held, ignores the principle of constitutional 
interpretation which requires courts, where possible, to construe the statute in a 
manner that promotes the Constitution and in particular the principles of 
accountability, responsiveness and openness. A construction that will bring the 
subsection within constitutional bounds must therefore be preferred to any other 
construction that would render the subsection unconstitutional.110  
 
As to whether this was possible in the current situation, the Constitutional Court held 
that the subsection was capable of being read in a manner that is consistent with 
the Constitution.111 Ngcobo J explained that section 170A(7) must be construed as 
requiring a court to give reasons whenever it refuses to allow the appointment of an 
intermediary in respect of children below the age of eighteen years. The mere fact 
that the subsection requires a court to give reasons in the case of a child 
complainant under the age of fourteen years does not exclude the need for reasons 
in respect of a child complainant over the age of fourteen years. The distinction 
drawn by the subsection does not lie between an obligation to give reasons and no 
obligation to give reasons but rather between an obligation to give reasons 
immediately upon refusal, where the child complainant is below fourteen years of 
age and an obligation to give reasons only at a later stage or at the end of the matter 
where the child complainant is fourteen years of age or older.112 While conceding 
                                            
108  Para [83]. 
109       2009 (2) SACR 130 (CC). 
110  Paras [156]-[158]. 
111  Para [159]. 
112  Para [160]. 
The intermediary system in South Africa 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
274 
that the selection of the age of fourteen years may possibly be perceived as 
arbitrary, the issue according to Ncgobo J is one of emphasis rather than one of 
exclusion. What this subsection emphasises is that the younger the child, the 
greater the need for protection. This distinction, according to the learned judge, is 
neither irrational nor unfair but merely serves to remind presiding officers of the 
greater vulnerability of young children. An intermediary can still be appointed for 
children who are fourteen years or older. For all of these reasons, the Constitutional 
Court concluded that section 170A(7) (as well as section 158(5)) in its current form 
was not unconstitutional.113 
 
Not surprisingly, the Constitutional Court’s viewpoint with regard to section 170A(7) 
has been the subject of criticism. Van der Merwe et al114 draw attention to the fact 
that the Constitutional Court’s interpretation may appear to some to be too 
strenuous an attempt to save legislation by attributing to the legislature an 
oversubtle design forged out of constitutional propriety. They correctly state that 
“one would be surprised to learn that the legislature was moved by such motives or 
even had in mind what was attributed to it in an attempt to keep its handiwork 
intact”.115 Matthias and Zaal116 find the Constitutional Court’s reasoning rather 
blurred. They point out that the court based its argument for retention on references 
to a distinction simply between “children” above and below the age of fourteen 
years, whereas section 170A(7), by referring to “complainant”, in fact denies the 
right of a category of children below the age of fourteen to immediate reasons for 
refusal of an intermediary. This, they highlight, considerably weakens the 
Constitutional Court’s rationale that the subsection passes constitutional muster 
because it encourages magistrates to view younger children as more vulnerable. 
Allowing some children the right to reasons immediately and others only later on in 
proceedings when they are very unlikely to be present is, according to the authors, 
discriminatory and in contravention of international standards such as the 2005 UN 
Guidelines on Justice Matters involving Child Victims and Witnesses of Crime. On 
                                            
113  Paras [161]-[162]. 
114  Van der Merwe et al Du Toit’s Commentary on the Criminal Procedure Act 22-109. 
115  Van der Merwe et al Du Toit’s Commentary on the Criminal Procedure Act 22-109. 
116  Matthias & Zaal 2011 International Journal of Children’s Rights 251 at 266. 
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the other hand, providing reasons immediately when the child is available to hear 
them would be in accordance with paragraphs 19(b) and 30(b) of the said 
Guidelines. They accordingly correctly emphasise that section 170A(7) falls short of 
international standards and Bertelsmann J was quite correct in his finding that it is 
highly discriminatory.117 
 
It is also puzzling that the Constitutional Court, in its judgment on the constitutionality 
of the discretion given to judicial officers by section 170A(1) on whether or not to 
appoint an intermediary, values individual justice as essential to the proper 
administration of justice,118 while following a non-individualised approach and 
finding no fault in making an arbitrary distinction between children below the age of 
fourteen and those above the age of fourteen. It is submitted that an individualised 
approach appropriately tailored to the needs of the individual case would surely take 
cognisance of the known fact that children develop mentally and physically at 
different rates and that their cognitive abilities differ widely from individual to 
individual, as so clearly pointed out by the High Court.119  
 
Prinsloo,120 with reference to Centre for Child Law v Minister of Justice and 
Others,121 emphasises that “[a] child’s interests are not capable of legislative 
determination by group” but that the children’s rights provision applies to each child 
in his or her individual circumstances. The aforementioned distinction between 
children older or younger than fourteen years of age is, according to the author, 
therefore contradictory to a just and child-centred or individualised approach. He 
points out that acknowledgement of children’s heightened vulnerability, relative lack 
of maturity and reduced capacity is fundamental to our notion of how a fair legal 
system ought to operate. In addition, he stresses that the children’s rights clause 
                                            
117  Matthias & Zaal 2011 International Journal of Children’s Rights 251 at 266. 
118  2009 (2) SACR 130 (CC) at para [120]. 
119  2008 (2) SACR 216 (T) at para [87]. 
120  Prinsloo “The constitutional right to protection of child victims and witnesses in the South 
African criminal justice system: Director of Public Prosecutions, Transvaal v Minister of Justice 
and Constitutional Development, and others” 2010 CARSA 1 at 9. 
121  2009 (2) SACR 477 (CC) at 478H. 
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applies to all children under the age of eighteen years. These rights do not apply 
indifferently to children by category, such as children below the age of fourteen, but 
equally to all children. Manipulation of the formal understanding of the age 
determination of a child, in other words a person younger than eighteen years, 
coinciding with diminished rights and protection, is thus unacceptable.122  
 
In addition it should be noted that both the Constitution and international child rights 
documents such as the CRC define a child as a person under the age of eighteen 
years.123 There are no “subclasses of children” in these documents. The viewpoint 
of the High Court in S v Mokoena124 is hence endorsed. It is therefore submitted that 
section 170A(7) should either be declared unconstitutional as recommended by the 
High Court125 or amended by the legislature to read as follows: 
 
The court shall provide reasons for refusing any application or request by the public 
prosecutor for the appointment of an intermediary in respect of each witness under 
the biological or mental age of 18 years immediately upon refusal and such reasons 
shall be entered into the record of the proceedings.  
 
3.1.7 Effect of the defence’s objection to the appointment of an intermediary 
 
In S v Stefaans126 the court in setting out certain guidelines for the appointment of 
an intermediary held that an application to invoke the section may be more readily 
granted where there is no objection to the appointment of an intermediary by the 
defence. The court further held that an unrepresented accused should be told of his 
right to oppose the application and if any doubt exists as to the accused’s 
                                            
122  Prinsloo 2010 CARSA 1 at 9 
123  S 28(3) of the Constitution and art 1 of the CRC. 
124  2008 (2) SACR 216 (T) at para [185]. 
125  Para [185]. 
126  1999 (1) SACR 182 (C). 
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understanding of the matter the application should be treated as if it were 
opposed.127  
 
In S v Booi128 however, the court disagreed with S v Stefaans on this point. The 
court correctly held that the attitude of the accused’s counsel is not decisive, but 
that the court is under a duty to establish for itself whether the requirements for the 
application of section 170A have been met.129 This is the case even if the accused 
is legally represented and there is no opposition to the application.130 The court 
furthermore pointed out that the fact that an application was not opposed, for 
instance, would not prevent counsel from making the point on appeal that the 
statutory requirements for appointing an intermediary had not been met if that was 
indeed the case.131 
 
In Kerkhoff v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development132 Southwood J 
points out that although an accused must have a right to be heard on the issue of 
the application for the appointment of an intermediary, no provision is made in the 
section for the accused to oppose the appointment of an intermediary. The learned 
judge emphasised that it is clear that the enquiry has a narrow focus: to determine 
whether it is in the best interests of the child that an intermediary be appointed. With 
reference to DPP v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development133 
Southwood J reiterated that the fairness of a trial stands to be enhanced by these 
procedures and should not be seen as a limitation on the rights to a fair trial, but as 
conducive to a trial that is fair to all.134 
 
                                            
127  At 183. 
128  2005 (1) SACR 599 (B). 
129  Paras [14]-[15]. 
130  Para [16]. 
131  Para [17]. 
132  2011 (2) SACR 109 (GP) at para [7]. 
133  2009 (2) SACR 130 (CC). 
134  2011 (2) SACR 109 (GNP) at para [6]. 
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The conclusions reached in both S v Booi135 and Kerkhoff v Minister of Justice and 
Constitutional Development136 are endorsed. It is accordingly submitted that 
although an accused may convey an “objection” to the appointment of an 
intermediary this is only one aspect that will be considered by the courts in their 
determination of whether an intermediary should be appointed. When the courts 
reach their final conclusion on the appointment of an intermediary the question 
remains whether the requirements of section 170A have been met.  
3.2 Appointment of a competent person as intermediary 
 
Once it has been established that the child witness would be exposed to undue 
mental stress or suffering if he or she testifies at such proceedings the court may, 
subject to subsection (4), appoint a competent person as an intermediary in order 
to enable the witness to give his or her evidence through that intermediary. The 
Criminal Procedure Act does not define the term “competent” other than to provide 
in section 170A(4)(a) that the Minister may by notice in the Government Gazette 
determine the persons or the category or class of persons who are competent to be 
appointed as intermediaries. The list of eligible people was set out in the 
Government Gazette,137 and has subsequently been amended on a number of 
occasions to extend eligibility.138 Seven categories of competent intermediaries 
have been identified; these include medical practitioners specialising in paediatrics 
or psychiatry, family counsellors, child care workers who have successfully 
completed a two-year course in child and youth care work and who have four years’ 
work experience in child care, social workers with at least two years’ work 
                                            
135  2005 (1) SACR 599 (B). 
136  2011 (2) SACR 109 (GP) at para [7]. 
137  GN R 1374 in GG 15024, 30/07/1993. 
138  Refer to fn 10 above. The National Intermediary Committee has drafted an amendment to 
Government Notice: Determination of Persons or Category or Class of Persons who are 
Appointed as Intermediaries in terms of Section 170A (4) of the Criminal Procedure Act, 1977 
to ensure an enlarged but competent category of persons who could provide these services. 
This Draft Amendment is currently being taken through the inter-sectoral adoption process, 
and will be submitted to the Minister for approval as soon as all the comments and inputs from 
the relevant stakeholders (including NGOs) have been received. Refer to the Department of 
Justice and Constitutional Development: Report on the Implementation of the Criminal Law 
Sexual Offences and Related Matters Amendment Act 32 of 2007: 01 April 2013 to 31 March 
2014 at para 3.8 available at http://www.justice.gov.za/vg/sxo/2013-2014-sxo-ProgressReport 
(accessed 25/04/2015). 
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experience, school teachers with at least four years’ work experience and who have 
not at any stage for any reason whatever been suspended or dismissed from service 
in teaching, as well as clinical, educational or counselling psychologists. In practice, 
intermediaries are, however, largely appointed from two of these categories, namely 
social workers and psychologists.139 
 
Neither the Criminal Procedure Act nor the Gazette prescribes any additional 
qualifications for a person to be appointed as an intermediary other than those 
attached to the specific category as set out in the Gazette.140 Furthermore, an 
intermediary is not required to undergo any special training before being appointed 
as an intermediary.141 A potential candidate will therefore be deemed competent in 
terms of section 170A(4)(a) if the person falls into one of the prescribed categories. 
It is, however, widely accepted that because of the functions he or she will have to 
perform an intermediary is generally expected to possess the following attributes or 
knowledge:142 
 
                                            
139  See for example S v Stefaans 1999 (1) SACR 182 (C); K v Regional Court Magistrate 1996 
(1) SACR 434 (E); S v Mathebela 1996 (2) SACR 231 (T); S v Mokoena 2008 (2) SACR 216 
(T); S v Peyani 2014 (2) SACR 127 (GP). See also Schwikkard et al Principles of Evidence 
18 11. 
140  For example, if a child care worker is appointed as an intermediary such a child care worker 
must in terms of the GG have successfully completed a two-year course in child and youth 
care approved by the National Association of Child Care Workers and must have two years’ 
experience in child care. Refer to fn 10 above for a discussion of the persons or different 
category or class of persons who are competent to be appointed as intermediaries.  
141  Müller & Tait 1999 THRHR 241 at 253. The Department of Justice and Constitutional 
Development has, however, delivered training in 2013 and 2014 to 11 intermediaries in the 
Free State and 9 intermediaries in Mpumalanga. Refer to The Department of Justice and 
Constitutional Development: Report on the Implementation of the Criminal Law Sexual 
Offences and Related Matters Amendment Act 32 of 2007: 01 April 2013 to 31 March 2014 at 
para 5.6 available at http://www.justice.gov.za/vg/sxo/2013-2014-sxo-ProgressReport 
(accessed 25/04/2015). 
142  Jonker & Swanzen “Intermediary services for child witnesses testifying in South African 
criminal courts” 2007 SUR International Journal of Human Rights 91 at 95; Müller & Tait 1999 
THRHR 241 at 253; Müller & Marowa-Wilkerson “An innovative approach to the use of 
intermediaries: lessons from Zimbabwe” 2011 CARSA 13 at 17; refer also to the proposed job 
description for court intermediaries attached to the thesis as Annexure A, graciously provided 
by Ms Kamogelo Lebuke-Wilderson, Director: Victim Support and Specialised Services. 
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 an understanding of the developmental stages through which children pass in order 
to deal appropriately with a child of a particular age; 
 knowledge of the critical framework of a child’s ability to understand language in 
order to communicate with a child of a particular age in a manner that the child will 
understand; 
 knowledge of children’s communication patterns and styles; 
 proficiency in local languages and language skills; 
 an understanding of social and cultural diversities; 
 a proven ability to relate to children and an ability to develop rapport in a short time; 
 sound interpretation skills; 
 an understanding of the psychological effects of testifying and incidental stress 
which the child is likely to experience, as well as the effects of abuse where the child 
witness is a victim of abuse; 
 knowledge of trauma; 
 knowledge of the legal framework, especially court proceedings, including an 
understanding of the features of a legal (forensic) interview as opposed to  a 
therapeutic interview; 
 knowledge of legal terms and terminology; 
 no previous convictions of a sexual offence involving children or convictions of child 
abuse; 
 the intermediary must not be the subject of a domestic violence protection order; 
 the intermediary must not have been the subject of disciplinary action  during the 
course of such a person’s career.  
 
In essence, an intermediary should be skilled at communicating with children and 
should also have some insight into the law. It is therefore surprising that the list of 
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competent persons does not include the profession of speech and language 
therapists. Communication is part of the core skills of a speech or language therapy 
professional and a speech or language therapist would be particularly suitable as 
an intermediary.143 The Department of Justice and Constitutional Development 
indicates144 that it has recently drafted an amendment to the Government Notice 
dealing with the determination of persons or categories or classes of persons who 
may be appointed as intermediaries in terms of section 170A(4) of the Criminal 
Procedure Act in order to ensure enlarged but competent categories of persons who 
could provide these services. It is hoped that this draft will include speech and 
language therapists in its list of persons who could provide these services.  
 
Müller and Tait145 point out that the persons who have currently been designated by 
the Minister as being capable of acting as intermediaries seem to have been chosen 
on the basis that they are people who regularly come into contact with children. They 
emphasise, however, that paediatricians, family counsellors, teachers and even 
some psychiatrists and psychologists are not trained to communicate with children 
unless they specialise in this field. A paediatrician, for example, is a medical doctor 
and is not qualified to interview children, and some social workers have no 
experience of working with children.146 An evaluation of the persons listed in the 
categories of persons eligible to perform intermediary functions also reveals a lack 
of familiarity with legal practices. This may consequently result in intermediary 
services being provided without the proper knowledge or skills. There is therefore a 
need to professionalise intermediaries by requiring them to possess a single 
accredited qualification that will equip them with the necessary skills to perform their 
functions.  
                                            
143  Countries such as England and Wales make extensive use of speech and language therapists 
as intermediaries. See Davies et al Questioning Child Witnesses: Exploring the Benefits and 
Risks of Intermediary Models (2011) 1 at 12. 
144  See the Department of Justice and Constitutional Development: Report on the Implementation 
of the Criminal Law Sexual Offences and Related Matters Amendment Act 32 of 2007: 01 
April 2013 to 31 March 2014 at para 3.8 available at http://www.justice.gov.za/vg/sxo/2013-
2014-sxo-ProgressReport (accessed 25/04/2015). 
145  1999 THRHR 241 at 254. 
146  Müller and Tait 1999 THRHR 241 at 254. 
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In realising this shortcoming or need the National Intermediary Committee (the 
Intermediary Committee)147 in the Department of Justice and Constitutional 
Development (the department) has been mandated by the department to establish 
a permanent structure for intermediaries within the department with a view to 
addressing all challenges relating to the execution of the functions of intermediaries. 
In this regard the Intermediary Committee has finalised an investigation into the 
viability of establishing permanent posts for intermediaries within the departmental 
structure and addressing all challenges relating to the execution of the functions of 
intermediaries. The findings of this investigation resulted in the development of a 
job description for intermediaries.148 In this regard the following areas of job 
knowledge, skills and personal attributes have been identified by the department as 
relevant: 149 
 
 Knowledge of legislation and regulations pertaining to the public service and 
administration, specifically the following: 
- Public Service Act and Regulations  
- Basic Conditions of Employment Act  
- Criminal Procedure Act, sections 170A, 158 and 153 
- Intermediary training manual 
- Intermediary Policies, Procedures and Norms and Standards 
- Children’s Act  
                                            
147  This Intermediary Committee is chaired by the Chief Directorate: Promotion of the Rights of 
Vulnerable Groups and draws national representation from the National Prosecuting Authority 
(NPA) and the Justice College, Human Resources Branch (represented by the Chief 
Directorate: Human Resources Organisational Design and Development and the Employee 
Health and Wellness Directorate. See the Department of Justice and Constitutional 
Development: Report on the Implementation of the Criminal Law Sexual Offences and Related 
Matters Amendment Act 32 of 2007: 01 April 2013 to 31 March 2014 at para 3.8 available at 
http://www.justice.gov.za/vg/sxo/2013-2014-sxo-ProgressReport (accessed 25/04/2015). 
148  Refer to the proposed job description for court intermediaries attached to the thesis as 
Annexure A as well as the proposed draft job description for regional intermediaries attached 
to the thesis as Annexure B, graciously provided by Ms Kamogelo Lebuke-Wilderson, Director: 
Victim Support and Specialised Services.  
149  Refer to the proposed job description for court intermediaries attached to the thesis as 
Annexure A as well as the proposed draft job description for regional intermediaries attached 
to the thesis as Annexure B, graciously provided by Ms Kamogelo Lebuke-Wilderson, Director: 
Victim Support and Specialised Services.  
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- Sexual Offences Act 
 Knowledge of trauma and developmental stages of witnesses; 
 Keeping abreast of new work-related developments; 
 Knowledge and understanding of human rights; 
 Knowledge of children’s and mentally disabled communication patterns and styles;  
 Knowledge of legal terms and terminology; 
 Knowledge of relevant prescripts, policies and practices;  
 Ability to apply technical/professional knowledge and skills; 
 Ability to communicate on a child’s level; 
 Ability to engage with all vulnerable witnesses; 
 Ability to co-operate well with supervisors, colleagues and other managers; 
 Ability to demonstrate a sound and healthy attitude when interacting with others; 
 Ability to provide containment skills when required during the intermediary session; 
 Ability to execute functions as instructed and within agreed time frames, including 
punctuality; 
 Administrative skills; 
 Communication skills; 
 Customer focus and responsiveness; 
 Excellent working relations; 
 Problem solving and decision making skills; 
 Computer literacy. 
 
The Intermediary Committee also recommended the progressive, permanent 
appointment of 185 court intermediaries, 21 area intermediaries and nine regional 
intermediaries. At the time of drafting this thesis the approval of this 
recommendation was pending at the Department of Public Service and 
Administration.150 
 
3.2.1 Implications of an incompetent intermediary 
                                            
150  The Department of Justice and Constitutional Development: Report on the Implementation of 
the Criminal Law Sexual Offences and Related Matters Amendment Act 32 of 2007: 01 April 
2013 to 31 March 2014 available at http://www.justice.gov.za/vg/sxo/2013-2014-sxo-
ProgressReport (accessed 25/04/2015) at para 3.8. Refer also to para 3.2.3 of ch 5 of this 
thesis for more on the concerns about the availability of competent intermediaries.  
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Section 170A(5)(a) provides that no oath or affirmation or admonition which has 
been administered through an intermediary shall be invalid151 and no evidence 
presented through an incompetent intermediary, appointed in good faith, will be 
inadmissible solely on the basis that the intermediary was incompetent to act as 
such. Instead, section 170A(5)(b) empowers the court to consider the effect of the 
incompetence of an intermediary on the validity of the oath, affirmation or 
admonition or the admissibility of that evidence given through that intermediary, as 
the case may be, with due regard to the three factors listed in section 170A(5)(b), 
namely: 
 
(i) the reason why the intermediary concerned was not qualified to be appointed as 
an intermediary, and the likelihood that the reason concerned will affect the reliability 
of the evidence so presented adversely; 
(ii) the mental stress or suffering which the witness, in respect of whom that 
intermediary was appointed, will be exposed to if that evidence is to be presented 
anew, whether by the witness in person or through another intermediary; and 
(iii) the likelihood that real and substantial justice will be impaired if that evidence is 
admitted. 
 
As can be noted from the three factors, the aim of section 170A(5)(b) is to balance 
the rights of the accused against the rights of the complainant in the overall interests 
of justice. The section therefore provides a safeguard against the failure of justice 
owing to technical non-compliance with the rules relating to the appointment of an 
intermediary.152 
 
                                            
151  The implication of an invalid oath, affirmation or admonition is that the witness’s evidence 
would be inadmissible. Refer to sections 162, 163 and 164 of the Act. 
152  Whitear-Nel 2006 SACJ 334 at 335. 
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In S v Booi153 the court pointed out that the said subsection only finds application 
where the intermediary has been appointed, but the appointment is invalid owing to 
the fact that the intermediary in question does not meet any of the requirements for 
competence or appointment set out by the Minister in the Gazettes referred to in 
section 170A(4)(a).154 
 
In S v SN155 the person used as an intermediary held a Bachelor of Social Science 
degree and was registered with the South African Council for Social Service 
Professions. She did not, however, have the two years’ work experience in social 
work required by paragraph (e)(i) of Government Notice R597 of 2 July 2001 nor did 
she have the qualification of a two-year course in Child and Youth Care approved 
by the National Association of Child Care Workers, as contemplated in paragraph 
(d) of the same Government Notice. The matter was accordingly referred to the High 
Court for special review, so that the court could determine and decide whether the 
use of the intermediary had or had not affected the conduct of the proceedings. The 
High Court held that the intermediary’s qualifications fell short of the said 
requirements as set out in the specific categories,156 but that in so far as the trial 
itself was concerned there had been no breakdown in communication, no irregularity 
or breach of procedure when the intermediary performed her duties. She had in fact 
successfully and completely breached the communication gap between the minor 
witnesses (including the complainant) and the officials in court.157 
 
With reference to section 170A(5)(a) the High Court made it clear that the lack of 
the intermediary’s qualifications did not per se invalidate the proceedings, but that 
a finding as to the validity of the oath administered or evidence admitted had to be 
made. The High Court concluded, however, that it was better for the court a quo to 
make a finding as to the admissibility of the evidence in the trial with due regard to 
the various factors involved as it was better placed than the reviewing court to do 
                                            
153  2005 (1) SACR 599 (B). 
154  Para [28]. 
155  2012 (2) SACR 317 (GNP). 
156  Para [12]. 
157  Para [27]. 
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so.158 The High Court held in addition that the enactment of section 170A(5) and (6)  
made it unnecessary in future to refer the issue of an intermediary who is unqualified 
in terms of section 170A of the Act for special review, as the trial court was 
empowered to deal with such situations whenever they arose.159 
 
3.2.2 Implications of an appointed but unavailable intermediary 
 
Section 170A(9) provides that in instances where an intermediary has been 
appointed by the court, but becomes unavailable to complete his or her duties (due 
to being absent for any reason, unable to act as an intermediary in the opinion of 
the court or dies) before the completion of the proceedings concerned, the court 
may take certain steps to ensure the continuation of the proceedings. The court 
may, in the interests of justice and after due consideration of any arguments put 
forward by the accused person and the prosecutor, either postpone the proceedings 
in order to obtain the intermediary’s presence, appoint another intermediary or 
revoke the intermediary’s appointment and direct that the proceedings continue in 
the absence of an intermediary. 
 
As can be noted from the listed alternatives, the purpose of section 170A(9) is to 
maintain a balance between the rights of the child witness and those of the accused 
in the overall interests of justice. The section thus ensures that justice will prevail 
despite the unavailability of an appointed intermediary.160  
 
It is important that a court should not hesitate to postpone proceedings to obtain the 
presence of an appointed but absent intermediary or to consider the appointment of 
an alternative intermediary. In Director of Public Prosecutions v Makhubela161 the 
                                            
158  Para [28]. 
159  Para [30]. 
160  Whitear-Nel 2006 SACJ 334 at 335. 
161  Unreported, GP case no A 91/2014 (06/08/2014) at para [15]. 
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High Court stated that it was obliged to consider or hear an application for a child 
witness to testify through an intermediary even though this might result in the further 
postponement of the proceedings.  
 
If the court directs or orders that the appointment of the intermediary be revoked 
and that the proceedings continue in the absence of an intermediary as provided for 
in section 170A(9)(iv), the court must immediately give reasons for such a decision 
or order, which reasons must be entered into the record of the proceedings. It is 
submitted that in view of the extra requirements set out in section 170A(9)(vi) the 
continuance of the proceedings in the absence of an intermediary should be seen 
by the court as a last resort. 
 
3.2.3 Concerns about the availability of competent intermediaries 
 
It goes without saying that the proper implementation of any intermediary system is 
dependent on the availability of competent intermediaries. In the event of an 
intermediary not being available a child witness faces the dilemma of the case being 
postponed in order to obtain the services of an intermediary or having to testify 
without the aid of an intermediary. An audit conducted by the National Prosecuting 
Authority in February 2005 on the functioning of the Sexual Offences Courts 
revealed that 91.6% of cases in Gauteng, 4.7% of cases in KwaZulu Natal and 2% 
of cases in the Eastern Cape were postponed as a result of the non-availability of 
intermediaries.162 A follow-up audit conducted by the office of the National 
Prosecuting Authority in November 2008 revealed that the unavailability of 
intermediaries resulted in 594 postponements in cases involving the rape of 
children.163  
                                            
162  Department of Justice and Constitutional Development Draft Discussion Document on 
Intermediaries (2008) 1 at 12. 
163  Department of Justice and Constitutional Development Report of the Director-General 
(October 2009) at para 3. 
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In S v Mokoena164 the High Court expressed its concern about the shortage of 
suitably qualified intermediaries and pointed out that this creates a serious obstacle 
to the realisation of the rights of child witnesses. In DPP v Minister of Justice and 
Constitutional Development165 the Constitutional Court reiterated this concern by 
stating that “the rights of child complainants in sexual offence cases are threatened 
by the non-availability of intermediaries and related child protection facilities” while 
the “subsections also contemplate that the state will commit the necessary 
resources in order to achieve the objects of the subsection consistently with s 28(2) 
of the Constitution and give effect to ss 170A(1) and 170A(3). The non-availability 
of these measures contemplated in the CPA is not only a breach of the relevant 
provisions of the CPA, but is indeed a breach of the Constitution.”166  
 
The Constitutional Court held, appropriately so, that these concerns required urgent 
attention. The Constitutional Court considered it appropriate to call for information 
as a first step in the court’s supervisory processes. The Director-General for the 
Department of Justice and Constitutional Development was therefore ordered to 
furnish the court with the following information:167 
 
(1) A list of regional courts indicating how many intermediaries each regional 
court requires to meet its needs and how many intermediaries each regional 
court has. 
(2)  If the regional courts do not have the number of intermediaries required to 
meet their needs, the steps which are being taken to ensure that each 
regional court has the number of intermediaries necessary to meet its needs. 
 
                                            
164  2008 (2) SACR 216 (T) at paras [165]-[168]. 
165  2009 (2) SACR 130 (CC) at paras [191]-[192]. 
166  Paras [202]-[203].  
167  Para [209]. 
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In his report168 the Director-General stated that despite the availability of a total of 
155 intermediaries a shortage of 150 intermediaries still prevailed. In order to meet 
this need the Department of Justice and Constitutional Development (the 
department) intended to phase in the appointment of more intermediaries so that by 
2011/2012 all of the regional courts in the nine regional divisions of the country 
would have at least one intermediary available to assist child witnesses.169  
 
However, the Director-General emphasised that the appointment of intermediaries 
had to be considered against the backdrop of the following factors, namely the dire 
shortage of social workers in the country as well as the fact that the available 
intermediaries are also required to serve the children’s courts. The department is of 
the view that social workers are ideally suited to undertake the tasks that are 
performed by intermediaries and has historically relied on the Department of Social 
Development to provide intermediaries. The Department of Social Development is, 
however, reluctant to fulfil this role, in view of the aforementioned shortage and their 
need to focus on their core functions. This exacerbated the situation and as a result 
the department was forced to make ad hoc appointments and also to rely on the 
Office of the Family Advocate as well as on NGOs to provide intermediaries.170 
 
The Director-General further indicated that in order to obviate the need to rely on ad 
hoc intermediaries the department has taken steps to ensure that all the existing 
intermediaries receive training. It has also consulted with the various sectors with a 
view to increasing the pool of persons from whom intermediaries may be appointed. 
Moreover, a data base of intermediaries is being distributed to the regional offices 
in order to have intermediaries available whenever such services are required.171  
                                            
168  Department of Justice and Constitutional Development Report of the Director-General (July 
2009) at paras 6 and 11. I would like to express my appreciation to the Department of Justice 
and Constitutional Development for providing me with a copy of the said report. 
169  Department of Justice and Constitutional Development Report of the Director-General 
(October 2009) at para 10. 
170  Department of Justice and Constitutional Development Report of the Director-General (July 
2009) at paras 9 and10. 
171  Department of Justice and Constitutional Development Report of the Director-General 
(October 2009) at paras 11 and 15. 
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It should be noted that the department has since, with the assistance of its 
Intermediary Committee, progressively appointed intermediaries at provincial and 
national levels. The progressive appointment of intermediaries at provincial and 
national levels at 31 March 2014 stood as follows:172 
 
Region 
 
2012/2013 2013/2014 
Contract 
appointments 
Ad hoc 
intermediaries 
DSD 
social 
workers 
Total 
Eastern Cape  15 19 1 6 26 
Free State 11 14 4 0  18  
Gauteng 13  16 33 15 64 
KZN 29 33 5 5 43 
Limpopo 16 19 0 2 21 
Mpumalanga 12 15 1 9 25 
Northern Cape  11 14 0 6 20 
North West 23 26 0 1 27 
Western Cape 26 29 4 2 35 
TOTALS 156 185 48 46 279 
                                            
172  The Department of Justice and Constitutional Development Report on the Implementation of 
the Criminal Law Sexual Offences and Related Matters Amendment Act 32 of 2007: 01 April 
2013 to 31 March 2014 available at http://www.justice.gov.za/vg/sxo/2013-2014-sxo-
ProgressReport at para 4.3.1 (accessed 25/04/2015). Note that the aforementioned report 
refers to three types or categories of appointments, namely contract appointments, ad hoc 
appointments and appointments of social workers in the employment of the Department of 
Social Development. 
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As indicated in the table above, Gauteng Province makes more use of ad hoc 
intermediaries than of those in contract employment. This is due to the fact that the 
Department of Social Development (DSD) and local NGOs complement the 
Gauteng regional courts as regards the services of intermediaries. Gauteng has the 
highest rate of sexual offences in the country and is therefore among the 
department’s priority focus areas. A situational analysis of the provision of 
intermediary services in the country conducted by the department during 2013/2014 
revealed a need for the appointment of more intermediaries in Gauteng. The 
department planned to address this matter in 2014/2015 by progressively converting 
the ad hoc posts into permanent intermediary posts.173 
 
An evaluation of the aforementioned steps taken by the department reveals a 
noteworthy improvement in the progressive realisation of intermediary services. It is 
nonetheless imperative that the department should continue to evaluate situational 
needs in order to address any shortages that may still prevail.  
 
3.3 Swearing in of an intermediary 
 
An aspect related to the appointment and function of an intermediary is the question 
whether intermediaries need to be sworn in by the court in order to be properly 
                                            
173  The Department of Justice and Constitutional Development: Report on the Implementation of 
the Criminal Law Sexual Offences and Related Matters Amendment Act 32 of 2007: 01 April 
2013 to 31 March 2014 available at http://www.justice.gov.za/vg/sxo/2013-2014-sxo-
ProgressReport at para 4.3.1. Note s 170A(4) of the Criminal Procedure Act. It is submitted 
that by referring to the remuneration of intermediaries that are not in the full-time employment 
of the State this section implies that an intermediary may either be appointed on an ad hoc 
basis or be in the full-time employment of the State. Also note that according to information 
graciously provided to the author of this thesis by Ms Kamogelo Lebuke-Wilkerson, Director: 
Victim Support and Specialised Services in an email dated 06/05/2016, intermediary posts 
were advertised between June and Dec 2015 and a total of 186 Court-Based Intermediaries 
and 9 Assistant Director Intermediaries (in a supervisory role) have been appointed.    
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appointed and, if not, whether non-compliance invalidates the child witness 
testimony.174 
A review of statutory law in this regard does not prove to be helpful in answering this 
question, as the Criminal Procedure Act itself does not contain any requirement or 
guidance as to whether an intermediary needs to be sworn in; neither the Uniform 
Rules of Court, the Magistrates’ Court Rules nor any other statute sets such 
requirements. No such rule could be found at common law.175  
 
The cases dealing with this aspect are furthermore not in agreement. In S v 
Motaung176 and S v Booi177 it was held that an intermediary performs the same 
function as that of an interpreter and, as such, the same rules of practice require 
that an oath or affirmation be administered to the intermediary in every matter of 
course, unless such intermediary is a full-time employee of the state and is generally 
sworn in. Both S v Motaung and S v Booi relied in turn on the case of S v Naidoo178 
in which it was held that testimony given in court through an unsworn interpreter is 
unsworn testimony and thus constitutes an irregularity.179 
 
In S v Booi180 two intermediaries were used to facilitate communication between the 
court, counsel and the two minor rape victims. It appeared that the two 
intermediaries were appointed but the record of the proceedings of the court a quo 
showed no indication thereof.181 On referral to the High Court, the court held that 
the intermediaries were not properly appointed in terms of section 170A and had not 
been sworn in.182 The High Court held that this failure to comply with the proper 
                                            
174  See eg S v Naidoo 1962 (2) SA 625 (A); K v Regional Court Magistrate 1996 (1) SACR 434 
(E); S v Booi 2005 (1) SACR 599 (B); S v Motaung 2007 (1) SACR 476 (SE); Whitear-Nel 
2006 SACJ 334; Bekink “Section 170A (1) of the Criminal Procedure Act of 1977: do 
intermediaries need to be sworn in or not? S v QN 2012 (1) SACR 380 (KZP)” 2013 THRHR 
285. 
175  Bekink 2013 THRHR 285 at 286. 
176  2007 (1) SACR 476 (SE) at para [7]. 
177  2005 (1) SACR 599 (B) at para [25]. 
178       1962 (2) SA 625 (A). 
179  Paras [16]-[17]. 
180        2005 (1) SACR 599 (B). 
181  Para [21]. 
182  Paras [21]-[23]. 
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appointment and swearing in of the intermediaries was a serious irregularity which 
could not be condoned as it resulted in a situation where the accused was not given 
a fair trial. The conviction was subsequently set aside. The accused was to be tried 
de novo.183 
In S v Motaung,184 a case concerning the rape of a thirteen-year-old girl, an 
intermediary was also utilised to facilitate communication between the parties. The 
intermediary was not sworn in.185 The High Court, as in S v Booi, held that the 
magistrate’s failure to swear in the intermediary was an irregularity. The court, 
however, applied a second leg to the “irregularity test”, namely whether this 
irregularity caused prejudice to the defendant resulting in a failure of justice. The 
court held that as the complainant had been sworn in and her words were audible 
to the court there was no evidence of any irregularity in the presentation of her 
evidence or its admissibility. The proceedings were therefore in accordance with 
justice despite the initial irregularity, and the conviction was confirmed.186  
 
In S v QN,187 a case concerning the rape of a five-year-old girl, an intermediary was 
similarly utilised to facilitate communication between the court, counsel and the 
victim.188 In the latter case the court per Gorven J took the view, however, that the 
decisions in both S v Booi and S v Motaung were based on an incorrect analogy 
between the role of an interpreter and that of an intermediary. He pointed out that 
the crucial role of an interpreter is to convey the evidence of the witness in a 
language intelligible to the court. The interpreter testifies about the content of the 
witness’s evidence and therefore has to be sworn in, in order for the witness’s 
testimony to be placed before the court.189 The spoken evidence of the witness is 
interpreted by the interpreter.190  
                                            
183  Paras [28]-[29]. 
184       2007 (1) SACR 476 (SE). 
185  Para [2]. 
186  Paras [9]-[11]. 
187       2012 (1) SACR 380 (KZP). 
188  Para [8]. 
189  Para [18]. 
190  Bekink 2013 THRHR 285 at 289. 
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The court then went on to analyse the precise role of an intermediary as introduced 
by section 170A of the Criminal Procedure Act. In this regard the court emphasised 
that although evidence is given through an intermediary, the general practice is that 
the witness gives his or her own answers to the court. If these answers are given in 
a language not understood by the court they are then interpreted by an interpreter. 
The learned judge pointed out that in his view this does not mean that the 
intermediary is “to convey what is said by the witness as was stated in Motaung”, 
but that “the purpose of this section is made by mediating the questions put and not 
the answers given”.191 The reason for this is that the witness will not be unduly upset 
if the answer is not conveyed through the intermediary, nor will the courts have 
difficulty in understanding its meaning.192  
 
It was moreover held by the court that the analogy between an interpreter and an 
intermediary breaks down further when the case is conducted in a language 
common to all participants (such as English). There is then no question of 
interpretation and once again the intermediary is not conveying the child’s evidence 
to the court, as does an interpreter. The analogy can only be valid if the intermediary 
is also fulfilling the role of an interpreter. The most fundamental difference between 
the two functionaries therefore lies in the fact that “the intermediary is not involved 
in conveying to the court what emerges from the mouth of the witness” as an 
interpreter does.193 
 
The court rightly held that, in the absence of a basis for assimilating the function of 
an intermediary to that of an interpreter, there is no foundation for a conclusion that 
the failure to swear in an intermediary amounts to an irregularity. The evidence so 
given is thus neither unsworn nor hearsay.194 This, the court pointed out, is lent 
greater force by the fact that the legislature did not see fit to include such a 
                                            
191  2012 (1) SACR 380 (KZP) at para [21]. 
192  Para [21]. 
193  Paras [22]-[23].  
194  Bekink 2013 THRHR 285 at 290.  
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requirement in the Criminal Procedure Act and “it seems clear from this that the 
legislature does not see the function of the two as comparable”.195 
 
The role of an intermediary should therefore not be equated with that of an 
interpreter. The role of an interpreter is clearly to testify about what constitutes the 
evidence of the witness and to do so in a language intelligible to the court, whereas 
the role of an intermediary is to act as a conduit and to convey the general purport 
of the question to the child witness.196 The child witness gives his or her own 
answers to the court. The intermediary does not interpret the evidence to the 
court.197 A more persuasive argument in support of the practice of administering an 
oath or affirmation to an intermediary can perhaps be found in the view of Jones J 
in S v Motaung,198 namely that the use of an intermediary makes inroads into the 
fundamental rule that the accused is entitled to be confronted by the accuser in open 
court and that the administration of an oath is one way of reducing this impact. 
However, it should be remembered that it is the role of the adjudicating officer who 
presides at the trial and controls the proceedings to ensure that the intermediary 
carries out his or her functions properly and without prejudice to the accused.199 If 
this role is fulfilled by the presiding officer, one might argue that the administering of 
an oath or affirmation, although a worthy practice, is superfluous.200 
 
In addition, although the practice that has developed in some courts of swearing 
intermediaries in may be commendable, a failure to do so should not result in an 
irregularity and a commencement of a trial de novo. Children are already exposed 
to considerable emotional distress and suffering when they have to testify at a trial. 
To expect them to go through the ordeal twice, because an intermediary has not 
been sworn in, is unacceptable and is clearly not in their best interests.201 
                                            
195  2012 (1) SACR 380 (KZP) at para [25]. 
196  Bekink 2013 THRHR 285 at 291. 
197  Bekink 2013 THRHR 285 at 291. 
198  2007 (1) SACR 476 (SE) at para [7]. 
199  K v Regional Court Magistrate 1996 (1) SACR 434 (E). 
200  Bekink 2013 THRHR 285 at 291. 
201  Bekink 2013 THRHR 285 at 291. 
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It is furthermore important to note that the purpose of section 170A(5) is to safeguard 
the oath, affirmation or admonition administered to a child witness through an 
incompetent (but appointed) intermediary. The taking of the oath or affirmation is 
not a prerequisite for the proper appointment of an intermediary in terms of the Act. 
If this is indeed a requirement of law, section 170A(5) needs to be amended. 
 
3.4 Functions of an intermediary 
 
In terms of section 170A(2)(a) of the Criminal Procedure Act no examination, cross-
examination or re-examination of any witness in respect of which the court has 
appointed an intermediary shall take place in any other manner than through an 
intermediary. This entails that the parties to the matter may at no stage question the 
witness directly. As an exception the court may question the witness without the 
intervention of an intermediary, for instance by putting the original question in a form 
it thinks fit.202 The court may not, however, cross-examine the witness as this could 
amount to the court’s descending into the arena.203 
 
Section 170A(2)(b) provides that the said intermediary may, unless the court directs 
otherwise, convey the general purport of any question to the child witness. The 
function of the intermediary is thus to convey the overall or broad content and 
meaning of the questions of the prosecution or the defence to the child in a manner 
which is understandable to the child so that the child is able to answer the questions 
properly. In so doing, the intermediary may ignore the ipsissima verba of the original 
question and may rephrase the question in terminology and imagery that the child 
is able to understand. This allows the intermediary, subject to the court’s final 
                                            
202  See s 170A(2)(a)(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act and Van der Merwe “Cross-examination of 
the (sexually abused) child witness in a constitutionalised adversarial trial system: is the South 
African intermediary the solution?” 1995 Obiter194 at 197. 
203  Van der Merwe 1995 Obiter 194 at 197. 
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control, to “block” any question put by the prosecutor or the defence in the sense 
that the intermediary may “relay” the question to the witness in a different form.204  
 
An intermediary may thus tone down questions which would otherwise have been 
aggressive and threatening if put directly to the child witness. The intermediary may 
also put the questions to the child witness in a language that is familiar to the child 
by using any slang, jargon or speech that is peculiar to the witness’s age or societal 
background. In carrying out this duty, the intermediary performs two very distinct 
functions, namely to protect the child witness against hostile cross-examination and 
to assist the child in understanding the questions posed to the child witness.205  
 
It is important that the intermediary, while fulfilling the aforementioned duties and 
rendering emotional support to the child during the trial, should still display the 
necessary impartiality and remain unbiased. The reason is that the intermediary 
neither represents the child nor acts on behalf of the prosecution against an 
accused. The intermediary should also assist the presiding officer who is not trained 
in interviewing children to understand and evaluate the child’s testimony.206 In this 
regard the intermediary also acts as a conduit.207 
 
In response to the argument that an intermediary’s right to convey the general 
purport of a question may result in an infringement of an accused’s right to cross-
examine the witness, the court in K v The Regional Court Magistrate208 held that the 
section, by providing for questions to be put to the witness in a form and manner 
which are appropriate to the witness’s mental and emotional development, is neither 
                                            
204  Van der Merwe 1995 Obiter 194 at 197. 
205  Müller & Tait 1999 THRHR 241 at 251. 
206  Wattney “Aspekte van getuienisaflegging deur kindergetuies deur bemiddeling van 
tussengangers” 1989 THRHR 423 at 433. 
207  S v Peyani 2014 (2) SACR 127 (GP) at para [3.4]. 
208  1996 (1) SACR 434 (E) at 445. 
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unconstitutional nor overshoots the mark.209 The court pointed out in addition that 
there are sound reasons for this practice, namely: 210 
 
[T]he conveyance of the general purport of the question might enable a child witness 
to participate properly in the system. Questions should always be put in a form 
understandable to the witness so that he or she may answer them properly. Where 
the witness is a child, there is the possibility that he may not fully comprehend or 
appreciate the content of the question formulated by counsel. The danger of this 
happening is more real in the case of a very young child. By conveying “the general 
purport” of the question, the intermediary is not permitted to alter the question. He 
must convey the content and meaning of what was asked in a language and form 
understandable to the witness. From the articles and the evidence put before us it is 
quite apparent that it is in the interest of justice for questions to be posed to children 
in a way that is appropriate to their development. This furthers the truth seeking 
function of the trial court without depriving the accused of his right to cross-examine. 
 
The court also emphasised, with reference to Du Toit et al,211 that as the legislature 
has sanctioned the use of intermediaries a certain latitude must be allowed in order 
to give effect to the subsection, while it must be remembered that the court still has 
the power to direct that the intermediary should convey the actual question and not 
merely its general purport. In the final analysis the presiding officer remains in 
control of the proceedings and has the task of seeing to it that an intermediary 
performs his or her duties properly and without prejudice to the accused.212 
 
Section 170A has, however, been criticised because the intermediary’s powers or 
functions are unnecessarily limited, in particular the function of assisting the child to 
                                            
209  At 445. 
210  At 446. 
211  Commentary on the Criminal Procedure Act 1995 at 21-33 (note that an updated edition of 
the Commentary on the Criminal Procedure Act is available). 
212  1996 (1) SACR 434 (E) at 445. 
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understand the questions.213 The court may, as was pointed out above, insist that 
the intermediary repeat the questions exactly as they were phrased. In addition the 
intermediary does not have the right to comment on a question, to object to certain 
questions being asked, to suggest that questions be put in a particular sequence, 
or to object to the way in which questions are phrased. The intermediary also does 
not have the right to give an opinion as to whether a child understands a question 
or not, or to alert a court if and when a child witness is fatigued or stressed and 
requires a recess.214 
 
In DPP v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development215 the Constitutional 
Court emphasised the following: 
 
[T]he manner in which the child is questioned is crucial to the enquiry. It is here 
where the role of an intermediary becomes vital. The intermediary will ensure that 
questions by the court to the child are conveyed in a manner that the child can 
comprehend and that the answers given by the child are conveyed in a manner that 
the court will understand. As pointed out earlier, questioning a child requires a 
special skill. Not many judicial offices have the skill …. This illustrates the importance 
of using intermediaries when young children are called upon to testify. They have 
particular skills in questioning and communicating with children. 
 
It is incomprehensible that although this crucial element, namely the questioning of 
child witnesses through intermediaries, is acknowledged by the Constitutional 
Court, the powers of intermediaries in performing this function are so limited. 
Available research on child development and language acquisition clearly illustrates 
                                            
213  Müller & Tait 1999 THRHR 241 at 251; Jonker & Swansen 2007 SUR International Journal of 
Human Rights 91 at 104.  
214  Müller & Tait 1999 THRHR 241 at 251; see also  S v Mokoena 2008 (2) SACR 216 (T) at  para 
[98] where the court held that it is clearly in the best interests of the child and of justice that a 
provision that the intermediary should have the power and duty to bring the circumstances to 
the court’s attention if and when a child witness was fatigued or stressed, did not understand 
a question or required a recess, be adopted as a practical measure to be included in the 
envisaged framework, in which the specific duties of intermediaries might be defined. 
215  2009 (2) SACR 130 (CC) at paras [167]-[168]. 
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that the way questions are put to a child witness, such as leading questions, 
repetitive questions, disclosures, use of negatives, multi-faceted questions or 
specialised language, plays a significant role in dis-enabling children to give 
accurate evidence.216 
Müller,217 for example, points out that the legal language used in courts includes 
vocabulary and technical terms specific to the discipline of law, such as “I put it to 
you that …”, “I believe you told us …”, and “Isn’t it a fact that …”, which do not fall 
within a child’s normal language repertoire. Children who are relatively 
inexperienced language users find this legal language difficult to comprehend. The 
legal language furthermore makes use of syntactical structures which include 
complex linguistic features and are riddled with the use of negative expressions 
such as “But if as you say it was dark outside, and if as you say there was no light 
on the room, it would not have been possible for you to see what you said you have 
seen, would it?” These syntactical and grammatical structures of the language used 
conform to a set of rules to which children do not have access and cause major 
difficulties for children.218 Moreover, the language used by cross-examiners is 
sometimes very compact and a lot of information is squeezed into one question. 
Plotnikoff and Woolfson219 give an example of such a question asked of a five-year-
old at a murder trial:  
 
Do you recall talking to her on the Sunday after they found – discovered – something 
had happened to Doug and asking her, “Do you know Mark?” and then saying, “That 
is who did it”? Do you remember telling her that?  
                                            
216  Müller “The effect of the accusatorial system on the child witness” 2000 CARSA 13 at 19-22; 
Louw “Die bevoegdheid van kinders as getuies: die rol van taalvaardigheid” 2005 CARSA 19 
at 19-22, Müller “Clinical and forensic interviews and the child witness” 2001 CARSA 8; Müller 
“The enigma of the child witness: a need for expert evidence.” 2003 CARSA 2 at 2-8; Ovens, 
Lambrechts & Prinsloo “Child witnesses in the criminal justice system” 2001 CARSA 25 at 28-
31; Plotnikoff & Woolfson “Measuring up? Evaluating implementation of Government 
commitments to young witnesses in criminal proceedings” 2009 available at 
www.Nspcc.org.uk/measuringup (accessed 05/06 2014); Hanna et al Child Witnesses in the 
New Zealand Criminal Courts: A Review of Practice and Implication Policy (2010) 1 at 53 -88. 
217  Müller 2000 CARSA 13 at 21. 
218  Müller 2000 CARSA 13 at 21. 
219  Plotnikoff & Woolfson “Measuring up? Evaluating implementation of government 
commitments to young witnesses in criminal proceedings” 2009 available at 
www.Nspcc.org.uk/measuringup (accessed 05/06 2014). 
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In order for the child to process the abovementioned question the child has to be 
able to remember the whole question.220 Clearly this line of questioning would prove 
difficult for a five-year-old, if not for an adult.   
 
In addition, research indicates that certain concepts pose difficulties for children, 
such as estimating time, duration, numbers, frequency, other people’s intentions, 
and distinguishing between prepositions such as before, after, above and below.221 
Louw,222 for example, points out that the fact that a young child can count from one 
to ten does not mean that the child understands the underlying concepts. The child’s 
understanding of the numerals may be mechanical in nature (such as the 
memorising of a poem).223 An eight-year-old child who has been abused numerous 
times may accordingly report that the abuse occurred on “fifty” occasions or even 
“two hundred” occasions. This may be due to the fact that numbers are not 
significant to children of this age and it would be wrong to consider this inaccuracy 
significant.224  
 
The effective questioning of child witnesses is a highly specialised task and requires 
an understanding by the interviewer of child development in three critical domains, 
namely linguistic, cognitive and emotional development, as well as an appreciation 
of the use of appropriate questions specific to a child’s level of development.225 
Linguistic development refers to a child’s acquisition of language skills. It involves 
the acquisition of an understanding of the meaning of words (semantics), 
grammatical and sentence structure (syntax) and the rules of language used in 
                                            
220  Plotnikoff & Woolfson “Measuring up? Evaluating implementation of government 
commitments to young witnesses in criminal proceedings” 2009 available at 
www.Nspcc.org.uk/measuringup (accessed 05/06 2014). 
221  Walker Handbook on Questioning Children: A Linguistic Perspective 2 ed (1999); Louw 2005 
CARSA 19 at 19-22. 
222  Louw 2005 CARSA 24. 
223  Louw 2005 CARSA 24. 
224  Schuman, Bala & Lee “Developmentally appropriate questions for child witnesses” 1999 
Queens LJ 251 at 274. 
225  Schuman, Bala & Lee 1999 Queens LJ 251-304. 
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different social contexts (pragmatics). Cognitive development refers to the 
acquisition of a child’s ability to perceive and store information, to form concepts 
and to reason about various ideas. This developmental stage plays a significant role 
in determining how well children will function as eyewitnesses in court, because the 
court often requires of children to make accurate observations, recollect past events, 
understand concepts such as time, size, numbers and frequency as well as handle 
abstractions and draw inferences. Emotional development refers to a child’s 
emotional maturity, including such issues as a child’s reactions to separation from 
parents and ability to deal with intimidation and frustration. A child’s emotional 
development accordingly also affects the child’s capacity to answer questions.226  
 
Schuman, Bala and Lee227 point out that when dealing with child witnesses it is 
useful to remember that there are essentially four periods of child development: 
infancy – from birth to approximately age two; early childhood – from about age 
three to age six; middle childhood – from about age seven to age ten; and 
adolescence – from about age eleven to about age eighteen. Child witnesses should 
be questioned according to their developmental levels.228 For example, when 
questioning pre-schoolers it is important to appreciate that there are many words 
and grammatical rules that they do not understand. They are not familiar with even 
the simplest legal terms, frequently confuse the meaning of prepositions, have 
difficulty with pronouns and may interpret words literally and very narrowly.229 They 
have difficulty accurately comparing quantities, cannot tell time and do not 
understand the concept of time measurement. They also have difficulty with logical 
or abstract reasoning and can only focus on one idea at a time.230  
                                            
226  Schuman, Bala & Lee 1999 Queens LJ 258. 
227  Schuman, Bala & Lee 1999 Queens LJ 258. They emphasise, however, that these age groups 
are only approximate because of individual differences. Children develop at different rates and 
do not move from one stage to another at a specific age. Furthermore, aspects such as 
gender, different cultural backgrounds, language spoken at home, home environments and 
qualities of education may affect how fast and in what manner a child develops. According to 
the authors it is therefore important that each child be considered individually to determine 
exactly what type of questions are appropriate to the child witness. 
228  Schumann, Bala & Lee 1999 Queens LJ 258. 
229  Schumann, Bala & Lee 1999 Queens LJ 261-263. 
230  Schumann, Bala & Lee 1999 Queens LJ 265-269. 
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In comparison children in the middle childhood category have a more sophisticated 
ability to use language and better reasoning skills than pre-schoolers. The language 
that children use during this period may even sound very much like that of adults. 
However, although their conversation may sound like that of an adult this should be 
regarded with caution, as children in this period of development may still have 
difficulty with negatives, the passive voice, more advanced verb tenses and complex 
sentences. During this stage children make substantial gains in cognitive 
development. They become aware of different perspectives and can recognise 
similarities and differences between groups of objects or events. However, they 
cannot apply logical processes to abstract ideas, cannot accurately estimate 
distances or sizes and also have trouble comparing periods of time.231  
 
As children continue to develop into adolescence their vocabulary continues to grow 
and they develop the ability to work out the meaning of a word from its context. 
However because of their lack of exposure to legal phrases these terms may still be 
misunderstood.232 In addition, adolescents still have difficulty with complex forms of 
negation that involve multiple negatives or phrases and will probably not fully 
understand the passive voice until the end of this stage. During adolescence 
children learn to think abstractly and may understand generalisation. This increases 
their ability to solve problems and allows them to think about hypothetical situations. 
This also allows them to speculate about the motives of other people.233 In late 
adolescence, children can accurately estimate times, distances and physical 
dimensions. Schulman, Bala and Lee point out, however, that it is important to 
consider adolescents’ emotional and social development as confusing or 
embarrassing questions may cause them to refuse to answer a question, may lead 
to an evasive or inaccurate answer or may even result in an emotional outburst.234 
 
                                            
231  Schumann, Bala & Lee 1999 Queens LJ 270-275. 
232  Schumann, Bala & Lee 1999 Queens LJ 276. 
233  Schumann, Bala & Lee 1999 Queens LJ 277. 
234  Schumann, Bala & Lee 1999 Queens LJ 277. 
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Schuman, Bala and Lee235 emphasise that these differences clearly illustrate that if 
a child is expected to answer a question that he or she does not understand because 
the question falls outside one of these developmental levels, the answer will 
probably be inaccurate. Children are also reluctant to acknowledge that they do not 
understand a question or to ask for clarification. Children often do not even 
appreciate that they have not understood the question and as a result may give 
incorrect answers.236 Zajac237 points out that children will even attempt to answer 
questions that do not make sense, for example “Where do circles live?”  
 
Müller238 illustrates some of the serious misunderstandings by child witnesses in the 
courtroom, as well as the direct effect on the outcome of the cases discussed by 
her. She argues that these misunderstandings occur as a result of a lack of 
understanding of child development, child language and children’s beliefs, 
perceptions and fears. She explains for example that children below the age of ten 
years tend to fuse separate events into a single event. This creates problems in 
circumstances where a child has been abused or molested more than once. A child 
may testify to one event and only through further questioning will it appear that the 
incidents did not happen at the same time or on the same occasion.239 Children 
under the age of ten years also find it difficult to handle abstract and hypothetical 
concepts, which means that they have trouble in describing why they behaved in a 
certain way, or why they experienced specific emotions, or what they thought.240 
She points out that by asking children questions they are developmentally unable to 
answer their credibility in the eyes of the court is compromised.241 She also 
highlights that adults assume that children use language in the same way adults do 
and then tend to interpret the child’s communication as they would that of an adult. 
For example, a common error found in children’s communication is what is referred 
                                            
235  Schumann, Bala & Lee 1999 Queens LJ 255. 
236  Saywitz “Improving children’s testimony: the question, the answer and the environment” in 
Zaragosa et al (eds) Memory and Testimony in the Child Witness (1995) 113 at 124. 
237  Zajac “Investigative interviewing in the courtroom: child witnesses under examination” in Bull, 
Valentine & Williamson Handbook of Psychology of Investigative Interviewing: Current 
Developments and Future Directions (2009) 161 at 164. 
238  Müller 2003 CARSA 2 at 2-8. 
239  Müller 2003 CARSA 2 at 4. 
240  Müller 2003 CARSA 2 at 4. 
241  Müller 2003 CARSA 2 at 4. 
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to as under-extension. Under-extension takes place when a child attributes to a 
word only part of the meaning attributed by adults. A child may for instance deny 
that she was wearing any clothing, only to admit later that she was wearing a 
costume. To the child this does not constitute a contradiction, as a costume is not 
considered to be clothing. This is further exacerbated by the specialised language 
employed in the courtroom.242 She concludes that in order to elicit accurate 
evidence from children and to address the serious misunderstanding of children in 
the courtroom, it is imperative that developmentally appropriate interviewing 
techniques are used and that the questioning of child witnesses is conducted by 
professionals who are experienced and skilled in the area.243 It is submitted that 
skilled intermediaries, knowledgeable in child linguistics, behaviour and 
development, can be utilised to perform this function.  
  
The above difficulties that children experience in being understood and expressing 
themselves begs the question why intermediaries are not afforded more 
comprehensive powers. Conceivably, the limited role of intermediaries can be 
attributed to two factors – the incorrect perception that an intermediary is nothing 
more than a special kind of interpreter as well as the specific intermediary model 
used in South Africa.  
  
In S v Booi244 and S v Motaung245 it was held that an intermediary performs functions 
similar to those of an interpreter.246 In S v QN,247 however, the court per Gorven J 
took the view that the decisions in both S v Booi and S v Motaung were based on 
an incorrect analogy between the role of an interpreter and that of an intermediary. 
The court pointed out that the vital role of an interpreter is to convey the evidence 
of the witness in a language intelligible to the court. The interpreter testifies as to 
                                            
242  Müller 2003 CARSA 2 at 4. 
243  Müller 2001 Crime Research in South Africa 1 at 6. 
244  2005 (1) SACR 599 (B) at para [25]. 
245  2007 (1) SACR 476 (SE) at para [7]; see also K v Regional Court Magistrate 1996 (1) SACR 
434 (E) at 444. 
246  Refer to para 3.3 above for a discussion of S v Booi  2005 (1) SACR 599 (B) & S v Motaung 
2007 (1) SACR 476 (SE). 
247  2012 (1) SACR 380 (KPZ) at paras [16]-[17]. 
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the contents of the witness’s evidence. This is also the reason why an interpreter 
has to be sworn in, in order for the witness’s testimony to be placed before the 
court.248 The spoken evidence of the witness is interpreted by the interpreter.249   
 
In analysing the precise role of an intermediary in terms of the Criminal Procedure 
Act, the court emphasised that although evidence is given through an intermediary, 
the general practice is that the witness should give his or her own answers to the 
court. These are then interpreted by an interpreter if given in a language not 
understood by the court. The learned judge pointed out that in his view this does not 
mean that the intermediary is “to convey what is said by the witness as was stated 
in Motaung”, but that “the purpose of this section is made by mediating the questions 
put and not the answers given”.250  
  
The court held moreover that the analogy between an interpreter and an 
intermediary breaks down further when the case is conducted in a language 
common to all participants (such as English). There is then no question of 
interpretation and the intermediary is not transmitting the child’s evidence to the 
court as an interpreter does. The analogy can only be valid if the intermediary is 
also fulfilling the role of an interpreter. The most fundamental difference between 
the two functionaries therefore continues to be that “the intermediary is not involved 
in conveying to the court what emerges from the mouth of the witness” as an 
interpreter does.251 
 
The court correctly concluded that the role of an intermediary should therefore not 
be equated with that of an interpreter. The role of an interpreter is clearly to testify 
about the content of the evidence of the witness and to do so in a language 
intelligible to the court, whereas the role of an intermediary is to convey the question 
                                            
248  Para [18]. 
249  Bekink 2013 THRHR 285 at 289. 
250  2012 (1) SACR 380 (KPZ) at para [21]. Own emphasis added. Refer also to para 3.3 above. 
251  Paras [22]-[23].  
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to the child witness. The child witness gives his or her own answers to the court. 
The intermediary does not interpret the evidence for the court.252  
 
It is submitted that the decision and conclusions in S v QN are correct and should 
be supported. An intermediary clearly fulfils a role distinct from that of an official 
court interpreter. The Constitutional Court in DPP v Minister of Justice and 
Constitutional Development253 pointed out, and correctly so, that an intermediary 
has a unique role to fulfil, namely to assist the child witness who would be exposed 
to undue mental stress and suffering when having to testify. The intermediary is also 
a person specifically skilled in dealing with children and communicating with a child 
in a manner that is neither intimidating nor embarrassing to the child. This noticeably 
distinguishes an intermediary from a court interpreter. 
 
Secondly, the limited role of intermediaries can possibly be attributed to the specific 
intermediary model used in South Africa. In general, three intermediary models can 
be distinguished. These include the full intermediary model, the question-by-
question model, and the topic-by-topic model.254 In the full intermediary model, the 
intermediary is briefed by counsel before trial on which aspects of the child’s 
testimony they want explored and tested. At trial, the intermediary takes 
responsibility for putting the requested exploration and testing into question form, 
including determining how questions are phrased and the order in which they are 
put.255 In the question-by-question model, counsel determines the questions and 
poses them one at a time to the intermediary, who translates the question into 
developmentally appropriate language for the child.256 In the topic-by-topic model, 
                                            
252  Bekink 2013 THRHR 285 at 291. See also S v Peyani 2014 (2) SACR 127 (GP) at 131 where 
the court held that “the intermediaries were acting as conduits and not as interpreters”. 
253  2009 (2) SACR 130 (CC) at para [96]. 
254  See Davies et al Questioning Child Witnesses: Exploring the Benefits and Risks of 
Intermediary Models (2011) Institute of Public Policy, AUT University 1 at 6. 
255  Refer for example to the system used in Israel. This model offers the most comprehensive 
protection to the child witness but it is criticised for its failure to provide the defendant with an 
adequate opportunity to test the child’s evidence. See Henderson “Alternative routes: other 
accusatorial jurisdictions on the slow road to best evidence” in Spencer & Lamb Children and 
Cross-examination: Time to Change the Rules? (2012) 43 at 60-64. 
256  Examples of countries utilising this system include South Africa, England and Wales. Refer to 
Henderson “Innovative practices in other jurisdictions” in Hanna et al  Child Witnesses in the 
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the intermediary is briefed as in the “full intermediary model”, but counsel breaks the 
questions up into topics, based on the areas of challenge or exploration. At trial 
there is an interactive process whereby the intermediary questions the child on the 
first topic, then refers back to the lawyer for further instructions (eg to put a question 
differently or to pick up on any inconsistency) before moving on to the next topic.257 
 
It is submitted that the model currently utilised in South Africa can be equated to the 
question-by-question model.258 Counsel determines the questions and puts them 
one at a time to the intermediary, who “translates” the question into developmentally 
appropriate language for the child. This system is limited, however, as was pointed 
out above, in that the intermediary does not have the right to point out that the 
questions posed (such as repetitive questioning, sudden shifts between subjects, 
multifaceted questions or closed questions) are likely to produce unreliable answers, 
or to suggest that alternative questioning styles should be used.259  
 
This shortcoming can be addressed to some extent by formulating and 
implementing general rules of practice and by setting specific “ground rules” for the 
questioning of children before the hearing.260 Examples of such rules include the 
following:261 
                                            
New Zealand Criminal Courts: A  Review of Practice and Implications for Policy (2010) 1 at 
117-142.  
257  An example of a country utilising this system is Norway. Refer to Henderson in Hanna et al 
Child Witnesses in the New Zealand Criminal Courts: A Review of Practice and Implications 
for Policy 1 at 159-161.  
258  See Davies et al Questioning Child Witnesses: Exploring the Benefits and Risks of 
Intermediary Models 5-6. 
259  Müller & Hollely Introducing the Child Witness (2009) 1 at 43.  
260  Müller 1999 THRHR 252 at 254. In England, for example, an intermediary typically makes an 
assessment of a child witness’s communication competencies before the trial, gives advice 
on the ground rules for questioning the child, then monitors counsel’s performance at trial, 
alerting the judge when a question is inappropriate. Ground rules hearings have recently 
became a requirement in intermediary cases in England. See England’s Criminal Procedure 
Rule 3.9(7), 2015 available at https://www.justice.gov.uk/courts/procedure-
rules/criminal/docs/crim-proc-rules-2014-part-03.pdf (accessed 10/05/2015). In terms of the 
Criminal Procedure Rule 3.9(7) 2015, the agenda for the hearing includes directions about 
inter alia the duration of questioning, the manner of questioning, the use of communication 
aids, and what questions may or may not be asked. 
261  Spencer “Conclusions” in Spencer & Lamb Children and Cross-Examination: Time to Change 
the Rules? (2012) at 187-188. See also Plotnikoff & Woolfson Intermediaries in the Criminal 
The intermediary system in South Africa 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
309 
 
 adapt questions to the specific child’s developmental stage; 
 ask short, simple questions – one idea at a time; 
 follow a logical sequence; 
 speak slowly, pause and allow the child enough time to process each question – 
for younger children almost twice as much time should be allowed; 
 give the child ample opportunity to answer; 
 avoid question types which may produce unreliable answers; (Tag questions, for 
example, “he didn’t touch you, did he?” are particularly complex; rather put the 
question more directly, for example: “Did John touch you?” or “How did John touch 
you?” Use names and not pronouns.) 
 avoid allegations of misconduct without reasonable grounds (being accused of lying, 
particularly if the accusation is repeated, may cause a child to give inaccurate 
answers or may result in the child’s agreeing simply to bring the questions to an 
end); 
 do not ask children to supply personal information such as their address unless for 
a specific reason; 
 do not ask children to demonstrate intimate touching on their body, use a body 
diagram or anatomic dolls. 
It is essential that this should be complemented by an assessment of a child 
witness’s communication competencies before the trial, as this will alert the court to 
unsuspected communication issues and affect the ground rules applied.262 An 
                                            
Justice System: Improving Communication for Vulnerable Witnesses and Defendants (2015) 
109-127. 
262  Such an assessment should cover the witness’s intelligence, developmental age, language 
competence, attention span, understanding of time, relevant medical conditions as well as any 
need for communication aids. Henderson reports that one senior judge described how an 
intermediary recommended that a young autistic man be allowed a special toy while testifying. 
With the toy the man was able to testify very competently. The judge stated that without the 
prior assessment and subsequent explanation in the report he would never have allowed the 
toy and the man would probably have been unable to testify. Other judges reportedly stated 
that the prior assessment validated their prior understandings and provided authority for 
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intermediary could then alert the presiding officer if a question is inappropriate 
and/or does not adhere to the rules of practice and/or the ground rules set. This is, 
however, only a partial solution as available research suggests that intermediaries 
find it difficult to interrupt proceedings, especially where the questioning is becoming 
faster and more probing.263.264 
 
This begs the question whether more could be done to reform the current South 
African system or whether the answer lies in following a different system or model. 
In order to do so we need to examine our assumptions about the need for our current 
procedures and decide what is in fact fundamental. Cross-examination is 
considered by many to be the essence of the accusatorial trial. The fundamental 
purpose of cross-examination is to test the witness’s evidence.265 However, it might 
be possible to envisage a process or system for testing child witnesses within an 
accusatorial trial that need not rely upon counsel to act as the direct examiner of the 
questions. What is essential to a fair trial is that the evidence of a witness should be 
fairly and thoroughly tested.266 If the purpose of cross-examination can be achieved 
by a better method, there is nothing to suggest that cross-examination might not be 
replaced.267 
 
In its Draft Discussion Document on Intermediaries of 2008268 the Department of 
Justice and Constitutional Development (the department) inter alia evaluated the 
functions of an intermediary. The department stated that the core function of an 
intermediary was to convey the general meaning of questions to the child witness in 
appropriate language. Unfortunately the department did not define the boundaries 
                                            
interventions. See Henderson in Hanna et al Child Witnesses in the New Zealand Criminal 
Courts: A Review of Practice and Implications for Policy 134. 
263  Henderson in Spencer & Lamb Children and Cross-examination: Time to Change the Rules? 
43 at 72. 
264  Henderson in Spencer & Lamb Children and Cross-examination: Time to Change the Rules? 
43 at 72. 
265  Refer to para 2.5 of ch 3 of this thesis. 
266  Henderson in Spencer & Lamb Children and Cross-examination: Time to Change the Rules? 
73. 
267  See Henderson in Hanna et al Child Witnesses in the New Zealand Criminal Courts: A Review 
of Practice and Implications for Policy (2010) 190. 
268  At 21-25. 
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of this core function but it did express the view that the functions of an intermediary 
should be broadened to include other duties that would assist the child and his or 
her family with the court process. According to the department these functions could 
be extended to include the following duties:  
 
(a) serve as frontline person - provide the interface between the child and the court 
process; 
(b) assess the developmental levels of the child; 
(c) provide information – for example, regarding postponements or court procedures to 
the child; 
(d) court preparation – provide the child with knowledge of the process as well as the 
skills to cope with the court process; 
(e) aftercare referral – ensure that the child receives counselling when necessary; 
(f) conduct workshops – to provide parents and caregivers with knowledge and skills 
on how to deal with children who have been abused; 
(g) administrative duties – such as obtaining witness fees and compiling statistics on 
children testifying in court. 
 
These duties have been included in the proposed Draft Job Description for Court 
Intermediaries,269 drafted by the department, which states as follows:  
  
1. Provide intermediary services for vulnerable witnesses, where an application is 
granted in court 
 Inform the court at all times about changes/observations regarding the witness’s 
physical, emotional and mental [behaviour]. Provide emotional and 
                                            
269  Refer to the proposed job description for court intermediaries attached to the study as 
Annexure A, graciously provided to the author hereof on 03/30/2015 by Ms Kamogelo Lebuke-
Wilderson, Director: Victim Support and Specialised Services. 
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psychological support to child witnesses before, during and after testimony. 
 Avail and maintain intermediary tools (i.e. the sets of anatomical dolls, 
intermediary toolkits, first aid crayons and pencil, black paper for drawing, plastic 
glass and jug of good quality and tissues); that might assist a witness to the 
court. 
 Orientate the child witness with regard to court processes, roles and procedures 
as applicable to intermediary duties. 
 Participate in community outreach activities. 
 Recommend referral of child witnesses for [counseling] when necessary.  
2. Provide specialized child language services 
 Make proper arrangements with qualified individuals in cases where witnesses 
have a language dialect and/or communication need that the Intermediary 
cannot assist with. 
 Convey the general purport of questions to the witness in age appropriate 
language. 
 Orientate the child witness with regard to court processes, roles and procedures 
that are applied to intermediary duties. 
 
3. Maintain intermediary room 
 Maintain the condition of equipment (CCTV camera) and report faults where 
necessary. 
 Monitor cleanliness of the intermediary room. 
 Monitor audibility of the system on both sides and report faults to the court. 
4. Render administration support services in courts 
 Complete and maintain official registers and intermediary information and 
statistical files. 
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 Compile monthly intermediary reports for submission to the direct supervisor.  
 Liaise with Court Clerk (stenographer) with regard to arrangements with qualified 
individual to meet the needs of the said witness. 
 Assist with case flow management functions and liaise with judicial officers when 
necessary. 
 
The formulation of a job description for intermediaries is welcomed as it not only 
extends intermediaries’ duties but also outlines their duties more clearly. Aspects 
such as the provision of emotional and psychological support to child witnesses 
before, during and after testimony is valued as this will lessen the emotional trauma 
of the whole process for the child. This also addresses uncertainty regarding 
whether the intermediary should be allowed to meet the child before the trial in order 
to give the child the opportunity to become familiar with the intermediary, thereby 
gaining the child’s confidence and putting the child at ease. The orientation of the 
child witness with regard to the court processes, roles and procedures will ensure 
that the child is not confronted with an alien environment when required to testify 
and will reduce feelings of stress or intimidation.270 The recommended referral of 
child witnesses for counselling when necessary is also welcomed as this will ensure 
that the child is not abandoned by the criminal justice process once the child has 
testified. The making of proper arrangements with qualified individuals in cases 
where witnesses have a language dialect and/or communication need that the 
intermediary cannot assist with presupposes a pre-trial assessment of children’s 
developmental competencies. It would, however, enhance the system if the pre-
assessment of children’s developmental competencies is set out as a specific duty. 
This is important because, as was emphasised above, a child’s developmental 
competencies affect the child’s capacity to answer questions. Section 170A in its 
current form only requires that an assessment of whether a child will be exposed to 
undue mental stress or suffering has to be made before the section finds 
                                            
270  This will help to clear up some of the confusion about what the role of an intermediary 
encompasses. See for example Müller 1999 THRHR 241 at 254 where these aspects were 
specifically questioned. 
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application.271 Although it may possibly be assumed that the last-mentioned 
assessment will include an assessment of a child’s developmental competencies, 
the setting of such a duty will ensure that no uncertainty exists in this regard. The 
completion and maintenance of official registers pertaining to intermediary 
information and statistical data are also hailed as a welcome improvement as this 
will enable on-going evaluation of current systems. 
 
3.5 Intermediary facilities 
 
Section 170A(3) of the Criminal Procedure Act provides that if a court appoints an 
intermediary in terms of section 170A(1), the court may direct that the witness 
concerned shall give his or her evidence at any place:272 
 
 (a) which is informally arranged to set that witness at ease; 
 (b) which is so situated that any person whose presence may upset that witness, 
is outside the sight and hearing of that witness; and 
(c) which enables the court and any person whose presence is necessary at the 
relevant proceedings to see and hear, either directly or through the medium 
of any electronic or other devices, that intermediary as well as that witness 
during his or her testimony. 
 
Once an intermediary has been appointed, the court has a discretion to make a 
further order entitling the child to give evidence in a place other than the courtroom, 
through the medium of any electronic or other device. Müller and Tait273 point out 
that the first discretion of the court, namely whether to appoint an intermediary or 
not, does not appear to make sense unless the second discretion is also exercised. 
                                            
271  Refer to para 3.1.5 above. 
272       Own emphasis added. 
273  Müller and Tait 1999 SACJ 57 at 59. 
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They emphasise that if the child is not allowed to testify outside the courtroom away 
from the presence of the accused the child will be exposed to the factors that cause 
emotional distress and suffering. They suggest that the discretion to make use of a 
separate room be removed completely and that the use of this facility should be 
available to all children.274 
 
The Constitutional Court in DPP v Minister of Justice and Constitutional 
Development275 emphasised that section 170A(1) must be understood and 
construed in the context of section 170A as a whole, and in particular sections 
170A(2) and 170A(3). The Constitutional Court furthermore held that section 
170A(1) read with section 170A(3) recognises that children are often intimidated by 
the court environment, especially if they have to confront the alleged abuser. 
According to the court the sections “therefore contemplate that a child who testifies 
through an intermediary will not ordinarily testify in the presence of the accused but 
will testify from a separate room ‘which is informally arranged to set [the child 
complainant] at ease’.”276 In addition section 170A(3) should be interpreted in a 
manner consistent with the objectives of section 28(2) of the Constitution and article 
3 of the CRC to ensure that a child’s best interests are of paramount importance in 
all matters concerning the child. The Constitutional Court state277 that this conforms 
to the Guidelines of the CRC, which proclaim the right of child complainants to be 
protected from hardship and trauma that may result from their participation in the 
criminal justice system; provide that the protection of child complainants includes 
modified court environments; allow the child complainant to testify out of sight of the 
alleged perpetrator; and envisage testifying with the assistance of a professional 
such as an intermediary. The prospect of the court’s appointing an intermediary and 
not also exercising its discretion in favour of allowing the child to testify from a 
separate room, if available, is accordingly questionable. 
 
                                            
274  Müller and Tait 1999 THRHR 241 at 257. 
275  2009 (2) SACR 130 (CC) at para [86]. 
276  Para [97]. 
277  Para [98]. 
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Müller and Tait278 point out in addition that it is easy to envisage a situation where 
the appointment of an intermediary may not be necessary, but where it is essential 
that the child testifies outside the court and outside the presence of the accused. 
Melunsky J in K v Regional Court Magistrate279 referred to this incongruity as 
follows: 
 
It should be observed that a court may not direct, in terms of ss (3), that a witness 
shall give evidence in a separate room unless it makes a provision [for] appointing 
an intermediary in terms of ss (1). The effect is that the witness who reasonably 
needs to give evidence in a separate room will also have to be examined and cross-
examined through an intermediary although he may not be exposed to undue mental 
stress and suffering if he testifies without the intermediary’s assistance. 
 
Müller and Tait280 accordingly correctly call for an amendment of the section so that 
a child’s evidence can be given from outside the courtroom without the use of an 
intermediary where the latter is not required.  
 
In terms of the subsection the room may be adjacent to the courtroom, in any other 
room in the court building or in another suitable place. It should be noted that by the 
use of the words “any place … to set that witness at ease” the legislature makes 
allowances for a child to testify in a place removed from the courtroom or even the 
court building. Müller and Tait281 indicate that the subsection has in fact been 
interpreted so widely that in 1995 a young child in East London gave evidence from 
home, which evidence was relayed to the court by means of a live video link.  
 
                                            
278  Müller and Tait 1999 SACJ 57 at 59. 
279  1996 (1) SACR 434 (E) at 440.  
280  Müller and Tait 1999 SACJ 57 at 60. For a discussion on whether s 158 of the Act can be 
used to circumvent the problem inherent in the wording of s 170A(3), refer to Müller & Tait 
1999 SACJ 57 at 60-61. 
281  Müller and Tait 1999 THRHR 241 at 244. 
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In view of the fact that we live in a digital age it is submitted that serious 
consideration should be given to making more use of what has been labelled “virtual 
courtrooms”.282 This will enable a child witness to testify by means of a live video 
link from any place specifically designated for this purpose, such as the offices of a 
social worker, psychologist, family counsellor, medical practitioner or childcare 
worker who has been employed by the department on contract to service the courts. 
A child witness could, for example, testify from home, as indicated in the scenario 
above or from the premises of a childcare facility such as the Teddy Bear Clinic via 
a live video link. An example of testifying from the Teddy Bear Clinic has been 
described as follows:283 
 
A lanky eleven-year-old girl sits on the floor of a brightly painted room at the Teddy 
Bear Clinic, surrounded by faded stuffed animals and a few well-used toys. Around 
her are scattered a half dozen puppets and a large laminated photograph of an 
empty courtroom.  
 
“Hello,” says the doll on the hand of Ntombi Makwanyane, a matronly volunteer 
counsellor who sits beside the girl. “I am the magistrate.”  
 
“Hello”, responds the girl quietly to the grey-haired, black robed puppet. The doll and 
the girl chat back and forth in Zulu, a widely spoken South African language. The 
puppet explains the job of a judge; the girl asks questions or simply indicates that 
she understands. She is timid at first, but then begins to enjoy the play. Eventually 
                                            
282  See Hyde “CJC [Civil Justice Council] calls for online claims resolution” available at 
http://lawgazette.co.uk/law/cjc-calls-for-online-claimsrevolutions/5046775.article (accessed 
19/02/2015) in which the author discusses a report of the Civil Justice Council’s advisory body 
recommending a new internet-based court service run by government to handle civil claims 
under £25 000. The report also indicates that the jurisdiction of online courts could be 
extended to suitable family disputes. The report’s principal author, Prof Richard Susskind, 
said: “Online dispute resolutions is not science fiction. There are examples from around the 
world that clearly demonstrate its value and future potential not least to litigants in person.” 
283  Itano “S. Africa finds rape courts work” The Christian Science Monitor 29/01/2003 available at 
http://www.csmonitor.com/2003/0129/p01s04-woaf.html. (accessed 19/06/2015). 
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she picks up another puppet. This one is of a pigtailed girl. It represents her, the 
child rape victim who is learning to testify in court. 
 
Down the hall, in another brightly painted room, a seven-year-old girl in a pink tank 
top is preparing to testify. She bounces around the room playfully, waving and 
chattering, until a large woman in a green suit tells her to come sit down. A retired 
teacher of 40 years, she serves as an intermediary between the child and the court, 
relaying questions - which she hears through earphones - while the court watches 
the girl’s responses on closed-circuit television. 
 
A few minutes later, when the testimony begins, the previously bubbly child is gone. 
Instead, the screen in the courtroom shows a terrified girl huddled close to her 
intermediary, rubbing her hands nervously as she haltingly tells the court in a high-
pitched voice about the day the man held her down and stuck his finger inside her. 
 
An elderly white defence lawyer questions the girl. But there is none of the typical 
confrontation: no badgering of the witness, no leading questions. Questions are 
asked repeatedly, in different ways, to clear up confusion. The sometimes curt 
queries of the defence lawyer are gently interpreted for the child.284 
 
Testifying from home or from facilities such as the Teddy Bear Clinic described 
above is clearly more child-friendly and has the further advantage that the child 
witness will not run the risk of coming face-to-face with the alleged perpetrator. In 
addition such facilities obviate the need to refurbish existing court infrastructure, 
which can be time-consuming and expensive. 
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Irrespective of where the room is situated, section 170(A)(3) determines that it 
should be informally arranged so that the witness is put at ease and placed in a 
position from which any person whose presence may upset the witness cannot be 
seen or heard. It should be noted that the subsection refers to “any person”, 
presumably because the provision also applies to legal representatives and even to 
the presiding officer.285 The court and the parties must, however, be able to see and 
hear the child witness and the intermediary “either directly or through the medium 
of any electronic or other devices”.286 The use of screens, one-way glass and closed 
circuit television (CCTV) is envisaged. Although screens may go some way towards 
reducing confrontational stress, the use of a separate room with one-way glass or 
CCTV is preferred as this addresses the issues of both confrontation and courtroom 
stress. Screens should accordingly only be used where a separate room and other 
electronic devices are not available.287 
 
If a CCTV is used a video camera is mounted on a wall of the room and videotapes 
both the child witness and the intermediary while the child gives testimony. The 
intermediary is provided with earphones which enable him or her to follow the 
proceedings in the courtroom and relay the questions to the child. The child 
witness’s answers are captured on the live video link and relayed to the courtroom. 
The courtroom is provided with a television monitor, on which the parties to the 
proceedings and members of the court are able to view and hear the child and the 
intermediary as they speak.288  
 
The successful implementation of the intermediary system is reliant on the 
availability not only of competent intermediaries289 but also of the necessary 
infrastructure. In S v Mokoena290 the High Court stated that “[it] is a sad fact that the 
                                            
285  Van der Merwe et al Hiemstra’s Criminal Procedure 22-71. 
286  See s 170(A)(3)(c) of the Criminal Procedure Act. 
287  Hanna et al Child Witnesses in the New Zealand Criminal Courts: A Review of Practice and 
Implication Policy 9. This will probably be the case in rural courts where one-way glass or 
CCTVs are not available.  
288  Müller & Tait 1999 THRHR 241 at 243. 
289  Refer to para 3.2.3 of ch 5 above. 
290  2008 (2) SACR 216 (T) at paras [90]-[91]. 
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majority of our courts do not have access to the services of intermediaries or 
electronic devices to allow vulnerable witnesses to testify outside the courtroom”. 
This, the High Court pointed out: 
 
[I]s a systemic challenge that must be overcome as soon as possible. The chronic 
lack of capacity and resources may well have been the reason for the present 
approach to make the services of intermediaries available on a selective basis only. 
A court can obviously not ignore the practical challenges facing the executive in the 
provision of essential service … but it cannot countenance an institutionalisation of 
conditions that do not comply with constitutional imperatives and fail to honour 
fundamental rights of vulnerable members of society. 
In DPP v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development291 the Constitutional 
Court reaffirmed the High Court’s concern. The Constitutional Court stated that the 
results of several surveys undertaken with regard to the availability of intermediary 
services were most disturbing. The Constitutional Court pointed out that “[o]nly 14% 
of the approximately 450 regional courts nationwide were equipped with the 
necessary facilities to promote the use of intermediaries. Even for those courts with 
these facilities a high percentage have continuing problems with broken or 
malfunctioning equipment ... A very low percentage of courts were equipped with 
one-way mirrors, and an only slightly higher percentage of courts were reported to 
have separate waiting rooms in each province”.292 
 
The Constitutional Court emphasised that sections 170A(1) and 170A(3) promise 
child complainants protective measures, such as the appointment of an intermediary 
and the creation of child-friendly courts. According to the Constitutional Court the 
non-availability of these measures not only constituted a breach of the 
aforementioned provisions of the Criminal Procedure Act but also a breach of the 
Constitution.293 This, the court held, required urgent attention294 and the Director-
                                            
291  2009 (2) SACR 130 (CC). 
292  Para [195] 
293  Para [202]. 
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General for the Department of Justice and Constitutional Development was ordered 
to furnish the court with the following information:295 
 
(3) A list of regional courts indicating which of them have the following facilities 
contemplated in s 170 A(3) of the CPA: 
  (i) separate rooms from which children may testify; 
  (ii) closed circuit television facilities; and 
  (iii) one-way mirrors. 
(f) To the extent that there are regional courts that do not have all the facilities 
in subpara 3 of this order, the steps which are being taken to provide these 
facilities to these regional courts. 
 
In his report296 the Director-General reported the availability of the following 
resources:  
 
Number 
of main  
Regional 
Court 
seats 
Province CCTV 
availabl
e 
CCTV  
require
d 
Children’
s witness 
testifying 
rooms 
Children’
s witness 
testifying  
rooms 
required 
One-
way 
mirrors 
availabl
e 
One-
way 
mirrors 
require
d 
10 Eastern 
Cape 
50 29  33 32 3 0 
9 Free 
State 
25 7  20 2 6 0 
                                            
295  Para [209]. 
296  Department of Justice and Constitutional Development Report of the Director-General (July 
2009) at para 15 and Annexure A. 
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19 Gauten
g 
43 6 0 6 0 0 
17 KZN 5 0 12 0 1 0 
7 Limpop
o 
39 11 15 20 14 19 
7 Mpuma-
langa 
29 0 25 0 2 0 
4 Norther
n Cape 
27 6  18 2 4 1 
 
10 
 
North 
West 
 
28 
 
0 
 
0 
 
2 
 
0 
 
0 
15 Western 
Cape 
26 8 24 2  9 1 
Total=9
8  
Total 272 67 147 66 39  21 
 
As indicated in this table, a total of 272 CCTVs were available countrywide at that 
time, leaving a shortage of 67 CCTVs. These CCTVs were utilised in the 147 
children’s witness testifying rooms. A further 66 testifying rooms were subsequently 
required. In addition 39 one-way mirrors had been installed in the courtrooms, 
leaving a shortage of 21 one-way mirrors. In the light of the shortage the department 
set out to identify the courts most urgently in need in order to provide them with the 
necessary CCTVs.297 
                                            
297  Department of Justice and Constitutional Development  Report of the Director-General (July 
2009) at para 15 and Annexure A. 
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In a follow-up report298 the Director-General reported that of the 47 testifying devices 
that had been reported to be malfunctioning, 34 were in working order. Those that 
were still not functional would be replaced or updated with video links. The regional 
offices had been allocated the necessary budgets to ensure that this is done. A 
dedicated staff member had also been assigned to attend to matters relating to 
infrastructure requirements. In addition, audit and maintenance systems had been 
developed in terms of which all regional offices were required to report on a monthly 
basis on the availability and functioning of specialised infrastructure.299 At December 
2012 there were 322 CCTV systems, 98 one-way mirrors and 22 witness testifying 
rooms.300  
Owing to numerous concerns regarding the demise of Sexual Offences Courts in 
South Africa, the former Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development 
established the Ministerial Task Team on the Adjudication of Sexual Offences 
Matters (MATTSO) in June 2012 to investigate the feasibility of re-establishing 
Sexual Offences Courts in South Africa. MATTSO recommended the urgent 
reintroduction of these courts. Following the recommendations of the MATTSO 
report, in August 2013 the department began the process of re-establishing 57 
Sexual Offences Courts.301 As at 31 March 2014 a total of 21 Sexual Offences 
Courtrooms had been established. These courtrooms are equipped with features 
such as a special room where witnesses can testify, a private waiting room for child 
witnesses, as well as CCTV systems302. The re-establishment of the 21 Sexual 
                                            
298  Department of Justice and Constitutional Development Report of the Director-General 
(October 2009).   
299  Department of Justice and Constitutional Development Report of the Director-General 
(October 2009) at paras 17 and18. 
300  Department of Justice and Constitutional Development Report on the Implementation of the 
Criminal Law Sexual Offences and Related Matters Amendment Act 32 of 2007: 1 April 2013 
to 31 March 2014 available at http://www.justice.gov.za/vg/sxo/2013-2014-sxo-progressreport 
(accessed 25/04/2015) at para 4.2.3. 
301  Department of Justice and Constitutional Development Report on the Implementation of the 
Criminal Law Sexual Offences and Related Matters Amendment Act 32 of 2007: 1 April 2013 
to 31 March 2014 available at http://www.justice.gov.za/vg/sxo/2013-2014-sxo-progressreport 
(accessed 25/04/2015) at para 8.1. 
302  This includes a two-way CCTV system, a 42-inch monitor in the testifying room, a 9-inch 
monitor for the presiding officer, a large-screen monitor for the other members of the court 
and a high-resolution camera in the testifying room. 
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Offences Courts therefore increased the intermediary resources by adding the 
following facilities:303 
 
Region Dual view CCTV 
system 
Testifying rooms Private child/teen 
waiting rooms 
Eastern Cape 2 2 3 
Free State 4 4 2 
Gauteng 2 2 2 
KZN 2  2 2 
Limpopo 1 1 1 
Mpumalanga 2 2 2 
Northern Cape  1 1 1 
North West 2  2 2 
Western Cape 5 5 2 
TOTAL 21 21 17 
 
The department plans to re-establish the remaining 36 courtrooms during the period 
2014/2015 to 2015/2016. This will contribute further to the provision of intermediary 
facilities. 
 
                                            
303  Department of Justice and Constitutional Development Report on the Implementation of the 
Criminal Law Sexual Offences and Related Matters Amendment Act 32 of 2007: 1 April 2013 
to 31 March 2014 available at http://www.justice.gov.za/vg/sxo/2013-2014-sxo-progressreport 
(accessed 25/04/2015) at para 4.2.3. 
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It should be noted that other regional courts also hear sexual offence matters. In 
instances where these courts are not equipped with the required audiovisual 
equipment (eg as a result of the fact that the court does not hear enough sexual 
offence cases to justify the permanent installation of the equipment) it is suggested 
that the use of mobile equipment be introduced, especially in rural areas where a 
permanent Sexual Offences Court is not feasible.304 
 
3.6 Intermediary fees 
 
In terms of section 170A(4)(b) an intermediary who is not in the full-time employment 
of the state shall be paid such travelling and subsistence and other allowances in 
respect of the services rendered by him or her as the minister with the concurrence 
of the Minister of Finance may determine. 
 
At the time of writing this thesis no tariff of allowances payable to intermediaries in 
criminal proceedings in terms of the regulations to the Criminal Procedure Act had 
been promulgated by the minister. Intermediaries are accordingly still paid in terms 
of the tariff of allowances payable to witnesses in criminal proceedings as set out in 
the regulations to the Criminal Procedure Act.305 The payment of a witness fee is 
currently considered inadequate by many professionals suitably qualified to act as 
intermediaries.306 
 
In his report307 to the Constitutional Court the Director-General acknowledged that 
the remuneration of R150 per day paid for intermediary services is unattractive. In 
                                            
304  Reyneke & Kruger “Sexual Offences Courts: better justice for children?” 2006 Journal for 
Juridical Science 73 at 89. 
305  GN R 391 in Government Gazette 30953 of 11 April 2008. 
306  Department of Justice and Constitutional Development Report of the Director-General 
(October 2009) at paras 4 and 12. 
307  Department of Justice and Constitutional Development Report of the Director-General 
(October 2009). 
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the light of this the prospect of attracting professionals for appointment as 
intermediaries is problematic. This, he points out, is unfortunately part of a bigger 
problem, namely the amount paid to professional witnesses, a matter which is 
receiving the attention of the department as a matter of priority.308  
 
It is trusted that the promulgation of regulations pertaining to the payment of 
intermediary services will without further delay receive the urgent attention it 
deserves as this will help to attract professional intermediary services. 
 
3.7 Intermediary services in non-criminal cases 
 
Although the focus of this thesis is the protection of child witnesses and child victims 
and the role of intermediaries in criminal cases, for the sake of completeness it 
should be noted that intermediaries may also assist child witnesses in the following 
non-criminal proceedings. 
 
Firstly, section 61(2) of the Children’s Act309 provides that a child who is a party or 
a witness in a matter before a children’s court must be questioned through an 
intermediary as provided for in section 170A of the Criminal Procedure Act, if the 
court finds that this would be in the best interests of the child. Secondly, section 
44(8)(c) of the Prevention and Combating of Trafficking in Persons Act310 requires 
of the National Director of Public Prosecutions to issue directives in respect of the 
criteria to be used and the circumstances in which the prosecution must request the 
court to consider appointing a competent person as an intermediary as provided for 
in section 170A of the Criminal Procedure Act, in respect of a child witness. Thirdly, 
                                            
308  Department of Justice and Constitutional Development Report of the Director-General 
(October 2009) at paras 4 and 12. Intermediaries are still paid R150 per day plus travel and 
subsistence allowances (information provided to author hereof in an e-mail dated 10/05/2015 
by the Department of Justice and Constitutional Development).  
309  Act 38 of 2005.  
310  Act 7 of 2013. 
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section 8(7) of the South African Schools Act311 determines that whenever 
disciplinary proceedings are pending before any governing body, and it appears to 
such governing body that it would expose a witness under the age of eighteen years 
to undue mental stress or suffering if he or she testifies at such proceedings the 
governing body may, if practicable, appoint a competent person as an intermediary 
in order to enable such witness to give his or her evidence through that intermediary. 
 
The legislature has through the enactment of the abovementioned sections 
envisaged three further scenarios where a child witness may find it extremely 
difficult to testify. For example, a child who is the subject of care and protection 
proceedings, the victim of trafficking, or the victim of or witness to bullying or other 
serious misconduct by a fellow learner, may find himself or herself in exactly the 
same situation as in a criminal court – being expected to testify in the presence of 
the person who has committed the crime or violation against the child, and thus in 
need of the protection and assistance of an intermediary. The purpose of appointing 
an intermediary in the three scenarios is, as in criminal law, to provide the child 
witness, who would otherwise suffer undue mental stress or suffering, with the 
necessary support of an intermediary. The application of section 170A or a similar 
provision in these instances is highly valued and is a significant step forward in the 
development of South African child law.  
 
As noted above, section 61(2) of the Children’s Act states that in addition to the 
grounds and processes provided for in section 170A of the Criminal Procedure Act, 
a children’s court must find that the use of an intermediary would be in the best 
interests of the child who is to give evidence. A children’s court therefore has to 
apply the grounds of “undue mental stress or suffering” as well as the “best interests 
of the child” test for the appointment of an intermediary. Matthias and Zaal312 
                                            
311  Act 84 of 1996. 
312  Matthias and Zaal “Intermediaries for child witnesses: Old problems, new solutions and judicial 
differences in South Africa” 2001 International Journal of Children’s Rights 251 at 255-256. 
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expressed concern that children’s courts may experience difficulty in reading the 
two provisions together. 
 
In DPP v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development313 the Constitutional 
Court held that “[i]n every trial in which a child is to testify, the court will enquire into 
the desirability of appointing an intermediary” and in so doing consider whether on 
the evidence presented “it is in the best interest of the child that an intermediary be 
appointed”.314 As stated above,315 the court has to intertwine the test of undue 
mental stress or suffering with that of the best interests of the child. This approach 
was also followed in Kerkhoff v Minister of Justice and Constitutional 
Development,316 where the High Court, with reference to the tests utilised in DPP v 
Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development, stated that “[it] is clear that the 
enquiry has a narrow focus: to determine whether it is in the best interests of the 
child that an intermediary be appointed”. Section 61(2) of the Children’s Act 
therefore reiterates the principles laid down in legal jurisprudence. It is moreover 
submitted that it is difficult to contemplate a situation where it would not be in the 
child’s best interests to appoint an intermediary where a child witness would 
otherwise have to endure “undue mental stress and suffering”.  
 
4 CONCLUSION 
 
There can be no question that the intermediary system is a powerful tool in 
enhancing the lives of child victims and child witnesses. In this regard, the 
introduction of the intermediary system in 1993 in South Africa has contributed 
significantly towards the realisation of the rights of child victims and child witnesses.  
 
                                            
313  2009 (2) SACR 130 (CC). 
314  Paras [114]-[115]. 
315  See para 3.1.5 above. 
316  2011 (2) SACR 109 (GNP) at para [7]. 
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However, the abovementioned analysis reveals some concerns and shortcomings 
that need to be addressed to develop the current intermediary system: 
 
 The appointment of an intermediary should be mandatory in all cases in 
which the witness is under the biological or mental age of eighteen years, 
unless cogent reasons exist not to appoint an intermediary. The setting of a 
standard norm not only simplifies the process while allowing for flexibility, but 
also ensures a more consistent interpretation and application of section 
170A. This also eliminates the problems emanating from the exercise of the 
discretion by the courts as alluded to previously.317 
 If a child witness under the biological or mental age of eighteen years so 
wishes or cogent reasons exist not to appoint an intermediary, the court 
should place such reasons on record before the commencement of the 
proceedings.318 
 If the legislature does not amend section 170A as recommended above, the 
test for the appointment of an intermediary, namely that of “undue mental 
stress or suffering”, should be substituted with that of “if it appears to be in 
the interests of justice”. The use of the latter test aligns the test for the 
appointment of an intermediary with that of section 158 of the Act (used for 
adult victims of violent crimes), allows for a number of factors to be 
considered, including the language and cognitive abilities of a child witness, 
eliminates the interpretational problems inherent in concepts such as “undue 
mental stress or suffering” and conforms to the best interests of the child 
principle as set out in the Constitution.319 
 The directives with regard to the application of section 170A (setting certain 
criteria to be used and circumstances in which the prosecution must request 
the court to consider appointing a competent person as an intermediary) as 
                                            
317  See para 3.1.4 above. 
318  See para 3.1.6 above. 
319  See para 3.1.5 above. 
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contemplated in section 66(2)(a) of the Amendment Act should be extended 
to non-sexual cases.320 
 All witnesses under the biological or mental age of eighteen years should be 
allowed to testify from a room separate to that of the courtroom or any other 
suitable place through the medium of any electronic or other devices. This 
ensures that child witnesses are removed from and protected against the 
confrontational effect of the accusatorial system.321  
 A pre-trial assessment of the communication competencies of all witnesses 
under the biological or mental age of eighteen years should be conducted. 
Questioning during the trial should be conducted in accordance with the pre-
determined competencies. The assessment would also alert the court to any 
unsuspected communication issues that need to be taken into account. The 
pre-trial assessment should be taken into account when “ground rules” for 
the questioning of a child witness are set.322 
 “Ground rules” as to the way in which the examination of a child witness is to 
be conducted should be set prior to each trial.323 
 The function or persona of an intermediary should be placed on a 
professional footing by the requirement of a single accredited qualification. 
This qualification should include aspects of child development, child 
communication patterns and styles, psychology of abuse, knowledge of the 
legal framework, terms and terminology and specialised training in the 
interviewing of child witnesses. This will ensure that intermediaries are 
properly equipped to question and assist child witnesses.324 
 The functions of an intermediary should be broadened to include the duties 
set out in the Draft Discussion Document on Intermediaries of 2008 and the 
                                            
320  See para 3.1.5 above. 
321  See para 3.5 above. 
322  See para 3.4 above. 
323  See para 3.4 above. 
324  See para 3.2 above. 
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Draft Job Description for Court Intermediaries drafted by the Department of 
Justice and Constitutional Development.325 
 A regulatory body within the Department of Justice and Constitutional 
Development addressing the management, training, supervision and 
monitoring of intermediaries should be established.326 
 The Minister should by notice in the Government Gazette include the 
profession of speech and language therapists in its list of competent persons 
to be appointed as intermediaries. In view of speech and language therapists’ 
skill in communication with children they are particularly suitable as 
intermediaries.327 
 An official register containing information and statistical data on 
intermediaries should be set up and maintained by the Department of Justice 
and Constitutional Development. This would simplify the process of the 
appointment of intermediaries and enable concerned parties to evaluate 
current systems.328  
 The Department of Justice and Constitutional Development should continue 
in its efforts towards the realisation of intermediary services by progressively 
appointing intermediaries and by converting the ad hoc posts into permanent 
intermediary posts.329 
 The Department of Justice and Constitutional Development should continue 
in its efforts to provide intermediary facilities such as a special room where 
witnesses can testify, a private waiting room for child witnesses as well as 
CCTV systems.330 
 The Minister of Justice with the concurrence of the Minister of Finance should 
determine the amounts to be paid as travelling and subsistence and other 
allowances in respect of the services rendered by an intermediary who is not 
                                            
325  See para 3.2 above. 
326  See para 3.4 above. 
327  See para 3.2 above. 
328  See para 3.2.3 above. 
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in the full-time employment of the state as set out in section 170A(4)(b) of the 
Criminal Procedure Act. The prospect of attracting professionals for 
appointment as intermediaries will be greatly enhanced through proper 
remuneration for intermediary services.331  
 
In conclusion, it is believed that the aforementioned recommendations will be a 
further step on the journey towards the full realisation of the rights of child victims 
and child witnesses within the criminal justice system in South Africa. Although in 
some instances this may require a move away from the traditional adversarial 
process to incorporate aspects of an inquisitorial system, such a fresh approach 
should not be met with fear or circumspection but should rather be seen as a catalyst 
inspiring enhance protection for child victims and child witnesses. 
 
As indicated in the introduction, the research also comprise of a comparative 
component. It is anticipated that such a study will be of significant value in providing 
new insights and knowledge, which may in turn give rise to suggestions for 
meaningful legal reform. In this regard the intermediary systems in Namibia and 
New Zealand are considered in chapter 6 and 7 respectively. Namibia and New 
Zealand share certain aspects with South Africa, such as an accusatorial criminal 
justice system and high levels of crime. These two countries are also signatories to 
key international instruments, for example the CRC. These chapters are therefore 
significant since they provide a comparative perspective on how Namibia and New 
Zealand meet their national and international obligations with regards to the 
protection of child victims and child witnesses within their respective criminal justice 
systems. As Namibia is also a signatory to several African treaties, for example the 
African Children’s Charter, a study of Namibian law also enables legal comparison 
on a regional level. Valuable features and shortcomings in the respective 
jurisdictions are considered with a view to enhancing the South African position. 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
The intermediary system in Namibia 
 
Approximately 60 per cent of people in Namibia are under the age of 25. Nearly 40 
per cent of the population is under the age of 15. The fact that children make up 
such a large portion of the population is reason enough to support the need for 
robust legislation on the care and protection of children. But there are more reasons. 
Many more. Children cannot keep for themselves in the same way that adults can. 
Children cannot make decisions for themselves in the same way that adults can. 
Children cannot protect themselves from home in the same way that adults can. 
There is an urgent need for all countries, including Namibia, to ensure that they have 
legislation in place that provides the basis for the care and protection of children.1 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The Republic of Namibia was declared a German Protectorate in 1884 and a Crown 
Colony in 1890. It later became known as South-West Africa. The territory remained 
a German Colony until 1915, when it was occupied by South African forces. From 
1920 onwards South-West Africa became a Protectorate of South Africa in terms of 
the Peace Treaty of Versailles. Namibia finally achieved its independence with the 
aid of the United Nations (UN) in 1990, after a long struggle on both diplomatic and 
military fronts.2 With the achievement of sovereignty and self-determination, 
Namibia adopted the Constitution of the Republic of Namibia of 1990 (hereinafter 
“the Constitution of Namibia”), which is the supreme law of the country and is 
                                            
1  Coomer “Protecting the next generation: have your say on the Child Care and Protection Bill” 
The Namibian (29/05/2009) available at http://www.namibian.com.na/indexx.php? 
archive_id=53868&page_type=archive_story_detail&page=3022 (accessed 03/07/2015). 
2  Amoo & Skeffers “The rule of law in Namibia” in Horn & Bösl (ed) Human Rights and the Rule 
of Law in Namibia (2008) 17. 
The intermediary system in Namibia 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
334 
founded upon the principles of democracy, the rule of law and justice for all.3 At the 
time the Constitution of Namibia was hailed as one of the most democratic 
constitutions in Africa. It has been praised for its strong provisions on fundamental 
human rights and freedoms.4 
 
This chapter consists of a discussion of child victims’ and child witnesses’ rights 
under the Namibian criminal justice system. These discussions are important 
because, as will be pointed out, South Africa and Namibia can learn from one 
another in this regard. South Africa and Namibia have similar constitutions, for 
example, and is it beneficial to both countries to compare these two constitutions in 
order to identify possible shortcomings as well as valuable features in the respective 
constitutions. 
 
Like South Africa, Namibia is a signatory to important international and regional 
human rights instruments such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the 
UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) and the African Charter on the 
Rights and Welfare of the Child (African Children’s Charter). It will be informative to 
see how Namibia meets its international and regional obligations regarding the 
protection of child victims and child witnesses in its criminal justice system. 
 
As a result of South Africa’s prolonged control over Namibia, the judicial structure in 
Namibia largely parallels that of South Africa. Prior to 1977, Namibian criminal 
prosecutions were conducted in terms of the Criminal Ordinance, which was similar 
to the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 of South Africa (hereinafter the South 
African Criminal Procedure Act). This also explains why the Namibian Criminal 
Procedure Act 51 of 1977 (hereinafter the Namibian Criminal Procedure Act), which 
                                            
3  See a 1(1) & (6) of the Constitution of Namibia.  
4  Adkisson (ed) Children in Namibia: Reaching Towards the Rights of Every Child (1995) 8. The 
rights and freedoms are contained in ch 3 of the Constitution of Namibia and include the rights 
to protection of life; protection of liberty; respectful human dignity; equality and freedom from 
discrimination, arbitrary arrest and detention; access to a fair trial; the right to privacy and 
respect for family and the rights of children. 
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bears the same name, amounts to a replica of the South African Act. The Namibian 
criminal justice system is therefore, like that of South Africa, accusatorial in nature.5  
 
Since independence, all laws in Namibia derive their legitimacy from the Constitution 
of Namibia. However, in order to prevent the creation of a legal vacuum, article 140 
of the Constitution of Namibia provides that all laws in force immediately before the 
date of independence shall remain in force until repealed or amended by an Act of 
Parliament or until such law has been declared unconstitutional by a competent 
court. Therefore, although the South African Criminal Procedure Act is still 
applicable, no amendments to the said Act after 1990 are applicable in Namibia 
unless such amendments have been enacted in Namibia.6 Both South Africa and 
Namibia have since amended their respective Criminal Procedure Acts to address 
the needs of child victims and child witnesses.7 A comparative perspective on 
Namibia’s amendments in respect of its criminal procedure to enhance the 
protection of the rights of child victims and child witnesses within their criminal 
justice system would be valuable. Such a comparison would enable South Africa to 
learn from Namibia’s shortcomings and successes.8 
 
In addition Namibian children face some of the same challenges that South African 
children are confronted with. Like South Africa, Namibia is subject to high levels of 
crime.9 According to studies conducted in Namibia, Namibian children themselves 
                                            
5  Horn “International human rights norms and standards: The development of Namibian case 
and statutory law” available at http://www.kas.de/upload/auslandshomepages/namibia/ 
HumanRights/horn.pdf141 at 150 (accessed 03/07/2015). 
6  Amoo & Skeffers in Horn & Bösl (ed) Human Rights and the Rule of Law in Namibia 17-18. 
7  See s 170A of the South African Criminal Procedure Act and ss 158 & 166 of the Namibian 
Criminal Procedure Act as amended by the Namibian Criminal Procedure Amendment Act 24 
of 2003. 
8  As a matter of interest it should be noted that between 1999 and 2000 Namibia carried out 
what is known as the Victim Friendly Sexual Offences Court Project. As part of the project 
Namibia visited South Africa in order to study the mechanisms, systems and procedures in 
place for the protection of victims of sexual violence in South Africa, in its quest to eliminate 
violence against women and children in Namibia. See UNESCO Towards Victim Friendly 
Sexual Offences Courts in Namibia (2001) 1.    
9  The victim statistics of 2012/2013 indicate that 73 780 persons were the victims of crime. Of 
these 622 were males under the age of eighteen years, and 858 were females under the age 
of eighteen years. See NAMPOL 2012-2013 crime statistics available at 
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identified violence directed against them as a key problem in Namibia.10 Namibian 
children, similar to South African children, also have to deal with socio-economic 
problems such as poverty, HIV/AIDS, discrimination and in some cases harmful 
cultural practices.11   
 
2 THE RIGHT TO PROTECTION OF NAMIBIAN CHILD VICTIMS 
AND CHILD WITNESSES 
 
2.1 The Constitution of Namibia 
 
The Constitution of Namibia is the supreme law of the country and provides for the 
promotion and protection of a wide range of human rights. The supremacy of the 
Constitution of Namibia entails that any law or conduct inconsistent with the 
provisions of the Constitution of Namibia will be invalid.12 The Constitution of 
Namibia also promotes and protects children’s rights, albeit in some instances 
indirectly. The first protection that is accorded by the Constitution of Namibia to all 
individuals, including children, is found in the Preamble, which inter alia provides the 
following:  
 
                                            
http://www.nampol.gov.na/documents/836442/838196/Crime_Statistic_2012_13_fin_year_3.
pdf/2caf572c-1beb-488e-b054-b0885b214347 (accessed 04/08/15). 
10  Data from Lifeline Namibia collected in 2008 indicated that “abuse and violence” was the 
second most common reason why children approached them for assistance. Children aged 
from eight to seventeen who took part in focus group discussions held in 2010 in four of the 
regions of Namibia, for a report published by the National Planning Commission, also listed 
“domestic violence” and “being physically abused” as being among the top ten most serious 
problems faced by children in Namibia. See Hubbard & Ruth Seeking Safety: Domestic 
Violence in Namibia and the Combatting of Domestic Violence Act 4 of 2003 Summary Report 
(2012) 21. 
11  Ambunda & Mugadza “The protection of children’s rights in Namibia: Law and policy” in 
Ruppel (ed) Children’s Rights in Namibia (2009) 46. 
12  A 25(1) of the Constitution of Namibia. 
The intermediary system in Namibia 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
337 
Whereas the recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable right 
of all members of the human family is indispensable for freedom, justice and peace:  
 
Whereas the said rights include the right of the individual to life, liberty and the 
pursuit of happiness, regardless of race, colour, ethnic origin, sex, religion, creed or 
social or economic status.  
 
Furthermore, in terms of the provisions of the Constitution of Namibia, children are 
entitled to a dignified life, liberty and the right to pursue happiness.13 In addition 
children are afforded the right to life,14 the right to human dignity including the right 
not to be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment15 as well as the right to equality, which includes the right to be equal 
before the law.16 The family, as the natural and fundamental group unit of society, 
is accorded special protection by society and the State in article 14 of the 
Constitution of Namibia. Article 14 also puts men and women (and thus also boys 
and girls) in an equal position regarding their rights as to marriage, during marriage 
and upon its dissolution. Article 15 of the Constitution of Namibia specifically refers 
to children’s rights and provides as follows: 
 
(1) Children shall have the right from birth to a name, the right to acquire a 
nationality and, subject to legislation enacted in the best interests of children, 
as far as possible the right to know and be cared for by their parents. 
(2) Children are entitled to be protected from economic exploitation and shall not 
be employed in or required to perform work that is likely to be hazardous or 
to interfere with their education, or to be harmful to their health or physical, 
mental, spiritual, moral or social development. For the purposes of this Sub-
Article children shall be persons under the age of sixteen (16) years. 
                                            
13  Preamble to the Constitution of Namibia. 
14  A 6 of the Constitution of Namibia.   
15  A 8(2) of the Constitution of Namibia. 
16  A 10 of the Constitution of Namibia. 
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(3) No children under the age of fourteen (14) years shall be employed to work 
in any factory or mine, save under conditions and circumstances regulated 
by Act of Parliament. Nothing in this Sub-Article shall be construed as 
derogating in any way from Sub-Article (2) hereof. 
(4) Any arrangement or scheme employed on any farm or other undertaking, the 
object or effect of which is to compel the minor children of an employee to 
work for or in the interest of the employer of such employee, shall for the 
purposes of Article 9 hereof be deemed to constitute an arrangement or 
scheme to compel the performance of forced labour. 
(5) No law authorising preventative detention shall permit children under the age 
of sixteen (16) years to be detained. 
 
Article 15 of the Constitution of Namibia corresponds to a certain degree with section 
28 of the Constitution of South African. Both constitutions afford children the right to 
a name and nationality, family care or parental care, and protection from economic 
exploitation and preventative detention.17 However, while the Constitution of 
Namibia does not permit the detention of children under the age of sixteen years the 
Constitution of South African allows for children under the age of eighteen years to 
be detained as a measure of last resort subject to certain conditions.18  
 
Unlike the Constitution of South Africa, which specifically defines a “child” as a 
person under the age of eighteen years19 and provides that “[a] child’s best interests 
are of paramount importance in every matter concerning the child”,20 there are no 
such provisions in article 15 of the Constitution of Namibia. One may accordingly 
argue that in comparison with South Africa, the Constitution of Namibia is 
underutilised as a tool for the protection of children’s rights. This may possibly be 
due to the fact that the concept of rights, let alone children’s rights, was relatively 
                                            
17  See s 28 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (hereinafter the Constitution 
of South Africa) & a 15 of the Constitution of Namibia. 
18  See s 28(1)(g) of the Constitution of South Africa. 
19  See s 28(3) of the Constitution of South Africa. 
20  See s 28(2) of the Constitution of South Africa. 
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new in Namibia at the time of the drafting of its Constitution.21 However, the 
legislature remedied this lacuna through the Namibian Child Care and Protection 
Act.22 In terms of the Child Care and Protection Act a child “means a person who 
has not attained the age of 18 years”.23 In addition, section 3(1) of the Child Care 
and Protection Act sets out the best interests of the child principle as follows: 
 
This Act must be interpreted and applied so that in all matters concerning the care, 
protection and well-being of a child arising under this Act or under any proceedings, 
actions and decisions by an organ of state in any matter concerning a child or 
children in general, the best interests of the child concerned is the paramount 
consideration. 
 
The legislature deemed it important to specifically highlight the significance and 
influence of the CRC and the African Children’s Charter in this regard by stating that 
the best interests principle as set out in the Bill is based on article 3.1 of the CRC 
as well as article 4.1 of the African Children’s Charter.24 It should be noted that in 
terms of the Child Care and Protection Bill the best interests of the child principle is 
regarded as the paramount consideration, thereby elevating its importance. 
 
The legislature, similar to its South African counterpart,25 lists certain factors that 
must be taken into consideration, where relevant, in determining the best interests 
                                            
21  Adkisson (ed) Children in Namibia: Reaching Towards the Rights of Every Child (1995) 7.  
22  Act 3 of 2015.  
23  S 1 of Act 3 of 2015. 
24  Refer also to paras 4.3.4 and 5.2.2.of ch 4 above for a comprehensive discussion on a 3.1 of 
the CRC and a 4.1 of the African Children’s Charter.  
25  See s 7 of the Children’s Act 38 of 2005. Refer also to para 2.3.2 of ch 4 above for a discussion 
on the best interests of the child in terms of the Constitution of South Africa and the Children’s 
Act.  
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of the child.26 It is envisaged that, once promulgated, the Bill will give adequate 
content to the principle of the best interests of the child.27  
An analysis of article 15 of the Constitution of Namibia reveals that the section does 
not afford the child victim and child witness a specific right to protection.28 Neither 
does the section afford the child witness and child victim indirect protection, as is 
                                            
26  S 3(2) states the following: “In determining the best interests of the child, the following factors 
must be taken into consideration, where relevant: 
(a) the child’s age, maturity and stage of development, gender, background, and any other 
relevant characteristics of the child; 
(b) the child’s physical and emotional security and his or her intellectual, emotional, social and 
cultural development; 
(c) any views or opinions expressed by the child with due regard to the child’s age, maturity 
and stage of development; 
(d) the right of the child to know and be cared for by both parents, unless his or her rights are 
persistently abused by either or both parents, or continued contact with either parent or 
both parents would be detrimental to the child’s well-being; 
(e) the nature of the personal relationship between the child and other significant persons in 
the child’s life, including each of the child’s parents, any relevant family member, any other 
care-giver of the child or any other relevant person; 
(f) the attitude of the each of the child’s parents towards the child and towards the exercise of 
parental responsibilities and rights in respect of the child; 
(g) the capacity of the parents, or any specific parent, or of any other care-giver or person, to 
provide for the needs of the child, including emotional and intellectual needs; 
(h) the desirability of keeping siblings together; 
(i) the likely effect on the child of any change in the child’s circumstances, including the likely 
effect on the child of any separation from – 
(i) both or either of the parents; or 
(ii) any brother or sister or other child, or any other care-giver or person, with whom the 
child has been living; 
(j) the practical difficulty and expense of a child having contact with the parents, or any specific 
parent, and whether that difficulty or expense will substantially affect the child’s right to 
maintain personal relations and direct contact with the parents, or any specific parent, on 
a regular basis; 
(k) the need for the child to maintain a connection with his or her family, extended family, 
culture or tradition; 
(l) any disability that a child may have; 
(m)any chronic illness from which a child may suffer; 
(n) the need for a child to be brought up within a stable family environment and, where this is 
not possible, in an environment resembling as closely as possible a caring family 
environment; 
(o) the need to protect the child from any physical or psychological harm that may be caused 
by – 
(i) subjecting the child to maltreatment, abuse, neglect, exploitation or degradation or 
exposing the child to violence or exploitation or other harmful behaviour; 
(ii) exposing the child to maltreatment, abuse, degradation, ill-treatment, violence or 
harmful behaviour towards another person; or 
(iii) any family violence involving the child or a family member of the child; 
(p) the need to avoid or minimise further legal or administrative proceedings in relation to the 
child; and 
(q) any other relevant factor.” 
27  Dausab “The best interest of the child.” in Ruppel (ed) Children’s Rights in Namibia (2009) 
155. 
28  This is similar to the position in s 28 of the Constitution of South Africa. 
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the case with section 28(1)(d) of the Constitution of South Africa, which guarantees 
every child the right “to be protected from maltreatment, neglect, abuse or 
degradation”. Protection for the child victim and child witness is, however, to be 
found in international and regional instruments, in particular the CRC and the African 
Children’s Charter, as well as in domestic law. 
 
2.2 The Convention on the Rights of the Child and the African Charter on 
the Rights and Welfare of the Child 
 
The Constitution of Namibia explicitly incorporates international law and makes it 
part of Namibian domestic law. This is done in article 144 of the Constitution of 
Namibia, which states the following: 
 
Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or Act of Parliament, the general 
rules of public international law and international agreements binding upon Namibia 
under this Constitution shall form part of the law of Namibia.  
 
In terms of article 144 of the Constitution of Namibia, public international law and 
international agreements are therefore part of the law of Namibia ab initio. No 
transformation or subsequent act by the legislature is required for public 
international law or international agreements to become part of the law as the 
Constitution incorporates them as part of the law of the land. However, as the 
Constitution is the supreme law, for international law to find domestic application, it 
has to conform to the provisions of the Constitution.29  
 
                                            
29  Erasmus “Namibian Constitution and the application of International Law” in van Wyk, 
Wiechers & Hill (eds) Namibia Constitutional and International Law Issues (1991) 94.  
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Since Namibia has ratified both the CRC30 and the African Children’s Charter,31 the 
government of Namibia is also obliged to fulfil its obligations in terms of the 
provisions pertaining to child victims and child witnesses contained in the said 
instruments. Three principles of the CRC, as well as the General Comments 
developed by the Committee on the Rights of the Child on the principles, are of 
particular importance, namely the best interests of the child (art 3), the right of the 
child to be heard (art 12) and the right of the child to freedom from all forms of 
violence (art 19). In terms of the three principles Namibia as a State Party to the 
CRC has to ensure that the child’s best interests are taken into account as a primary 
consideration in all actions or decisions that concern the child, in both the public and 
the private sphere. In addition, the government of Namibia should afford every child 
capable of forming his or her own views the right to express those views freely in all 
matters affecting the child, which views should be given due weight in accordance 
with the age and maturity of the child. A child capable of forming his or her own 
views should be afforded the opportunity to express those views either directly or 
through legal representation.32 The government of Namibia is also obliged to 
introduce measures for the protection of children from all forms of violence. Such 
protective measures should include a range of interventions, namely legislative, 
administrative, social and educational measures as well as proactive prevention, to 
provide protection against the experience of violence and maltreatment for those 
who have been the victims of violence.33 
 
As a signatory to the African Children’s Charter the government of Namibia must 
also fulfil its obligations in terms of the regional child law instrument. When 
considering child victims and child witnesses, two principles of the African Children’s 
Charter are of particular importance, namely that of the best interest of the child (art 
4.1) and the right of the child to be heard (art 4.2).34 
                                            
30  Namibia ratified the CRC on 30 September 1990. 
31  Namibia ratified the African Children’s Charter on 23 July 2004. 
32  Art 12(2) of the CRC. 
33  Refer to ch 4 above for a comprehensive discussion on arts 3, 12 & 9 as well as the General 
Comments of the Committee on the Rights of the Child on the articles. 
34  Refer to ch 4 above for a comprehensive discussion on art 4.1 & 4.2 of the African Children's 
Charter. 
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2.3 The Criminal Procedure Amendment Act 24 of 2003 
 
Prior to the enactment of the Criminal Procedure Amendment Act 24 of 2003 
(hereinafter “the 2003 Criminal Procedure Amendment Act”), child victims and child 
witnesses did not enjoy any special protection under the Namibian criminal justice 
system. Like any other adversarial system, the Namibian criminal justice system 
required child victims to testify in open court (although some testified in camera) and 
to give evidence viva voce without assistance.35 Child witnesses were also cross-
examined by the accused or the defence counsel. Not surprisingly, children 
experienced severe difficulties in the courtroom. In 1998, a Namibian prosecutor, 
expressing his concern over the circumstances, stated the following:36 
 
The current criminal justice system in Namibia leads to a second victimisation of the 
sexually abused woman or child. It is a standing rule that a complainant giving 
evidence must do so in the presence of the accused, despite her age. The 
complainant stands alone in the witness box and can be intimidated by the 
accused’s presence, often a male parent or relative. The complainant becomes 
more anxious and forgets facts which make her testimony less reliable and valuable 
in the prosecution. The alien atmosphere of the court combined with other factors 
as mentioned above, have such an impact on the young female witness that they 
are often reduced to silence which effectively wins the case for the defence. This is 
one of the most important reasons why cases of sexual abuse are not officially 
reported. 
Newspaper accounts of sexual offences committed at the time similarly illustrate 
some of the difficulties experienced by child witnesses. One such an account, in 
1998, reports that a ten-year-old girl had to testify while sitting opposite her accused 
rapist – a man who had helped to raise her from the time she was three years old. 
                                            
35  Ss 153 & 154 of the Namibian Criminal Procedure Act. 
36  As quoted by Hubbard Rape in Namibia: Assessment of the Operation of the Combating of 
Rape Act 8 of 2004: Gender Research and Advocacy Project (2006) 142.  
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In full view of the man whom she had regarded as a father, she testified that he had 
threatened to kill her with a knife and an axe if she told what he had done. In another 
case involving a hostel father accused of sodomising six young hearing-impaired 
boys, one of the boys (who was twelve years old at the time of the alleged offence) 
turned and bolted out of the courtroom on seeing his alleged attacker. He was only 
later persuaded to return to the courtroom to give his testimony in sign language.37  
  
In response to the discontent with the Namibian judiciary system at the time, a multi-
sectoral project under the auspices of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and 
Cultural Organization (UNESCO), namely the Victim-Friendly Sexual Offences 
Court Project, was initiated and ran from 1999 to 2000. The main objective of the 
project was to identify possible solutions towards the eradication of violence against 
women and children.38 The subsequent project report entitled “Towards Victim 
Friendly Sexual Offences Courts in Namibia” reported inter alia on the high levels of 
discomfort experienced by young children as they struggled to give evidence in 
court. Recommendations for changes to the Namibian criminal justice system were 
subsequently made. These recommendations underscored the need for the 
amendment of the 1977 Namibian Criminal Procedure Act in order to afford child 
witnesses more protection as they interface with the criminal justice system.39 This 
law reform materialised in December 2003 through the 2003 Criminal Procedure 
Amendment Act.40 This Act amended the Namibian Criminal Procedure Act41 to 
provide for, inter alia, the introduction of special measures for vulnerable witnesses, 
to further regulate the admissibility of unsworn or unaffirmed evidence, to provide 
for the manner of cross-examination of witnesses under a certain age and to provide 
for matters incidental thereto.  
 
                                            
37  As quoted by Hubbard Rape in Namibia: Assessment of the Operation of the Combating of 
Rape Act 8 of 2004: Gender Research and Advocacy Project 142.  
38  UNESCO Towards Victim Friendly Sexual Offences Courts in Namibia (2001) 1. 
39  UNESCO Towards Victim Friendly Sexual Offences Courts in Namibia 24-25. 
40  The Act came into force on 30 December 2003. See GN 266 GG 3123 of 30 December 2003. 
41  Act 51 of 1977. 
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The 2003 Criminal Procedure Amendment Act specifically, through the insertion of 
section 158A into and the amendment of section 166 of the Namibian Criminal 
Procedure Act, introduced special arrangements for the protection of vulnerable 
witnesses (including children) while providing for the way in which the cross-
examination of young witnesses should be conducted. Although the focus of the 
provisions of section 158A is not only on children as vulnerable witnesses, but on 
“all” vulnerable victims as defined in the Act,42 it impacts significantly on child 
witnesses and is therefore worthy of further discussion. Section 166 also introduced 
the concept of an “intermediary” in that it provides for the cross-examination of a 
witness “through a person other than the presiding officer”.43 Although section 166 
does not use the term “intermediary” it is generally accepted that the person 
mentioned in the section is essentially an intermediary.44 
 
The Namibian government promulgated the Criminal Procedure Act 25 of 2004 
(hereinafter the 2004 Criminal Procedure Act) in 2004. This Act is meant to replace 
the Namibian Criminal Procedure Act, including all its amendments.45 Section 193 
of the 2004 Criminal Procedure Act provides for the appointment of an 
intermediary.46 In terms of section 373 of the 2004 Criminal Procedure Act, the Act 
will come into operation on a date determined by the Minister by notice in the 
Gazette. No such notice has been published. The reason cited for the indefinite 
suspension of the implementation of the Act is that the Namibian government lacks 
adequate resources to fully implement the Act.47 The non-implementation of the 
2004 Criminal Procedure Act means that the 2003 Criminal Procedure Amendment 
Act remains effective until such time as the 2004 Criminal Procedure Act comes into 
                                            
42  S 158A (3) of the Namibian Criminal Procedure Act.  
43  S 166(5) of the Namibian Criminal Procedure Act. Refer to para 2.5 below for more on section 
166 of the Namibian Criminal Procedure Act.   
44  Hubbard The “Vulnerable Witnesses” Act: Children in Court: Protecting Vulnerable Witnesses 
(2004) available at http://www.lac.org.na/projects/grap/Pdf/childcourt2004.pdf 1 (accessed 
22/07/2015) at 3. This acceptance can be attributed to the functions performed through such 
other person. 
45  These include the Criminal Amendment Act 24 of 2003.  
46  S 193 closely resembled section 170A of the South African Criminal Procedure Act. 
47  Wilkerson A comparative analysis of the intermediary systems in South Africa, Namibia, 
Zimbabwe and Ethiopia LLM Thesis Rhodes University (2011) 131. 
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force.48 The Namibian government’s position is that once it has secured adequate 
financial resources to fully implement the 2004 Criminal Procedure Act, renewed 
attention will be given to the possible coming into force of the said Act.49 This is still 
the position and is it doubtful whether the Act will come into force in view of the fact 
that more than ten years have passed.50 
 
In order to examine the position of child witnesses and the role intermediaries play 
in the Namibian criminal justice system, sections 158A and the relevant subsections 
of section 166 of the Namibian Criminal Procedure Act as well as section 193 of the 
2004 Criminal Procedure Act will be evaluated. Section 158A and subsections of 
section 166 of the Namibian Criminal Procedure Act will be discussed first, after 
which section 193 of the 2004 Criminal Procedure Act will be discussed. 
 
2.4 Section 158A of the Namibian Criminal Procedure Act51 
 
Section 158A, commonly referred to as the “Vulnerable Witness Act”, provides as 
follows: 
 
(1) A court before whom a vulnerable witness gives evidence in criminal 
proceedings, may on the application of any party to such proceedings or the 
witness concerned, or on its own motion make an order that special 
arrangements be made for the giving of the evidence of that witness. 
                                            
48  Schwikkard “The evidence of sexual complainants and the demise of the 2004 Criminal 
Procedure Act” 2007 Namibian Law Journal 5 ff. 
49  Wilkerson A comparative analysis of the intermediary systems in South Africa, Namibia, 
Zimbabwe and Ethiopia 131. 
50 It should be noted that there is speculation that this Act will not be brought into force, but will 
be replaced instead with a substituted version. See http://www.lac.org.na/namlex/ Crimlaw.pdf 
(accessed 15/05/2016). 
51  As inserted into the Namibian Criminal Procedure Act by the Criminal Procedure Amendment 
Act 24 of 2003. 
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(2) “Special arrangements” means one or more of the following steps: 
(a) The relocation of the trial to another location while the evidence of 
the vulnerable witness is being heard; 
(b) the rearrangement of the furniture in a court room, or the removal 
from or addition of certain furniture or objects to or from the court 
room, or a direction that certain persons sit or stand at certain 
locations in the court room; 
(c) notwithstanding the provisions of section 153 the granting of 
permission to any person (hereinafter referred to as a “support 
person”) who is a fit person for that purpose to accompany the 
witness while he or she is giving evidence; 
(d)  the granting of permission to the witness to give evidence behind a 
screen or in another room which is connected to the court room by 
means of closed circuit television or a one way mirror or by any 
other device or method that complies with subsection (6);  
(e) the taking of any other steps that in the opinion of the court are 
expedient and desirable in order to facilitate the giving of evidence 
by the vulnerable witness concerned. 
(3) For the purposes of this section a vulnerable witness is a person - 
(a)  who is under the age of eighteen; 
(b)  against whom an offence of a sexual or indecent nature has been 
committed; 
(c)  against whom any offence involving violence has been committed by 
a close family member or a spouse or a partner in any permanent 
relationship; 
(d) who as a result of some mental or physical disability, the possibility 
of intimidation by the accused or any other person, or for any other 
reason will suffer undue stress while giving evidence, or who as a 
result of such disability, background, possibility or other reason will 
be unable to give full and proper evidence.  
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(4) The support person is entitled to - 
(a)  stand or sit near the witness and to give such physical comfort to 
the witness as may be desirable; 
(b) interrupt the proceedings to alert the presiding officer to the fact that 
the witness is experiencing undue distress: 
Provided that subject to subsection (5), the support person shall not be 
entitled to assist the witness with the answering of a question or instruct the 
witness in the giving of evidence. 
(5) The court may give instructions to a support person prohibiting him or her 
from communicating with the witness or from taking certain actions, or may 
instruct the support person to take such actions as the court may consider 
necessary.  
(6) When a witness gives evidence behind a screen or in another room, the 
accused, his or her legal representative, the prosecutor in the case and the 
presiding officer shall be able to hear the witness and shall also be able to 
observe the witness while such witness gives evidence. 
(7) When a court is considering whether an order under this section should be 
made, it shall also consider the following matters – 
(a)  the interest of the state in adducing the complete and undistorted 
evidence of a vulnerable witness concerned; 
(b) the interests and well-being of the witness concerned; 
(c)  the availability of necessary equipment and locations;  
(d)  the interests of justice in general. 
 
2.4.1 Application 
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Section 158A(1) applies to all criminal proceedings and comes into operation once 
an application for special arrangements has been made. An application may be 
made by any party to the proceedings or the witness concerned, or on the court’s 
own motion. If the prosecutor or a vulnerable witness fails to apply for special 
arrangements a court before whom a vulnerable witness is to testify may make such 
an order if it deems the witness to be deserving of such arrangements.52 
 
Section 158A(1) uses the words “a court” … “may”, implying that the granting of 
special measures is not automatic, but that section 158A(1) has the effect of 
affording a discretion to the trial court whether or not to make an order allowing for 
special arrangements to be made. This discretion is subject thereto that the witness 
falls within the definition of a “vulnerable witness” as provided for in section 158A(3) 
of the Namibian Criminal Procedure Act. No other prerequisites are provided for in 
section 158A other than that the court should consider certain matters as provided 
for in section 158A(7) of the Namibian Criminal Procedure Act, such as the interests 
and well-being of the witness concerned, the availability of equipment and locations 
and the interests of justice in general. 
 
If the vulnerable witness is a child under the age of eighteen a court may order that 
special arrangements be made for the child witness’s testimony (such as allowing 
the child to testify at another location with the aid of closed-circuit television (CCTV)) 
if the court deems it to be in the interests of the child and necessary for the child’s 
well-being and in the interests of justice in general.53 These provisions may be 
compared with section 170A of the South African Criminal Procedure Act, which 
also affords the trial court a discretion whether or not to allow a child witness to give 
                                            
52  Hubbard Rape in Namibia: Assessment of the Operation of the Combating of Rape Act 8 of 
2004: Gender Research and Advocacy Project at 434 points out, however, that in practice 
uncertainty exists as to whose responsibility it is to initiate an application. Hubbard suggests 
that prosecutors should take primary responsibility, but presiding officers should be sensitised 
to play a more active role in this regard, just as they are expected to give special attention to 
the rights of an unrepresentative accused.  
53  S 158(2) of the Namibian Criminal Procedure Act. See para 2.4.2 below. 
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evidence through an intermediary at a place which has been informally arranged 
with the aid of any electronic or other devices.54 
 
Despite the fact that the discretionary nature of section 158A may be attributed to 
the fact that the purpose of the insertion of section 158A into the Namibian Criminal 
Procedure Act is to provide for special arrangements for vulnerable witnesses in 
general and not for children in particular, it is submitted that section 158A would be 
more effective if it were amended to require a court to make use of special 
arrangements in all cases where a person under the age of eighteen years is 
required to testify. The court should only be excused from doing so where it is clear 
that the child would not be traumatised or where it would be impossible to do so. 
 
2.4.2 Special arrangements 
 
Section 158A(2) sets out the various steps that a court may take in order to 
accommodate a vulnerable witness who is giving evidence. These could include any 
one or more of the following arrangements: 
 
 The trial may be held in a less formal and less intimidating environment than 
a court.55 A small child, for example, may feel more comfortable testifying in 
an office than in a courtroom.56 
 The court may also order that the courtroom furniture be removed or 
rearranged, or persons attending the court may be directed to sit or stand in 
                                            
54  Schwikkard “The abused child: a few rules of evidence considered” 1996 Acta Juridica 148 at 
159. Refer also to ch 5 below for a discussion on the discretion of the South African courts to 
appoint an intermediary. The discretionary nature of section 170A of the South African 
Criminal Procedure Act has been criticised in that the application of the section has become 
the exception rather than the norm. 
55  S 158A(2)(a) of the Namibian Criminal Procedure Act. 
56  Hubbard Rape in Namibia: Assessment of the Operation of the Combating of Rape Act 8 of 
2004: Gender Research and Advocacy Project 145. 
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different places from their usual places.57 This might be done where, for 
example, a young child is too short to be seen while sitting in the usual 
witness box.58 It is thus possible to adapt the court environment to make the 
witness feel more comfortable. In his address on the occasion of the 
inauguration of the High Court Vulnerable Witness Project, High Court, 
Windhoek, Judge President PT Damaseb described how the High Court has 
been assiduous in establishing the facilities that would enable the Court to 
implement the relevant provisions of the Act as follows:59  
 
[S]ome Judges [have] been very imaginative: they have reverted to all 
manner of arrangements that would create a less intimidating environment 
in the courtroom. For example, some Judges [have] cast away their robes 
and have literally descended from the Bench in order to get closer to such 
witnesses, particularly very young children who are alleged victims of sexual 
assault. 
 
 A support person may accompany the witness while testifying.60 A young 
child, for example, may present his or her testimony while sitting on the lap 
of a support person who is a family member, friend or teacher. The support 
person is entitled to interrupt the proceedings to alert the presiding officer to 
the fact that the witness is experiencing undue distress, or may need a short 
recess.61 The support person may not, however, give testimony in the same 
case or help the witness answer questions or instruct the witness on what to 
say. The presiding officer is entitled to instruct the support person not to 
                                            
57  S 158A(2)(b) of the Namibian Criminal Procedure Act. 
58  Hubbard Rape in Namibia: Assessment of the Operation of the Combating of Rape Act 8 of 
2004: Gender Research and Advocacy Project 145. 
59  See Superior Courts “Address by the Hon Judge President of the High Court of Namibia, Mr 
Justice PT Damaseb, on the occasion of the inauguration of the High Court Vulnerable 
Witness Project, High Court, Windhoek: 21 July 2008” available at http://www. 
Superiorcourts.org.na.high/docs/speeches/vulnerablewitnessproject.pdf (accessed 15/07/ 
2015) at 3. 
60  S 158A(2)(c) of the Namibian Criminal Procedure Act. 
61  S 158A(4)(b) of the Namibian Criminal Procedure Act. See also Hubbard Rape in Namibia: 
Assessment of the Operation of the Combating of Rape Act 8 of 2004: Gender Research and 
Advocacy Project 146. 
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communicate with the witness during testimony or to refrain from doing 
anything which might interfere with the evidence.62 
 A witness may also be allowed to testify from behind a one-way screen or 
from another room by means of CCTV or any other device suitable for such 
purpose.63 The accused, the accused’s legal representative, the prosecutor 
in the case and the presiding officer must, however, be able to hear and 
observe the witness while such witness gives testimony.64 The witness, 
however, does not have to see the accused, which ensures that the 
accused’s intimidating presence is out of sight of the witness.65 The Katutura 
Regional Magistrates’ Court Victim Friendly Sexual Offences Courtroom 
serves as an example of such a facility, where vulnerable witnesses can 
testify behind a one-way window or by means of CCTV from a child-friendly 
room. This separate room, annexed to the courtroom, is equipped with the 
necessary technical equipment to enable the court to hear and observe the 
child. The room is also suitably furnished with inviting toys, colouring 
materials, children’s books and other furnishings aimed at putting the 
vulnerable child witness at ease.66 
 The presiding officer may also take any other steps that, in the opinion of the 
court, are “expedient and desirable” in order to facilitate the giving of 
evidence by a vulnerable witness.67 A presiding officer may, for example, 
explain to a vulnerable witness how the procedure will work before the 
testimony commences.68 
 
2.4.3 Vulnerable witnesses 
                                            
62  S 158A(5) of the Namibian Criminal Procedure Act. 
63  S 158A(2)(d) of the Namibian Criminal Procedure Act. 
64  S 158A(6) of the Namibian Criminal Procedure Act. 
65  Schwikkard 2007 Namibian Law Journal 25. 
66  Hubbard Rape in Namibia: Assessment of the Operation of the Combating of Rape Act 8 of 
2004: Gender Research and Advocacy Project 1 at 142; Silungwe in Ruppel (ed) Children’s 
Rights in Namibia (2009) 329-330. 
67  S 158A (2)(e) of the Namibian Criminal Procedure Act. 
68  Hubbard Rape in Namibia: Assessment of the Operation of the Combating of Rape Act 8 of 
2004: Gender Research and Advocacy Project 146. 
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Section 158A(3) of the Namibian Criminal Procedure Act provides a definition of  
persons who are regarded as vulnerable witnesses. In terms of the definition a 
vulnerable witness may be any person under the age of eighteen; any victim of a 
sexual offence or an offence of an indecent nature or any victim of an offence 
involving violence that has been committed by a close family member, a spouse, or 
a partner in any permanent relationship. A person may also qualify as a vulnerable 
witness if he or she, because of some mental or physical disability, may be 
intimidated by the accused or any other person69 and may for that reason suffer 
undue stress while giving evidence, or may be unable to give full and proper 
evidence. The factors listed in the subsection are not cumulative but should be read 
disjunctively. This effectively means that a child below the age of eighteen will 
qualify as a vulnerable witness and will be able to make use of special arrangements 
without having to convince the court of any additional conditions in order to be 
allowed to make use of the special arrangements.  
 
Section 158A of the Namibian Criminal Procedure Act closely resembles section 
158 of the South African Criminal Procedure Act in this regard. Section 158 of the 
South African Criminal Procedure Act essentially provides that evidence can be 
given by a witness by means of CCTV or similar electronic media if the equipment 
therefor is readily available or obtainable and if, inter alia, to do so would be in the 
interests of justice or prevent the likelihood that prejudice or harm might be 
experienced by the witness if he or she testifies at such proceedings.70  
 
An evaluation of the aforementioned provisions of section 158A of the Namibian 
Criminal Procedure Act reveals that the conditions for its application in situations 
where child witnesses are present are much less stringent than the requirements of 
section 170A of the South African Criminal Procedure Act. This could possibly be 
                                            
69  The words “or any other person” are not defined for the purposes of s 158 of the Namibian 
Criminal Procedure Act. It is assumed, however, that this phrase may include parties to the 
proceedings or even court officials.   
70  S 158(2)(a), (b), (d) and (e) of the South African Criminal Procedure Act. 
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ascribed to the fact that this section pertains to vulnerable witnesses and not to child 
witnesses only and a stringent requirement such as “it appears to such court that it 
would expose any witness under the biological or mental age of eighteen years to 
undue mental stress or suffering if he or she testified at such proceedings” is 
therefore not necessary.71 Section 158A of the Namibian Criminal Procedure Act 
appears to be much more child-friendly than section 170A of the South African 
Criminal Procedure Act as there are far fewer hurdles for a child to overcome in 
order to testify in an informally arranged setting out of sight of the accused despite 
the fact that it is not aimed at the child witness specifically.  
 
2.4.4 Matters for consideration 
 
Section 158A(7) of the Namibian Criminal Procedure Act provides a list of matters 
which a court must take into account when considering an order for special 
arrangements. In each matter, the court should consider the interest of the state in 
adducing the complete and undistorted evidence of the witness.72 In addition the 
courts must consider the interests and well-being of the vulnerable witness, as well 
as the interests of justice in general.73 It is submitted that in all likelihood this means 
that the courts must ensure that the needs of the vulnerable witness are met without 
compromising the accused’s right to a fair trial.74 The courts must also consider the 
availability of the necessary equipment and locations. This in effect means that even 
when a child witness is likely to suffer undue stress owing to fear of having to face 
the accused, if the court building is not equipped with special rooms or one-way 
mirrors, the court may have to resort to other special arrangements. These may 
include the use of a screen or the rearrangement of the furniture in the courtroom to 
lessen the impact for the child witness of having to face an accused.75 
                                            
71  S 170A(1) of the South African Criminal Procedure Act. 
72  S 158A (7)(d) of the Namibian Criminal Procedure Act. 
73  S 158A(7)(b) and (d) of the Namibian Criminal Procedure Act. 
74  A 12 of the Constitution of Namibia affords every accused the right to a fair trial.  
75  S 158A (2)(a) and (b) of the Namibian Criminal Procedure Act. 
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Although the legislature thus proposes, through the application of section 158A, to 
ameliorate the disadvantages suffered by child witnesses, in the Namibian criminal 
justice system the effective protection of vulnerable witnesses is subject to the 
availability of the necessary resources.76 Schwikkard, in commenting on the special 
arrangements in section 158A, also expressed her concern about the availability of 
the necessary resources by stating that “the effective protection of vulnerable 
witnesses will have significant resource implications, and it will be interesting to see 
how frequently these protections materialise”.77  
 
As far as could be established, victim-friendly courts are only available at the High 
Court in Windhoek, the High Court in Oshakathi,78 the Katutura Magistrate’s Court 
and the Walvis Bay Magistrate’s Court.79 This clearly indicates a significant shortage 
of victim-friendly courts. This shortage has been attributed to a lack of funding on 
the part of the Namibian government and an over-dependency on donors.80 In his 
address on the occasion of the inauguration of the High Court Vulnerable Witness 
Project, the Judge-President of the High Court of Namibia Justice PT Damaseb 
admitted the following with regard to the facilities at the Windhoek High Court:81 
                                            
76  In terms of s 158(7) of the Namibian Criminal Procedure Act, when considering whether an 
order under this section should be made a court also has to consider the availability of 
equipment. The lack of adequate financial resources may therefore seriously affect the 
implementation of child-friendly legislation and is also the reason why the 2004 Criminal 
Procedure Act has not been implemented. Refer to para 2.3 above.  
77  Schwikkard 2007 Namibian Law Journal 25. 
78  Information provided by the Chief Registrar High and Supreme Court of Namibia to the writer 
of this thesis in an email dated 02/07/2015. 
79  Hubbard Rape in Namibia: Assessment of the Operation of the Combating of Rape Act 8 of 
2004: Gender Research and Advocacy Project 432-433. 
80  Wilkerson A Comparative analysis of the intermediary systems in South Africa, Namibia, 
Zimbabwe and Ethiopia 146-147. See also Schultz “Juvenile Justice in Limbo: Quote Vadis 
Namibia?” The Namibian 3/03/2007 available at http://www.namibian.com.na/indexx.php? 
archive _id=35351&page_type=archive_story_detail&page=6249 (accessed 20/08/2015) 
where the author highlights several projects in which the Namibian government fell short in its 
implementation, such as the Namibian Pilot Project on Community Corrections, as a result of 
donor fatigue. 
81  See Superior Courts “Address by the Hon Judge President of the High Court of Namibia, Mr 
Justice PT Damaseb, on the occasion of the inauguration of the High Court Vulnerable 
Witness Project, High Court,  Windhoek: 21 July 2008” available at http://www. 
superiorcourts.org.na.high/docs/speeches/vulnerablewitnessproject.pdf (accessed 15/07/ 
2015). 
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Without the [Aus Rotary] Club’s general’s financial assistance, this project would 
probably not have seen the light of day. This project is yet another shining example 
of the complementarity of the state and civil society to promote the proper 
administration of justice, which is a sine qua non of the rule of law. 
 
Although this is to some extent understandable in a developing country with limited 
human and financial resources, what is alarming is that it seems that even where 
such facilities are available for child victims they are underutilised. A study 
conducted in 2005 by Theron82 involving an in-depth examination of seven cases of 
child abuse, reported that the Windhoek Woman and Child Protection Unit revealed 
that despite the existence of an elaborate child-friendly courtroom in Windhoek this 
facility was not utilised. She reported as follows:83 
 
All of the children in the study had to give evidence in the presence of the accused. 
This created immense difficulties for the children. Child 4 ran out of the court when 
he saw the accused. Screens were only used in one case, but only after child 5 had 
refused twice to talk in the presence of the accused. Court officials then decided to 
have the whole proceedings at the Woman and Child Protection Unit and that court 
officials should not wear black gowns … Child 2 had to stand on a chair because 
she was too short, and that made her feel more exposed. None of the children were 
permitted the use of the child-friendly courts. Some parents did not even know of 
such a facility.  
 
Disturbingly, when the prosecutor in one of these cases was asked why the trial had 
not taken place in the child-friendly courtroom, she replied: “We’ll see how it goes 
and if it is too difficult for her, we can use the victim-friendly court.”84  
                                            
82  Theron The Impact of the Namibian Judiciary System on the Child Witness Master’s 
dissertation in Diaconology, Unisa (2005). 
83  Theron The Impact of the Namibian Judiciary System on the Child Witness 70.  
84  Theron The Impact of the Namibian Judiciary System on the Child Witness 85. 
The intermediary system in Namibia 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
357 
 
As part of a study on rape in Namibia conducted by Hubbard in 2006,85 prosecutors, 
legal aid lawyers and magistrates were interviewed as to the manner in which they 
had utilised any of the provisions for vulnerable witnesses that were introduced by 
the 2003 Criminal Procedure Amendment Act in the rape cases they had handled 
since the introduction of the Act. Many indicated that they had utilised some of the 
provisions, particularly regarding the use of support persons, having the presiding 
officer restate questions to the complainant, moving furniture or dispensing with 
robes to make the atmosphere less intimidating for the vulnerable witness. Where 
facilities allowed, screens and testimony via CCTV had been employed. The lack of 
appropriate equipment was cited by the interviewees as a limiting factor in many 
regions. In the Katimo Mulilo region it was stated for example that “[w]e don’t even 
have a screen for her testimony … The courtroom should have things like screens 
to separate the accused and the victim from each other during trial” while at 
Swakopmund it was reported that “I haven’t used the screen yet, we are not that 
advanced and it’s not available. The complainants still have to face the perpetrators 
and that’s difficult.”86  
 
It is disheartening to note that despite proper legislation being in place, Namibian 
child victims and child witnesses still find themselves in court having to face their 
alleged perpetrators. During a workshop on child witnesses Theron87 was reported 
to have remarked that “[w]e [Namibia] have very progressive and even exciting 
legislation in place, but there are many gaps in implementing it, and we still have a 
very far way to go”. According to Hubbard88 this may be attributed to the fact that no 
one seems to be quite sure whose responsibility it is to initiate the vulnerable witness 
arrangements. Although social workers would, in her opinion, be the most suitable 
                                            
85  Hubbard Rape in Namibia: Assessment of the Operation of the Combating of Rape Act 8 of 
2004: Gender Research and Advocacy Project 430-433. 
86  Hubbard Rape in Namibia: Assessment of the Operation of the Combating of Rape Act 8 of 
2004: Gender Research and Advocacy Project 431. 
87  Hartman “Child witnesses ‘crushed in court’” The Namibian 02/06/2009 available at 
http://www.namibian.com.na/indexx.php?archive_id=53982 (accessed 23/06/2015). 
88  Hubbard Rape in Namibia: Assessment of the Operation of the Combating of Rape Act 8 of 
2004: Gender Research and Advocacy Project 431. 
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people to inform vulnerable witnesses of the possibility of special arrangements, the 
reality is that many complainants will not even meet a social worker.89 She therefore 
suggests that ultimately the prosecutor should take primary responsibility for 
suggesting special arrangements. She also recommends that court rules should 
require that the record of the case involving a child below the age of eighteen years 
should indicate what provisions for vulnerable witnesses were used, and the 
reasons for using or not using the potential special arrangements. This would ensure 
that the vulnerable witness options are given adequate consideration.90  
 
2.5 Amendment of section 166 of the Namibian Criminal Procedure Act91 
 
In terms of section 166 of the Namibian Criminal Procedure Act any witness for the 
defence or a co-accused may be cross-examined by an accused or the prosecutor.92 
This exposes vulnerable witnesses to severe difficulties when having to face cross-
examination in the presence of an accused or even by an accused. Section 166 was 
amended by subsections (3), (4), (5) and (6) of the 2003 Criminal Procedure 
Amendment Act to help improve the way vulnerable witnesses give evidence in 
criminal courts. These sections provide as follows:  
 
(3)(a) If it appears to the court that any cross-examination contemplated in 
this section is being protracted unreasonably and thereby causing the 
proceedings to be delayed unreasonably, the court may request the 
cross-examiner to disclose the relevance of any line of examination 
and may impose reasonable limits on that cross-examination 
regarding the length thereof or regarding any particular line of 
examination. 
                                            
89  Hubbard Rape in Namibia: Assessment of the Operation of the Combating of Rape Act 8 of 
2004: Gender Research and Advocacy Project 431. 
90  Op cit at 434-436. 
91  As amended by the Criminal Procedure Amendment Act 24 of 2003. 
92  S 166(1) and (2) of the Namibian Criminal Procedure Act. 
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(b) The court may order that any submission regarding the relevancy of 
the cross-examination be heard in the absence of the witness. 
(4) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsections (1) and (2) or anything to the 
contrary in any other law contained but subject to subsection (5), the cross-
examination of any witness under the age of thirteen years shall take place 
only through the presiding judge or judicial officer, who shall either restate 
the questions put to such witness or, in his or her discretion, simplify or 
rephrase such questions. 
(5) The court may allow the cross-examination of a witness referred to in 
subsection (3) to occur through a person other than the presiding officer if – 
(a) that person has the qualifications determined by the Minister by notice 
in the Gazette; and 
(b) that person is immediately available when the witness concerned 
gives evidence. 
(6) If the person referred to in subsection (5) is not in the full time employ of the 
state, the relevant provision of section 191 shall apply to that person as if he 
or she is giving evidence for the party for which the witness concerned gives 
evidence. 
 
Subsection (3) gives a presiding officer the right to place strict limitations on the use 
of irrelevant cross-examination to harass or intimidate any witness. In addition 
subsection (3) also empowers a presiding officer to curtail unreasonably protracted 
cross-examination. The presiding officer may then ask the cross-examiner to show 
the relevance of the line of questioning before such cross-examiner is allowed to 
proceed. Reasonable restrictions may also be placed on certain lines of questioning. 
This will ensure that equitable cross-examination takes place.  
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Subsection (4) determines that the cross-examination of any witness under the age 
of thirteen years93 may only be conducted through the presiding officer or judicial 
officer. The presiding officer may restate the questions put to such witnesses or if 
deemed necessary simplify or rephrase such questions.  
 
Subsection (5) makes provision for the use of an intermediary. Although the 
subsection refers to “a person other than the presiding officer” it is generally 
accepted that the person referred to in subsection (5) is in fact an intermediary.94 
An intermediary is a person who has the qualifications determined by the Minister 
by notice in the Gazette for this purpose and should be immediately available to 
assist the witness with the giving of evidence.95 No such notice could unfortunately 
be found. It is assumed, however, that the Minister may approve social workers or 
psychologists as intermediaries.96 The intermediary may restate questions, or 
simplify or rephrase a question if necessary. The essential meaning of the question 
may not be changed, however.97 
 
It should be noted that subsection (5) permits the use of an intermediary during the 
cross-examination of a witness. No age restriction is set in the said subsection. This 
means in effect that the use of an intermediary is not restricted to children under the 
age of thirteen years but that intermediaries may also be used for older children. 
Children under the age of thirteen years must therefore be cross-examined by either 
the presiding officer or an intermediary98 whereas children above the age of thirteen 
                                            
93  The reason for the age of thirteen is unclear as the age of fourteen is the operative age for 
other provisions, namely when children are presumed to have the capacity to know right from 
wrong for the purposes of criminal liability and the age of consent in the Combating of Rape 
Act 8 of 2004. 
94  Hubbard Rape in Namibia: Assessment of the Operation of the Combating of Rape Act 8 of 
2004: Gender Research and Advocacy Project 147. 
95  S 166 (5)(a) and (b) of the Namibian Criminal Procedure Act. 
96  Hubbard Rape in Namibia: Assessment of the Operation of the Combating of Rape Act 8 of 
2004: Gender Research and Advocacy Project 147. 
97  Ibid. 
98  Note that s 166 (4) states that the cross-examination of any witness under the age of thirteen 
years may be conducted “subject to subsection (5)”. 
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years (or even adults) may at the discretion of the court be cross-examined by an 
intermediary. 
 
The following is a comparison between section 166 of the Namibian Criminal 
Procedure Act and section 170A of the South African Criminal Procedure Act: 
 
Section  170A of the South African 
Criminal Procedure Act 
166 of the Namibian 
Criminal Procedure Act 
Discretion of trial court to 
appoint an intermediary  
Court has a discretion to 
appoint an intermediary in 
all instances where a 
child under the biological 
or mental age of eighteen 
years would be exposed 
to undue mental stress or 
suffering. 
Children under the age 
of thirteen must be 
cross-examined by the 
presiding officer or an 
intermediary. 
 
Children above the age 
of thirteen years may 
be cross-examined by 
an intermediary. 
Application Witnesses under the 
biological or mental age 
of eighteen years 
No age restriction 
Prerequisites Subject thereto that the 
witness will suffer “undue 
mental stress or suffering” 
if such witness testifies at 
such proceedings 
Subject thereto that an 
intermediary is 
immediately available  
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Qualifications As determined by the 
Minister in the Gazette 
As determined by the 
Minister in the Gazette 
Questioning of witness Convey the general 
purport of the question. 
Restate, simplify or 
rephrase questions. 
Procedural provisions Provided: steps to be 
taken if, for example, a 
court discovers after the 
fact that an intermediary 
appointed in good faith 
was in fact not competent 
to be appointed as such 
None 
 
An evaluation of the abovementioned table reveals that the application of section 
166 of the Namibian Criminal Procedure Act, in comparison to section 170A of the 
South African Criminal Procedure Act, appears to be significantly less stringent for 
child witnesses. Whereas the court has a discretion in terms of section 170A of the 
South African Criminal Procedure Act in all instances to appoint an intermediary,99 
in terms of section 166 of the Namibian Criminal Procedure Act child witnesses 
under the age of thirteen years must be cross-examined by either the presiding 
officer or an intermediary.100 In order for section 170A of the South African Criminal 
Procedure Act to find application, the witness must be under the biological or mental 
age of eighteen years,101 whereas no age restriction is set in section 166 of the 
Namibian Act. In addition, the application of section 170A of the South African 
Criminal Procedure Act is subject thereto that the witness will be exposed to “undue 
mental stress or suffering” if such witness testifies at the proceedings,102 whereas 
the application of section 166 of the Namibian Criminal Procedure Act is only subject 
to the availability of an intermediary.103  
                                            
99  S 170A of the South African Criminal Procedure Act. 
100  S 166(4)-(5) of the Namibian Criminal Procedure Act. 
101  S 170A of the South African Criminal Procedure Act. 
102  S 170A of the South African Criminal Procedure Act. 
103  S 166(5) of the Namibian Criminal Procedure Act. 
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Namibia has progressive child-friendly legislation in place, but there is a serious lack 
of implementation. As stated above, the provision of intermediary services is based 
entirely on their availability. This prerequisite appears to have become the 
justification for failure to implement this provision. It should be noted that under 
section 166(5) the Namibian courts are under no obligation to provide intermediary 
services, even to deserving vulnerable witnesses. The indications are that where 
witnesses under the age of thirteen years have to be cross-examined by either the 
presiding judge or judicial officer or in the alternative by an intermediary, the courts 
choose to cross-examine the witness through the presiding officer. In her 2006 study 
on rape in Namibia, which included a discussion of the implementation of the 
vulnerable witness provisions, Hubbard104 reports that prosecutors, legal aid 
lawyers and magistrates, when asked about the utilisation of the provisions for 
vulnerable witnesses, indicated that in most instances the presiding officer 
questioned the minor witnesses. The comments included the following:105 
 
 In one case we have the magistrate as an intermediary for the questions. 
 
We use presiding officers [to restate questions] when we have children under the 
age of thirteen. 
In some instances probation officers or social workers are used to assist with 
questions to child witnesses. It is quite common for a child under 12 to be questioned 
through the presiding officer, especially in Otjiwarongo. 
 
In one case, the [unrepresented] accused was very aggressive and I told him not to 
ask questions directly to the child, so it was done through the interpreter and then 
me [magistrate]. So, the accused asked the questions to the interpreter who 
                                            
104  Hubbard Rape in Namibia: Assessment of the Operation of the Combating of Rape Act 8 of 
2004: Gender Research and Advocacy Project 430. 
105  Op cit at 430-431. 
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articulated it to me, and I asked the child. This was the only time I’ve used an 
intermediary, because we don’t have anyone trained for that … 
 
The focus appears to have shifted towards the provision of a support person who 
accompanies the child witness while testifying, with the questioning of the child 
witness being left to the presiding officer. The following statements confirming this 
position were recorded in Hubbard’s report:106 
 
We let mothers sit with the kids, block the accused and request the magistrates to 
be tender. 
 
The support person sits close to the victim while he or she is testifying … 
 
There was one case where a 14 year girl would be accompanied by her auntie 
whenever she had to testify. 
 
[The] victim used to stand in the witness stand but we see that they feel isolated 
because they are not standing with the guardians. Now the guardian and prosecutor 
sit next to them and it has been helpful. 
 
For example, young people are very shy. I have allowed their parent/guardian to 
stand next to them when testifying so they can feel confident … 
 
More than nine years later this still appears to be the position. Although it could not 
be established how many intermediaries currently act as such in the Namibian 
                                            
106  Ibid. 
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criminal justice system, the indications are that while support persons are often 
used, intermediaries are seldom employed.107 
 
Although the use of support persons is welcomed, it should be noted that the role of 
the support person is restricted to the lending of physical comfort to the witness. The 
support person may in no way assist with the giving of evidence.108 The questioning 
of a child witness through a presiding officer is not recommended as research has 
shown that this does not elicit the best possible evidence from child witnesses.109 
The effective questioning of a child witness is a highly specialised task that requires 
an understanding by the interviewer of child development in three critical domains, 
namely the linguistic, cognitive and emotional domains, as well as an appreciation 
of the use of appropriate questions specific to a child’s level of development.110 Very 
few presiding officers have these specialised skills and many find it difficult to 
communicate effectively with children. In Director of Public Prosecutions v Minister 
of Justice and Constitutional Development111 the South African Constitutional Court 
alluded to this problem as follows: 
 
[T]he manner in which the child is questioned is crucial to the enquiry. It is here 
where the role of an intermediary becomes vital. The intermediary will ensure that 
questions by the court to the child are conveyed in a manner that the child can 
comprehend and that the answers given by the child are conveyed in a manner that 
the court will understand. As pointed out earlier, questioning a child requires a 
special skill. Not many judicial officers have the skill … This illustrates the 
importance of using intermediaries when young children are called upon to testify. 
They have particular skills in questioning and communicating with children. 
                                            
107  Information provided by the Prosecutor-General of Namibia, Adv Imalwa, to the writer of this 
thesis in an email dated 07/08/2015. The fact that a list of persons qualified to act as such in 
terms of s 166(5) of the Namibian Criminal Procedure Act has not been determined by the 
Minister by notice in the Gazette lends support to this notion. 
108  S 158A(2)(c) and 158A(4)-(5) of the Namibian Criminal Procedure Act. 
109  Zajac “Investigative interviewing in the courtroom: child witnesses under cross-examination” 
in Bull et al Handbook of Psychology of Investigative Interviewing (2009) 1 ff.  
110  Schumann, Bhala & Lee “Developmentally appropriate questions for child witnesses” 1999 
Queens LJ 251-304. Refer also to ch 5 para 3.4 for more on the functions of an intermediary. 
111  2009 (2) SACR 130 (CC) at paras [167] and [168]. 
The intermediary system in Namibia 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
366 
 
Intermediaries possess the necessary skills to fulfill this unique function, namely to 
convey the meaning of questions to the child witness in a manner which is 
understandable to the child, thereby enabling the child to answer the questions 
properly. Although much has been done by the Namibian government to enhance 
the position of child witnesses through the vulnerable witness provisions, the failure 
to use intermediaries is clearly not in the interests of child witnesses and may even 
result in a total failure of the implementation of the Namibian intermediary system. 
This warrants renewed action from the Namibian government to reinvigorate the 
implementation of section 166(5) of the Namibian Criminal Procedure Act. 
 
2.6 The 2004 Criminal Procedure Act 
 
The 2004 Criminal Procedure Act was promulgated by the Namibian government in 
2004, but the Act has not come into operation due to the fact that the Namibian 
government lacks adequate resources to fully implement it.112 This Act is meant to 
replace the 1977 Namibian Criminal Procedure Act. Despite its coming into 
operation being indefinitely suspended, it is necessary to examine the 2004 Criminal 
Procedure Act as it may still (subject to some review) be instated,113 and in addition 
it contains elaborate provisions on the use of intermediaries. Section 193 of the 2004 
Criminal Procedure Act in particular makes special reference to the use of 
intermediaries in the protection of child witnesses when interfacing with the criminal 
justice system. 
 
2.6.1 Section 193 of the 2004 Criminal Procedure Act 
 
                                            
112  Schwikkard 2007 Namibian Law Journal 5. 
113  Information provided by the Prosecutor-General of Namibia, Adv Imalwa, to the writer of this 
thesis in an email dated 07/08/2015. 
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Section 193 of the 2004 Criminal Procedure Act provides as follows: 
 
(1) When criminal proceedings are pending before a court and it appears to the 
court that it would expose a witness under the age of 18 years to undue 
mental stress or suffering if that witness testifies at such proceedings, the 
court may, subject to subsection (4), appoint a competent person as an 
intermediary to enable that witness to give his or her evidence through that 
intermediary. 
(2) (a) Notwithstanding section 187(1) and (2) or anything to the contrary in 
any other law contained, no examination, cross-examination or re-
examination of a witness in respect of whom a court has appointed 
an intermediary under subsection (1), except examination by the 
court, may take place in any manner other than through that 
intermediary.  
(b) The intermediary so appointed may, unless the court directs 
otherwise, convey the general purport of any question to the witness 
concerned. 
(3) If a court appoints an intermediary under subsection (1), the court may direct 
that the witness concerned gives his or her evidence at any place - 
(a) which is informally arranged to set that witness at ease; 
(b) which is so situated that any person whose presence may upset that 
witness, is outside the sight and hearing of that witness; and 
(c) which enables the court and any person whose presence is 
necessary at the proceedings in question to see and hear, either 
directly or through the medium of any electronic or other devices, that 
intermediary as well as that witness during his or her testimony. 
(4) (a) The Minister may by notice in the Gazette determine the persons or 
the category or class of persons who are competent to be appointed 
as intermediaries. 
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(b) An intermediary who is not in the full-time employment of the State 
must be paid such travelling and subsistence and other allowances 
in respect of the services rendered by him or her as the Minister, in 
consultation with the Minister responsible for finance, may determine. 
(5) (a) No oath, affirmation or admonition that has been administered 
through an intermediary in terms of section 186 is invalid and no 
evidence that has been presented through an intermediary is 
inadmissible solely on account of the fact that the intermediary was 
not competent to be appointed as an intermediary in terms of a notice 
under subsection (4)(a) at the time when that oath, affirmation or 
admonition was administered or that evidence was presented. 
(b) If in any criminal proceedings it appears to a court that an oath, 
affirmation or admonition was administered or that evidence has been 
presented through an intermediary who was appointed in good faith 
but, at the time of the appointment, was not competent to be 
appointed as an intermediary in terms of a notice under subsection 
(4)(a), the court must make a finding as to the validity of that oath, 
affirmation or admonition or the admissibility of that evidence with due 
regard to - 
(i) the reason why the intermediary was not competent to be 
appointed as an intermediary, and the likelihood that that 
reason will affect the reliability of the evidence so presented 
adversely; 
(ii) the mental stress or suffering which the witness in respect of 
whom that intermediary was appointed will be exposed to if 
that evidence is to be presented anew, whether by the witness 
in person or through another intermediary; and 
(iii) the likelihood that real and substantial justice will be impaired 
if that evidence is admitted. 
(6) Nothing in subsection (5) contained is to be construed as preventing the 
prosecution from presenting anew any evidence that was presented through 
an intermediary referred to in that subsection.  
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An evaluation of section 193 clearly illustrates that the Namibian government 
borrowed from the pre-amended section 170A of the South African Criminal 
Procedure Act. Section 193 closely resembles South Africa’s section 170A(1) to (6) 
before its amendment by the Criminal Law (Sentencing) Amendment Act.114 This 
explains why section 193(1) of the Namibian Criminal Procedure Act does not refer 
to witnesses under the biological or mental age of eighteen years and does not 
contain subsections (7), (8), (9) and (10) as the aforementioned amendment and 
subsections were inserted into the South African Criminal Procedure Act through 
the Criminal Law (Sentencing) Amendment Act in 2007. Since section 193 of the 
Namibian Criminal Procedure Act is similar to the previously discussed section 
170A(1) to (6), the provisions of section 193 will not be examined.115 
 
Suffice it to say that although section 193 of the 2004 Criminal Procedure Act 
provides more detailed provisions regarding the use of intermediaries, the removal 
of the mandatory requirement for examination of young witnesses is a considerable 
weakening of the 1977 Namibian Criminal Procedure Act.116 In terms of the 1977 
Act, children under the age of thirteen must be questioned through the presiding 
officer or an intermediary and an intermediary may be used for children under the 
age of eighteen years. In terms of the 2004 Act, intermediaries may be used for 
witnesses under the age of eighteen years but only if “it appears to the court that it 
would expose a witness under the age of 18 years to undue mental stress or 
suffering if that witness testifies at such proceedings”. The implementation of section 
193 of the 2004 Criminal Procedure Act would clearly significantly disadvantage 
child witnesses and would be a backward step in the advancement of the rights of 
Namibian child witnesses. Serious consideration should accordingly be given to the 
re-evaluation of section 193 of the 2004 Criminal Procedure Act by the Namibian 
legislature before the 2004 Criminal Procedure Act comes into force. 
                                            
114  Act 38 of 2007. 
115  Refer to ch 5 above. 
116  Compare s 166(4)-(5) of the Namibian Criminal Procedure Act with s 193 of the 2004 Criminal 
Procedure Act. 
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3 CONCLUSION 
 
As indicated in the introduction to this chapter, the aim of this chapter is to evaluate 
child victims and child witnesses’ rights in the Namibian criminal justice system with 
a view to comparing the position in Namibia with that of South Africa.117  
 
The Namibian judicial system is historically analogous to that of South Africa. Like 
South Africa, Namibia adopted a new Constitution in the early 1990s founded upon 
the principles of democracy, the rule of law and justice for all. The Constitution of 
Namibia promotes and protects children’s rights albeit indirectly in some instances. 
Apart from the general fundamental rights provided for in the Constitution of 
Namibia, article 15 specifically refers to children’s rights. Article 15 corresponds to 
a certain degree to section 28 of the Constitution of South Africa.118 However, unlike 
the Constitution of South Africa, article 15 does not define a “child” nor does it 
include the principle of the “best interests of the child”. The Namibian legislature 
rectified this lacuna through the Child Care and Protection Act.119 It is submitted that 
the Act gives adequate content to the principle of the best interests of the child, 
thereby enhancing the rights of children. 
 
Moreover, the evaluation of the Namibian criminal justice system revealed that, like 
the South African system, the Namibian criminal justice system is accusatorial in 
nature and for some time even resembled the South African Criminal Procedure Act 
to a significant extent.120 Namibian children, akin to South African children, suffered 
severe trauma and emotional distress during the court processes up until the early 
                                            
117  See a 1(1) and (6) of the Constitution of Namibia. 
118  Compare a 15 of the Constitution of Namibia with s 28 of the Constitution of South Africa. 
119  See ss (1) and 3(1) of the Child Care and Protection Act. 
120  Horn “International human rights norms and standards: The development of Namibian case 
and statutory law” available at http://www.kas.de/upload/auslandshomepages/namibia/ 
HumanRights/horn.pdf141 (accessed 03/07/2015) at 150. 
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twenty-first century. Only with the amendment of the Namibian Criminal Procedure 
Act through the enactment of the 2003 Criminal Procedure Amendment Act did the 
position change for child victims and child witnesses within the Namibian criminal 
justice system.  
 
In comparison to section 170A of the South African Criminal Procedure Act, the 
application of section 158A is more child-oriented in that there are fewer obstacles 
to overcome to be able to make use of the special measures.121 In addition, section 
166 of the Namibian Criminal Procedure Act prescribes as a standard norm that 
children under the age of thirteen must be cross-examined by the presiding officer 
or an intermediary, whereas children under the age of eighteen may at the discretion 
of the trial court testify with the aid of an intermediary.122 In terms of section 170A of 
the South African Criminal Procedure Act the court has a discretion in all instances 
to appoint an intermediary. In South Africa child victims and child witnesses under 
the age of thirteen years do not have the right to demand that they be cross-
examined by an intermediary. It is submitted that South African children will likewise 
greatly benefit from such a position and that serious attention should be given to the 
implementation of comparative legislation in South Africa. Further, there are no pre-
requisites for section 166 of the Namibian Criminal Procedure Act to find application 
other than that an intermediary should be immediately available. In comparison, its 
South African counterpart (s 170A) does not find application unless failure to apply 
it would expose the child witness to undue mental stress or suffering. However, the 
application of section 166 of the Namibian Criminal Procedure Act proves to be more 
child-oriented in this regard. The wording of section 166 and section 158A of the 
Namibian Criminal Procedure Act is therefore preferred to that of section 170A in 
that it affords child witnesses enhanced protection. In this regard the Namibian 
experience could act as an example and impetus for South Africa to introduce 
changes within its juristic system. 
 
                                            
121  Refer to para 2.4.3 above. 
122  S 166(4)-(5) of the Namibian Criminal Procedure Act, emphasis added. 
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Regrettably, while Namibia may be complimented on their advanced child-friendly 
legislation, they are open to criticism for their grave lack of implementation. As far 
as could be established Namibia has a significant shortage of child-friendly courts, 
and even where such facilities are available they are underutilised.123 This leaves 
children exposed to the adverse effects of the normal adult accusatorial judicial 
system. In addition to this dilemma, although it could not be established how many 
intermediaries currently act as such in the Namibian criminal justice system, the 
indications are that intermediaries are seldom used.124 This role is usually performed 
by the presiding officer.125 By failing to utilise intermediaries, Namibia chooses to 
ignore a vast amount of research and knowledge signifying the importance of the 
questioning of a child witness by a skilled interviewer who is specifically trained for 
this purpose and who has an understanding of a child’s linguistic, cognitive and 
emotional development. Very few presiding officers have these specialised skills or 
have been trained to perform this task.126 Intermediaries possess these skills and 
by drawing on them while questioning child witnesses they not only elicit more 
accurate and reliable evidence from child witnesses but also lessen the impact of 
the trial on child witnesses.127 It should be kept in mind that the whole object of the 
creation of the persona or function of an intermediary is to protect a child witness 
from the adverse effects of confrontation and cross-examination typical of an 
accusatorial system.128 The re-traumatisation of child witnesses as a result of 
inappropriate questioning or aggressive cross-examination is only partially 
addressed by the special arrangement measures.        
 
Namibia and South Africa, as signatories to important international and human rights 
instruments such as the CRC and the African Children’s Charter, carry the same 
obligations as a result of their endorsement of the said instruments to uphold the 
                                            
123  Refer to para 2.4.5 of ch 6 above. 
124  Refer to para 2.5 of ch 6 above. 
125  Hubbard Rape in Namibia: Assessment of the Operation of the Combating of Rape Act 8 of 
2004: Gender Research and Advocacy Project 431. 
126  DPP v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development 2009 (2) SACR 130 (CC) at paras 
[167]-[168]. 
127  DPP v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development 2009 (2) SACR 130 (CC) at paras 
[167]-[168]. 
128  DPP v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development 2009 (2) SACR 130 (CC) at paras 
[93]-[99]. 
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rights of child victims and child witnesses within their criminal justice systems. In 
terms of the CRC it is States Parties’ duty to ensure that local legislation adheres to 
the principles and provisions of the CRC in the protection of children from all forms 
of physical or mental violence, injury, abuse or neglect as well as in the protection 
and realisation of children’s best interests.129 As signatories to these instruments, 
countries should not only enact child-friendly legislation to assist child witnesses in 
line with their international obligations but should also invest in the implementation 
of such legislation. Owing to the aforementioned shortcomings it appears that the 
Namibian government has not fully discharged its obligations to provide sufficient 
protection for child witnesses interfacing with the Namibian justice system. Although 
this can be attributed in part to Namibia’s unfortunate financial constraints, it is 
submitted that the rights of child witnesses should not be weighed in Namibian 
dollars and cents. 
 
In conclusion, although Namibia has made some progress along the long and 
difficult road towards the realisation of child witnesses’ rights, it still has a way to go 
in its efforts to make the country a better place for its children. 
                                            
129  Arts 3 & 13 of the CRC. 
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CHAPTER 7 
 
The intermediary system in New Zealand 
 
It disturbs me that AUT’s [Auckland University of Technology] research found that 
30 per cent of children wept while testifying, more than 70 per cent of them did not 
understand a question posed by a defence lawyer, and that 65 per cent were 
accused of lying, [the then Justice Minister] Mr Power said.  
 
We simply must do better to ensure that the estimated 750 children who give 
evidence in criminal courts each year - the majority of them complainants in sexual 
offending cases - are not re-brutalised by their participation in the process. They are 
in the criminal justice system through no fault of their own and they deserve special 
protection.1 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The position of child victims and child witnesses in New Zealand in some respects 
resembles that of South African children. New Zealand children also have to face 
the difficulties associated with high levels of crime, for example, in that it is estimated 
that around 2000 or more children appear in New Zealand criminal courts as 
complainants or witnesses every year.2 Like South Africa, New Zealand has an 
                                            
1  Power Alternative court processes for child witnesses Press Release 5/10/2011 available at 
http://www.beehive.govt.nz/release/alternative-court-processes-child-witnessess (accessed 
07/09/2015). 
2  According to the issue paper of the New Zealand Ministry of Justice Alternative Pre-Trial and 
Trial Processes for Child Witnesses in New Zealand's Criminal Justice System Issues Paper 
(2011) available at http://justice.govt.nz/publications/global-publications/a/alternative-pre-
trail-and (accessed 07/09/2015), in 2009/2010 over 2000 child complainants were involved in 
cases before the courts and even more children were involved in court cases as witnesses.  
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adversarial criminal justice system.3 This entails that witnesses have to appear at 
trial to give oral evidence and be subjected to cross-examination.4 In this regard 
New Zealand child witnesses and child victims historically suffered similar hardship 
to South African children when they had to testify in criminal proceedings. Up to the 
early 1990s the position of most child witnesses and child victims in New Zealand, 
as in most of the common law world with an adversarial criminal justice system, was 
extremely bleak in that children were required to give evidence in the witness box in 
the same manner as adults5 while facing the additional hurdle of their evidence 
being regarded as inherently suspect.6  
 
Over the past twenty years the position of child witnesses and child victims within 
the New Zealand criminal justice system has, like that of South African child 
witnesses and child victims, been affected by the increasing concern expressed 
about the failure of the criminal justice process to meet the needs of child witnesses 
and gather adequate evidence from them.7 The criminal process for child witnesses 
and child victims in New Zealand has accordingly seen considerable reform through 
the enactment of the New Zealand Evidence Amendment Act 19898 and the New 
Zealand Evidence Act 2006,9 which provide for a range of alternatives to 
conventional testimony, including recording a child’s evidence-in-chief, the use of 
live links, and the use of intermediaries10 to assist in questioning children. 
 
                                            
3  Henderson “An idea whose time has come: The reform of criminal procedure for child 
witnesses in New Zealand” in Spencer & Lamb Children and Cross-Examination: Time to 
Change the Rules? (2012) 1 at 113. 
4  Pipe & Henaghan “Accommodating children’s testimony: Legal reforms in New Zealand” in 
Bottoms & Goodman International Perspectives on Child Abuse and Children’s Testimony: 
Psychological Research and Law (1996) 145 at 146. 
5  Pipe & Henaghan in Bottoms & Goodman International Perspectives on Child Abuse and 
Children’s Testimony: Psychological Research and Law 145 at 146.  
6  R v Parker [1968] NZLR 325 at 329. 
7  Henderson in Spencer & Lamb Children and Cross-Examination: Time to Change the Rules? 
1 at 114. 
8  The New Zealand Evidence Amendment Act 104 of 1989 inserted ss 23C- 23I into the New 
Zealand Evidence Act 56 of 1908.  
9  The New Zealand Evidence Act 69 of 2006. 
10  While the New Zealand Evidence Amendment Act 1989 provides for the use of an 
intermediary in s 23E(4), the New Zealand Evidence Act 2006 does not specifically refer to 
intermediaries but mentions communication assistance. See s 80 of the Evidence Act 2006. 
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This chapter consists of a discussion of the position of the rights of child victims and 
child witnesses in the New Zealand criminal justice system. The historical 
development of the rights of child victims and child witnesses in the New Zealand 
criminal justice system will also be referred to where relevant. These discussions 
are important because, as will be pointed out, owing to similarities between the two 
countries South Africa and New Zealand can learn from one another in this regard. 
Much is therefore to be gained from a comparative perspective on how New Zealand 
has improved its criminal justice system over the past twenty years to enhance the 
protection of the rights of child victims and child witnesses within their system. Such 
a comparison is beneficial to both countries in order to identify possible 
shortcomings as well as valuable features in the respective criminal justice systems. 
  
It is nevertheless important to remember that there are both similarities and 
differences between New Zealand and South Africa with regard to the rights to 
protection of child victims and child witnesses. New Zealand is a parliamentary 
democracy and a constitutional monarchy. Because it is a constitutional monarchy 
the Queen of the United Kingdom, as head of state, is the source of legal authority 
in New Zealand. The Queen, together with her representative the Governor General, 
acts on the advice of the democratically elected Government in all but the most 
exceptional circumstances. New Zealand is also one of only three countries in the 
world (the others being Britain and Israel) without a full and entrenched written 
constitution.11 New Zealand’s constitution in this regard differs from the constitutions 
of most other countries in that most modern countries, including South Africa, have 
a well-established constitution which is the supreme law and is compiled in a single 
document or a small number of documents comprising the elements which 
determine how public power is to be exercised and implemented within a specific 
state.12 The sources of the constitution of New Zealand conversely include the 
prerogative powers of the Queen, various statutes with constitutional significance 
                                            
11  “New Zealand’s Constitution – past, present and future” available at www.beehive.govt. 
nz/en/constitution%20Cabinet (accessed 13/10/15). 
12  Palmer & Palmer Bridled Power: New Zealand’s Constitution and Government 4 ed (2004) 4-
6. 
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(for example the New Zealand Constitution Act,13 the New Zealand Electoral Act,14 
the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act15) and the common law. 
 
Despite these constitutional differences, New Zealand and South Africa can still 
learn from one another. Like South Africa, New Zealand is a signatory to important 
international human rights instruments such as the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights and the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC). It will 
be informative to see how New Zealand meets its international obligations regarding 
the protection of child victims and child witnesses within its criminal justice system.  
 
2 THE RIGHT TO PROTECTION OF THE NEW ZEALAND CHILD 
VICTIM AND CHILD WITNESS 
 
2.1 The Convention on the Rights of the Child 
 
As stated previously, New Zealand is a signatory to and has ratified the CRC.16 In 
so doing New Zealand has committed itself to fulfilling its obligations in terms of the 
provisions pertaining to child victims and child witnesses within the said instrument. 
                                            
13  Act 114 of 1986. 
14  Act 87 of 1993. 
15  Act 109 of 1990. 
16  New Zealand ratified the CRC on 6 April 1993 subject to the following reservations: “Nothing 
in this Convention shall affect the right of the Government of New Zealand to continue to 
distinguish as it considers appropriate in its law and practice between persons according to 
the nature of their authority to be in New Zealand including but not limited to their entitlement 
to benefits and other protections described in the Convention, and the Government of New 
Zealand reserves the right to interpret and apply the Convention accordingly. The Government 
of New Zealand considers that the rights of the child provided for in article 32(1) are adequately 
protected by its existing law. It therefore reserves the right not to legislate further or to take 
additional measures as may be envisaged in article 32(2). The Government of New Zealand 
reserves the right not to apply article 37(c) in circumstances where the shortage of suitable 
facilities makes the mixing of juveniles and adults unavoidable; and further reserves the right 
not to apply article 37(c) where the interest of other juveniles in an establishment require the 
removal of a particular juvenile offender or where mixing is considered to be of benefit to the 
persons concerned.” 
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Three principles of the CRC, together with the General Comments developed by the 
Committee on the Rights of the Child on the principles, are of particular importance, 
namely the best interests of the child (article 3), the right of the child to be heard 
(article 12) and the right of the child to freedom from all forms of violence (article 
19).17 In terms of the three principles New Zealand as a State Party to the CRC has 
to ensure that the child’s best interests are taken into account as a primary 
consideration in all actions or decisions that concerns the child, in both the public 
and the private sphere. In addition the Government of New Zealand should afford 
every child capable of forming his or her own views, the right to express those views 
freely in all matters affecting the child, which views should be given due weight in 
accordance with the age and maturity of the child. The Government of New Zealand 
is also obliged to introduce measures for the protection of children from all forms of 
violence. Such protective measures should include a range of interventions, namely 
legislative, administrative, social and educational measures as well as proactive 
prevention against the experience of violence and treatment for those that have 
been the victims of violence.18 
 
As a signatory to the CRC, New Zealand, like other parties to the convention, is 
obliged under article 44 of the CRC to report on progress made with its 
implementation. In its 2015 report19 on New Zealand’s progress on the 
implementation of the CRC and the two Optional Protocols20 the Government of 
New Zealand reported21 with regard to inter alia the protection of child witnesses 
                                            
17  Note that although the right to be free from violence may not normally be associated with court 
proceedings, it is submitted that a case can be made out that exposing a child in open court 
to aggressive cross-examination by the alleged perpetrator or legal representative may 
amount to (secondary) violence. Refer also to ch 4 above for a comprehensive discussion of 
the right of the child to be free from violence in terms of the Constitution of the Republic of 
South Africa. This is equally true for children residing in New Zealand. Children are also 
afforded the right to be free from violence in terms of s 9 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act. 
18  Refer to ch 4 above for a comprehensive discussion on aa 3, 12 and 9 as well as the General 
Comments of the Convention on the Right of the Child on the articles. 
19  United Nations CRC: Fifth Periodic Report by the Government of New Zealand 2015 available 
at www.msd.govt.nz/.../2015.04.15-cabinet-paper-april-2015.pdf (accessed 19/10/2015). 
20  Optional Protocol on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict and the Optional Protocol 
on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography (OPSC).   
21  At paras 250 and 251 of the report. 
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and victims of crime that the following progress has been made towards the 
fulfilment of its obligations:  
 
250. The protective services offered to child victims and witnesses are outlined in 
paragraphs 89 to 106 of New Zealand’s Initial Report under OPSC.22  
 
251. Following the 2013 New Zealand Law Commission[’s] review of the Evidence 
Act 2006 a number of reforms to make appearing in court less traumatic for child 
witnesses [have been proposed]. These include creating a legislative presumption 
that all witnesses under the age of 18 use alternative ways to give their evidence. 
This involves the use of pre-recorded evidence, audio-visual link, closed-circuit 
television and the use of witness screens in court.  
 
The Evidence Act 2006 as well as the reviews of the Evidence Act 2006 with regard, 
specifically, to the protection afforded to child witnesses and child victims will be 
discussed below. The extent to which these reforms realise the rights enshrined in 
the CRC will be highlighted.  
 
2.2 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990  
 
As mentioned previously, the sources of the Constitution of New Zealand include 
various statutes with constitutional significance and in particular the New Zealand 
Bill of Rights Act.23 The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act (although not having the 
                                            
22  This includes aspects such as the interviewing of child witnesses by a specialist trained 
interviewer from the New Zealand Police, training of the judiciary on how best to question and 
cross-examine child witnesses, support, counselling and other treatment programmes for 
victims as well as budgetary reviews of specialist sexual violence services. See the Optional 
Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution 
and Child Pornography: Initial Report by the Government of New Zealand 2014 available at 
https:/www.msd.govt.nz/about-msd.../optional-protocols.html (accessed 25/10/2015). 
23  Act 109 of 1990. 
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status of supreme law24) serves to affirm, protect and promote the rights and 
freedoms contained in the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act and applies to acts 
performed by the legislative, executive or judicial branches of the Government of 
New Zealand.25 In this regard the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act corresponds to 
some degree with the Bill of Rights of the Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa, 1996.26  
 
The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act also promotes and protects children’s rights, 
albeit implicitly. Everyone, including children, is afforded the right to life27 as well as 
the right not to be subjected to torture or to cruel, degrading or disproportionately 
severe treatment or punishment.28 Section 27 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 
affords every person, and hence also children, the right to the observance of the 
principles of natural justice by any tribunal or other public authority which has the 
power to make a determination in respect of that person’s rights, obligations or 
interests as protected or recognised by law.  
 
The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act affords an accused certain special rights, namely 
the right to: a) a fair and public hearing;29 b) be present at the trial and to present a 
defence;30 and c) examine the witness for the prosecution.31 This has been affirmed 
in the Evidence Act 2006, which provides that any judicial decision to modify the 
ordinary manner of witness testimony set out in section 83(1) of the Evidence Act 
2006 must take the aforementioned rights of the accused into account.32 No similar 
rights are afforded to witnesses in the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act. 
 
                                            
24  See s 4 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act. 
25  See ss 2 and 3 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act.  
26  Hereinafter the Constitution of South Africa. 
27  S 8 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act. 
28  S 9 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act. 
29  S 25(a) of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act. 
30  S 25(e) of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act. 
31  S 25(f) of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act. 
32  Mahoney et al The Evidence Act 2006: Act and Analysis 3 ed (2014) EV 83.02.  
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In addition, unlike the Bill of Rights of the Constitution of South Africa, which 
specifically provides for children’s rights,33 the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act makes 
no such provision. There is also no equivalent to the best interests of the child 
principle as set out in section 28(2) of the Bill of Rights of the Constitution of South 
Africa. This may perhaps be attributed to the fact that the New Zealand Bill of Rights 
Act was enacted in part to affirm New Zealand’s commitment to the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The latter document does not contain any 
specific reference to children’s rights either. 
 
It is accordingly argued by the writer hereof that in comparison with the South African 
Bill of Rights, the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act is underutilised as a tool for the 
protection of children’s rights. The only reference to the best interests of the child 
principle can be found in the New Zealand Care of Children Act34 (sections 4 and 
                                            
33  See s 28 of the Constitution of South Africa. 
34  Act 90 of 2004. 
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535) and the New Zealand Children, Young Persons, and Their Families Act36 
(section 637) respectively. An analysis of sections 4 and 5 of the New Zealand Care 
of Children Act reveals that these sections do not extend the right to the protection 
of their best interests to child victims and child witnesses. This is understandable as 
the focus of the New Zealand Care of Children Act is not on child victims and child 
witnesses within the criminal justice domain but on the promotion of children’s 
welfare and best interests by ensuring that appropriate arrangements are in place 
for their guardianship and care. The principle of the paramountcy of the welfare and 
interests of children or young persons as stated in section 6 of the New Zealand 
Children, Young Persons, and Their Families Act has to do with matters relating to 
the administration or application of the latter Act and as such does not afford child 
victims and child witnesses any protection either. Protection for child victims and 
                                            
35 Sections 4 and 5 state as follows:  
4(1) The welfare and best interests of a child in his or her particular circumstances must be 
the first and paramount consideration- 
(a) in the administration and application of this Act, for example in proceedings under this 
Act; and 
(b) in any other proceedings involving the guardianship of, or the role of providing day-to-
day care for, or contact with, a child. 
(2) Any person considering the welfare and best interests of a child in his or her particular 
circumstances- 
(a) must take into account- 
(i) the principle that decisions affecting the child should be made and implemented 
within a time frame that is appropriate to the child’s sense of time; and 
(ii) the principles in section 5; and 
(b) may take into account the conduct of the person who is seeking to have a role in the 
upbringing of the child to the extent that that conduct is relevant to the child’s welfare 
and best interests”. 
5 The principles relating to a child’s welfare and best interests are that- 
(a) a child’s safety must be protected and, in particular a child must be protected from all 
forms of violence (as defined in section 3(2) to (5) of the Domestic Violence Act 1995) 
from all persons, including members of the child’s family, family group, whãnau, hapù 
and iwi; 
(b) a child’s care, development, and upbringing should be primarily the responsibility of his 
or her parents and guardians; 
(c) a child’s care, development, and upbringing should be facilitated by on-going 
consultation and co-operation between his or her parents, guardians, and any other 
person having a role in his or her care under a parenting or guardianship order; 
(d) a child should have continuity in his or her care, development, and upbringing; 
(e)  a child should continue to have a relationship with both of his or her parents, and that 
a child’s relationship with his or her family group, whānau, hapū, or iwi should be 
preserved and strengthened; 
(f)  a child’s identity (including, without limitation, his or her culture, language, and religious 
denomination and practice) should be preserved and strengthened. 
36  Act 24 of 1989. 
37  Section 6 states as follows: 
“In all matters relating to the Administration or application of this Act (other than Parts 4 and 5 
and sections 351 to 360), the welfare and interest of the child or young person shall be the 
first and paramount consideration, having regard to the principles set out in sections 5 and 
13.”  
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child witnesses is however found in international instruments, in particular the CRC 
as stated previously, as well as in other domestic law. 
 
2.3 Reforms to the New Zealand law of evidence before 1989 
 
Prior to the enactment of the New Zealand Evidence Amendment Act 1989, the 
successful prosecution of child sexual abuse cases in New Zealand was relatively 
rare. This was mainly due to the stringent evidentiary law requirements for children, 
based on society’s adherence at the time to the myth that children are prone to 
invention, fantasy and a distortion of reality.38 Research in the early 1980s, however, 
produced contrary results on the credibility of children and a shared concern in the 
common law world regarding the failure of criminal justice processes to meet the 
needs of child witnesses. These concerns led to discussions among stakeholders 
on the possibility of reforming criminal evidence law and procedure, with a view to 
removing barriers to children’s effective participation in criminal trials.39 
 
The New Zealand Government shared this concern. Reforms to the criminal justice 
process for New Zealand child witnesses were accordingly initiated. In 1984 and 
1985, the legislature enacted major changes to the law of evidence and procedure 
relating to rape complainants. These changes gave child complainants in sexual 
criminal matters their first real protection.40 The requirement that the evidence of 
complainants in sexual offence trials had to be corroborated was abolished.41 Rape 
complainants were furthermore excused from appearing at oral committal 
                                            
38  Ball “The law of evidence relating to child victims of sexual abuse” 1995 Waikato LR 1. 
39  Henderson in Spencer & Lamb Children and Cross-Examination: Time to Change the Rules? 
1 at 114. 
40  Henderson in Spencer & Lamb Children and Cross-Examination: Time to Change the Rules? 
1 at 114. 
41  S 23AB of the New Zealand Evidence Act 56 of 1908, inserted by s 3 of the New Zealand 
Evidence Amendment Act 2 of 1985. 
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proceedings42 and child victims obtained the right to be accompanied by support 
persons in court.43 
 
2.4 New Zealand Evidence Amendment Act 1989 
 
At the end of 1989, the New Zealand Parliament passed the New Zealand Evidence 
Amendment Act 1989 (hereinafter the Evidence Amendment Act), which came into 
force on 1 January 1990. The Evidence Amendment Act was introduced in an 
attempt to change attitudes towards child witnesses, to make the process of 
testifying less traumatic for children and to remove the traditional scepticism towards 
children’s evidence.44 In order to achieve this the Evidence Amendment Act 
introduced a series of alternative methods through section 23 by which a child 
complainant under the age of seventeen years testifying in sexual cases could give 
evidence, namely via a pre-recorded video interview, closed circuit television 
(CCTV), from behind a screen, through one-way glass, or from 
 
behind a wall or partition, constructed in such a manner and of such materials as to 
enable those in the courtroom to see the complainant while preventing the 
complainant from seeing them, the evidence of the complainant being given through 
an appropriate audio link.45  
 
Where a trial was one to which section 23 of the Evidence Amendment Act applied 
the prosecution was required to apply for directions as to how a child complainant 
was to give evidence.46 Judges had a discretion as to whether they wished to use 
                                            
42  S 185C of the New Zealand Summary Proceedings Act 87 of 1957. 
43  S 375A(2)(h) and (3)(b) of the New Zealand Crimes Act 43 of 1961 inserted by s 5 of the New 
Zealand  Crimes Amendment Act 3 of 1985. 
44  The New Zealand Evidence Amendment Act 104 of 1989 inserted ss 23C-23I into the New 
Zealand Evidence Act 56 of 1908.  
45  S 23E(1) of the Evidence Amendment Act. 
46  S 23D(1) of the Evidence Amendment Act. 
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any of the alternative modes. However, in exercising this discretion they were 
subject to a mandatory requirement to have regard for the need to minimise stress 
on the complainant while ensuring a fair trial for the accused.47 In exercising this 
discretion a judge could direct that “any questions to be put to the complainant shall 
be given through an appropriate audio link to a person, approved by the Judge, 
placed next to the complainant, who shall repeat the questions to the complainant”.48 
This in effect allowed for the use of an “intermediary”. The role of an intermediary in 
terms of section 23E(4) was however in essence restricted to that of an “amplifier”. 
In R v Accused49 the New Zealand High Court in characterising the role of an 
intermediary explained that the function of an intermediary was to responsibly and 
fairly put questions as asked by counsel to the child. If the child did not appear to 
understand the question, it would be for counsel to rephrase the question or to 
approach the matter from another angle.50  
 
The legislative changes also allowed for expert evidence regarding the intellectual 
attainment, mental capacity and emotional maturity of the complainant, the general 
developmental level of children of the same age group as the complainant as well 
as the extent to which the child’s behaviour was consistent with having been 
sexually abused.51 In addition it restricted the defendant’s right to personally cross-
examine children where a judge considered such questioning to be intimidating or 
overbearing.52 
 
The Evidence Amendment Act furthermore legislated against the previously 
standard practice of warning the jury about the reliability of a child witness. It 
statutorily abolished the judicial practice of requiring corroboration of children’s 
                                            
47  S 23D(4) of the Evidence Amendment Act. 
48  S 23E(4) of the Evidence Amendment Act. 
49  T 91/92 HC Wellington (05/03/1993). 
50  T 91/92 HC Wellington (05/03/1993) at 5. 
51  S 23G of the Evidence Amendment Act. 
52  S 23F(1) of the Evidence Amendment Act. 
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evidence and in fact required a judge to instruct the jury not to draw any adverse 
conclusion from the way in which the child complainant’s evidence was given.53 
 
Although the Evidence Amendment Act was specific as to the nature of crimes 
(crimes of a sexual nature) and the witness with whom the modes could be used (a 
child complainant), the New Zealand courts extended the modes to other crimes 
and other child witnesses besides the complainant on the basis of their “inherent 
jurisdiction”.54  
 
The changes introduced by the aforementioned legislation were seen at the time as 
“remarkably radical legislation” exceeding “similar legislation in comparable 
commonwealth jurisdictions such as South Africa, Canada Australia and the UK”.55 
A general perception furthermore prevailed in New Zealand that “cases involving a 
child witness were now more likely to reach court and to result in a defendant being 
found guilty than was the case prior to the introduction of the new procedures”.56  
 
The use of the forensic interview video as evidence-in-chief, with the child appearing 
at trial to be cross-examined using live links or screens, quickly became standard 
procedure for child witnesses in New Zealand criminal courts. Regrettably, within a 
very short period of time, the other alternatives offered by the Evidence Amendment 
Act were overlooked. These included the use of intermediaries. Henderson57 reports 
that an investigation conducted by the author into the use of intermediaries after the 
implementation of the Evidence Amendment Act uncovered only three instances 
where intermediaries were used, only one of which resulted in evidence being put 
to the jury. In the first of the other two cases, proceedings were withdrawn before 
                                            
53  S 23H of the Evidence Amendment Act. 
54  R v Accused (T4/88)[1989] NZLR 660 (CA), R v L 6 Criminal Reports New Zealand 383 (1990). 
55  Henderson in Spencer & Lamb Children and Cross-Examination: Time to Change the Rules? 
1 at 117. 
56  Pipe et al “Perceptions of the legal provisions for child witnesses in New Zealand” 1996 
NZLJ18. 
57  Henderson in Spencer & Lamb Children and Cross-Examination: Time to Change the Rules? 
1 at 117. 
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trial and in the second instance proceedings stopped when the child could not 
explain the meaning of “truth”. Henderson58 suggests that the failure of the use of 
intermediaries could be attributed to a failure by the New Zealand government to 
invest in the infrastructure, training and organisation necessary for such reforms to 
succeed.  
 
Further, an evaluation of the overall treatment of child witnesses by the criminal 
justice system undertaken in the mid-1990s revealed that while the forensic 
interviewing standards were adequate, the rest of the criminal justice system was 
uncoordinated and flawed. Delays had increased and serious concerns had been 
expressed about lawyers’ developmentally inappropriate questioning of child 
witnesses (especially in cross-examination) and judicial reluctance to intervene. The 
applications for videotaped evidence-in-chief and live links for children protected by 
the Evidence Amendment Act also proved problematic as they were usually made 
only for children below the age of twelve years, while older children were generally 
only offered screens.59 Thus, as pointed out by Henderson,60 “child abuse trials 
continued to be ‘confusing, frustrating and ultimately disempowering for many 
participants’”. Fortunately proposals for reform materialised in 1996 through the 
actions of the New Zealand Law Commission (hereinafter the Law Commission) and 
the New Zealand Working Party of the Court Consultative Committee (hereinafter 
the Working Party).  
 
2.5 1996 Law reform 
 
In 1996 the Law Commission and the Working Party released proposals for further 
reform. The Working Party focused on infrastructure, while the Law Commission 
                                            
58  Henderson in Spencer & Lamb Children and Cross-Examination: Time to Change the Rules? 
1 at 118. 
59  Henderson in Spencer & Lamb Children and Cross-Examination: Time to Change the Rules? 
1 at 120. 
60  Ibid. 
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focused on evidence law. The recommendations of the Working Party included 
practical measures for fast-tracking cases involving child witnesses as well as the 
development of a national court program for children. The Law Commission 
recommended that the competency tests for children be abolished and that 
everyone, including children, be deemed eligible to testify.61 The Law Commission 
furthermore recommended reintroducing pre-recordings62 as well as providing all 
complainants with a support person.63 The Law Commission also suggested that 
expert witnesses be appointed to advise the court and counsel on the most 
appropriate way to question witnesses with communication or comprehension 
difficulties.64 The Law Commission proposed that the role of intermediaries be 
extended to allow them to “rephrase questions to assist witness comprehension”.65 
It should be noted that this recommendation received overwhelming governmental 
and community support, with a number of people describing it as “the best in the 
paper”.66 The Law Commission retained most of its original recommendations when 
delivering its final proposals in 1999.67 However, while the Law Commission 
recommended “communication assistance”68 in its final document, it withdrew its 
recommendation for the use of intermediaries. The Law Commission cited divided 
views within the profession as well as the existence of three unfavourable research 
articles from the United States of America, as justification for its stance.69 In my 
                                            
61  New Zealand Law Commission The Evidence of Children and Other Vulnerable Witnesses: A 
Discussion Paper (1996) available at http://www.lawcom.govt.nz/our-projects/evidence-law-
evidence-children-and-other-vulnerable-witnesses (accessed 27/10/2015); New Zealand Law 
Commission Evidence: Reform of the Law Report 55 vol 1 (1996) available at 
http://www.lawcom.govt.nz/sites/default/files/publication/1990/08/Publication_56_163_R55%
20Vol%201.pdf (accessed 27/10/2015) at para 329. 
62  New Zealand Law Commission The Evidence of Children and Other Vulnerable Witnesses: A 
Discussion Paper at paras 144-158. 
63  New Zealand Law Commission The Evidence of Children and Other Vulnerable Witnesses: A 
Discussion Paper at paras 160-166. 
64  New Zealand Law Commission The Evidence of Children and Other Vulnerable Witnesses: A 
Discussion Paper at para 176. 
65  New Zealand Law Commission The Evidence of Children and Other Vulnerable Witnesses: A 
Discussion Paper at para 173. 
66  New Zealand Law Commission The Evidence of Children and Other Vulnerable Witnesses: A 
Discussion Paper at paras 100-101, New Zealand Law Commission Evidence: Reform of the 
Law 1 at para 371. 
67  New Zealand Law Commission Evidence: Reform of the Law; New Zealand Law Commission 
Evidence: Evidence Code and Commentary Report 55 vol 2 (1999) available at 
http://www.lawcom.govt.nz/UploadFiles/Publications_64_227_R55%20Vol%202.pdf 
(accessed 27/10/2015). 
68  New Zealand Law Commission Evidence: Reform of the Law at paras 368-369. 
69  New Zealand Law Commission Evidence: Reform of the Law at paras 372-374.  
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view, the above-mentioned articles70 do not lend support to the claims made by the 
Law Commission at the time. The articles related to “facilitated communication”, a 
specific type of communication assistance for persons with a physical or intellectual 
disability, and focused primarily on remedying problems associated with expressive 
disorder in the context of severely disabled adult witnesses. Although severely 
disabled adults are not excluded from the use of intermediaries, the focus for the 
use of intermediaries in the discussion paper was on assisting child witnesses to 
understand questions posed to them in order to elicit accurate information. In my 
view research pertaining to child witnesses should rather have been consulted.  
 
2.6 New Zealand Evidence Act 2006 
 
The Evidence Act 2006 (hereinafter the Evidence Act) codified New Zealand’s 
evidence law. This Act replaced all pre-existing legislation and, together with the 
New Zealand Evidence Regulations 2007, governs the way in which witnesses, 
including child71 witnesses, give evidence in proceedings today. 
 
In terms of the Evidence Act every person, and thus also children, is eligible to testify 
and the common law competency rule for children is excluded.72 If the 
characteristics of a witness invite concern as to his or her reliability (for example if 
the witness is a very young child), the Evidence Act makes allowances for the 
mitigation rather than the exclusion of such witness’s evidence.73 Witnesses aged 
twelve years and over must take an oath or make an affirmation before giving 
evidence. Child witnesses under the age of twelve years may give evidence without 
                                            
70  Green & Shane “Science, reason, and facilitated communication” 1994 Journal of the Severely 
Handicapped 151; Jacobson, Mulick & Schwartz, “A history of facilitated communication: 
Science, pseudoscience, and anti-science” 1995 American Psychologist 750; Montee, 
Miltenberger & Wittrock “An experimental analysis of facilitated communication” 1995 Journal 
of Applied Behaviour Analysis 189. 
71  A child is defined in the Evidence Act as a person under the age of eighteen years. 
72  S 71 of the Evidence Act. 
73  S 8 of the Evidence Act. See also R v Tanner [2007] NZCA 391 at [24] where the Court of 
Appeal held that if a young child is unable to give coherent evidence a judge still retains a 
discretion to exclude the testimony under s 8 of the Evidence Act.  
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taking an oath or making an affirmation, provided they have been informed by a 
judge of the importance of telling the truth and not lying and they promise to tell the 
truth before giving evidence.74  
 
Ordinarily, evidence is to be presented by a witness orally in a courtroom in the 
presence of the judge or, if there is a jury, the judge and jury and the parties to the 
proceedings.75 The Evidence Act, however, allows any witness to depart from the 
ordinary manner of giving evidence and instead give evidence in an alternative 
manner provided certain requirements are met.76  
 
2.6.1 Alternative ways of giving evidence 
 
The evidential rules governing the use of alternative modes of giving evidence are 
set out in sections 102 to 107 of the Evidence Act.77 Section 103 of the Act sets out 
the directions for alternative ways of giving evidence and can be regarded as the 
primary empowering provision regulating the use of alternative ways of giving 
evidence. Section 105 defines the nature of directions that may be given by a judge, 
and sections 104 and 106, pertaining respectively to the requirement of a hearing in 
chambers and the use of video recordings, relate to procedural aspects. Section 
107 regulates the manner in which child complainants in criminal proceedings are 
to give evidence.  
 
Section 103 reads as follows: 
                                            
74  S 77(2) of the Evidence Act. 
75  S 83 of the Evidence Act. See also Sing v R [2010] NZCA 144 at [6] where the Court of Appeal 
emphasised the importance of section 83(1) of the Evidence Act. 
76  S 103(1) of the Evidence Act. 
77  S 102 of the Evidence Act is a reminder that when a witness in question fits within one of the 
three listed categories, namely child complainant, undercover police officer or anonymous 
witness, the specified provisions of the Act relating to each case must be followed. 
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(1) In any proceeding, the Judge may, either on the application of a party or on 
the Judge’s own initiative, direct that a witness is to give evidence-in-chief 
and be cross-examined in the ordinary way or in an alternative way as 
provided in section 105. 
(2) An application for directions under subsection (1) must be made to the Judge 
as early as practicable before the proceeding is to be heard, or at any later 
time permitted by the court. 
(3) A direction under subsection (1) that a witness is to give evidence in an 
alternative way, may be made on the grounds of— 
(a) the age or maturity of the witness: 
(b) the physical, intellectual, psychological, or psychiatric impairment of 
the witness: 
(c) the trauma suffered by the witness: 
(d) the witness’s fear of intimidation: 
(e) the linguistic or cultural background or religious beliefs of the witness: 
(f) the nature of the proceeding: 
(g) the nature of the evidence that the witness is expected to give: 
(h) the relationship of the witness to any party to the proceeding: 
(i) the absence or likely absence of the witness from New Zealand: 
(j) any other ground likely to promote the purpose of the Act. 
(4) In giving directions under subsection (1), the Judge must have regard to— 
(a) the need to ensure— 
(i) the fairness of the proceeding; and 
(ii) in a criminal proceeding, that there is a fair trial; and 
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(b) the views of the witness and— 
(i) the need to minimise the stress on the witness; and 
(ii) in a criminal proceeding, the need to promote the recovery of 
a complainant from the alleged offence; and 
(c) any other factor that is relevant to the just determination of the 
proceeding. 
 
 
 
 
 
2.6.1.1 Application 
 
Section 103 applies to any proceeding78 and affords any witness, thus also children, 
a right to apply for alternative ways of giving evidence. Directions may be made on 
the application of any party to the proceedings or on a judge’s own initiative.79 
Section 103 uses the words “a Judge may”, implying that an application for 
alternative ways is not automatic. However, it is mandatory in terms of section 107 
for the prosecution to apply for directions where the complainant in a criminal 
proceeding is a child.80 This does not apply to non-complainant child witnesses and 
raises the question of whether mandatory applications about alternative ways of 
giving evidence should be extended either in terms of section 103 or section 107 to 
child witnesses who are not complainants. Whilst the discretionary nature of section 
103 is understandable as the section provides for all witnesses, the application of 
the discretionary nature of section 103 to child witnesses may become the exception 
                                            
78  Refer to s 5 of the Evidence Act for a definition of the concept “proceedings” as governed by 
the Act. 
79  S 103(1) of the Evidence Act. 
80  S 107(1) of the Evidence Act. 
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rather than the norm. It is thus submitted that it will be more effective to extend the 
mandatory mode of evidence application to section 107 so as to include all child 
witnesses. 
 
An extension of the mandatory mode of evidence application to all child witnesses 
will ensure that there is no arbitrary differentiation between child complainants and 
other child witnesses. Cleland81 arguing in favour of the mandatory application for 
directions as to modes of evidence for all child witnesses, points out that it should 
be remembered that the effects of stress on recall and ability to recount events is 
not restricted to complainants or a particular event and non-complainant child 
witnesses may experience similar distress to complainants in giving evidence in the 
courtroom in front of the defendant. Such a reform will furthermore improve both the 
child’s experience of the process and the evidence presented to court.82  
 
It is imperative that the law should be adapted to the needs of child witnesses. It is 
submitted that section 107 of the Evidence Amendment Act would be more effective 
if it were amended to require courts to consider directions on alternative ways of 
giving evidence for all children below the age of eighteen years. A court should only 
be excused from doing so where it is clear that the child witness would not be 
traumatised when testifying in the ordinary way and does not need to give evidence 
in an alternative way.  
 
Cleland83 emphasises that research into jurors’ perceptions suggest that they regard 
children as less reliable than adults. Although evidence is mixed, removing children 
from the courtroom may have a negative impact on how children’s testimony is 
perceived by jurors. For example, some of the witness behaviours which jurors 
associate with credibility, such as emotional distress, are exactly the behaviours 
                                            
81  Cleland “Hearing and understanding? Child witnesses and the Evidence Act” 2008 NZLJ 425 
at 426.   
82  Cleland 2008 NZLJ 426. 
83  Cleland 2008 NZLJ 426.   
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which the alternative modes of evidence aim to prevent. Children may thus appear 
more calm and composed than the juror as layperson might expect.84 This problem 
is acknowledged by the Evidence Act, which provides that unless there is expert 
evidence to support the direction, a judge must not instruct the jury that there is a 
need to scrutinise children’s evidence with special care.85 The Regulations 
pertaining to the Evidence Act go even further by providing that, where a witness is 
under the age of six years, the judge may direct the jury that even young children 
can remember accurately and report things although not in the same manner as 
adults.86 Cleland87 furthermore points out that because of the dangers of jurors’ 
incorrect perceptions it “would be best to ‘normalise’ modes of evidence so that 
there is less scope for juries to suspect that the child is somehow less credible 
because of the way in which its evidence is delivered”. According to her it would 
therefore be logical for applications for directions as to modes of evidence to be 
mandatory for all child witnesses, irrespective of whether they are complainants or 
not.88  
 
Proposals for a mandatory mode of evidence application for all child witnesses were 
put forward by the New Zealand Ministry of Justice in 2011.89 Unfortunately, in its 
report on the review of the Evidence Act90 the Law Commission stated in 2013 that 
it does not consider it appropriate to specify that child complainants should give 
evidence in any particular way and recommended that a decision of whether to apply 
for directions on alternative ways should be based on the needs of the individual 
witness rather than on the fact that they belong to a particular category (such as 
child witnesses).91  
                                            
84  Hanna et al Child Witnesses in the New Zealand Criminal Courts: A Review of Practice and 
Implications for Policy (2010) 1 at 114. 
85  S 125(2) of the Evidence Act. 
86  Evidence Regulations 2007 (SR 2007/204). 
87  Cleland 2008 NZLJ 426. 
88  Cleland 2008 NZLJ 426. 
89  New Zealand Ministry of Justice Alternative Pre-Trial and Trial Processes for Child Witnesses 
in New Zealand's Criminal Justice System Issues Paper (2011) at section 2A.  
90  New Zealand Law Commission The 2013 Review of the Evidence Act 2006 - Report 127 
available at http://r127.publications.lawcom.govt.nz/ (accessed 17/01/2016). 
91  New Zealand Law Commission The 2013 Review of the Evidence Act 2006 - Report 127 at 
11.71. Refer to para 2.7 below for a further discussion on the issue. 
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An application for directions must be made at the earliest possible time before the 
proceedings or at any later time permitted by the court.92 Directions are allowed for 
the use of alternative modes of giving evidence-in-chief and during cross-
examination.93 No specific standard of proof for the ordering of the use of alternative 
ways is included in the Evidence Act. Furthermore, no explicit presumption in favour 
of either the “ordinary way” or an “alternative way” or any express balancing act can 
be found in the phraseology employed.94 Courts are only required to “have regard 
to” the matters in sections 103(4) and 107(4). No particular matter is given more 
weight than another.95 In R v Shone96 the Court of Appeal stated with regard to 
sections 103 and 107 that the Evidence Act “should not be read down by introducing 
‘presumptive positions’, so long as proper regard is had to the fairness of the 
proceedings.” Despite this, several High Court judges have been inclined to follow 
a presumption “in favour of evidence being given in the usual manner”97 or preferring 
a balancing exercise “whereby the ground(s) established and other applicable 
factors from s103(4) will be considered”.98 However, in relation to child 
complainants, the Court of Appeal has clearly set out a contrary view, namely that 
the standard practice is for child complainants to give evidence is through the use 
of video record, unless exceptional circumstances prevail.99 Proposals for a 
                                            
92  S 103(2) of the Evidence Act. 
93  S 103(1) of the Evidence Act. 
94  McDonald & Tinsley “Evident Issues” 2011 Canterbury LR 123 at 124. 
95  Mahoney et al The Evidence Act 2006 Act and Analysis EV 103.07. 
96  [2008] NZCA 313 at [28]. 
97  R v Briggs HC Whangarei CRI-2008-027-60 (13/03/2009) at [12], R v SJP HC Auckland CRI-
2009-004-22634 (13/07/2010) at [28]. 
98  Deutsche Finance New Zealand Limited v Commissioner of Inland Revenue (2007) 18 PRNZ 
710 (HC) at [24]. 
99  R v E (CA308/06) [2007] NZCA 404, R v M (CA 590/09) [2009] NZCA 455. In both the cases 
the courts respectively refer (at paras [56] and [17]) to the use of videotapes or DVDs as the 
mode to be used for the child witness’s evidence-in-chief. It is, however, submitted that the 
other alternative methods provided for in s 105 of the Evidence Act may also be used.  
Mahoney et al The Evidence Act 2006: Act and Analysis EV 105.05 point out that there is no 
prioritisation of the different ways in which evidence may be given in terms of section 105, but 
that the focus will no doubt remain on what measure is most effective to ensure that the 
witness gives the best evidence and that the truth-finding process is enhanced. They 
emphasise that the evidence of younger children may be more reliable when recorded as soon 
as practicable after the event.  
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presumption in favour of alternative ways for all child witnesses have recently been 
put forward by both academics and the New Zealand Government.100  
 
Section 103(3) sets out a broad range of grounds upon which a mode direction may 
be made and includes aspects such as the age, physical, intellectual or 
psychological impairment of the witness as well as the trauma suffered by the 
witness and the nature of the proceedings.101 In considering the grounds the judge 
must also have regard to the matters covered in section 103(4), which include: the 
need to ensure the fairness of the proceedings; that there is a fair trial; the views of 
the witness; the need to minimise the stress on the witness; the need to promote 
the recovery of a complainant and any other factor that is relevant to the just 
determination of the proceedings.102 Mahoney et al103 point out that courts have 
noted a lack of legislative guidance as to whether the grounds must be determined 
subjectively or objectively. Pointing, however, to the need for a fair trial and the 
mandatory consideration of the matters in section 103(4), courts have preferred to 
make an objective assessment of the grounds.104 
 
Subsections 6(a) to (f) of the Evidence Act clarify how the “just determination of 
proceedings” is to be secured. Factors listed include the recognition of the 
importance of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act, promoting fairness to the parties 
and witnesses, and enhancing access to the law of evidence. The interests of both 
the defendant and the child witness must accordingly be considered.105 This 
corresponds to the courts’ interpretation of section 103(4)(a)(i) (“fairness of the 
                                            
100  Hanna et al Child Witnesses in the New Zealand Criminal Courts: A Review of Practice and 
Implications for Policy at 116, New Zealand Ministry of Justice Alternative Pre-Trial and Trial 
Processes for Child Witnesses in New Zealand's Criminal Justice System Issues Paper (2011) 
section 2A. Refer to para 2.7 below for a further discussion on the issue. 
101  S 103(3) of the Evidence Act. 
102  S 103(4) of the Evidence Act.  
103  The Evidence Act 2006: Act and Analysis EV 103.08. 
104  Mahoney et al The Evidence Act 2006: Act and Analysis EV 103.08.  
105  R v Hetherington CA 14/2014 [2015] NZCA 248 at [22].  
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proceedings”) and (ii) (“a fair trial”)106 in that the Court of Appeal in R v M107 held 
that “fairness of the trial includes fairness to all parties”.  
 
As was alluded to above, New Zealand statutory law does not contain a requirement 
in trial proceedings equal to the best interests of the child provision in section 28(2) 
of the Constitution of South Africa. It is thus submitted that although section 103(4) 
does not pertain to children alone, it is particularly important in the case of children 
to have regard to the factors listed in section 103(4) when directions regarding 
alternative ways of giving evidence are considered. Consideration of factors such 
as the age of the witness, any physical, intellectual or psychological impairment of 
the witness, the trauma suffered by the witness, the views of the witness and the 
need to minimise stress on the witness and to promote the recovery of the 
complainant are of particular significance to child witnesses and may go some way 
towards ensuring their protection.  
 
2.6.1.2 The alternative ways of giving evidence 
 
Section 105 describes alternative directions that may be given by a judge and reads 
as follows: 
                                            
106  Limited judicial comments exist on the difference between the two concepts. Mahoney et al 
The Evidence Act 2006: Act and Analysis EV 103.09 highlight that it is difficult to understand 
the need for the inclusion of both concepts. They point out that the Evidence Code which 
preceded the Evidence Act only provided (at 234) that a judge had to ensure the fairness of 
the proceedings and in particular that the defendant had a fair trial. Cleland points out that as 
the Evidence Act refers to both a fair trial and fairness of the proceedings the two concepts 
should be regarded as distinct. According to her the concept of a fair trial encompasses the 
accused’s right to hear and test evidence against him or her. The fairness of the proceedings 
must therefore, according to her, refer to fairness to participants other than the accused (see 
Cleland 2008 NZLJ 426). This corresponds with available case law on the subject. In R v Simi 
[2008] NZCA 515 the Court of Appeal held (at para [28]) that the fairness of the proceedings 
“can properly include the need to be fair to a complainant”. In R v Kahui HC AK CRI 2006- 
057-1135 10/07/2007 the court held at para [15] that “[i]t remains to be said that in the 
determination to ensure our criminal trial process is as fair as possible, fairness to all accused 
should predominate … But fairness to an accused is not the only criterion. The fairness of a 
criminal trial is fairness on all its bearings, including fairness to a complainant.” 
107  (CA 590/09) [2009] NZCA 455 at [40]. 
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(1) A Judge may direct, under section 103, that the evidence of a witness is to 
be given in an alternative way so that— 
(a) the witness gives evidence— 
(i) while in the courtroom but unable to see the defendant or 
some other specified person; or 
(ii) from an appropriate place outside the courtroom, either in 
New Zealand or elsewhere; or 
(iii) by a video record made before the hearing of the proceeding: 
(b) any appropriate practical and technical means may be used to enable 
the Judge, the jury (if any), and any lawyers to see and hear the 
witness giving evidence, in accordance with any regulations made 
under section 201: 
(c) in a criminal proceeding, the defendant is able to see and hear the 
witness, except where the Judge directs otherwise: 
(d) in a proceeding in which a witness anonymity order has been made, 
effect is given to the terms of that order. 
(2) If a video record of the witness’s evidence is to be shown at the hearing of 
the proceeding, the Judge must give directions under section 103 as to the 
manner in which cross-examination and re-examination of the witness is to 
be conducted. 
(3) The Judge may admit evidence that is given substantially in accordance with 
the terms of a direction under section 103, despite a failure to observe strictly 
all of those terms. 
 
In terms of section 105, three deviations from the ordinary way of giving evidence 
are available to a witness, provided the defendant is able to hear and see the 
witness. A witness may testify while in the courtroom, screened from the defendant, 
from an appropriate place outside the courtroom with the aid of CCTV, for example, 
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or by a pre-recorded video. The Evidence Act does not prioritise or prescribe the 
various ways in which the evidence should be presented. The most effective choice 
between the three options would accordingly depend on the particular 
circumstances.108 
 
It should be noted that although the Evidence Act does not include the overt option 
of full pre-recording of a child witness’s evidence,109 it is theoretically possible to 
allow a pre-recorded videotape of a child’s evidence-in-chief and cross-examination 
to be admitted as the child’s entire evidence at trial. A judge must, if a video record 
is to be shown in terms of section 105(2) of the Evidence Act, give directions under 
section 103 as to the manner in which the cross-examination and re-examination of 
the witness is to be conducted and these directions may include a pre-recording of 
a child’s entire evidence at trial.110  
 
Relying on the breadth of the aforementioned provisions, the Crown Solicitor for 
Auckland began applying them to fully pre-record children’s evidence.111 However, 
in M v R112 the Court of Appeal held that while accepting that the Evidence Act 
permits pre-trial cross-examination recordings, such an order would in its view have 
substantial disadvantages for both the defendant and the witness. It therefore limited 
its use to extreme situations, stating that it would require a compelling case and 
unusual circumstances (such as where a witness was dying) before such a directive 
could be given. It therefore seems that although pre-recorded cross-examination 
may be available under sections 103 and 105 of the Evidence Act, the admission of 
such evidence is currently unlikely. A proposal for the introduction of a legislative 
presumption in favour of pre-recordings of the entire evidence of children under the 
                                            
108  Mahoney et al The Evidence Act 2006: Act and Analysis EV105.05. 
109  S 105 (1)(a)(iii) only refers to “a video record made before the hearing of the proceeding”.  
110  M v R [2011] NZCA 303; [2012] 2 NZLR at para [28]. 
111  R v Sadlier unreported, Auckland District Court, CRI-2010-044-4165 (07/12/2010) per Wade 
J as cited by Henderson in Spencer & Lamb Children and Cross-Examination: Time to Change 
the Rules? 1 at 128. 
112  M v R [2011] NZCA 303; [2012] 2 NZLR at para [41]. 
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age of twelve was put forward by the Ministry of Justice in 2011.113 However, this 
proposal has been rescinded by the New Zealand Government.114   
 
2.6.1.3 Directions concerning child complainants’ evidence 
 
Section 107 of the Evidence Act provides directions about the way child 
complainants are to give evidence in criminal proceedings and reads as follows: 
 
(1) In a criminal proceeding in which there is a child complainant, the 
prosecution must apply to the court in which the case will be tried for 
directions about the way in which the complainant is to give evidence in chief 
and be cross-examined. 
(2) An application for directions under subsection (1) must be made to the court 
as early as practicable before the case is to be tried, or at any later time 
permitted by the court. 
(3) When an application is made for directions under subsection (1), before 
giving any directions about the way in which the complainant is to give 
evidence in chief and be cross-examined, the Judge— 
(a) must give each party an opportunity to be heard in chambers; and 
(b) may call for and receive a report, from any persons considered by 
the Judge to be qualified to advise, on the effect on the complainant 
of giving evidence in the ordinary way or any alternative way. 
(4) When considering an application under subsection (1), the Judge must have 
regard to— 
                                            
113  New Zealand Ministry of Justice Alternative Pre-trial and Trial Processes for Child Witnesses 
in New Zealand‘s Criminal Justice System Issues Paper (2011) section 2A.  
114  New Zealand Cabinet Paper Amendments to the Evidence Act 2006 (12/11/2013) at [35]-[38] 
available at http://www.justice.govt.nz/publications/global-publications/a/amendments-to-the-
evidence-act-2006 (accessed 07/01/2016). Refer to para 2.7 below for a further discussion on 
the issue. 
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(a) the need to ensure— 
(i) the fairness of the proceeding; and 
(ii) that there is a fair trial; and 
(b) the views of the complainant and— 
(i) the need to minimise the stress on the complainant; and 
(ii) the need to promote the recovery of the complainant from the 
alleged offence; and 
(c) any other factor that is relevant to the just determination of the 
proceeding. 
 
Section 107 broadens the requirements previously contained in section 23D of the 
New Zealand Evidence Act 1908 by requiring the prosecution to apply for directions 
as to the way in which a child complainant is to give evidence, not only in sexual 
cases, but in any criminal proceedings. As was mentioned previously, some 
commentators are of the view that directions should be sought in all cases 
concerning child witnesses.115  
 
When applying to the court for directions about the way in which child complainants 
are to give evidence, prosecutors must do so as early as is practicable before the 
proceedings are to be heard, or if this is not possible, at any later time as permitted 
by the court.116 In terms of the guidelines for prosecutors117 “prosecutors will have 
to consider whether a particular mode of evidence is appropriate and would improve 
the quality of the evidence”. Furthermore, when seeking such directions prosecutors 
should “confirm the views of the victim; inform the victim of the directions made (if 
                                            
115  Cleland 2008 NZLJ 425 at 426. See also Hanna et al Child Witnesses in the New Zealand 
Criminal Courts: A Review of Practice and Implications for Policy 186. 
116  S 107(1) & (2) of the Evidence Act. 
117  New Zealand Crown Law Office Victims of Crime: Guidance for Prosecutors (05/03/2012) at 
[22] available at http://www.crownlaw.govt.nz/uploads/victims_of_crime.pdf (accessed 01/11/ 
2015). 
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any), or explain why it is not considered appropriate to apply for a direction”.118 It is 
submitted that as this practice corresponds to the principle of “just determination of 
the proceedings” referred to in sections 6 and 103(4) of the Evidence Act it will 
contribute to the fairness of the proceedings to child witnesses.  
 
Once an application is made for directions under section 107 of the Evidence Act, 
the judge, when deciding on directions, must give each party an opportunity to be 
heard in chambers and may call for and receive a report from a person considered 
by the judge to be qualified to advise the judge on the effect on the complainant of 
giving evidence in the ordinary way or any alternative way.119 Apart from information 
on the stress likely to be suffered by the child complainant, this could include expert 
evidence on the cognitive and linguistic abilities of children of the complainant’s age 
and stage of development as well as of the abilities of the particular child 
complainant.120 
 
In terms of the general provisions of section 103 of the Evidence Act, the judge must 
have regard to the following: the need to ensure the fairness of the proceedings; 
that there is a fair trial;121 the views of the witness; the need to minimise the stress 
on the witness; the need to promote the recovery of a complainant as well as any 
other factor that is relevant to the just determination of the proceedings.122 Unlike 
the general provisions of section 103, section 107 does not include a list of grounds 
(such as the age, physical, intellectual psychological or other impairment of the 
witness, trauma suffered by the witness, linguistic or cultural background of the 
witness etc) on which a direction may be made. It has accordingly been argued that 
there is a different threshold for applications for child complainants as opposed to 
other witnesses.123 However, one may argue that the aforementioned grounds may 
                                            
118  New Zealand Crown Law Office Victims of Crime: Guidance for Prosecutors (05/03/2012) at 
[23]. 
119  S 107(3) of the Evidence Act. 
120  Cleland 2008 NZLJ 425 at 427.   
121  Refer to fn 106 above for a discussion on the difference between the two concepts. 
122  S 107(4) of the Evidence Act. 
123  Henderson in Spencer & Lamb Children and Cross-Examination: Time to Change the Rules? 
1 at 124. 
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be included and considered under a broad interpretation of the words “any other 
ground likely to promote the purpose of the Act”124 or “any other factor that is 
relevant to the just determination of the proceedings”.125 Cleland126 maintains that 
by making a direction mandatory where the child is a complainant, the Evidence Act 
accepts by implication that the factors in section 103(3) that would be relevant to 
child witnesses are regarded as automatically operating in respect of child 
complainants.   
 
 
 
 
2.6.2 Support person 
 
In terms of section 79 of the Evidence Act, complainants127 are entitled to a support 
person while other witnesses may apply for a support person to be near the witness 
when testifying. The differentiation between child complainants and child witnesses 
cannot be justified. As was mentioned before, non-complainant child witnesses may 
experience similar distress to complainants when having to present their evidence 
and may likewise require the aid of a support person. A study conducted on the 
advantages of having a support person present in court demonstrated that child 
complainants were able to answer more of the prosecutors’ questions, appeared 
less fearful of the defendant, were less likely to provide inconsistent testimony, were 
more consistent about peripheral details and were less likely to recant on the identity 
or actions of the perpetrator.128 This may be equally true for child witnesses. Hanna 
                                            
124  S 103(3)(j) of the Evidence Act. 
125  S 107(4)(c) of the Evidence Act. 
126  Cleland 2008 NZLJ 425 at 426.   
127  “Complainant” has been held to refer to the person involved in the offence, the alleged victim, 
who did or could have complained. It is not restricted to children but may include adult 
complainants (see Mahoney et al The Evidence Act 2006: Act and Analysis EV 79.01).     
128  Goodman et al “Testifying in criminal court: emotional effect on child sexual assault 
victims”1992 Monographs of the Society for Research in Child Development 1 at 85.  
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et al129 emphasise that section 79 would be more effective if it was amended to allow 
for all child witnesses to have a support person present when they had to testify. A 
court should only be excused from appointing such a support person where the child 
witness prefers not to have a support person present or it is clearly not necessary 
to have one present. A proposal to ensure that all child witnesses under the age of 
eighteen years have an automatic right to a support person when giving evidence 
in court has recently been put forward by the New Zealand Government.130  
 
The Evidence Act places no restriction on the persons who may be appointed as 
support persons for child witnesses. In most instances this function is performed by 
family members, counsellors or social workers. According to Henderson it is 
important, however, that the child witness is familiar with or has a close relationship 
with this person, as the child derives strength from the proximity of the support 
person.131  
 
The role of the support person is not defined in the Evidence Act, other than that the 
Evidence Act determines that a judge may give directions regulating the conduct of 
the support person.132 It is, however, assumed that the support person will most 
probably be instructed by the presiding judge not to assist the witness with the 
answering of questions and to refrain from doing anything which might interfere with 
the evidence presented. Although the use of a support person is welcomed, it should 
be remembered that the role of the support person is restricted to the lending of 
physical comfort and does not address the problems associated with the effective 
                                            
129  Hanna et al Child Witnesses in the New Zealand Criminal Courts: A Review of Practice and 
Implications for Policy 56. 
130  Hanna et al Child Witnesses in the New Zealand Criminal Courts: A Review of Practice and 
Implications for Policy  45 & 56; New Zealand Ministry of Justice Alternative Pre-Trial and Trial 
Processes for Child Witnesses in New Zealand's Criminal Justice System; New Zealand 
Cabinet Paper Amendments to the Evidence Act 2006 (12/11/2013) at para 31. Refer to para 
2.7 below for a further discussion on the issue. 
131  Henderson in Spencer & Lamb Children and Cross-Examination: Time to Change the Rules? 
1 at 124. 
132  S 79(5) of the Evidence Act. 
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questioning of child witnesses. The use of an intermediary may prove useful in this 
regard.   
 
2.6.3 Communication assistance 
 
The Evidence Act does not explicitly provide for intermediary services other than 
those referred to as “communication assistance”.133 This communication assistance 
is provided by an interpreter.134 Mahoney et al135 emphasise, however, that the Law 
Commission noted that the wide definition of communication assistance means that 
the term interpreter has an extended meaning and includes anyone who enables or 
facilitates communication in any way.136 Section 80(3) of the Evidence Act137 
provides for communication assistance to witnesses, including child witnesses, in 
civil and criminal proceedings who do not have sufficient proficiency in English to 
understand the court proceedings or to give their evidence or who may have a 
communication disability.138 A child witness who does not have sufficient proficiency 
in English, does not have the sophistication to understand the court proceedings, or 
                                            
133  Communication assistance is defined as follows in s 4 of the Evidence Act: “Communication 
assistance means oral or written interpretation of a language, written assistance, technological 
assistance, and any other assistance that enables or facilitates communication with a person 
who— 
(a) does not have sufficient proficiency in the English language to— 
(i) understand court proceedings conducted in English; or  
(ii) give evidence in English; or 
(b) has a communication disability. 
According to Mahoney et al The Evidence Act 2006: Act and Analysis EV80.01 the use of 
intermediaries could fall under the definition of communication assistance in s 4(1).  
134  An interpreter is defined in s 4 of the Evidence Act as including “a person who provides 
communication assistance to a defendant or a witness”. 
135  Mahoney et al The Evidence Act 2006: Act and Analysis EV 4.24.01. Own emphasis added. 
136  This definition of interpreter means that a person who provides communication assistance of 
any kind must take an oath or make an affirmation (see ss 80 and 78 of the Evidence Act). 
137  S 3 of the Evidence Act reads as follows: “A witness in a civil or criminal proceeding is entitled 
to communication assistance in accordance with this section and any regulations made under 
this Act to enable that witness to give evidence.” At the date of writing this thesis the 
regulations have not been enacted. 
138  Communication disability is not defined in the Act. According to Mahoney et al The Evidence 
Act 2006: Act and Analysis EV80.01 fn 2507 the definition is likely to cover any disability that 
restricts the ability to communicate orally, for example hearing impairment or autism. 
According to Mahoney et al authority for the latter stance can be found in Laumalili v S [1994] 
NZFLR 413 (DC), where the District Court accepted evidence given of disclosures made by 
an autistic child who was assisted in communicating by pressing or pointing to letters on a 
keyboard. 
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who may have a communication disability such as a hearing impairment or autism 
may thus qualify for communication assistance.  
  
An application for communication assistance can be made by the witness, a party 
to the proceedings or on the judge’s own initiative.139 The granting of such 
assistance is, however, subject to the judge’s discretion.140 Section 81(2) of the 
Evidence Act allows a judge to refuse communication assistance to a witness if the 
judge considers that the witness can sufficiently understand questions put orally and 
can adequately respond to them. There is no guidance in the Evidence Act as to 
what level of understanding would be sufficient or what would constitute an 
adequate response. This leaves the judge with the task of deciding on these issues 
in the light of the circumstances and the nature of the trial.141 
In exercising discretion the judge may direct what kind of communication assistance 
is to be provided for the witness and this may include translation services and oral, 
written, technological or other assistance.142 In order to determine the kind of 
assistance required, a judge may obtain expert evidence about the nature and 
extent of the witness’s communication difficulties and need for special assistance.143  
 
The Evidence Act does not prescribe who should be appointed to perform the role 
of communication assistant. The judge may accordingly also issue a direction as to 
the person who should provide the communication assistance, such as a teacher or 
                                            
139  S 80(4) of the Evidence Act. 
140  In terms of s 81(2) of the Evidence Act communication assistance need not be provided to a 
witness if the judge considers that the witness can sufficiently understand questions put orally 
and can adequately respond to them. 
141  Mahoney et al The Evidence Act 2006: Act and Analysis EV 81.01. Note however that in terms 
of s 25(g) of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, such assistance is a right for defendants 
in criminal proceedings. Note also that the provisions of ss 80 and 81 of the Evidence Act are 
subject to the Mãori Language Act 1987. Where a person wishes to speak Mãori in court, the 
provisions of the latter Act  apply (allowing for an interpreter) even if the te reo speaker can 
also communicate in English (Mahoney et al The Evidence Act 2006: Act and Analysis EV 
4.05.01). It is submitted that although a similar provision is not available to witnesses in 
general, s 6(c) of the Evidence Act, which is aimed at securing the just determination of the 
proceedings by promoting fairness to the parties and witnesses, lends support to the 
presumption that judges will not discharge this discretion frivolously. 
142  S 81(3) of the Evidence Act. 
143  R v Hetherington CA 14/2014 [2015] NZCA 248 at [21]. 
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speech-language therapist, depending on the nature of the witness’s 
communication difficulties or disabilities.144 
 
In rendering communication assistance the communication assistant, apart from 
rendering the aforementioned oral, written or technological assistance, is entitled to 
interrupt cross-examination when incomprehensible to the witness and to request 
frequent breaks.145 The communication assistant may also indicate to the judge 
whether the witness is able to understand questions because of the words used or 
the structure of the sentence or the concepts within the sentences.146  
 
The communication assistant accordingly enables the witness to communicate in a 
way which best serves the witness’s evidence. In R v Hetherington147 the New 
Zealand Court of Appeal highlighted that this is key to a fair trial and stated as 
follows:148 
 
The accused’s right to a fair trial is a keystone of our criminal justice system. It is not 
the only keystone. People with intellectual difficulties and challenges should be able 
to come to our Courts and present their evidence in a way that is tailored to their 
needs to ensure that the trier of fact, whether it be a Judge or a jury, can be as 
confident as possible that the answers are true answers, that it is [a true reflection] 
as to what occurred, rather than the witness being confused and challenged by the 
questions being asked. 
                                            
144  In R v Hetherington CA 14/2014 [2015] NZCA 248 the complainant was a girl with Down’s 
Syndrome who was thirteen years of age at the time the alleged incidents were committed 
against her. At the first trial she gave her evidence with the assistance of her teacher. At the 
re-trial she gave her evidence with the assistance of a speech-language therapist per the 
further pre-trial directions, as the judge recognised that given the complainant’s special 
difficulties the experience, training and qualifications of the speech-therapist would be better 
suited to assisting the complainant. See paras [10], [11] and [23].        
145  R v Hetherington CA 14/2014 [2015] NZCA 248 at [27]. 
146  R v Hetherington CA 14/2014 [2015] NZCA 248 at [23]. 
147  CA 14/2014 [2015] NZCA 248 at para [22]. 
148  CA 14/2014 [2015] NZCA 248 at para [21]. 
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The Court of Appeal149 furthermore drew attention to the dual purpose of the 
communication assistance, namely “[t]o ensure, as far as possible, that [the 
complainant] understood what she was being asked and to help us [the court], 
where necessary, to understand what [the complainant] was saying”. 
 
This communication assistance may be equally crucial for child witnesses who do 
not necessarily have a communication disability but may have difficulty in 
understanding the questions asked in the normal way because of age and who in 
turn are misunderstood by the court. Available research on child development and 
language acquisition clearly illustrates that the way questions are put to a child 
witness, for example leading questions, repetitive questions, disclosures, use of 
negatives, multi-faceted questions or specialised language, plays a significant role 
in dis-enabling children to give evidence.150 This raises the question whether the 
concept of communication assistance would be broadly interpreted so as to include 
these difficulties as sufficient reason for a child witness to qualify for communication 
assistance.  
 
This may prove to be problematic owing to the fact that, as pointed out above,  there 
are no guidelines on the meaning of the concepts “sufficiently understand” and 
“adequately respond” in section 81(2) of the Evidence Act, nor are the concepts 
defined in the Act. These concepts are by their very nature vague, complex and 
difficult to define and are thus open to interpretation by the New Zealand courts.151 
This may lead to inconsistency in the meaning assigned to these terms, with some 
                                            
149  R v Hetherington CA 14/2014 [2015] NZCA 248 at para [27]. 
150  Müller “The effect of the accusatorial system on the child witness” 2000 CARSA 13 at 19-22; 
Louw “Die bevoegdheid van kinders as getuies: die rol van taalvaardigheid” 2005 CARSA 19 
at 19-22; Müller “Clinical and forensic interviews and the child witness” 2001 CARSA 8; Müller 
“The enigma of the child witness: a need for expert evidence” 2003 CARSA 2 at 2-8; Ovens 
et al “Child witnesses in the criminal justice system” 2001 CARSA 25 at 28-31; Plotnikoff & 
Woolfson “Measuring up? Evaluating implementation of Government commitments to young 
witnesses in criminal proceedings” 2009 available at www.Nspcc.org.uk/measuringup 
(accessed 05/06 2014); Hanna et al Child Witnesses in the New Zealand Criminal Courts: A 
Review of Practice and Implication Policy 1 at 53-88. 
151  Mahoney et al The Evidence Act 2006: Act and Analysis EV81.01. 
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courts placing a narrow meaning on the term whereas others may not, thereby 
resulting in inconsistent application and injustices. In recognition of some of these 
concerns, a proposal for the amendment of the definition in section 4 of 
“communication assistance” to specifically include assistance with understanding 
questions for witnesses who do not have a communication disability, but may find it 
difficult to comprehend questions, was made by the Law Commission, who 
commented as follows:152  
 
An amendment should be made to the definition of “communication assistance” in 
section 80 of the Evidence Act in order to allow for assistance in the process of 
answering questions for a wider group than just witnesses with a “communication 
disability”. This would allow for an incremental and careful approach to the 
introduction of intermediaries, who could assist with the phrasing of questioning in 
an appropriate way. Their primary initial role would be to assist with the 
communication and questioning issues rather than actually questioning witnesses. 
The mere fact that the Law Commission expressed the opinion that the definition 
should be broadened to provide for child witnesses who have difficulties with 
comprehension suggests that the courts may be following a narrow rather than a 
broad interpretation of section 4, thereby excluding child witnesses from its use.  
 
It should furthermore be kept in mind that although the function of a communication 
assistor may be compared to that of an intermediary, the two roles should not be 
equated. This is underscored by the fact that, despite section 80 of the Evidence 
Act being in force, the introduction of specialist trained intermediaries as a means 
of improving the way child witnesses are questioned has nonetheless been widely 
advocated.153 
                                            
152  New Zealand Ministry of Justice Alternative Pre-trial and Trial Processes for Child Witnesses 
in New Zealand‘s Criminal Justice System Issue Paper 30 (2012) at 39 available at 
http://www.lawcom.govt.nz/sites/default/files/projectAvailableFormats/NZLC%20IP30.pdf 
(accessed 07/01/2016). 
153  Hanna et al Child Witnesses in the New Zealand Criminal Courts: A Review of Practice and 
Implication Policy; Davies et al Questioning Child Witnesses: Exploring the Benefits and Risks 
of Intermediary Models (2011).  
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The aforementioned proposal of the Law Commission to broaden the definition 
provided in section 80 did not materialise with the 2013 review of the Evidence 
Act.154 The application of section 80 of the Evidence Act would possibly be more 
effective as a means of ensuring that the best evidence of child witnesses was 
elicited if child witnesses were allowed to testify with the help of communication 
assistance as a standard practice, unless there were cogent reasons for not making 
use of communication assistance.  
 
In 2011 the New Zealand Cabinet announced its intention of introducing specialist 
trained intermediaries to improve the way child witnesses are questioned in court.155 
The New Zealand Cabinet, however, despite conceding that the way children are 
questioned in court is sometimes inappropriate, particularly during cross-
examination, and that accurate and reliable evidence is unlikely to be obtained from 
them if they do not understand the questions, rescinded the New Zealand Cabinet’s 
earlier decision in 2013.156 This is regrettable, as gaining the most accurate and 
complete testimony from a child witness is critical to the quality of justice delivered 
in court.  
  
In view of the fact that intermediaries will not be introduced into the New Zealand 
criminal justice system for the foreseeable future, the use of intermediaries in terms 
of section 170A of the South African Criminal Procedure Act can only be compared 
for the purposes of this thesis with that of communication assistance (provided it is 
broadly interpreted to include child witnesses who have difficulties with 
                                            
154  New Zealand Law Commission The Review of the Evidence Act 2006 - Report 127 1.48. 
155  New Zealand Cabinet Domestic Police Committee Minutes of Decision: Child witnesses in the 
Criminal Courts: Proposed Reforms DOM Min (11) 10/1 available at 
http://www.google.co.za/url?url=http://www.justice.govt.nz/publications/global-publications/c/ 
child-witnesses-in-the-criminal-courts-proposed-reforms/child-witnesses-in-the-criminal-
courts-proposed-reforms/at_download/file&rct=j&frm=1&q=&esrc=s&sa=U&ved=0ahUKE 
wjVlPRlLPKAhUrnnIKHX1HAxoQFggTMAA&usg=AFQjCNEKLU57KWL9CtcbUlwKUappGJJ
Oag (accessed 12/01/2016). 
156  New Zealand Cabinet Paper Amendments to the Evidence Act 2006 (12/11/2013) at paras 
[25], [32], [33], and [39]-[42]. 
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comprehension) in terms of section 80157 read with section 81 of the Evidence Act. 
Sections 80 and 81 of the New Zealand Evidence Act may be compared to section 
170A of the South African Criminal Procedure Act in the following manner: 
 
Section  170A of the South 
African Criminal 
Procedure Act 
80 and 81 of the New 
Zealand Evidence Act 
Discretion of trial court  to 
appoint an intermediary  
Court has a discretion to 
appoint an intermediary 
in all instances. 
Court has a discretion 
to allow 
communication 
assistance.  
Application Witnesses under the 
biological or mental age 
of eighteen years 
No age restriction – all 
witnesses are entitled 
to apply. 
Prerequisites Subject thereto that the 
witness will suffer 
“undue mental stress or 
suffering” if such 
witness testifies at such 
proceedings. 
Subject thereto that 
the witness does not 
have sufficient 
proficiency in English 
to understand court 
proceedings or to give 
evidence, or has a 
communication 
disability.  
Qualifications of 
intermediary/communication 
assistant 
As determined by the 
Minister in the Gazette 
No qualifications are 
set out in the Act. 
                                            
157  Read together with s 81 of the Evidence Act. 
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Questioning of witness Convey the general 
purport of the question. 
As directed by the 
court: may include 
oral or written 
interpretation of the 
language, written 
assistance, 
technological 
assistance or any 
other assistance that 
enables or facilitates 
communication.  
Procedural provisions Provided: for example 
what to do if a court 
discovers after the fact 
that an intermediary 
appointed in good faith 
was in fact not 
competent to be 
appointed as such. 
Not provided. 
 
An evaluation of the abovementioned table reveals that the requirements for the 
application of section 80 of the Evidence Act, in comparison to section 170A of the 
South African Criminal Procedure Act, appear to be less stringent for child 
witnesses. In order for section 170A of the South African Criminal Procedure Act to 
find application, the witness must be under the biological or mental age of eighteen 
years,158 but no age restriction is laid down in section 80 of the Evidence Act.159 In 
addition, the application of section 170A of the South African Criminal Procedure 
Act is subject thereto that the witness will be exposed to “undue mental stress or 
suffering” if such witness testifies at the proceedings160 whereas the application of 
                                            
158  S 170A of the South African Criminal Procedure Act. 
159  See s 80 of the Evidence Act which refers to “a witness”. 
160  S 170A of the South African Criminal Procedure Act. 
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section 80 read together with section 81(2) of the Evidence Act is only subject 
thereto that the witness is not able to sufficiently understand questions put orally 
and to adequately respond to them.161 
 
Despite the aforementioned differences, New Zealand and South African criminal 
courts face an analogous difficulty in that the concepts “sufficiently understand” and 
“adequately respond” in section 81(2) of the Evidence Act, like the concept of “undue 
mental stress or suffering” used in section 170 of the South African Criminal 
Procedure Act, are not defined in the respective Acts and are thus open to 
interpretation by the New Zealand and South African courts respectively.  
 
Section 80 of the Evidence Act provides for a variety of forms of communication 
assistance, which may include oral or written interpretation of the language, written 
assistance, technological assistance or any other assistance that enables or 
facilitates communication.162 In performing communication assistance the 
communication assistant, apart from rendering the aforementioned assistance, is 
entitled to interrupt cross-examination when incomprehensible to the witness and to 
indicate to the judge whether the witness is able to understand questions because 
of the words used or the structure of the sentence or the concepts within the 
sentences.163 In terms of section 170A of the Criminal Procedure Act, an 
intermediary is only allowed to convey the general purport of the question to the 
child witness. Section 80 of the Evidence Act, in comparison to section 170A of the 
Criminal Procedure Act, hence affords the communication assistant more freedom 
to assist a child witness than is permitted to an intermediary in the South African 
criminal justice system.  
 
2.6.4 Concerns about the child witness system in terms of the Evidence Act 2006 
                                            
161  Ss 80 and 81(2) of the Evidence Act. 
162  S 81(3) of the Evidence Act. 
163  R v Hetherington CA 14/2014 [2015] NZCA 248 at [23]. 
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In response to concerns about the treatment of child witnesses in the New Zealand 
criminal justice system, a study164 of the application of the provisions of the Evidence 
Act was conducted by Dr Hanna, a linguist, Dr Davies, a psychologist, together with 
other researchers of the Auckland University of Technology (hereinafter AUT). The 
purpose of the study was to determine what improvements had been made in 
addressing concerns raised in the 1990s and the extent to which measures adopted 
to ameliorate conditions for children had achieved their purpose. This study 
considered two groups of criminal cases involving child witnesses under the age of 
seventeen years over the period 2008-2009. The first group included 46 trials 
involving 71 children.165 The second group consisted of pre-trial applications on 
behalf of 134 children for directions allowing the use of special measures for 
upcoming criminal trials. Transcripts of eighteen children’s forensic interviews and 
courtroom examinations by either the defence or prosecutors were also analysed.166   
 
The study revealed a number of significant problems with the situation of child 
witnesses in the New Zealand criminal justice system. A few of the problems 
identified by the researchers are highlighted: 
 
 Although police investigations were completed reasonably quickly, compared to the 
position in 1993, instead of a decrease in time a significant increase in court 
processing time was noted.167 
 Regardless of the fact that there is no presumption in the Evidence Act that forensic 
interviews and CCTV are appropriate for younger children only, the data analysed 
                                            
164  Hanna et al Child Witnesses in the New Zealand Criminal Courts: A Review of Practice and 
Implication for Policy. 
165  Hanna “Questioning Children” in Hanna et al Child Witnesses in the New Zealand Criminal 
Courts: A Review of Practice and Implication for Policy (2010) 1 at 21. The children’s ages 
ranged from six to seventeen years. Only three of the children in the sample had intellectual 
disabilities. 
166  Hanna in Hanna et al Child Witnesses in the New Zealand Criminal Courts: A Review of 
Practice and Implication for Policy 58-60. 
167  Hanna in Hanna et al Child Witnesses in the New Zealand Criminal Courts: A Review of 
Practice and Implication for Policy 24-26. 
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suggested a pattern indicating that CCTV was used for younger children and 
screens for older children.168  
 Although the Evidence Act states that it is mandatory for the courts to consider the 
views of witnesses when issuing directions about alternative ways of giving 
evidence, the study found that 60% of children in the trial sample were not consulted 
about their preferred choice of ways of giving evidence.169 
 Although the Evidence Act states that complainants are entitled to and other 
witnesses may apply for a support person, the study revealed that 30% of the 
children had no such support person.170 
 The questioning of child witnesses by lawyers in particular proved to be very 
problematic. Lawyers often continued to use inappropriate modes of questioning, 
which included leading questions, double negatives and complex vocabulary. Also, 
lawyers did not adjust their questioning styles and techniques to accommodate the 
age of the child being questioned.  According to the authors of the study, this 
suggests that lawyers’ understanding of how to accommodate children’s language 
competencies is not adequate, or that this understanding is not translated into 
practice.171  
 A significant percentage of children exhibited signs of distress during cross-
examination in court: 35% of the children below the age of twelve years wept while 
25% of the children between the ages of thirteen and seventeen years 
wept. Disturbingly, 80% of the children below the age of twelve years indicated that 
they had not understood the questions posed by the defence, and 71% of children 
between the ages of thirteen and seventeen years told the defence lawyer they had 
not understood some of the questions. Furthermore, the defence accused 65% of 
the younger and older children in the study sample respectively of lying.172 
                                            
168  Hanna in Hanna et al Child Witnesses in the New Zealand Criminal Courts: A Review of 
Practice and Implication for Policy 42. 
169  Hanna in Hanna et al Child Witnesses in the New Zealand Criminal Courts: A Review of 
Practice and Implication for Policy 36. 
170  Hanna in Hanna et al Child Witnesses in the New Zealand Criminal Courts: A Review of 
Practice and Implication for Policy 45. 
171  Hanna in Hanna et al Child Witnesses in the New Zealand Criminal Courts: A Review of 
Practice and Implication for Policy 70-82. 
172  Hanna in Hanna et al Child Witnesses in the New Zealand Criminal Courts: A Review of 
Practice and Implication for Policy 51-57. 
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 The study also found that although the frequency of judicial interventions had 
increased since the mid-1990s, these interventions were still far too infrequent to 
control the full extent of problematic questioning. Many complex questions were not 
challenged. 173 
 
In their conclusion Hanna et al set out certain recommendations, which included 
legislative reform as well as two procedural reforms or innovations. The legislative 
reform proposals are the following:174 
 
 Amend the provisions of sections 102 to 107 of the Evidence Act to include pre-
recording of a child witness’ entire evidence, including re-examination and cross-
examination.  
 Amend legislation to a presumption in favour of video-recorded forensic interviews 
and CCTV or live audio-visual links for all child witnesses. 
 Strengthen legislation so that the use of specialist child examiners becomes routine 
practice. 
 Amend section 106(4)(a) of the Evidence Act and the Evidence Regulations 2007 
so that video-recorded forensic interviews are once again not allowed to be removed 
from police premises (save for court purposes alone).  
 
With regard to the procedural reforms, Hanna et al suggested that the practice of 
pre-recording children’s entire evidence before trial in order to deal with the problem 
of delays, as well as the introduction of some type of intermediary system to alleviate 
problems with conventional cross-examination, should be considered.175 In 
considering the introduction of a system of intermediaries, several jurisdictions were 
                                            
173  Hanna in Hanna et al Child Witnesses in the New Zealand Criminal Courts: A Review of 
Practice and Implication for Policy 90-91. 
174  Hanna in Hanna et al Child Witnesses in the New Zealand Criminal Courts: A Review of 
Practice and Implication for Policy 12. 
175  Hanna in Hanna et al Child Witnesses in the New Zealand Criminal Courts: A Review of 
Practice and Implication for Policy 168. 
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evaluated, including South Africa.176 The Norwegian system was preferred as this 
system integrates both pre-recording and specialist child examiners according to 
best practices within a trial process similar to that of New Zealand. According to 
Hanna et al the use of such a system would simultaneously address delays and 
inappropriate cross-examination.177 
 
These proposals were met with approval by the New Zealand Government. In early 
2011 the then Minister of Justice, Simon Power, released an issue paper on child 
witnesses investigating alternative pre-trial and trial processes that may improve the 
way child witnesses are treated within the criminal justice system, for targeted 
consultation.178 The paper outlined various reform options, including a presumption 
in favour of alternative ways of giving evidence, a mandatory mode of evidence 
application for all child witnesses, the pre-recording children’s entire evidence and 
the use of intermediaries. Not surprisingly, both the Children’s Commissioner and 
the New Zealand Psychology Society strongly supported the reform proposals.179 
With regard to intermediaries in particular, the New Zealand Psychology Society 
emphasised that the use of intermediaries would not only improve the quality of 
children’s evidence but also alleviate the level of stress that children experienced in 
the present system. This is particularly true where cross-examination and re-
examination are conducted by practitioners whose background, education and 
experience do not readily equip them with the skills required to elicit complete, 
accurate and reliable evidence from child witnesses.180 The New Zealand Law 
                                            
176  Hanna in Hanna et al Child Witnesses in the New Zealand Criminal Courts: A Review of 
Practice and Implication for Policy at ch 5. The other jurisdictions are Australia, England, 
Israel, Norway and France. For more on the evaluations of the different jurisdictions, refer to 
Hanna in Hanna et al Child Witnesses in the New Zealand Criminal Courts: A Review of 
Practice and Implication for Policy at ch 5. 
177  Hanna in Hanna et al Child Witnesses in the New Zealand Criminal Courts: A Review of 
Practice and Implication for Policy 168. 
178  New Zealand Ministry of Justice Alternative Pre-trial and Trial Processes for Child Witnesses 
in New Zealand’s Criminal Justice System Issues Paper (2011). Written submissions were 
received from lawyers, judicial groups, counsellors, psychologists and psychotherapists, 
academics and non-governmental agencies, government agencies and members of the 
public. 
179 New Zealand Children’s Commissioner Children’s Commissioner Submission to the Ministry 
of Justice (21/02/2011); Seymour, Blackwell & McDougall Submission on Behalf of the New 
Zealand Psychology Society (21/02/2011).  
180  Seymour, Blackwell & McDougall Submission on Behalf of the New Zealand Psychology 
Society (21 February 2011) 1 at 5. 
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Society also endorsed an increase in the use of alternative ways of giving evidence 
as well as the use of pre-recordings, although commenting that the use of pre-
recordings should be the usual, but not mandatory, method of proceeding. The use 
of intermediaries was also supported. The New Zealand Law Society expressed the 
view that the intermediary should be a person who possesses the skills to put the 
questions asked by counsel into suitable language. This would give the intermediary 
the right to determine the nature of the question. However, the New Zealand Law 
Society commented that the trial judge should have an overriding discretion to 
require the intermediary to put questions in a particular form, if it can be 
demonstrated by counsel that this is necessary.181  
 
As a result of the positive feedback the New Zealand Cabinet approved certain 
reforms in October 2011.182 These reforms fell into three categories and included 
eight proposals:183  
 
a) Reducing the impact of time delays 
 Introduce a legislative presumption that all children under the age of twelve give 
their evidence via their evidential interview by video record or CCTV. 
 Introduce a legislative presumption in favour of pre-recording a child under the age 
of twelve’s entire evidence, including cross-examination and re-examination, at a 
pre-trial hearing conducted in an age-appropriate setting. This presumption would 
apply unless there was good justification why a child should not give evidence in this 
way. 
                                            
181  New Zealand Law Society Submission to Ministry of Justice on behalf of the New Zealand 
Law Society (21/02/2011) 1-4. The New Zealand Law Society does not indicate in what form 
the question should be formulated or when this discretion would be exercised. It is assumed 
however that this would be the case when a question no longer represents a true reflection of 
the original question posed by counsel.  
182  New Zealand Cabinet Domestic Police Committee Minutes of Decisions: Child Witnesses in 
the Criminal Courts: Proposed Reforms Dom Min (11) 10/1. 
183  New Zealand Cabinet Domestic Police Committee Minutes of Decisions: Child Witnesses in 
the Criminal Courts: Proposed Reforms: Dom Min (11) 10/1 at 1-2. 
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 Introduce a requirement, in regulation, to hold pre-recording evidence hearings 
within a specified timeframe.184 
 Clarification and improvements to legislation to support an increased use of pre-
recordings.185 
b) Improving the questioning of child witnesses 
 Introduce specialist intermediaries trained in the cognitive development and 
language comprehension of children, to improve the questioning of child 
complainants under the age of eighteen in court. The exact nature of the model was 
to be developed by the Minister of Justice in consultation with a working group of 
legal and judicial professionals and other stakeholders. 
 Improve the availability of guidance, education and training for the judiciary and 
lawyers on how best to question and cross-examine child witnesses. 
c) Other enhancements relating to child witnesses and the evidence 
 Extending the automatic right to have a support person present while giving 
evidence to all child witnesses.186 
                                            
184  The New Zealand Cabinet Domestic Police Committee proposed (in their Minutes of 
Decisions: Child Witnesses in the Criminal Courts: Proposed Reforms Dom Min (11) at 6) that 
a timeframe should be set that will significantly reduce the average time children have to wait 
to give evidence at court, potentially to less than six months. This will ensure that the central 
purpose of pre-recording of evidence, namely to reduce the time children wait to testify, is 
achieved. 
185  The New Zealand Cabinet Domestic Policy Committee highlighted (in their minutes Minutes 
of Decisions: Child Witnesses in the Criminal Courts: Proposed Reforms Dom Min (11) at 7) 
that the provisions relating to pre-recording were ambiguous. They accordingly proposed to 
clarify the law in the following manner: 
 amending ss 103-107 of the Evidence Act to clarify that all witnesses can give evidence, 
including evidence in cross-examination and re-examination, at a pre-trial hearing where 
the visual and audio evidence is recorded and replayed at trial;  
 amending the Evidence Regulations 2007 to outline any necessary requirements around 
the pre-recording of witnesses’ entire evidence at a pre-trial hearing; 
 explicitly providing that a witness may be recalled for further questioning, on application 
of counsel, but with a very high threshold (ie where it would be contrary to the interests 
of justice to reject the application); and 
 allowing video records, whether evidential interview video records or records made at a 
pre-trial hearing, to be used at re-trials instead of recalling the witness (unless the order 
for a retrial following appeal is based upon a deficiency in the way in which the evidence 
was elicited). 
186  In terms of the proposal the use of a support person was to be extended as an automatic right 
to all witnesses and not only to complainants. Also, the use of a support person was to be 
utilised in addition to the services of an intermediary.  
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 Introducing a new judicial direction to juries relating to the demeanour of child 
witnesses who give evidence by an alternative mode.187 
 
With regard to specifically improving the questioning of child witnesses, the New 
Zealand Minister of Justice, Simon Power, stated that he believed that the 
introduction of specialist trained intermediaries would be the best way to improve 
the questioning of children at court.188 He also highlighted some of the benefits of 
utilising intermediaries, namely to mitigate the impact of inappropriate questioning, 
to elicit more accurate and reliable evidence, and to take into account cultural 
considerations in children’s communication and especially the needs of Maori 
children, who are substantially overrepresented as victims of crime.189  
 
The New Zealand Minister of Justice furthermore stressed that while some members 
of the legal profession might be concerned that intermediaries could interfere with 
the defence’s ability to challenge a witness’s evidence, with the development of 
clear rules, any risk that the defendant’s rights might be affected would be 
minimised, and any other practical concerns could be resolved during the 
implementation process.190 The Minister of Justice accordingly proposed that the 
Ministry phase in intermediary services over a period of two years to ensure that the 
needs of child victims are met and to resolve any issues prior to full implementation. 
He also proposed an amendment to the Evidence Act to enable regulations to be 
made on the use of intermediaries in court proceedings.191 These changes were to 
                                            
187  Alternative modes of evidence are designed to reduce stress for children when testifying. 
Children may accordingly appear more calm or dispassionate when testifying with such a 
mode. This may lead jurors to believe that the child is less credible. The New Zealand Cabinet 
Domestic Policy Committee therefore proposed to introduce a direction that juries should not 
draw any inference from the demeanour of a child witness when testifying by an alternative 
mode. In terms of the proposal the judicial discretion should be mandatory as the opinion is 
held by the committee that it will lower the risk of perceived bias and reinforce the principle 
that demeanour is not an accurate way of assessing truth. 
188  New Zealand Cabinet Domestic Police Committee Minutes of Decisions: Child Witnesses in 
the Criminal Courts: Proposed Reforms: Dom Min (11) 10/1 at 9-10 
189  New Zealand Cabinet Domestic Police Committee Minutes of Decisions: Child Witnesses in 
the Criminal Courts: Proposed Reforms: Dom Min (11) 10/1 at 9-10. 
190  New Zealand Cabinet Domestic Police Committee Minutes of Decisions: Child Witnesses in 
the Criminal Courts: Proposed Reforms Dom Min (11) 10/1 at 9-10. 
191  New Zealand Cabinet Domestic Police Committee Minutes of Decisions: Child Witnesses in 
the Criminal Courts: Proposed Reforms Dom Min (11) 10/1 at 10. 
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be introduced by way of an Evidence Amendment Bill, which was expected to be 
presented to the New Zealand Parliament in 2012. However, in 2013 the New 
Zealand Government rescinded the New Zealand Cabinet’s 2011 decision.192  
 
In the meantime, a further study exploring the viability of different intermediary 
models in the New Zealand context was conducted in 2011 by members of the same 
research team of AUT that produced the study about the treatment of child 
witnesses in the New Zealand criminal justice system referred to above.193 The 
purpose of this exploratory study was to investigate the potential risk and benefits 
of intermediary systems in general, and perceptions of each specific model as a 
means of identifying key issues that would need to be taken into consideration in 
developing a suitable model for New Zealand. In so doing, three models were 
considered,194 namely the full intermediary model,195 the question-by-question 
model196 and the topic-by-topic model.197 A series of mock trials were held using 
each of the aforementioned models. The mock trials were conducted in a courtroom 
with a district court judge, prosecutors and a defence lawyer fulfilling their respective 
roles, while the “child” witness was role-played by an adult and the intermediary role 
was shared principally between a forensic interviewer and a speech-language 
therapist. The trials were observed by members of the judiciary (including three 
                                            
192  New Zealand Cabinet Paper Amendments to the Evidence Act 2006 (12/11/2013) at paras 
[25], [32], [33], [39]-[42]. 
193  Davies et al Questioning Child Witnesses: Exploring the Benefits and Risks of Intermediary 
Models.   
194  Refer to Davies et al Questioning Child Witnesses: Exploring the Benefits and Risks of 
Intermediary Models for a detailed discussion of each of the models. 
195  In terms of this model, the intermediary is briefed by counsel before trial on the aspects of the 
child's testimony they want explored and tested. At trial the intermediary takes responsibility 
for putting the requested exploration and testing into question form, including determining how 
questions are phrased and the order in which the questions are presented to the child (refer 
to Davies et al Questioning Child Witnesses: Exploring the Benefits and Risks of Intermediary 
Models  6). 
196  In terms of this model, counsel determines the questions and poses them one at a time to the 
intermediary, who translates the question into developmentally appropriate language for the 
child (refer to Davies et al Questioning Child Witnesses: Exploring the Benefits and Risks of 
Intermediary Models  6).  
197  In terms of this model, the intermediary is briefed as per the full intermediary model, but 
counsel breaks the questions up into topics, based on the area of challenge or exploration. At 
trial there is an interactive process whereby the intermediary questions the child on the first 
topic, then refers back to the lawyer for further instructions, before moving on to the next topic 
(refer to Davies et al Questioning Child Witnesses: Exploring the Benefits and Risks of 
Intermediary Models  6). 
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judges) and other interested professionals. The mock trials were followed by 
facilitated discussions with the participants.198 The mock trials revealed that the 
participants’ perceptions of the full intermediary and question-by-question models 
were generally poor.199 The full intermediary model, with the intermediary taking 
responsibility for conducting the examination, from beginning to end, was perceived 
to place too much responsibility on the intermediary, while limiting counsel’s right to 
demand further exploration of any inconsistency.200 The need for the intermediary 
to “translate” the questions one-by-one, with an inevitable delay between the child’s 
last response and hearing the next question, resulted in the question-by-question 
model being perceived as “clunky” and “stop-start”. It was moreover feared by the 
participants that the child might lose focus as a result of the poor flow of the question 
and answer sequence. Concerns were also raised as to what language-related 
issues intermediaries would be permitted to address – would they be allowed only 
to rephrase complex language into simpler language or would they also have the 
freedom to rephrase closed and leading questions whenever possible?201  
 
The topic-by-topic model was perceived by the participants to be more effective than 
the other two models considered. The anticipated benefits of the topic-by-topic 
model cited by the participants included: 
 
 better quality evidence from children through better developmentally and 
appropriately sequenced questions; 
 improved pre-trial preparation by counsel; 
 clearer evidence for the fact-finders to assess; 
                                            
198  Davies et al Questioning Child Witnesses: Exploring the Benefits and Risks of Intermediary 
Models 6-9. 
199  The participants included judges, defence lawyers, prosecutors, legal scholars, pediatricians, 
forensic interviewers and language therapists.  
200  Davies et al Questioning Child Witnesses: Exploring the Benefits and Risks of Intermediary 
Models 22. 
201  Davies et al Questioning Child Witnesses: Exploring the Benefits and Risks of Intermediary 
Models 22-23. 
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 neutralising negative perceptions of the defence; 
 increasing counsel’s and judges’ understanding of appropriate questioning for 
children; 
 allowing the child breaks in the testimony. 
 
Nonetheless, the participants agreed that regardless of the model utilised the 
intermediary needs to be highly skilled in communicating with children and has to 
be informed of court procedure and the law of evidence. A pre-trial assessment of 
a child’s communicative competencies should form part of any chosen model.202 
Finally, there has to be a clear delineation of an intermediary’s role, including clarity 
surrounding the circumstances in which an intermediary can refuse to carry out 
counsel’s instructions.203  
 
Reflecting on the mock trials and the participants’ views of the intermediary models, 
the authors proposed certain steps towards enhancing the court’s facilitation of 
eliciting the best evidence from children. These included the following:204 
 
1. The creation of a legislative presumption in favour of pre-recording children’s entire 
testimony; 
2. The development of training programs for the judiciary and counsel on 
communication with children, particularly during cross-examination;  
3. The establishment of a multidisciplinary child witness working group with terms of 
reference over an extended period of time to: 
                                            
202  Davies et al Questioning Child Witnesses: Exploring the Benefits and Risks of Intermediary 
Models 7. 
203  Davies et al Questioning Child Witnesses: Exploring the Benefits and Risks of Intermediary 
Models 36. 
204  Davies et al Questioning Child Witnesses: Exploring the Benefits and Risks of Intermediary 
Models 8. 
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 communicate research findings on children’s language, including problems on 
poor communication in order to improve the quality of evidence for children; 
 draft guidelines to depict best practices in cross-examining of children; 
 explore the possibility of mandatory training for judges and counsel on best 
practices with children; 
 develop an intermediary model for New Zealand, including: 
o framing the roles and responsibilities of the intermediary and counsel; 
o developing a code of conduct for intermediaries; 
o specifying the core components of a training package for intermediaries; 
outlining pre-trial processes of engagement between the intermediary and 
other parties;  
o establishing protocols for courtroom practice; and  
o determining criteria for children’s access to an intermediary. 
 contribute advice on legislation. 
 
The study clearly highlighted the benefits of intermediary systems in general, and 
the perceptions of each specific model as a means of identifying key issues that 
would need to be taken into consideration in developing a suitable model for New 
Zealand. New Zealand would then be able to develop its own intermediary system 
for the criminal justice system, building on the insight gained from the 
aforementioned studies. 
 
2.7 Proposed reform 
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Section 202 of the Evidence Act places a responsibility on the Minister of Justice to 
periodically review the operation of the Evidence Act.205 In line with this provision 
and following the 2011 New Zealand Cabinet decisions on child witnesses giving 
evidence, the then Minister of Justice, Judith Collins, requested the Law 
Commission in 2012 to carry out a review of the operation of the Evidence Act. The 
Law Commission subsequently delivered their report, The 2013 Review of the 
Evidence Act 2006, in February 2013.206 The Law Commission made the following 
recommendations with regard to child witnesses – recommendations which ran 
counter to previous recommendations: 
 
 Communication assistance  
 
The Law Commission stated that although they remained of the view that amending 
section 80 of the Evidence Act (to specifically include assistance with understanding 
questions for witnesses who do not have a communication disability, but who might 
have difficulty in comprehending questions, for example because of age) could be 
a useful avenue to allow for the use of intermediaries, consideration of the merits of 
                                            
205  S 202 of the Evidence Act states the following: 
(1) The Minister must, as soon as practicable after 1 December 2011 or any later date set by 
the Minister by notice in the Gazette, and on at least 1 occasion during each 5-year period 
after that date, refer to the Law Commission for consideration the following matters: 
(a) the operation of the provisions of this Act since the date of the commencement of this 
section or the last consideration of those provisions by the Law Commission, as the 
case requires: 
(b) whether those provisions should be retained or repealed: 
(c) if they should be retained, whether any amendments to this Act are necessary or 
desirable. 
(2)The Law Commission must report on those matters to the Minister within 1 year of the date 
on which the reference occurs. 
(3) The Minister— 
(a) may not set a date later than 1 December 2011 for the commencement of the initial 
periodic review of this Act under subsection (1) unless the Minister is satisfied that, 
because of the limited number of cases concerning the provisions of this Act decided 
by the superior courts of New Zealand or for any other reason, it is appropriate to defer 
the date of the initial periodic review; and 
(b) must not set a date later than 1 December 2014 under subsection (1). 
206  New Zealand Law Commission The 2013 Review of the Evidence Act 2006 - Report 127 
available at http://r127.publications.lawcom.govt.nz/ (accessed 17/01/2016). 
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doing so would in their view involve a number of substantive policy issues.207 An 
amendment of section 80 of the Evidence Act to broaden the definition of 
communication assistance was accordingly not recommended. 
 
 Alternative ways of giving evidence 
 
The Law Commission indicated that they held the view that the decision of whether 
to apply for directions on alternative ways should be based on the needs of the 
individual witness rather than on the fact that they belonged to a particular category. 
Mandatory applications concerning alternative ways of giving evidence were hence 
not supported.208  
 
 Pre-recording of evidence 
 
The Law Commission stated that they remained of the view that although the pre-
recording of evidence had some merit, for example where expediting of a trial was 
not possible, this area raised a number of significant policy and practical issues that 
would need to be fully explored. According to the Law Commission this statutory 
review was not the appropriate platform for such an enquiry.209 
 
Following the Law Commission’s 2013 Review of the Evidence Act the then Minister 
of Justice, Judith Collins, presented certain recommendations to the New Zealand 
                                            
207  New Zealand Law Commission The 2013 Review of the Evidence Act 2006 - Report 127 at 
1.48.The New Zealand Law Commission unfortunately does not indicate what these 
substantive policy issues involve. 
208  New Zealand Law Commission The 2013 Review of the Evidence Act 2006 - Report 127 at 
11.71. 
209  New Zealand Law Commission The 2013 Review of the Evidence Act 2006 - Report 127 at 
11.79. 
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Cabinet on the amendment of the Evidence Act in November 2013.210 The 
recommendations included the progression of certain decisions while rescinding 
some of New Zealand’s 2011 Cabinet decisions. The following progressions were 
recommended: 
 
 Alternative ways of giving evidence-in-chief 
 
The introduction of a legislative presumption that witnesses under the age of 
eighteen give their evidence-in-chief via the video record of their evidential interview 
where available, or via one of the alternative ways of giving evidence set out in the 
Evidence Act, was proposed. This legislative presumption would remove the need 
for prosecutors to apply to the court to use alternative ways of giving evidence. This 
proposal extends the scope of the New Zealand Cabinet’s 2011 decision regarding 
the pre-recording of the evidence-in-chief from witnesses under the age of twelve 
years to all child witnesses, in other words to all persons under the age of eighteen 
years.211 
 
 Support person in court 
 
The progression of the automatic right to have a support person present while giving 
evidence to all child witnesses was also proposed.212 
 
 Improving guidance and training for the judiciary and lawyers on questioning 
child witnesses 
                                            
210  New Zealand Cabinet Paper Amendments to the Evidence Act 2006 (12/11/2013). 
211  New Zealand Cabinet Paper Amendments to the Evidence Act 2006 at paras 28-30. 
212  New Zealand Cabinet Paper Amendments to the Evidence Act 2006 at para 31. 
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The improvement of the availability of guidance, education and training for the 
judiciary and lawyers on how best to question and cross-examine child witnesses in 
consultation with the judiciary and the New Zealand Law Society was furthermore 
proposed.213 
 
The following rescissions of New Zealand’s 2011 Cabinet decisions were 
recommended: 
 
 
 Pre-recording of children’s entire evidence 
 
In 2011 Cabinet agreed to the introduction of a legislative presumption in favour of 
pre-recording the entire evidence of children under the age of twelve years in 
criminal proceedings. A rescission of this Cabinet decision was recommended. The 
reasons cited for the rescission of the proposal were: a lack of funding; a Court of 
Appeal decision, namely R v M,214 concluding that pre-recording should only be 
used in compelling cases and unusual circumstances; and concern about the effect 
pre-recording could have on a defendant’s right to a fair trial.215  
 
 Intermediaries to assist with questioning of child witnesses 
 
In 2011, Cabinet agreed to the introduction of specialist trained intermediaries as a 
means of improving the way child witnesses are questioned in court. Cabinet noted 
                                            
213  New Zealand Cabinet Paper Amendments to the Evidence Act 2006 at paras 32-33. 
214  [2011] NZCA 303. 
215  New Zealand Cabinet Paper Amendments to the Evidence Act 2006 at paras 35-38. 
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that extensive policy work would need to be undertaken to develop the exact nature 
of the model along with the necessary training and qualifications before the 
intermediary’s decision could be implemented. This decision was not supported by 
the Minister of Justice on both policy and practical grounds. The Minister of Justice 
held the view that it would be difficult to use intermediaries in New Zealand. 
According to the Minister of Justice intermediaries were better suited to an 
inquisitorial criminal justice process than the New Zealand adversarial process. 
Concern was also expressed as to who would fulfil the role of an intermediary as 
this role would require knowledge of child development, linguistics and the evidential 
processes. According to the Minister of Justice, New Zealand may not have enough 
suitably qualified people. A rescission of Cabinet’s 2011 decision to implement 
intermediaries was hence proposed.216 
 
 Judicial direction relating to the demeanour of child witnesses 
 
In 2011, Cabinet agreed to the introduction of a new judicial direction relating to child 
witnesses. This judicial direction would advise jurors not to draw inferences from the 
demeanour of child witnesses when giving evidence by an alternative mode as 
concern existed that jurors might take a child’s lack of distress while giving evidence 
as a sign that they had not been victimised in the way alleged. This decision was 
not supported by the Minister of Justice as she expressed concern that jurors would 
not understand that judicial directions are standard and that in her opinion they could 
be confused by the direction and think that the judge was providing them with clues 
as to his or her view of the case. The Minister of Justice also considers the 
demeanour of a witness to be a relevant consideration when evaluating the 
witness’s evidence. A rescission of Cabinet’s 2011 decision was hence proposed. 
 
The New Zealand Cabinet approved the aforementioned recommendations and 
rescinded the Cabinet decision of 2011. These changes have been incorporated 
                                            
216  New Zealand Cabinet Paper Amendments to the Evidence Act 2006 at paras 39-42. 
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into the Evidence Amendment Bill 2015 (hereinafter “the Evidence Amendment 
Bill”).217 The Evidence Amendment Bill accordingly proposes to introduce a 
legislative presumption that all child witnesses in criminal proceedings are entitled 
to give their evidence in one or more of the alternative ways of giving evidence set 
out in the Evidence Act.218 The Evidence Amendment Bill also intends to provide all 
child witnesses with an automatic right to have a support person present when 
giving evidence.219  
In introducing the Evidence Amendment Bill during the first Parliamentary Debate 
on the Bill on 2 July 2015, the Minister for Land Information, Louise Upston, acting 
on behalf of the Minister of Justice, emphasised that the changes set out in the 
Evidence Amendment Bill aim to make the criminal trial process easier and less 
damaging for child witnesses. She also pointed out that as applications for the use 
of alternative methods vary across different regions of New Zealand, the Evidence 
Amendment Bill will align standard practice and help to ensure that all children in 
criminal trials are protected as much as possible, while still allowing for the method 
of giving evidence to be tailored to the specific case and child. The importance of 
the extension of the right to a support person from complainants only to all child 
witnesses was also underlined by Minister Upston.220 The Evidence Amendment Bill 
was very well received by Parliament.221   
 
                                            
217  Evidence Amendment Bill 2015. The Bill will come into force as an Act on the earlier of the 
following dates: (a) a date appointed by the Governor-General by Order in Council (and 1 or 
more orders may be made bringing different provisions into force on different dates) or (b) 1 
July 2017. 
218  Clause 32, which inserts ss 107, 107A and 107B into the Evidence Act, gives effect to the 
presumption that child witnesses give evidence in alternative ways (see Evidence Amendment 
Bill 2015 available at http://www.legislation.govt.nz/bill/government/2015/0027/ 
latest/DLM6488707.html (accessed12/06/2016). 
219  S 79 is to be amended as follows: “After section 79(1), insert: (1A) A child witness, when giving 
evidence in a criminal proceeding, is entitled to have 1 person, and may, with the permission 
of the Judge, have more than 1 person, near him or her to give support.” (see Evidence 
Amendment Bill 2015 available at http://www.legislation.govt.nz/bill/government/ 
2015/0027/latest/DLM6488707.html (accessed 12/06/2016)). 
220  New Zealand Parliament Evidence Amendment Bill - First Reading (02/07/2015) available at 
http://wwww.Parliament/nz/en-nz/pb/debates/51HansD_20150702_00000036/e (accessed 
20/01/2016). 
221  New Zealand Parliament Evidence Amendment Bill - First Reading. 
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The amendments proposed to the Evidence Act through the implementation of the 
Evidence Amendment Bill will help to improve the situation for child witnesses within 
the criminal justice system in New Zealand. It is, however, perhaps unfortunate that 
the New Zealand Cabinet decided to rescind some of its 2011 decisions and 
especially the decision to implement the use of intermediaries.222 It is also 
unfortunate that the broadening of the section 4 definition of “communication 
assistance” in the Evidence Act to specifically include assistance with understanding 
questions for witnesses who do not have a communication disability, but may 
nevertheless find it difficult to comprehend questions, was not included in the 
Evidence Amendment Bill. This still leaves the New Zealand courts with the difficulty 
of having to decide whether a child witness’s communication abilities entitle the child 
to communication assistance within the current definition and may result in a child 
ending up without such assistance.223  
 
3 CONCLUSION 
 
The aim of this chapter is to evaluate the rights of child victims and child witnesses 
in the New Zealand criminal justice system with a view to comparing the position in 
South Africa with that in New Zealand. 
 
The evaluation of the New Zealand judicial system showed that historically New 
Zealand children, like South African children, suffered severe trauma during the 
court process up and until the late 1980s. Only with the introduction of the Evidence 
                                            
222  New Zealand Ministry of Justice Alternative Pre-trial and Trial Processes for Child Witnesses 
in New Zealand’s Criminal Justice System Issue Paper 30 (2012) at 39. 
223  The former Minister of Justice, Simon Power, points out that a considerable body of literature 
shows that the strategies used in adversarial cross-examination do not obtain the most 
accurate and reliable evidence from children and that great evidential safety can be achieved 
by specialist questioning. This is also the case for child witnesses in New Zealand in that the 
AUT report found that a high level of inappropriate and unsafe questioning of child witnesses, 
particularly during cross-examination, takes place. The introduction of intermediaries is 
recommended by Minister Power as a possible solution to the problem (see the New Zealand 
Cabinet Domestic Police Committee Minutes of Decisions: Child Witnesses in the Criminal 
Courts: Proposed Reforms: Dom Min (11) 10/1 at 9). 
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Amendment Act of 1989 and the subsequent enactment of the Evidence Act 2006 
did their position improve within the New Zealand criminal justice system. The 
Evidence Amendment Act introduced a series of alternative methods by which a 
child complainant under the age of seventeen years testifying in sexual cases could 
give evidence, such as via pre-recorded video interviews, via CCTV, from behind a 
screen or one-way glass, or through an appropriate audio link at the discretion of 
the judge.224 These methods, in effect, allowed for the use of an “intermediary” 
although their role was quite restricted as the appointment of intermediaries was not 
explicitly mentioned as one of the alternative methods.225 
 
The legislative changes furthermore allowed for expert evidence regarding the 
intellectual attainment, mental capacity and emotional maturity of the complainant, 
the general developmental level of children of the same age group as the 
complainant, and the extent to which the child’s behaviour was consistent with 
having been sexually abused.226 It also restricted the defendant’s right to personally 
cross-examine children where a judge considered such questioning to be 
intimidating or overbearing227 and legislated against the previously standard 
practice of warning the jury about a child witness’s reliability.228 The changes 
brought about by the Evidence Amendment Act were seen at the time as remarkably 
radical legislation.229 
 
Regrettably, although the use of the forensic interview video as evidence-in-chief 
with the child appearing at trial to be cross-examined using live links or screens 
quickly became standard procedure for child witnesses in New Zealand criminal 
courts, within a very short period of time the other alternatives offered by the 
                                            
224  S 23 of the Evidence Amendment Act 1989. 
225  S 23E(4) of the Evidence Amendment Act 1989. 
226  S 23G of the Evidence Amendment Act. 
227  S 23F(1) of the Evidence Amendment Act. 
228  S 23H of the Evidence Amendment Act. 
229  Henderson in Spencer & Lamb Children and Cross-Examination: Time to Change the Rules? 
1 at 117. 
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Evidence Amendment Act were overlooked. These included the use of 
intermediaries.230 
 
In 1996 the Law Commission released further proposals for reform which included 
the re-introduction of pre-recordings, the provision of all witnesses with a support 
person and the extension of the role of intermediaries to allow them to rephrase 
questions to assist with witness comprehension.231 Conversely, while the Law 
Commission recommended “communication assistance” in its final document, it 
withdrew its recommendation for the use of intermediaries.232 
The introduction of the Evidence Act in 2006 further improved the position of child 
witnesses within the New Zealand criminal justice system. This Act allows child 
witnesses to give evidence in an alternative way, provides child complainants with 
a right to a support person and makes allowances for communication assistance.233  
 
The Evidence Amendment Bill of 2015 promises to continue to improve the standing 
of child witnesses within the New Zealand criminal justice system. It allows a 
presumption that all witnesses may give evidence in an alternative way234 and 
provides child complainants and child witnesses alike with a right to a support 
person.235 
 
                                            
230  Henderson in Spencer & Lamb Children and Cross-Examination: Time to Change the Rules? 
1 at 117. 
231  New Zealand Law Commission The Evidence of Children and Other Vulnerable Witnesses: A 
discussion paper at para 173. 
232  New Zealand Law Commission Evidence: Reform of the Law at paras 368-369. The Law 
Commission cited divided views within the profession, as well as the existence of three 
disapproving research articles from the United States of America, as justification for its 
standpoint. 
233  See respectively ss 103-107, 79 and 80 of the Evidence Act. 
234  Unless the witness chooses not to and the judge is satisfied that the witness fully appreciates 
the effect of his or her doing so (see s 107A of the Evidence Amendment Bill 2015 available 
at http://www.legislation.govt.nz/bill/government/2015/0027/latest/DLM 6488707.html 
(accessed 12/06/2016)). 
235  See s 79(1A) of the Evidence Amendment Bill 2015 available at http://www.legislation. 
govt.nz/bill/government/2015/0027/latest/DLM6488707.html (accessed 12/06/2016). 
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While New Zealand can be complimented on the advancements made with regard 
to child-friendly legislation for child witnesses, such as alternative ways of giving 
evidence and pre-recordings, the New Zealand Government can be criticised for 
their decision to rescind the implementation of the use of intermediaries. This means 
that children are exposed to the adverse effects of the normal adult accusatorial 
judicial system, especially since the use of communication assistance is not 
guaranteed. By failing to utilise intermediaries, the New Zealand Government has 
chosen to ignore a vast body of research and knowledge signifying the importance 
of the questioning of a child witness by a skilled interviewer who has been 
specifically trained for this purpose and who has an understanding of a child’s 
linguistic, cognitive and emotional development. Very few presiding officers or 
lawyers have these specialised skills or have been trained to perform this task.236 
Intermediaries have acquired these skills and it has been found that if child 
witnesses are questioned with the benefit of such an understanding not only is more 
accurate and reliable evidence elicited from child witnesses but the adverse impact 
of the trial on child witnesses is also lessened.237 The use of alternative ways of 
giving evidence is only part of the solution and may not fully obviate the re-
traumatisation of child witnesses due to inappropriate questioning or aggressive 
cross-examination.238 Alternative ways of giving evidence, coupled with a distinctive 
intermediary model tailor-made for New Zealand’s situation with specialist trained 
intermediaries who focus on the proper questioning of child witnesses within the 
criminal justice system, may also benefit New Zealand child witnesses. 
 
However, the hope is expressed that New Zealand will continue with reform efforts 
in order to enhance its criminal justice system for child victims and child witnesses 
and that this will include reconsidering the introduction of an intermediary system. 
                                            
236  Hanna in Hanna et al Child Witnesses in the New Zealand Criminal Courts: A Review of 
Practice and Implications for Policy 70-82. 
237  Plotnikoff et al Intermediaries in the Criminal Justice System: Improving Communication for 
Vulnerable Witnesses and Defendants (2015) 1 at 282. See also DPP v Minister of Justice 
and Constitutional Development 2009 (2) SACR 130 (CC) at paras [167]-[168]. 
238  Hanna in Hanna et al Child Witnesses in the New Zealand Criminal Courts: A Review of 
Practice and Implications for Policy 51-57. 
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CHAPTER 8 
 
Concluding remarks and recommendations 
 
Speak up for those who cannot speak for themselves, for the rights of all who are 
destitute. Speak up and judge fairly; defend the rights of the poor and needy.1 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The purpose of the research was to investigate whether child witnesses and child 
victims of crime are afforded adequate protection and support in the South African 
criminal justice system when called upon to testify. The historical development of 
the protection for child witnesses and child victims in the criminal justice system was 
taken as the starting point; this was followed by an interrogation of the positive law 
on the protection of children as witnesses and victims in criminal proceedings. 
International instruments and the impact of the resolutions on the position of the 
child witness and victim in the criminal justice system were discussed. Comparative 
research on the protection of child witnesses and child victims in the criminal justice 
systems of Namibia and New Zealand contributed to the conclusions and 
recommendations. The final recommendations are informed by the conclusions 
reached by the researcher on the basis of her research. These recommendations 
are submitted in the expectation that they will be instrumental in enhancing the 
position of the child witness and child victim in the South African criminal justice 
system. 
 
                                            
1 Proverbs 31: 8-9 Holy Bible New International Version. 
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2 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
A large number of children are either exposed to physical and sexual violence or 
witness criminal acts which led to them having to testify in courts of law to the 
atrocities they have witnessed.2 Owing to their developmental shortcomings and 
lack of maturity, child victims and child witnesses find the criminal justice process 
particularly intimidating and onerous.3 The purpose of this research was therefore 
to determine whether a balance can be found between the accused’s right to a fair 
trial and the protection of the rights of the child witness and child victim. 
 
It is common knowledge that the rights of children have not been adequately 
recognised in the past and that many legal systems have failed to fulfil this objective. 
The historical overview of the development of South Africa’s criminal justice system 
in chapter 2 illustrates some of the past failures.4 Conversely, the overview also 
illustrates a significant evolution in the treatment of child victims and child witnesses 
within the criminal justice system, from early systems such as Germanic law where 
children were regarded as pars domus, in other words the mere objects of the 
domus of the family,5 to the present-day system that acknowledges the significance 
of child victims and witnesses in the criminal justice system.6 
 
                                            
2 Department of Social Development, Department of Women, Children and People with 
Disabilities and UNICEF Violence Against Children in South Africa (2012) 1 at 3. 
3 Ovens, Lambrechts & Prinsloo “The child witness in the criminal justice system” 2001 Acta 
Criminologica 25. 
4 For example, in terms of the 1917 Criminal Procedure Act if a child was deemed to be 
competent to give evidence at a trial, such evidence had to be given in the presence of the 
accused, before an all-male European jury, and the child had to remain in attendance 
throughout the trial unless excused by the court. Refer to para 2.4.3.4 of ch 2 above.  
5 Wessels The History of the Roman-Dutch Law (1908) 423. See also para 2.1 of ch 2  above. 
6 See for example Director of Public Prosecutions, Transvaal v Minister of Justice and 
Constitutional Development 2009 (2) SACR 130 (CC) at paras [72]-[74] (hereinafter referred 
to as DPP v Minster of Justice and Constitutional Development). See also ch 5 above. 
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Regrettably, history shows that the increase in children’s involvement in the judicial 
system has been coupled with some injustices. In this regard the accusatorial 
system has proved to be extremely hostile towards children.7 An evaluation of the 
elements of the accusatorial system, especially those of oral presentation of 
evidence, confrontation and cross-examination, as was conducted in chapter 3, 
clearly illustrates that children still find it significantly problematic to give evidence in 
criminal cases.8 These difficulties, combined with the anxiety experienced by 
children, sometimes lead to their testimony being “inaccurate” as they may confuse 
events and details or “forget” essential information.9 This in turn affects their 
credibility as witnesses dramatically and sometimes leads to the generalisation that 
children are unreliable witnesses.10 It is precisely for this reason that an inquisitorial 
approach is widely thought to be more advantageous to child witnesses and has 
been suggested as a possible solution to the problems experienced in the 
adversarial system.11 This approach, as was illustrated in chapter 3, is nonetheless 
not immune from criticism since the presiding officer inter alia has to fulfil the roles 
of both prosecutor and adjudicator.12 It is submitted that the solution to the problem 
may be found in the development of a novel system, tailor-made for child witnesses 
and victims, that combines inquisitorial elements with accusatorial elements while 
allowing a child victim to testify with the help of a “go between” or intermediary. An 
example of such a system can be found in the Norwegian model outlined in chapter 
3.13 This system protects the child witness against rigorous and inappropriate cross-
examination while retaining the two-party character of adversarial proceedings as 
well as the right of the accused to challenge evidence.14 
 
                                            
7 See ch 3 above. 
8 See ch 3 above. See also for example DPP v Minster of Justice and Constitutional 
Development 2009 (2) SACR 130 (CC) at para [1]. 
9 Müller & Tait “A prosecutor is a person who cuts off your head: children’s perceptions of the 
legal process” 1997 SALJ 593. 
10 Müller & Tait 1997 SALJ 593. 
11 See for example Zeiff “The child victim as a witness in sexual abuse cases – a comparative 
analysis of the law of evidence and procedure” 1991 SACJ 21 at 37; McEwan “Child evidence: 
more proposals for reform” 1988 CLR 813.  
12 See para 2.1 of ch 3 above. 
13 See para 3 of ch 3 above. 
14 Myklebust “The position in Norway” in Spencer & Lamb (ed) Children and Cross-examination: 
Time to Change the Rules? (2012) 147-159. See also paras 3.1.4-3.1.6; 3.4 and 4 of ch 5 
above. 
Concluding remarks and recommendations 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
441 
The study of the protection of child victims and witnesses under the Constitution of 
the Republic of South Africa, 1996, and international instruments, conducted in 
chapter 4, revealed a steadfast awareness of the importance of the protection of 
children and the progress that has been made in this regard in South Africa. The 
post-constitutional system is welcomed in that it not only recognises children’s 
vulnerabilities but also affords child victims and child witnesses protection, as 
illustrated in chapter 4 of this thesis. In this regard the Bill of Rights affords special 
protection to children in section 28 and serves inter alia to guarantee child victims 
and child witnesses the right to respect for their human dignity, privacy, equality, 
freedom and security of the person (which includes the right to be free from 
violence), and freedom of expression.15 The Constitution also advocates a criminal 
procedure that is tailored to the individual needs of children.16 The legal 
jurisprudence relating to these rights discussed in chapter 4 demonstrates a real 
commitment by the courts in recognising children as the independent rights holders 
of these fundamental rights and contributes to the realisation of these rights in 
practice.17 In DPP v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development,18 for 
example, the Constitutional Court inter alia held the following: 
 
Each child must be treated as a unique and valuable human being with his or her 
individual needs, wishes and feelings respected. Children must be treated with 
dignity and compassion. In my view these considerations should also inform the 
principle that the best interests of the child are of paramount importance in all 
matters concerning the child as envisaged in s 28(2) of the Constitution. 
 
The research has also demonstrated that an awareness of the rights and best 
interests of child victims and child witnesses lies at the heart of international and 
                                            
15 See ss 10, 14, 9, 12 and 16 of the Constitution. See also paras 2.2-2.3 of ch 4 above. 
16 See for example s 28(2) of the Constitution as well as aa 2, 3, 6 and 12 of the CRC. 
17 See for example S v M 1999 (2) SACR 548 (SCA); Director of Public Prosecutions v S 2000 
(2) SA 711 (T); S v M (Centre for Child Law as amicus curiae) 2007 (2) SACR 539 (CC); 
Prinsloo v Bramley Children’s Home 2005 (5) SA 119 (T); DPP v Minister of Justice and 
Constitutional Development 2009 (2) SACR 130 (CC); Teddy Bear Clinic for Abused Children 
v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development 2014 (1) SACR 327 (CC). See also para 
2 of ch 4 above. 
18 2009 (2) SACR 130 (CC) at para [79]. 
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regional instruments such as the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) and 
the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child.19 Documents relating to 
some of these instruments, for example, the UN Guidelines on Justice in Matters 
involving Child Victims and Witnesses of Crime, provide a valuable framework for 
assisting Member States, including South Africa, to enhance the protection of child 
victims and witnesses in their criminal justice systems.20 The Guidelines have also 
provided direction to South Africa in drafting relevant national legislation, policies 
and protocols involving child victims and witnesses in accordance with the 
Guidelines and other international instruments, such as the CRC. The National 
Programme of Action for Children outlines the actions government intends to take 
to realise its commitment towards children in accordance with these principles.21 
The Constitution, as well as the international and regional instruments and their 
related documents, has undoubtedly proved to be a powerful tool in enhancing the 
lives of child victims and child witnesses in South Africa. 
 
It has been pointed out that the protection of child victims and child witnesses in the 
aforementioned documents only forms part of the solution; it is also necessary to 
transcend the rhetoric of international and national documents and proceed to 
implement them, thereby making the rights of child victims and witnesses a practical 
reality. Notably, one such legislative procedural advance at national level, central to 
the theme of this study, relates to the function or persona of an intermediary.22 
 
The application of the intermediary system in terms of the South African criminal 
procedure was analysed in chapter 5. The historical background to the introduction 
and role of the intermediary in the South African criminal justice system was 
discussed.23 Aspects such as the appointment, role and functions of an intermediary 
and the categories of people qualified to act as such as well as the problems 
                                            
19 See paras 4 and 5 of ch 4 above. 
20 See para 4.4 of ch 4 above for more on the Guidelines. 
21 See para 6.3 of ch 4 above. 
22 See ch 5 above.   
23 See para 2 of ch 5 above. 
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experienced within the intermediary system were analysed.24 The study clearly 
revealed the importance of the role of intermediaries in the criminal justice system. 
Not only do intermediaries provide access to justice for child victims who may 
previously have been excluded from the trial process owing to their developmental 
shortcomings but they also facilitate the reception of the best evidence of child 
witnesses in criminal proceedings.25 They ensure that questioning is 
developmentally appropriate and hence contributes to the fairness of the trial 
process while not imposing on the defendant’s right to a fair trial.26  
 
However, an in-depth interrogation of the utilisation of intermediaries revealed that 
the efficacy of the South African intermediary system is dependent on certain 
factors, such as the clarity and ease with which enabling legislation can be 
interpreted by judicial officers; the sensitisation of the courts to children’s rights and 
limitations; the acceptance of the importance of the role of an intermediary, and 
finally government’s commitment towards the proper implementation of enabling 
legislation.27 Despite the fact that the study revealed an increase by the higher 
courts, prosecutors and other stakeholders in support of the intermediary system, 
as well as an intensified commitment by government towards the successful 
realisation of the intermediary system,28 there are still some systemic challenges 
within our criminal justice system. These include aspects such as the discretionary 
threshold for eligibility,29 the limited role of intermediaries30 and the financial and 
                                            
24 See para 3 of ch 5 above. 
25 K v Regional Court Magistrate 1996 (1) SACR 434 (E); S v Mokoena 2008 (2) SACR 216 (T); 
DPP v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development 2009 (2) SACR 130 (CC). 
26 K v Regional Court Magistrate 1996 (1) SACR 434 (E); S v Mokoena 2008 (2) SACR 216 (T); 
DPP v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development 2009 (2) SACR 130 (CC). 
27 See ch 5 above. 
28 See for example an improvement in the progressive appointment of intermediaries, together 
with increased establishment of intermediary facilities and the development of a job 
description for intermediaries. See also para 3.2-3.5 of ch 5 above. 
29 In terms of s 170A of the Criminal Procedure Act the appointment of an intermediary is subject 
to the discretion of a judicial officer presiding over a criminal proceeding. The judicial officer 
has to determine whether the services of an intermediary are required based on an 
assessment of whether the child would suffer undue mental stress or suffering if the child 
testified at such proceeding. This test or threshold for eligibility has been criticised for being 
too vague, too stringent and excluding many who might benefit, such as a complainant 
showing little stress but with serious communication difficulties. See S v Mokoena 2008 (2) 
SACR 216 (T) at para [79]; Muller & Tait 1999 THRHR 247-248. See also para 3.1.4 of ch 5 
above.  
30 See para 3.4 of ch 5 above. 
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logistical problems that even extend to the availability of intermediaries and 
intermediary facilities.31 Some concerns and shortcomings that need to be 
addressed to develop the current intermediary system have been highlighted and 
proposals on how to address these concerns have been made.32 These include the 
appointment of an intermediary as a standard norm, the pre-trial assessment of a 
witness and the setting of ground rules.33  
 
The application of the intermediary systems in Namibia and New Zealand was 
examined with a view to determining whether lessons could be learned from other 
jurisdictions which could alleviate the plight of child victims and witnesses within the 
criminal justice system of South Africa. 
 
The evaluation of the Namibian system revealed that the Namibian judicial system 
is comparable in many ways to that of South Africa. Like South Africa, Namibia 
adopted a new Constitution in the early 1990s, which constitution promotes and 
protects children’s rights albeit indirectly in some instances.34 Furthermore, the 
evaluation of the Namibian criminal justice system revealed that, like the South 
African system, the Namibian criminal justice system is accusatorial in nature and 
for some time even resembled the South African Criminal Procedure Act to a 
significant extent.35 Up to the early twenty-first century, Namibian children faced 
some of the same challenges as South African children during court processes. Only 
with the amendment of the Namibian Criminal Procedure Act through the enactment 
of the 2003 Criminal Procedure Amendment Act did the position change for child 
victims and child witnesses within the Namibian criminal justice system.  
 
                                            
31 Unfortunately, despite the increase in the progressive appointment of intermediaries and the 
establishment of intermediary facilities this remains problematic. 
32 See para 4 of ch 5 above. 
33 See para 4 of ch 5 above. 
34 See para 2.1 of ch 6 above. 
35 Horn “International human rights norms and standards: The development of Namibian case 
and statutory law” available at http://www.kas.de/upload/auslandshomepages/namibia/ 
HumanRights/horn.pdf141 (accessed 03/07/2015) at 150. See also para 2.3 of ch 6 above. 
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However, despite these similarities the evaluation of the criminal justice system of 
Namibia revealed that the legislation of the Namibian criminal justice system 
sanctioning the special treatment of child victims and child witnesses appears to be 
more child-friendly than South African legislation. For example, the conditions for 
the application of section 158A of the Namibian Criminal Procedure Act that allow 
for special measures where child witnesses are present are much less stringent 
than those of its South African counterpart.36 Section 166 of the Namibian Criminal 
Procedure Act, in addition, prescribes as a standard norm that children under the 
age of thirteen must be cross-examined by the presiding officer or an intermediary, 
whereas South African children under the age of thirteen years do not have a similar 
right to demand that they be cross-examined by an intermediary.37 Also, there are 
no pre-requisites for section 166 of the Namibian Criminal Procedure Act to find 
application other than that an intermediary should be immediately available. In 
comparison, its South African counterpart (s 170A) requires that to find application 
it must be established that the child witness would be exposed to undue mental 
stress or suffering if this section were not applied. In addition, witnesses are granted 
the right to have a support person present when having to testify.38 No such right is 
afforded to South African child witnesses in the South African Criminal Procedure 
Act. It is submitted that South African children would likewise greatly benefit from 
similar legislative provisions and that serious attention should be given to the 
implementation of comparative legislation in South Africa.  
 
Nevertheless, while Namibia may be complimented on their advanced child-
orientated legislation, the country is seriously in need of proper implementation. As 
far as could be established, Namibia has a significant shortage of child-friendly 
courts39 and the indications are that intermediaries are seldom used.40 Although this 
can be attributed to Namibia’s unfortunate financial constraints, inter alia, this clearly 
illustrates that enabling legislation in itself is not sufficient, but must be followed up 
by meaningful implementation. Both these aspects are equally important to ensure 
                                            
36 See paras 2.4.1- 2.4.3 of ch 6 above. 
37 S 166(4)-(5) of the Namibian Criminal Procedure Act, emphasis added. 
38 S 158A (2) of the Namibian Criminal Procedure Act. See also para 2.5 of ch 5 above. 
39 See para 2.4.4 of ch 6 above. 
40 See para 2.5 of ch 6 above. 
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that the rights of child victims and child witnesses are effectively protected. South 
Africa as a Third World country faces similar fiscal challenges. It is submitted, 
however, that with proper financial planning and commitment by the South African 
government, South Africa will be able to rise to this challenge.41 
 
The New Zealand legal system appears to share some characteristics with its South 
African counterpart. The New Zealand criminal justice system is accusatorial in 
nature and up to and until the late 1980s New Zealand children suffered severe 
trauma during the court process, just as South African children did.42 Positive reform 
only came about with the introduction of the Evidence Amendment Act of 1989 and 
the subsequent enactment of the Evidence Act of 2006.43 As was highlighted in 
chapter 7, the Evidence Amendment Act introduced a range of alternatives to 
conventional testimony,44 including the use of intermediaries. This resulted in the 
process being less traumatic for children and proved valuable in questioning 
children.45 
 
Unfortunately, although some of these alternatives, such as the use of the forensic 
interview video as evidence-in-chief with the child appearing at trial to be cross-
examined using live links or screens, quickly became standard procedure for child 
witnesses in New Zealand criminal courts, the other alternatives provided by the 
Evidence Amendment Act were overlooked and soon fell into disuse. These 
included the use of intermediaries.46 
 
                                            
41 See ch 5 above for more on the South African government’s commitment towards the 
progressive appointment of intermediaries and the provision of intermediary facilities.  
42 See para 2.3 of ch 7 above. 
43 See paras 2.4 and 2.6 of ch 7 above. 
44 For example, via pre-recorded video interviews, CCTV, from behind a screen or one-way 
glass, or through an appropriate audio link at the discretion of the judge. See s 23 of the 
Evidence Amendment Act 1989. 
45 S 23E(4) of the Evidence Amendment Act 1989. 
46 Henderson “Child witnesses in New Zealand” in Spencer & Lamb Children and Cross-
Examination: Time to Change the Rules? (2012) 1 at 117. See also para 2.5 of ch 5 above. 
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Despite initial proposals by the New Zealand Law Commission47 for the re-
introduction of intermediaries, coupled with support from various stakeholders,48 
intermediaries have not been re-introduced up to the time of writing this thesis. 
Further reform to the position of child witnesses did, however, materialise with the 
introduction of the Evidence Act in 2006 which, apart from making provision for child 
witnesses to give evidence in alternative ways, provides for “communication 
assistance” in section 80 of the Act.49 An evaluation of section 80 of the Evidence 
Act revealed that the requirements for the application of section 80, in comparison 
with section 170A of the South African Criminal Procedure Act, appear to be more 
favourable to child witnesses.50 For example, in order for section 170A of the South 
African Criminal Procedure Act to apply, the witness must be under the biological or 
mental age of eighteen years,51 whereas no age restriction is set in section 80 of 
the Evidence Act.52 Furthermore, the application of section 170A of the South 
African Criminal Procedure Act is subject to the condition that the witness will be 
exposed to “undue mental stress or suffering” if such witness testifies at the 
proceedings,53 although the application of section 80 read with section 81(2) of the 
Evidence Act is only subject thereto that the witness does not have sufficient 
proficiency in English to understand court proceedings or questions put orally and 
to adequately respond to them.54 
 
However, although the legislation allowing for communication assistance in terms 
of the New Zealand criminal justice system may be preferred to section 170A of the 
South African Criminal Procedure Act, as reported in chapter 7, the study revealed 
some serious concerns about the very guarantee of the use of communication 
                                            
47 New Zealand Law Commission The Evidence of Children and Other Vulnerable Witnesses: A 
Discussion Paper (1996) at paras 100-101, New Zealand Law Commission Evidence: Reform 
of the Law Report 55 vol 1 (1996) at para 371. 
48 Hanna et al Child Witnesses in the New Zealand Criminal Courts: A Review of Practice and 
Implications for Policy (2010) at 12; New Zealand Children’s Commissioner Children’s 
Commissioner Submission to the Ministry of Justice (21/02/2011); Seymour, Blackwell & 
McDougall Submission on Behalf of the New Zealand Psychology Society (21 February 2011). 
49 See respectively ss 103-107, 79 and 80 of the Evidence Act. 
50 See para 2.6.3 of ch 7 above. 
51 S 170A of the South African Criminal Procedure Act. 
52 See s 80 of the Evidence Act, which refers to “a witness”. 
53 S 170A of the South African Criminal Procedure Act. 
54 Ss 80 & 81(2) of the Evidence Act. 
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assistance for child witnesses.55 Although the use of communication assistance may 
come to the rescue of some child witnesses, others may still be left out in the cold.56 
It has already been pointed out that despite the fact that the Evidence Act provides 
for the use of alternative ways of giving evidence, this is only part of the solution. A 
system that does not guarantee the use of either communication assistance or an 
intermediary may not fully obviate the re-traumatisation of child witnesses due to 
inappropriate questioning or aggressive cross-examination.57 
 
Conversely, New Zealand promises to improve the standing of child witnesses 
within their criminal justice system through the Evidence Amendment Bill. It allows 
a presumption that all child witnesses may give evidence in an alternative way58 and 
provides child complainants and child witnesses alike with a right to a support 
person.59 It is submitted that serious attention should be given to the implementation 
of similar legislation in South Africa as this would also improve the position of child 
witnesses in South Africa.  
 
In conclusion it is submitted that, in comparison with Namibia and New Zealand, the 
protection afforded to child witnesses and child victims and especially the role 
fulfilled by intermediaries in the South African criminal justice system may by and 
large be regarded as highly advanced. However, it is submitted that the South 
African criminal justice system could be further enhanced through the following 
recommendations. 
                                            
55 See paras 2.6.3 and 2.6.4 of ch 7 above. 
56 As was highlighted in chapter 7, uncertainty exists as to the very availability of communication 
assistance for child witnesses who do not necessarily have a communication disability but 
may have difficulty in understanding  questions asked in the normal way because of age. See 
para 2.6.3 of ch 7 above. 
57 See para 2.6.3 of ch 7 above. 
58 Unless the witness chooses not to and the judge is satisfied that the witness fully appreciates 
the effect of his or her doing so (see s 107A of the Evidence Amendment Bill 2015 available 
at http://www.legislation.govt.nz/bill/government/2015/0027/latest/DLM 6488707.html 
(accessed 12/06/2016)). 
59 See s 79(1A) of the Evidence Amendment Bill 2015 available at http://www.legislation. 
govt.nz/bill/government/2015/0027/latest/DLM6488707.html (accessed 12/06/2016). 
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3 RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
The recommendations are divided into four main categories: The first 
recommendation comprises the introduction of a hybrid approach to accommodate 
the child witness and child victim, and is based on a blend of principles from both 
the accusatorial and the inquisitorial systems.60 This is presented as the most 
effective option for addressing the protection of the child witness and child victim. 
However, as this would be a time-consuming project, an alternative approach is 
suggested, namely to amend the existing intermediary system as suggested in a 
proposed general amendment Act. This recommendation is followed by some 
recommendations in respect of pre-recording of evidence-in-chief and lastly some 
recommendations with regard to the support person. 
 
3.1 Novel intermediary system/model 
 
As previously highlighted,61 the presentation of testimony in an accusatorial criminal 
justice system has proved to be extremely difficult for child witnesses. The question 
was thus asked whether more could be done to reform the current South African 
system or whether the answer lies in following a different system or model.62 
                                            
60 An example of an approach comprising both accusatorial and inquisitorial elements can be 
found in ss 112 and 115 of the Criminal Procedure Act. It is submitted that a similar method 
may be followed to realise the introduction of a hybrid approach to accommodate the child 
witness and child victim.  
61 See ch 3 above. 
62 See ch 3 above. The different intermediary models include the full intermediary model, the 
question-by-question model, and the topic-by-topic model. In the full intermediary model, the 
intermediary is briefed by counsel before trial on which aspects of the child’s testimony are to 
be explored and tested. At trial, the intermediary takes responsibility for putting the requested 
exploration and testing into question form, including determining how questions are phrased 
and the order in which they are put. In the question-by-question model, counsel determines 
the questions and poses them one at a time to the intermediary, who translates the question 
into developmentally appropriate language for the child. In the topic-by-topic model, the 
intermediary is briefed as in the full intermediary model, but counsel breaks the questions up 
into topics, based on the areas of challenge or exploration. At trial there is an interactive 
process whereby the intermediary questions the child on the first topic, then refers back to 
counsel for further instructions (eg to put a question differently or to pick up on any 
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As was highlighted above, it is submitted that the model currently utilised in South 
Africa can be equated to the question-by-question model.63 Counsel determines the 
questions and puts them one at a time to the intermediary, who “translates” the 
question into developmentally appropriate language for the child. This system is 
limited, however, as was pointed out above, in that the intermediary does not have 
the right to point out that the questions posed (such as repetitive questioning, 
sudden shifts between subjects, multifaceted questions or closed questions) are 
likely to produce unreliable answers, or to suggest that alternative questioning styles 
should be used.64 
 
Although proposals for reform to the current model have been set out65 it is 
submitted that child witnesses and child victims will benefit even more from a novel 
system or model. The implementation of a novel system or model that combines 
inquisitorial elements with accusatorial elements, such as the Norwegian topic-by-
topic model outlined in chapter 3,66 is therefore recommended. This system or model 
allows special examiners to question children according to their professional 
judgement and skills, but also gives defence counsel the opportunity to direct the 
examiner to explore issues of concern to the defence. This accusatorial-inquisitorial 
model combines elements of both systems. It is submitted that in the South African 
context the application of the topic-by topic model would play out as follows: 
 
 That the questioning be conducted via CCTV or by another electronic means 
in exactly the same manner as that envisaged by section 170A(3) of the 
Criminal Procedure Act. In other words that the questioning of the witness 
be conducted from any place informally arranged to set the witness at ease 
                                            
inconsistency) before moving on to the next topic. See also Henderson “Alternative routes: 
other accusatorial jurisdictions on the slow road to best evidence” in Spencer & Lamb Children 
and Cross-examination: Time to Change the Rules? (2012) 43 at 60-64.  
63 See para 3.4 of ch 5 above. 
64 See para 3.4 of ch 5 above. 
65 See para 3.2 below. 
66 See para 3 of ch 3 above. 
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while outside the sight and hearing of any person whose presence might 
upset the witness. 
 That the defence may view the child’s demeanour and hear the child either 
directly or through the medium of any electronic or other device while the 
child is being questioned by the intermediary.  
 The main difference is that the examination of the evidence is only 
conducted by an intermediary.  
 The intermediary accordingly plays a far more active role in the questioning 
of the witness in that the intermediary: 
o determines how questions are phrased; and 
o the order in which the questions are put.  
 To allow the intermediary to do so, counsel provides the intermediary with 
questions broken up into topics based on the areas of challenge or 
exploration.  
 The intermediary questions the child on the first topic in accordance with his 
or her professional skills and when he or she considers the interview 
complete, refers back to counsel for further instructions/topics to be explored 
before moving on to the next topic. The defence and the court therefore retain 
the right to raise any matter that has not been covered in the evidence already 
given or that may have appeared inconsistent.67 
 This process continues until the presiding officer and counsel are satisfied 
that all areas have been sufficiently covered through the interview.  
 The whole process is recorded and the interview is transcribed. 
 The video and transcript are accepted in court as evidence-in-chief. 
                                            
67 Myklebust “The position in Norway” in Spencer & Lamb Children and Cross-examination: Time 
to Change the Rules? (2012). 
Concluding remarks and recommendations 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
452 
 If necessary the child can be re-interviewed, in which case the same process 
will be followed. 
 
The evidence of a child witness is therefore still fairly and thoroughly tested without 
having to rely upon a direct examination by counsel.68 
 
3.2 Implementation of reform proposals 
 
Proposals to reform the current intermediary system have already been referred to69 
and are repeated below as it is submitted that these proposals will significantly 
improve the intermediary system in South Africa. The following proposals should be 
implemented to address the shortcomings in present legislation as far as the 
appointment of intermediaries, the function of intermediaries and aspects incidental 
thereto are concerned: 
 
 That the appointment of an intermediary becomes mandatory in all cases in 
which the witness is under the biological or mental age of eighteen years, 
unless the child witness chooses not to use the services of an intermediary 
or cogent reasons exist not to appoint an intermediary.  
 That if a child witness under the biological or mental age of eighteen years 
so wishes or cogent reasons exist not to appoint an intermediary, such 
reasons be placed on record before the commencement of the proceedings. 
In order to give effect to these proposals it is submitted that section 170A(1) 
of the Criminal Procedure Act should be amended by way of an Amendment 
Act to read as follows: 
                                            
68 Henderson “Alternative routes to best evidence” in Spencer & Lamb Children and Cross-
examination: Time to Change the Rules? (2012) 43 at 73. 
69 See para 4 of ch 5 above. 
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Whenever criminal proceedings are pending before any court and the 
witness is under the biological or mental age of eighteen years the court 
must, subject to subsection (4), unless the witness chooses not to use an 
intermediary or cogent reasons exist not to appoint an intermediary, appoint 
a competent person as an intermediary to enable such witness to give his or 
her evidence through that intermediary. In the event that an intermediary is 
not appointed, the court shall provide reasons for not appointing an 
intermediary and such reasons shall immediately be entered into the records 
of the proceedings. 
 That if the legislature does not amend section 170A to make the appointment 
of an intermediary mandatory unless reasons not to do so exist, the test for 
the appointment of an intermediary, namely that of “undue mental stress or 
suffering”, be substituted with that of “it appears to be in the interests of 
justice”. Section 170A(1) should then be amended by way of an Amendment 
Act to read as follows:  
Whenever criminal proceedings are pending before any court and the 
witness is under the biological or mental age of eighteen years and it appears 
to such court to be in the interests of justice, the court may, subject to 
subsection (4), appoint a competent person as an intermediary in order to 
enable such witness to give his or her evidence through that intermediary.  
 That the directives with regard to the application of section 170A (setting 
certain criteria to be used and circumstances in which the prosecution must 
request the court to consider appointing a competent person as an 
intermediary) as contemplated in section 66(2)(a) of the Amendment Act be 
amended to include both sexual and non-sexual cases. 
 That all witnesses under the biological or mental age of eighteen years, 
irrespective of whether the services of an intermediary are used or not, be 
allowed to testify in a room separate from the courtroom or in any other 
suitable place through the medium of any electronic or other device. In order 
to give effect to these proposals, section 170A(3) of the Criminal Procedure 
Act should be amended by way of an Amendment Act to read as follows: 
Concluding remarks and recommendations 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
454 
[If a court appoints an intermediary] The court may direct that a witness under 
the biological or mental age of eighteen years shall give his or her evidence 
at any place – 
(a)  which is informally arranged to set the witness at ease; 
(b) which is so situated that any person whose presence may upset 
that witness is out of sight and earshot for that witness; and 
(c) which enables the court and any person whose presence is 
necessary at the relevant proceedings to see and hear, either 
directly or through the medium of any electronic or other devices, 
that intermediary as well as that witness during his or her 
testimony. 
 That a pre-trial assessment of the communication competencies of all 
witnesses under the biological or mental age of eighteen years be conducted. 
That the questioning during the trial be conducted in accordance with the pre-
determined competencies. That the pre-trial assessment be taken into 
account when “ground rules” for the questioning of a child witness are set. 
 That “ground rules” as to the way in which the examination of a child witness 
is to be conducted be set with all the parties concerned prior to each trial. 
 That the function or persona of an intermediary be placed on a professional 
footing by the requirement of a relevant accredited qualification. This 
qualification could include aspects of child development, child 
communication patterns and styles, psychology of abuse, knowledge of the 
legal framework, terms and terminology and specialised training in the 
interviewing of child witnesses.  
 That the functions of an intermediary be broadened to include the duties set 
out in the Draft Discussion Document on Intermediaries of 2008 and the Draft 
Job Description for Court Intermediaries drafted by the Department of Justice 
and Constitutional Development.70 
                                            
70 See para 3.4 of ch 5 above. 
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 That the Minister by notice in the Government Gazette include professional 
speech and language therapists in its list of competent persons to be 
appointed as intermediaries.71 
 That an official register containing information and statistical data on 
intermediaries be set up and maintained by the Department of Justice and 
Constitutional Development.  
 That the Department of Justice and Constitutional Development continue in 
its efforts towards the realisation of intermediary services by progressively 
appointing intermediaries and by converting the ad hoc posts into permanent 
intermediary posts. 
 That a regulatory body within the Department of Justice and Constitutional 
Development be established to address the management, training, 
supervision and monitoring of intermediaries. 
 That the Department of Justice and Constitutional Development continue in 
its efforts to provide intermediary facilities such as a special room where 
witnesses can testify, a private waiting room for child witnesses and CCTV 
systems. 
 That the Minister of Justice, with the concurrence of the Minister of Finance, 
annually determine the amounts to be paid as travelling and subsistence and 
other allowances in respect of the services rendered by an intermediary who 
is not in the full-time employment of the state as set out in section 170A(4)(b) 
of the Criminal Procedure Act. That this amount be stipulated annually in the 
budget speech presented to Parliament by the Minister of Finance.72 In order 
to give effect to this proposal, section 170A(4)(b) of the Criminal Procedure 
Act should be amended by way of an Amendment Act to read as follows: 
                                            
71 Communication is part of the core skills of speech and language therapists, which makes them 
particularly suitable as intermediaries. Countries such as England and Wales already make 
extensive use of speech and language therapist as intermediaries. See para 3.2 of ch 5 below 
for more on this aspect. 
72 It is submitted that this could be done in a similar fashion to the way social grants are 
determined annually by the Minister of Finance in consultation with the Minister of Social 
Development. See s 4 of the Social Assistance Act 13 of 2004. 
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An intermediary who is not in the full-time employment of the State shall be 
paid such travelling and subsistence allowance and other allowances in 
respect of the services rendered by him or her as the Minister, with the 
concurrence of the Minister of Finance, may annually determine out of 
moneys appropriated by Parliament for that purpose. 
 
3.3 Pre-recordings of evidence-in-chief 
 
The delays before trials are a related practical difficulty attached to the accusatorial 
system.73 Delays cause mayor issues for children in terms of both their 
psychological welfare and the quality of their evidence.74 In some instances 
intermediaries have indicated that owing to numerous court postponements they 
would no longer be available, with the consequence that the courts were unable to 
function due to a lack of competent intermediaries or else children had to testify 
without the aid of an intermediary.75 An alternative solution to this problem is to pre-
record children’s evidence.76 The introduction of a legislative presumption in favour 
of the pre-recording of children’s evidence is therefore recommended. This 
presumption should apply unless good reasons exist why a child should not give 
evidence in this way.  
 
                                            
73 See para 2.2 of ch 3 above. The difficulties caused by delays were recently alluded to by the 
Public Protector Adv Thuli Madonsela speaking at the launch of the Child Witness Foundation, 
in that she related a heart-breaking story of a minor who was gang-raped and had to endure 
the further trauma of her court case being postponed 48 times and drawn out for nine years. 
The Office of the Public Protector investigated the matter and “red-carded” the entire judicial 
process – from the police to the courts. See “Public Protector Thuli Madonsela calls for 
disaggregated data to help fight child abuse” available at http://www/goc/za/speeches/public-
protector-calls-disaggregated-data-help-fight-child-abuse (accessed on 07/09/ 2016). 
74 See para 2.2 of ch 3 above. 
75 Department of Justice and Constitutional Development Draft Discussion Document on 
Intermediaries (2008) 1 at 13. 
76 See para 2.2 of ch 3 above for a discussion of the benefits of pre-recording, such as that it 
eliminates the need for multiple interviews, alleviates problems with delays, guards against 
later memory lapses on the part of the child and may even prompt a guilty plea from the 
accused . 
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Furthermore, this evidential interview should be conducted in an age-appropriate 
setting in the manner described in paragraph 2.2 above. The interview should then 
be transcribed and the pre-recorded video together with the transcription should be 
accepted as evidence-in-chief. The child witness need not attend court. If further 
evidence is required the child should be re-interviewed using the process described 
above. Experience indicates that this happens only in exceptional cases.77 
 
3.4 Support person 
 
The comparative component of the study of the protection of child victims and child 
witnesses in Namibia and New Zealand respectively highlighted the value and 
importance of the role of a support person.78 South African child victims and child 
witnesses would benefit equally from the presence of a support person when having 
to testify. The introduction of a legislative provision into the Criminal Procedure Act 
allowing for all child witnesses and victims to have a support person present when 
giving evidence in court is therefore recommended.   
 
4 CONCLUSION 
 
It can be authoritatively concluded that a criminal justice system that not only 
recognises the vulnerabilities of children but also affords them comprehensive 
protection is vital to the protection of child victims and child witnesses. This is 
applicable to the South African criminal justice system but also to criminal justice 
systems universally. South Africa will only be able to adhere fully to the principles 
and standards set out in the Constitution and international instruments when the 
criminal justice system is amended in the manner proposed above. 
                                            
77 Jackson “Children’s evidence in Western Australia” in Spencer & Lamb Children and Cross-
examination: Time to Change the Rules? (2012) 75 at 81. 
78 See respectively para 2.4.2 of ch 6 and para 2.6.2 of ch 7 above. 
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These amendments are imperative if we do not want to fail child victims and child 
witnesses, for in the words of our late president Nelson Mandela “[h]istory will judge 
us by the difference we make in the everyday lives of children”.79 
 
                                            
79 Nelson Mandela speaking during a luncheon hosted by United Nations Secretary General Kofi 
Annan at the Special Session of the United Nations for Children, United Nations, New York 
City, USA, 9 May 2002 available at https://www.facebook.com/nelsonmandela/photos/ 
a.633023513375108.1073741825.468207846523343/1227978363879617/?type=3&theater 
(accessed on 16/08 2016). 
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ANNEXURE A1 
PROPOSED JOB DESCRIPTION: COURT INTERMEDIARY 
 
INDEX 
A. Job information summary  
B. Job purpose 
C. Main objectives 
D. Outputs and competency profiles 
D.1. Output profiles 
D.1.1. Customers 
D.2. Competency profiles 
D.2.1 Job knowledge description 
D.2.2. Skills description 
D.2.3. Personal attributes description 
D.2.4. Learning fields 
D.2.5. Learning indicators 
E. Progression to next higher salary range 
F. Promotion to next higher post 
F1. Next higher post 
F2. Nature of work for next higher post  
G. Job description agreement 
                                            
1  Note some editorial changes have been made to the proposed job description. 
Annexure 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
461 
JOB DESCRIPTION: 
A.  JOB INFORMATION SUMMARY 
JOB TITLE: Court Intermediary 
CORE: Administrative line function and support personnel 
POST LEVEL: To be determined by JE 
DATE: April 2014 
LOCATION:  
COMPONENT:  
POST REPORTS TO:  Regional Intermediary  
POSITION IN THE ORGANISATION: (attach the organogram where available) 
 
B. JOB PURPOSE 
TO ACT AS AN INTERMEDIARY BY FACILITATING COURT PROCEEDINGS 
WHERE CHILDREN UNDER THE BIOLOGICAL OR MENTAL AGE OF 18 YEARS 
AND MENTALLY DISABLED WITNESSES ARE INVOLVED  
 
C.  MAIN OBJECTIVES 
1. Provide intermediary services for vulnerable witnesses, where an 
application is granted in court 
 Inform the court at all times about changes/observations regarding the 
witness’s physical, emotional and mental behaviour. 
 Provide emotional and psychological support to child witnesses before, 
during and after testimony. 
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 Supply and maintain the intermediary tools (i.e. the sets of anatomical dolls, 
intermediary toolkits, first-aid crayons and pencils, black paper for drawing, 
plastic glass and jug of good quality and tissues) that might assist a witness 
to the court. 
 Orientate the child witness with regard to court processes, roles and 
procedures as applicable to intermediary duties. 
 Participate in community outreach activities. 
 Recommend referral of child witnesses for counselling when necessary. 
 
2. Provide specialised child language services 
 Make proper arrangements with qualified individuals in cases where 
witnesses have a language dialect and/ or communication need that the 
intermediary cannot assist with. 
 Convey the general purport of questions to the witness in age-appropriate 
language.  
 Orientate the child witness with regard to court processes, roles and 
procedures that are applicable to intermediary duties. 
 
3. Maintain intermediary room 
 Maintain the condition of equipment (CCTV camera) and report faults where 
necessary. 
 Monitor cleanliness of the intermediary room. 
 Monitor audibility of the system on both sides and report faults to the court. 
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4. Render administrative support services in courts 
 Complete and maintain official registers and intermediary information and 
statistical files. 
 Compile monthly intermediary reports for submission to the direct supervisor.  
 Liaise with court clerk (stenographer) with regard to arrangements with 
qualified individuals to meet the needs of the said witness. 
 Assist with case flow management functions and liaise with judicial officers 
when necessary. 
 
D.  OUTPUT AND COMPETENCY PROFILES 
D1.  OUTPUT PROFILES 
D.1.1. KEY CUSTOMERS AND STAKEHOLDERS 
 
Stakeholders/customers 
 
Stakeholder/customer requirements 
Managers  Reporting and statistics submission 
CJS  Liaise, support and communicate 
Interpreters and court 
clerks 
 Liaise, support and communicate court 
proceedings 
Court Manager/ Judge/ 
Magistrate and 
Prosecutors  
 Liaise, support and communicate  
Court Preparations Officer  Liaise, support and communicate 
Parents and caregivers   Liaise, support and communicate 
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Any witness under the 
biological or mental age of 
18 yrs  
 Support, guide and communicate 
 
D.2 COMPETENCY PROFILES 
D.2.1 Job knowledge, skills and personal attributes description 
 Knowledge of legislation and regulations pertaining to the Public Service and 
Administration, specifically the following: 
- The Public Service Act and Regulations 
- Basic Conditions of Employment Act 
and knowledge of: 
- Section 170A, ss 158 and 153  of the Criminal Procedure Act; 
- Intermediary training manual 
- Intermediary Policies, Procedures and Norms and Standards 
- Children’s Act  
- Sexual Offences Act 
 Knowledge of trauma and developmental stages of witnesses 
 Up-to-date knowledge of new work-related developments 
 Knowledge and understanding human rights  
 Knowledge of children’s and mentally disabled communication patterns 
and styles  
 Knowledge of legal terms and terminology 
 Knowledge of relevant prescripts, policies and practices  
 Ability to apply technical/professional knowledge and skills 
 Ability to communicate on a child’s level 
 Ability to engage with all vulnerable witnesses 
 Ability to co-operate well with supervisors, colleagues and other managers 
 Ability to demonstrate a sound and healthy attitude when interacting with 
others 
 Ability to provide containment skills when required during the intermediary 
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session 
 Ability to execute functions as instructed and within agreed time frames, 
including punctuality 
 Administrative skills 
 Communication skills 
 Customer focus and responsiveness 
 Excellent working relations 
 Problem-solving and decision-making skills 
 Computer literacy, i.e. 
- MS Office 
- MS Word 
- Excel 
- Outlook 
D.2.4 Learning fields 
  Teaching or Social work or Child Care and Youth Development, Pediatrics, 
Psychiatry, Clinical, Counseling and Educational Psychology and Family 
Counselling.  
D.2.5 Learning indicators 
  Senior Primary Teacher’s Diploma with three years’ experience in teaching  
 Clinical, Counselling or Educational Psychologists who are registered 
under the Health Professional Act,1979 
 Family Counsellors who have been appointed under section 3(1) of the 
Mediation in Certain Divorce Matters Act,1987 
 Social workers who are registered in terms of section 17 of the Social 
Service Professions Act 1978 and have two years’ experience in social 
work, three years’ post matriculation education qualification in Child or 
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Youth Care  with three years’ experience in child or youth care 
 Medical Practitioners with specialisation in Pediatrics or Psychiatry [and] 
who are registered in terms of section 17 of the Health Professions [Act].   
 
E. PROGRESSION TO NEXT HIGHER SALARY RANGE 
The Code of Remuneration and the Public Service Regulations provide guidelines. 
 
F.  PROMOTION TO NEXT HIGHER POST 
F1. Next higher post:  
F2. Nature of work for next higher post 
 
G.  JOB DESCRIPTION AGREEMENT 
Parties agree to the contents of the job description. 
 
______________________________  ___________________________ 
Signature of post incumbent Signature of Supervisor 
 
Date: Date: 
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ANNEXURE B2 
PROPOSED DRAFT JOB DESCRIPTION: REGIONAL INTERMEDIARY  
 
INDEX 
A. Job information summary  
B. Job purpose 
C. Main objectives 
D. Outputs and competency profiles 
D.1. Output profiles 
D.1.1. Customers 
D.2. Competency profiles 
D.2.1 Job knowledge description 
D.2.2. Skills description 
D.2.3. Personal attributes description 
D.2.4. Learning fields 
D.2.5. Learning indicators 
E. Progression to next higher salary range 
F.  Promotion to next higher post 
F1. Next higher post 
F2. Nature of work for next higher post  
G.  Job description agreement 
                                            
2  Note some editorial changes have been made to the proposed job description. 
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JOB DESCRIPTION: 
A.  JOB INFORMATION SUMMARY 
JOB TITLE:  Regional Intermediary 
CORE:  Management support personnel 
POST LEVEL: To be determined by JE 
DATE:  April 2014 
LOCATION:  
COMPONENT:  
POST REPORTS TO:  Director: Court Operations 
POSITION IN THE ORGANISATION: (attach the organogram where available) 
 
B. JOB PURPOSE 
TO MANAGE AND COORDINATE THE WORK OF COURT INTERMEDIARIES IN 
THE RESPECTIVE REGION 
 
C.  MAIN OBJECTIVES 
1. Manage and coordinate intermediary services in the Region 
 Manage and control court intermediary services in the respective Region. 
 Manage and coordinate the work of intermediaries. 
 Develop and manage the intermediary service business plan and operational 
plan 
 Manage special projects of intermediary services. 
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 Manage and control the victim support feeding scheme within the Region. 
 Provide inputs for policy formulation. 
 Make recommendations on financial expenditure of the Region. 
 Coordinate feeding schemes for child witnesses within the Region. 
 Monitor recommendations on child witness counselling referrals and referrals 
to places of safety. 
 
2. Manage operational efficiency of intermediary services in the Region. 
 Conduct regular court visits in the Region. 
 Identify intermediary services gaps and regional interventions. 
 Develop innovations for continuous improvement. 
 Provide necessary and sufficient intermediary resources within the Region. 
 Approve participation of court/area intermediaries in community outreach 
activities. 
 Liaise with relevant stakeholders on intermediary matters. 
 Facilitate the rendering of case flow related services 
 
3. Coordinate and consolidate regional intermediary service information 
and statistics and reports  
 Manage the provision of intermediary information and statistics within the 
Region. 
 Analyse and consolidate regional intermediary services reports in line with 
the prescribed format.   
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 Quality-assure and authorise intermediary reports and business cases. 
 Manage the maintenance of a database for all intermediaries, ad hoc and 
other victim support services for the area.    
 
4. Facilitate and coordinate training and development of ad hoc court 
intermediaries and court intermediaries.  
 Identify, analyse and recommend training needs for inclusion in the 
workplace skills plan.   
 Arrange and conduct capacity-building workshop for court intermediaries in 
the area.  
 Mentor, coach and support court intermediaries on relevant skills and 
responsibilities for area-related activities for the team. 
 Recommend ethical guidelines and render advice on language matters 
specifications. 
 
5. Monitor the maintenance of equipment in both courts and the 
intermediary rooms and the audible status of the system on both sides. 
 Monitor the maintenance of intermediary rooms and all resources in the 
Region. 
 Monitor the condition of equipment in intermediary rooms (CCTV cameras) 
and report any faults. 
 
6. GENERIC FUNCTIONS: 
 Manage human resources in the Region.  
 Build capacity of court intermediaries within the Region. 
 Respond to audit reports for the Region. 
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 Provide budgetary inputs in terms of prescripts. 
 Facilitate compliance with internal policies and legislative requirements. 
 Manage performance of court intermediaries.  
 Coordinate EAP and related services and programmes in the Region. 
 Report writing and consolidation 
 Policy formulation and analysis 
 
D.  OUTPUT AND COMPETENCY PROFILES 
D1.  OUTPUT PROFILES 
D.1.1. KEY CUSTOMERS AND STAKEHOLDERS 
 
Stakeholders/customers 
 
Stakeholders/customers requirements 
Manager  Reporting and rendering advice on 
intermediary-related matters 
CJS  Submission of consolidated statistics for 
the Region 
 Liaise, support and communicate 
 National Office DOJ & CD  Liaise, support and communicate 
Interpreters and court 
clerks 
 Liaise, support and communicate 
Court Manager/Judge/ 
Magistrate and Prosecutor 
 Liaise, support and communicate 
Annexure 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
472 
Court preparations  Liaise, support and communicate 
Non-Government 
Organisation (NGO) 
 Render training, source ad hoc 
intermediary 
Other departments  
(SAPS, Correctional 
Services and Social 
Development) 
 Liaise, support and communicate 
(collaboration) 
 
D.2 COMPETENCY PROFILES  
D.2.1 Job knowledge, skills and personal attributes description 
 Knowledge of legislation and regulations pertaining to Public Service and 
Administration, specifically the following: 
- The Public Service Act and Regulations 
- Basic Conditions of Employment Act 
And knowledge of: 
- section 170A, ss 158 and 153 of the Criminal Procedure Act 
- Intermediary training manual 
- Intermediary Policies, Procedures and Norms and Standards 
- Children’s Act  
- Sexual Offences Act 
 Knowledge of trauma and developmental stages of witnesses 
 Up-to-date knowledge of new work-related developments 
 Knowledge and understanding of human rights  
 Knowledge of children’s and mentally disabled persons’ communication 
patterns and styles  
 Knowledge of legal terms and terminology 
 Knowledge of relevant prescripts, policies and practice  
 Ability to apply technical/professional knowledge and skills 
 Ability to communicate on a child’s level 
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 Ability to engage with all vulnerable witnesses 
 Ability to co-operate well with supervisors, colleagues and managers 
 Ability to demonstrate a sound and healthy attitude when interacting with 
others 
 Ability to provide containment skills when required during the intermediary 
session 
 Ability to execute functions as instructed and within agreed time frames, 
including punctuality 
 Administrative skills 
 Communication skills 
 Customer focus and responsiveness 
 Problem-solving and decision-making skills 
- Computer Literacy: MS Office, MS Word, Excel and Outlook 
 
D.2.4 Learning fields 
  Teaching or Social Work or Child Care and Youth Development, 
Pediatrics, Psychiatry, Clinical Psychology, Counselling, Educational 
Psychology and Family Counselling. 
D.2.5 Learning indicators 
  Senior Primary Teacher’s Diploma with three years’ experience in teaching  
 Clinical, Counselling or Educational Psychologists who are registered in 
terms of the Health Services Professions Act,1979 
 Family Counsellors who are appointed under section 3(1) of the Mediation 
in Certain Divorce Matters Act,1987 
 Social workers who are registered in terms of section 17 of the Social 
Service Professions Act, 1978, with two years’ experience in social work  
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 Three years’ postmatriculation education qualification in Child or Youth 
Care  with three years’ experience in child or youth care 
 Medical practitioners who [specialise] in Pediatrics or Psychiatry [and] who 
are registered in terms of section 17 of the Health Professions [Act]. 
 
E.  PROGRESSION TO NEXT HIGHER SALARY RANGE 
The Code of Remuneration and the Public Service Regulations provide guidelines. 
 
F.  PROMOTION TO NEXT HIGHER POST 
F1. Next higher post:  
F2. Nature of work for next higher post  
 
G.  JOB DESCRIPTION AGREEMENT 
 Parties agree to the contents of the job description. 
 
______________________________ ___________________________ 
Signature of post incumbent Signature of Supervisor 
 
Date: Date:
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